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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> RADIO FRANCE AND OTHERS v. FRANCE - 53984/00 [2007] ECHR 127 (30 March 2004) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2004/127.html Cite as: (2005) 40 EHRR 29, 40 EHRR 29, [2007] ECHR 127

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SECOND SECTION

CASE OF RADIO FRANCE AND OTHERS v. FRANCE

(Application no. 53984/00)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

30 March 2004

In the case of Radio France and Others v. France,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Mr A.B. Baka, President,
Mr L. Loucaides,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr M. Ugrekhelidze,
Mrs A. Mularoni, judges,
Mr P. Truche, ad hoc judge,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 23 September 2003 and 9 March 2004,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

“'It has to be said that, all political consideration set aside, Vichy's civil servants gave a remarkable example of efficient, skilful and honest administration.' That good-conduct citation, awarded in 1981, does not come from Maurice Papon, who has now been committed to stand trial in the Bordeaux Assize Court for 'complicity in crimes against humanity'. Those are the exact words used in L'illusion du bonheur, a book published ... by Michel Junot, a deputy mayor when Jacques Chirac ran Paris City Council between 1977 and 1995, who knows his subject, since he was Deputy Prefect in Pithiviers, in the département of Loiret, in 1942 and 1943. In that capacity he supervised the maintenance of order in the camp of that town, where thousands of Jews were interned before being deported to Auschwitz. Unlike Maurice Papon – and this is a significant difference between the two cases – he did not order anyone to be arrested, interned or transferred to Drancy.

After the war Michel Junot enjoyed a brilliant career in France's highest administrative spheres before turning to politics. He was to become a member of parliament for Paris from 1958 to 1962, giving his allegiance to the CNI, which he never left. But it was on Paris City Council, where he served as mediator from 1977 to 1989 that he spent the longest part of his career. He is a former MEP and since 1978 has been the president of the Maison de l'Europe in Paris.

Until now, he has always maintained that the internment camps in his district, Pithiviers, and Beaune-la-Rolande some twenty kilometres away, were not under his control. His main duties were to inspect the local districts and to compile 'general and confidential information' files on local dignitaries. The Pithiviers camp? 'it was not under my jurisdiction. I never set foot in it' he told L' Express magazine in 1990.

An outright denial which is, however, inconsistent with several documents not previously published which Le Point has managed to obtain. Documents which clarify his field of activity.

... when he was appointed Deputy Prefect at Pithiviers on 9 June 1942 ... the camps at Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande, originally intended for German prisoners of war, were already being used as internment camps prior to their inmates being deported, the first having left on 8 May 1942.

Michel Junot, who was to remain in office for exactly a year to the day, took up his post in Pithiviers on 24 August 1942, that is, less than a month before the departure, on 20 September 1942, of a fresh transport of Jewish deportees.

On that day a thousand detainees arrested during house-to-house searches in the Paris region, including 163 children under 18, were put on transport no. 35 and shipped off to Auschwitz via Drancy, the camp to the north of Paris.

On the eve of their departure, Michel Junot informed the Prefect of his concerns about maintaining order. 'I hereby inform you that I have just been notified of the entrainment of a thousand Jews from the Pithiviers camp tomorrow from 5 p.m. onwards at Pithiviers railway station, and that all the gendarmes in my district apart from one officer per squad are therefore required to assist with the entrainment ... .' ...

Two days later, on 22 September, Junot did not hide his satisfaction when sending the Prefect the following report: 'The day of 20 September 1942 went very smoothly throughout my district. The limited police presence planned for the afternoon of 20 September could not be deployed ... because all the gendarmes in the area, except for one officer per squad, were required for the entrainment of the Jewish detainees of the Pithiviers camp, whose departure I was suddenly notified of on 19 September at 3 p.m. The entrainment was to take place between 4 and 7 p.m. at Pithiviers station at the far end of the avenue de la République where the communists had called on ... the inhabitants of Pithiviers to demonstrate at 6.30 p.m., and I was concerned that some incidents might occur which could disrupt an orderly departure. But nothing of the sort happened and the town remained perfectly calm.' ...

Then, in a 'monthly report' drafted eight days later for his superiors, he scrupulously went over the events again.

On 30 September 1942 he reported in detail on the situation in the two 'internment camps', as he headed the third paragraph of his report. 'The Beaune-la-Rolande camp, which has been empty since the end of August, has been cleaned', Junot stated. 'The conditions there are now excellent. Two transports of Jews passed through and spent twenty-four hours there before leaving for Drancy. There are only about twenty detainees left at the camp, doing maintenance work.'

