BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
European Court of Human Rights |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> KEMMACHE v. FRANCE (No. 3) - 17621/91 - Chamber Judgment [1994] ECHR 41 (24 November 1994) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1994/41.html Cite as: (1995) 19 EHRR 349, [1994] ECHR 41, 19 EHRR 349 |
[New search] [Contents list] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
COURT (CHAMBER)
CASE OF KEMMACHE v. FRANCE (No. 3)
(Application no. 17621/91)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
24 November 1994
In the case of Kemmache v. France (no. 3)*,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant provisions of Rules of Court A**, as a Chamber composed of the following judges:
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr L.-E. Pettiti,
Mr B. Walsh,
Mr A. Spielmann,
Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha,
Mr L. Wildhaber,
Mr J. Makarczyk,
Mr D. Gotchev,
Mr B. Repik,
and also of Mr H. Petzold, Acting Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 24 June and 27 October 1994,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby France recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) of the Convention.
On 2 May 1994 the Commission produced various documents as requested by the Registrar on the President’s instructions.
There appeared before the Court:
- for the Government
Mr P. Titiun, magistrat,on secondment to
the Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Agent,
Mrs N. Combot, magistrat, on secondment to
the Criminal Affairs and Pardons Department, Ministry of
Justice,
Mr F. Pion, magistrat, on secondment to
the European and International Affairs Section, Ministry of
Justice, Counsel;
- for the Commission
Mr J.-C. Soyer, Delegate;
- for the applicant
Mrs C. Méral, avocate, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Titiun, Mr Soyer and Mrs Méral.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
In a judgment of 27 November 1991, the Court found that there had been a breach of Article 5 para. 3 and Article 6 para. 1 (art. 5-3, art. 6-1) of the Convention (Series A no. 218).
A. The proceedings in the Alpes-Maritimes Assize Court
1. The indictment and the custody order
2. The adjournment of the proceedings
The Assize Court allowed these applications by a decision of 12 June and ordered the separation of the cases. Mr Ceccio was, accordingly, the only one of the accused to be tried on 12 and 13 June 1990.
3. The dismissal of the application for release
"...
The application to have the proceedings adjourned was made not only by Stephan Klaushofer, but also by Michel Kemmache.
The delivery into custody order executed on 11 June 1990 remains in force throughout the trial proceedings.
In view of the sentence which he risks, the accused is not able to provide sufficient guarantees that he will appear for trial.
Mere court supervision, even subject to the payment of a security, appears at this stage of the proceedings inadequate to ensure that the accused Kemmache will appear for trial.
In addition, the risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses cannot be ruled out.
..."
B. The proceedings in the Indictment Division of the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal
1. Release subject to court supervision
By a decision of 4 July 1990 the Indictment Division ordered his release subject to court supervision and to the payment of a security set at 800,000 French francs (FRF). FRF 400,000 of this amount was intended to ensure that he appeared for trial and the remainder to guarantee payment of such costs and fines as he might be required to pay. It considered, inter alia:
"...
Michel Kemmache was committed for trial in the Alpes-Maritimes Assize Court by a decision of the Indictment Division of the Lyons Court of Appeal of 13 August 1985.
He is detained pursuant to the delivery into custody order issued with that decision.
...
Michel Kemmache had been released on 8 December 1986 and it would not therefore appear that his detention is necessary unless there are new considerations justifying such a step.
However, it seems that the case is ready for trial at a forthcoming session of the Assize Court.
Given the numerous disruptions to these proceedings as a result of the use by the accused persons of all the available means to delay the trial, it is necessary to take steps to ensure that Kemmache appears for trial.
To this end his release must be subject to court supervision and to the obligation to pay a security.
Kemmache had previously paid two securities amounting to a total of FRF 800,000 in accordance with a court supervision order.
By a decision of 4 October 1988 the Alpes-Maritimes Assize Court ordered the lifting of the court supervision order and the repayment of the securities on the ground that, purely as a matter of law, since the time-limit for giving judgment had expired, the court supervision order had automatically to be rescinded.
In his memorial Michel Kemmache indicated that there had been no significant change in the guarantees that he could provide to ensure his appearance for trial.
He is still an employee of the company ‘Société Nouvelle Hôtelière de Pantin’, in which he has shares and the only alteration had been in his family circumstances.