Michel Junot went on: 'The Pithiviers camp had been occupied since the end of August by 1,800 Jewish internees of all categories, French and foreign, men, women and children, some arrested during the August and December 1941 round-ups, others for having infringed the regulations of the occupying forces (demarcation line, wearing the star of David, etc.). All of them, except those married to Aryans and a few mothers of young children, were placed on trains bound for Germany on 20 September. Finally the last internees left Pithiviers in the evening of the 24th for Beaune-la-Rolande so as to clear the camp, which was due to receive communist internees. In fact this last Jewish transport spent only twenty-four hours in Beaune before being sent on to Drancy on the orders of the occupying forces.'

Drancy was the last stop in France before they were deported to Germany and the final solution: their physical destruction. ...

On reading this dry civil servant's prose, the Acting Prefect of Loiret, Jacques Marti-Sane, expressed his satisfaction in writing. He was pleased with the orderliness which had prevailed during the entrainment of the deportees, who until then had been crammed into huts surrounded by barbed wire and picked out by searchlight beams from the watchtowers.

In an internal memorandum dated 1 October 1942 – another document not previously published – the Acting Prefect informed the head of the first division of the prefecture, who was responsible for organisation and surveillance: 'The Pithiviers Deputy Prefect may be called upon to intervene in the matter of the camps in an emergency and on my express instructions. In any event, in his capacity as the government representative in Pithiviers, he has the right to monitor the proper functioning of the camps. Accordingly, it seems to me essential that all instructions sent to the camp commandant should be copied to the Pithiviers Deputy Prefect, so that he is not bypassed.' ...

No fewer than seven transports left from camps in Loiret between June and September 1942, the last one under Junot's responsibility.

In his October report, the Deputy Prefect expressed his concerns over the difficulty in maintaining order in Beaune-la-Rolande, which was full of 'French and foreign Jews who have contravened the regulations of the occupying forces (in particular, attempts to cross the demarcation line) and whom the German police have sent to the Beaune camp'. As a conscientious official, Michel Junot went so far as to suggest: 'If there is a further rise in the number of internees, we should make plans to strengthen the security arrangements.'

In the same report, he pointed out that communists were gradually replacing the Jews in Pithiviers, though there were still 1,574 of the latter on 30 October 1942 compared with 1,798 on 26 September.

'The presence of this camp inside my district means that the sub-prefecture is receiving a number of letters asking for leave to visit and even for people to be released. I have had some standard-form replies drafted explaining that I have no power to take such measures and that only the Prefect who took the internment decision has any authority in that respect. There is nothing to report from the camp, which is guarded most efficiently by a detachment of gendarmes', he wrote.

...

On the day of the liberation of Orléans, 16 August 1944, Michel Junot was present. He waved the tricolour from the balcony of Loiret's prefecture. And he stood at the head of the prefecture steps to welcome André Mars, the commissaire de la République sent by General de Gaulle. But that did not stop him being swept away in the subsequent purge. On 14 December 1945, ten months after awarding Junot a 'certificate of participation in the Resistance', de Gaulle signed a decree removing him from office. The hero of Free France was acting in response to a decision of the National Purification Commission based on a report from the Loiret departmental liberation committee stating that Junot was 'a typical careerist, devoid of all moral scruples, not to be allowed to hold any kind of public office'.

However, like many servants of the French State, Junot claimed to have been playing a double game. He explained that he had worked for a 'network' of the Central Intelligence and Action Bureau ... citing his activity on behalf of General de Gaulle's intelligence service in London under the Occupation and the medals he had received as a result. He must have been persuasive, because when peace returned he was to be found once more as permanent secretary to various Ministers, before becoming a deputy prefect again in 1956 and then prefect in 1957. ...”

“... It was only when I reported to the Prefect of Loiret that I discovered the existence of the camps. At that time I did not know who was interned there. There had been communists, at the time of the breaking of the Germano-Soviet pact. And there were foreign Jews. We did not know their ultimate destination. We only knew that they were going to Drancy. Rumour had it that they were being sent to work in salt mines in Poland. We obviously knew that they were not going off on a pleasant holiday. But I did not learn of the existence of the extermination camps until April 1945 when the first deportees returned.

When I took up office, on 24 August 1942, all the transports except one had already left.”

When the interviewer asked Mr Junot if he thought this “renewed interest in those dark years” was “necessary for the young generations” he replied: “If Frenchmen in those days made mistakes, or sometimes committed war crimes, I think there is the discreet veil of history...”

“According to the weekly magazine Le Point, a former deputy mayor of Paris supervised the deportation of a thousand French and foreign Jews in 1942. Michel Junot, now aged 80, was Deputy Prefect of Pithiviers at the time. He admits that he organised the departure of a transport of deportees to Drancy. Michel Junot, whom General de Gaulle removed from office at the end of the war, claims to have been in the Resistance and subsequently rose through the ranks of the civil service. In his defence, the former deputy mayor of Paris between 1977 and 1995 maintains, like Maurice Papon, that he knew nothing of the fate of the deported Jews and says that the discreet veil of history should be drawn over the crimes of those days.”

The way in which France Info operates is for the presenter to broadcast live, with two news bulletins and two news flashes per half-hour. He then breaks for an hour to update his information before going on air again. The above-mentioned broadcast was accordingly repeated by the third applicant and by other journalists sixty-two times between 6 p.m. on 31 January and 11.04 a.m. on 1 February, in either the same or a slightly different form. However, the broadcasts systematically specified that the report was based on an article published in Le Point. After 11 p.m., a number of news bulletins and flashes mentioned the fact that, “unlike Maurice Papon”, Michel Junot had never issued any orders for anyone to be arrested, interned or transferred to Drancy, sometimes adding that he was “responsible only for keeping order”.

On 1 February 1997, from 5.45 a.m. onwards, several news bulletins and flashes (broadcast at 6.45, 7, 7.15, 8, 8.15, 8.23, 8.30, 8.45 and 9.33 a.m.) mentioned that Mr Junot denied the allegations published in Le Point. According to the applicants, this point was made systematically after 11.04 a.m.

In their defence, the applicants argued that the case under section 31 of the 1881 Act was inadmissible, because Mr Junot had been retrospectively stripped of his status as a civil servant at the time of the Liberation. They also contended that the prosecution's case against the second applicant was inadmissible: the disputed statement had been broadcast live and its content could not therefore be construed as having been “fixed prior to being communicated to the public” within the meaning of section 93-3 of the Audiovisual Communication Act of 29 July 1982 (“the 1982 Act”). Moreover, they submitted that the third applicant had acted in good faith. In that connection, they argued that public interest in the period of the Occupation had been revived by the news of the Papon trial; that the third applicant had been in possession of the article published in Le Point on the previous day along with three agency dispatches; that it had been reasonable to link the cases of Mr Junot and Mr Papon because both men had held high public office during the Occupation and had subsequently enjoyed brilliant political careers; that the use of the conditional tense and the absence of any personal comment about Mr Junot demonstrated the journalist's caution; and that France Info had reported Mr Junot's denials from 6 a.m. on 1 February onwards.

With regard to the defamatory nature of the disputed allegations, the judgment reads as follows:

“Mr Junot is alleged ... to have personally played an active role in the deportation of Jews in his capacity as Deputy Prefect of Pithiviers. This allegation, which undoubtedly damages the honour of the civil party, is moreover aggravated by the connection made between the case of Mr Papon – who has been committed for trial before the Gironde Assize Court to answer charges that he participated in crimes against humanity – and that of Mr Junot, with the suggestion that the latter was seeking to evade responsibility for the crimes committed during that period, over which he believes that 'the discreet veil of history should be drawn'.

The fact that it was specified that, 'unlike Maurice Papon', Michel Junot 'did not issue any orders for anyone to be arrested, interned or transferred to Drancy' in no way detracts from the seriousness of the charge levelled at the civil party; the same can be said of the use of the conditional tense throughout the broadcasts.

The allegations in question also cast doubt on Mr Junot's membership of the Resistance, which was reported as a mere 'claim' on his part, and suggested that he had been stripped of his status by General de Gaulle at the end of the war. These words also damage the civil party's honour and reputation.”

The court found that Mr Junot had never lost the rank of Deputy Prefect, and that he should be considered as having been acting in that capacity in Pithiviers at the time of the facts alleged against him and accordingly to have been exercising public authority. It found that section 31 of the 1881 Act was therefore applicable.

With regard to the good faith of the third applicant, the court found as follows:

“There being a presumption that defamatory statements are made in bad faith, it is for the defendants to prove their good faith.

It should first be noted that the repetition of defamatory statements already published in another medium does not in any way provide the person who repeats them with a defence; such journalistic practice is particularly to be deprecated, because it means that a statement that has not been verified by anyone subsequently reporting it acquires the appearance of an absolute certainty.

This is what happened with Mr Junot: having assumed that the enquiries made by his fellow journalists at Le Point were reliable, Bertrand Gallicher simply repeated the magazine's allegations against the civil party without checking them.