The security should therefore be set at FRF 800,000, an amount which he had earlier been in a position to pay and which corresponds to his financial circumstances in view of his salary, and above all his position as partner.
..."
2. The variation of the court supervision order
3. The applications to have the court supervision order lifted and Mr Kemmache’s release
"...
Kemmache, who was at liberty and not subject to court supervision surrendered to be taken into custody the day before he was due to appear in the Assize Court, in accordance with the provisions of Article 215-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By virtue of those provisions the delivery into custody order continues to produce its effects until the final determination of the charges set out in the indictment.
Kemmache’s release was ordered by a decision of 4 July 1990. It follows that he is no longer detained pursuant to the delivery into custody order, but because he has failed to satisfy the conditions of court supervision requiring him to pay the first instalment of the security prior to his release.
The case is ready for trial at a forthcoming session of the Assize Court. Given the numerous disruptions to these proceedings and in particular the use by the accused persons of all the available means to delay the trial, it is necessary to take steps to ensure that Kemmache appears for trial. To this end his release must remain subject to court supervision and to the obligation to pay a security.
As was noted in the decision of 4 July 1990 the amount of the security corresponds to Kemmache’s financial circumstances and in particular to his position as a partner in the ‘Sté Nouvelle Hôtelière de Pantin’; he has not shown that his businesses have failed, as he maintained in his pleadings, or that he has insufficient funds to pay the sum fixed as security.
..."
C. The proceedings in the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation
In the first it held, inter alia, as follows:
"...
... the delivery into custody order, properly executed, constitutes authority for detention which remains valid until the final determination of the charges set out in the indictment, without its being necessary to order its continuation where the accused’s case is separated from other proceedings and adjourned to a subsequent session.
..."
In the second and third decision, it found that:
"...
... as Michel Kemmache was lawfully detained, his release ordered by the impugned decision could be made subject to a court supervision order pursuant to the combined provisions of Articles 138 and 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ... [and] ... according to the terms of Article 5 para. 3 (art. 5-3) of the ... Convention ..., release may be conditioned by guarantees to ensure that the accused will appear for trial.
..."
D. The subsequent developments
The appeal on points of law lodged against that last decision was dismissed by the Court of Cassation on 3 February 1993.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The delivery into custody order
"An accused who is not in remand custody must surrender to be taken into custody not later than the day before the trial hearing in the Assize Court ...
The delivery into custody order shall be enforced against him if, having been duly summoned through administrative channels to report to the registry of the Assize Court and without a legitimate excuse, he fails to appear on the appointed day to be examined by the President of the Assize Court. The same applies in the situation provided for in Article 141-2 [, that is if he deliberately fails to comply with the conditions of court supervision]."
According to the case-law of the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 18 above), the delivery into custody order, lawfully executed, constitutes authority for detention which remains valid until the final determination of the charges set out in the indictment.
B. Applications for release
Under Article 144 CCP, in proceedings concerning serious offences, detention on remand may be ordered or continued:
It may also be ordered, in the circumstances provided for in Article 141-2, "where the accused deliberately fails to comply with the conditions of court supervision".
C. Court supervision
The relevant court may therefore place the accused under court supervision and, at any moment, impose on him one or more new conditions, revoke conditions entirely or in part, vary one or more conditions or accord an occasional or temporary derogation from the obligation to comply with certain conditions (Article 139 CCP). It may also, at any moment, direct that the court supervision order be lifted (Article 140 CCP).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
AS TO THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 PARA. 1 (art. 5-1) OF THE CONVENTION
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
..."
Accordingly, the Court’s first task is to determine the period of detention to be taken into consideration. It must then assess whether the detention was ordered in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law and whether it was lawful.
A. Period of detention to be taken into consideration
According to the Government, the judicial authorities effectively opposed Mr Kemmache’s release only until 4 July 1990, the date on which the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal ordered his release subject to the payment of a security; the accused had been kept in detention after 4 July because he had failed to comply with the conditions of the court supervision order.
Like the applicant and the Commission, the Court takes the view that, in the present case and for the purposes of its review, the relevant date is that of the applicant’s actual release, namely 10 August 1990, when the first instalment of the above-mentioned security was paid (see paragraph 12 above).