As evidence that he had carried out a serious investigation, Bertrand Gallicher told the Court that he had been in possession of the article published in Le Point on the previous day, and of three agency dispatches; however these dispatches, which simply quoted large sections of the magazine article, could not, without more, provide the journalist with a legal defence.

The journalist also produced the documents mentioned in Le Point: the Prefect's memorandum of 1 October 1942, Michel Junot's notes of 19 and 22 September 1942 and the monthly reports for September and October 1942; however, these documents did not give him grounds for asserting that Michel Junot, Pithiviers Deputy Prefect, had supervised the deportation of a thousand Jews or that he had admitted having organised the departure of a transport of Jewish deportees.

Neither the memorandum from the Prefect of Loiret dated 1 October 1942 specifying that the Pithiviers Deputy Prefect must be copied in on all the instructions given to the camp commandant, nor the memorandum of 19 September 1942 to the Prefect signed by Michel Junot and expressing his concerns about keeping order on 20 September 1942 in the event of communist demonstrations because all the gendarmes in the district had been drafted in to help with the 'entrainment of a thousand Jews', nor the report drawn up by Michel Junot on 22 September 1942 on the events of the day, which had been 'perfectly calm', prove that Michel Junot, Deputy Prefect, had played a personal part in the organisation and departure of that transport for Drancy. In fact, what these documents show is that he complained of having been notified only belatedly of the 'entrainment of a thousand Jews', that he did not receive copies of all the instructions sent to the camp commandant, a memorandum from the Prefect having been required to ensure that he was not 'bypassed' and that his concern was to maintain order outside the camps.

Michel Junot's monthly reports for September and October 1942 do not carry any more evidential weight in this respect; while the first mentions that most of the Jews in the Pithiviers camp had been 'entrained' on transports bound for Germany on 20 September 1942; while both report on the occupancy rate of the two internment camps situated in his district and thus establish his 'responsibility in principle' for the camps (using Mr Serge Klarsfeld's formula); while they keep the Prefect informed of relations with the German forces and the circumstances in which the anti-Jewish laws were being applied and certainly show that Mr Junot was performing his functions of Deputy Prefect under the Occupation with zeal and determination, and without being troubled by too many scruples, they nonetheless do not prove that he played a personal part in the deportation of Jews or that he organised the departure of a transport of Jewish deportees.

Turning to the other documents cited by the defence, namely a letter dated 19 September 1942 from the secretary-general for the police on the Conseil d'Etat to the Orléans Regional Prefect and the latter's reply dated 21 September 1942, and a memorandum dated 19 September 1942 from the Pithiviers Deputy Prefect to the captain of the gendarmerie and police superintendent, they cannot be regarded by the Court as having any evidential weight, since they are merely summarised on a plain sheet of paper.

In short, the documents in Bertrand Gallicher's possession did not give him grounds for alleging that Mr Junot was guilty of having participated in crimes against humanity.

Nor did these documents entitle the presenters who came on air after 0.33 a.m. on 1 February to repeat the allegation that the plaintiff had supervised the Jewish internment camps of Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande and the maintenance of order in both camps.

Lastly, the testimony of Mrs Mouchard-Zay recounting the dramatic circumstances of the various round-ups of Jewish men, women and children, the conditions in which they were transferred to and arrived in the two camps of Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande, and the dramatic change in public opinion which coincided with these events, does not prove that Mr Junot played any part in the organisation of these deportations.

While being aware of the professional constraints imposed by the need to break news rapidly, which is inherent in the very nature of radio, the Court notes that the journalists, far from merely reporting raw news objectively, endorsed the interpretation adopted by some of their fellow journalists, while going further by making a connection with the 'Papon case', no doubt with the intention of making the story more sensational.

The disputed broadcasts were therefore particularly careless and contributed to the spread of rumour by repeating defamatory allegations.

In relation to the allegation that Mr Junot was not a genuine member of the Resistance, the Court finds that the evidence produced by the defence is insufficient to cast doubt on his Resistance activities, which in any event have been vouched for by Jean-Claude Aaron, the leader of the Masséna network, by Colonel Rémy and by several people of Jewish descent who described the help he had given them during the Occupation.

For all of the above reasons, the Court is unable to accept that [the third applicant] acted in good faith.”

The court found the second applicant, in his capacity as publishing director, not liable for the first broadcast, which had been made live by the third applicant on 31 January at 6 p.m. It found, however, that the same statement had been repeated either in full or in condensed form by the various presenters who subsequently went on air, and considered that such “systematic repetition of the disputed statements” should be construed as “rolling broadcasting” within the meaning of section 93-3 of the 1982 Act. The court concluded as follows:

“[The second applicant], as publishing director, whose duty it is to control what is broadcast on the channel for which he is responsible, is therefore liable in law as principal for the offence of defamation.”