B. Whether the detention was ordered in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law
Although it is not normally the Court’s task to review the observance of domestic law by the national authorities, it is otherwise in relation to matters where, as here, the Convention refers directly back to that law; for, in such matters, disregard of the domestic law entails breach of the Convention, with the consequence that the Court can and should exercise a certain power of review. However, the logic of the system of safeguard established by the Convention sets limits on the scope of this review. It is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply the domestic law, even in those fields where the Convention "incorporates" the rules of that law: the national authorities are, in the nature of things, particularly qualified to settle the issues arising in this connection (see the Winterwerp judgment, cited above, p. 20, para. 46, the Bozano v. France judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 111, p. 25, para. 58, and the Bouamar v. Belgium judgment of 29 February 1988, Series A no. 129, p. 21, para. 49).
C. Whether the detention was lawful
As regards the fact that he had been kept in detention after the decision to release him taken by the Indictment Division on 4 July 1990, this had been the result of his failure to satisfy the conditions of the court supervision order, in other words his failure to pay the security intended to ensure his appearance for trial, a sum which was fixed and then varied in the light of Mr Kemmache’s financial circumstances.
Lawfulness implies conformity with the substantive and the procedural rules of domestic law and also with the purpose of Article 5 (art. 5), namely to protect individuals from arbitrariness (see, as the most recent authority, the Wassink v. the Netherlands judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 185-A, p. 11, para. 24). In a democratic society subscribing to the rule of law, no detention that is arbitrary can ever be regarded as lawful (see, inter alia, the Winterwerp judgment, cited above, p. 18, para. 39).
D. Conclusion
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Holds by eight votes to one that there has been no breach of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) of the Convention.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 24 November 1994.
Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Herbert PETZOLD
Acting Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the Convention and Rule 53 para. 2 of Rules of Court A, the dissenting opinion of Mr Walsh is annexed to this judgment.
R. R.
H. P.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE WALSH
1. Under the Convention no person is obliged to provide a justification for his right not to be deprived of his liberty. It is for those who deprive him of that right to justify their actions. Any "justification" put forward by the detainer must be treated as a nullity unless it is one which does not contravene the provisions of the Convention even if it is in accord with the national law.
2. The reasons put forward to justify the detention complained of in the present case are all conclusions of fact devoid of any factual evidence put forward to support them. As no factual evidence was offered in the national courts to justify the conclusions the applicant was thereby deprived of the opportunity of challenging "such facts" (if any such existed).
3. It appears to me that conclusions expressed were entirely based on a speculative and intuitive approach on the part of the national judicial authorities. Such an approach cannot be a substitute for evidence. Neither does it offer any meaningful respect for the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Convention. That presumption does not permit of any a priori assumption that every person reasonably suspected of or charged with a criminal offence will seek to evade justice either by flight or by interference with the witnesses or the evidence.
4. The Convention contemplates provisional liberty being available to such persons and contemplates that in appropriate circumstances certain conditions may be attached to such liberty including financial conditions by way of security against evading justice. It follows that any such condition must not be so unreasonable in all the circumstances, including the means of the detained person, as to be effectively a refusal.
5. In the present case the conditions initially imposed on the applicant could not be met by him and so he remained in detention. He had been ordered to pay FRF 400,000 as security against the possibility of non-appearance at the trial and, more dubiously, payment of another FRF 400,000 to guarantee payment of any costs or fines which he might be ordered to pay in respect of a conviction on the charges for which he had not yet been tried. This was not compatible with the presumption of innocence. That eventually he was released upon payment of a first instalment of 100,000 francs highlights the unreasonableness and the prohibitory character of the initial demand. The fact that he had not paid the initial demand had been offered as one of the justifications for refusing an earlier release.
6. As no evidence had been offered in the national courts on the intentions of the applicant or of his probable attitude to the question of evading justice, or evidence which could reasonably support an inference that he would probably seek to evade justice, I am of the opinion that the surrounding circumstances fully justified the opinion of the Commission on this point as set out in paragraphs 51, 52 and 53 of the Commission’s report. The Commission was not seeking to re-interpret any evidence offered to the national courts but were simply drawing legitimate inferences from uncontested material.
7. In my opinion the applicant has been the victim of a breach of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) of the Convention.
* The case is numbered 45/1993/440/519. The first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.
** Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) and thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that Protocol (P9). They correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.
* Note by the Registrar. For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume 296-C of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of the Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.