On the question of the defamatory nature of the offending bulletin's content, it ruled as follows:

“Words may be defamatory as the result of an insinuation, a question or an assertion. In addition, words must be assessed both in terms of their intrinsic meaning and in the light of their context.

Attributing to Mr Junot responsibility for supervising the deportation of a thousand Jews and organising their despatch to Drancy was plainly an attack on his honour and dignity. The defence arguments ... tending towards proving the truth of the facts is not relevant here, quite apart from the fact that no evidence to that effect has been adduced. Moreover, comparing Mr Junot's position to that of Mr Papon, who had indeed just been committed for trial in the Bordeaux Assize Court, also necessarily had a defamatory resonance.

The same defamatory classification must also be given to the passage '[Mr Junot] ... claims to have been in the Resistance'. Coming as it does between the reference to his being sacked by General de Gaulle and the comparison to Mr Papon, this can only insinuate that Mr Junot's assertion was false.”

On the question of good faith, the judgment said:

“Calumnious imputations are deemed to be in bad faith unless it can be established that they were made in pursuit of a legitimate aim, without any personal animosity, after a serious investigation and in temperate language.

There is no doubt that providing information about the attitude of administrative officials during the period of the Occupation, particularly as regards one of the main dramas of that time, the deportation and extermination of Jews, is perfectly legitimate.

Nothing in the file reveals any particular animosity on the journalist's part towards the civil party.

On the other hand, the preliminary investigation was singularly lacking in rigour. The civil party has rightly observed that Mr Gallicher began to broadcast his remarks at 6 p.m. on 31 January, in other words when the issue of Le Point dated 1 and 2 February had just come out.

In seeking to establish their good faith the defence cite three dispatches (AFP, AP and Reuters) which mentioned the article in Le Point and the content of a television programme in which Mr Junot had taken part. But the use of agency dispatches as one's main source, especially when they are purely repetitive and reproduce an article that has already been published does not constitute evidence that an attempt has been made, if not to conduct an investigation, then at least to check the information. In addition, the wholly gratuitous assertion that Mr Junot admitted his culpability is particularly reprehensible from both the criminal and the ethical points of view.

As regards the debate about whether Mr Junot had been a member of the Resistance, the Criminal Court rightly noted that the documents produced by the defence were not sufficient evidence to the contrary, whereas his participation has been attested to by the leader of the Masséna network, Jean-Claude Aaron, by Colonel Rémy and by a number of persons of Jewish origin who have drawn attention to Mr Junot's courageous attitude.

Moreover, the imputations contained in the message sent out were disproportionate in relation to the objective material that the accused maintained they had at their disposal, and here it should be noted, as clarification of this point may be helpful, that neither the use of the conditional tense pleaded in defence, nor the mention – very late in the day – of Mr Junot's denials, affect the gravity of the allegations made in dispatches broadcast several dozen times.

The content of the documents which the defendants learned of in Le Point is not convincing in terms of the construction that has been placed upon them if they are to be considered to reflect Deputy Prefect Junot's attitude at the time of the departure of the last transport of Jewish deportees on 20 September 1942.

The memo of 19 September from the deputy prefect to his prefect ... said: 'I have just been notified of the entrainment of a thousand Jews ... tomorrow', and he complained that he would therefore not have sufficient manpower to control a communist demonstration.

The same deputy prefect sent a memo, dated 22 September, informing the prefect that there had been no incidents on account of the demonstration and that the departure of the transport had been orderly.

The memo of 1 October 1942 from the Prefect of Loiret seems to echo his subordinate's concerns about being informed in stipulating that the deputy prefect 'in his capacity as the government representative ..., has the right to monitor the proper functioning of the camps'.

The reports sent by Michel Junot to his prefect in September and October 1942 describe the situation in the camps but do not reveal that he had any power over them or initiative regarding them.

The witness evidence heard in court did not provide any additional information about Mr Junot's duties.

As to the other documents produced in court, the Criminal Court rightly found, for reasons which the Court of Appeal endorses, that they did not appear to have been in the defendants' possession at the time when the statement was broadcast. Moreover, they do not necessarily weaken Mr Junot's argument, since they include one memo he wrote on 15 April 1943 to the Prefect of Orléans about improving the food and bedding in the camps. It ends with the following sentence: 'Although the management and administration of the camps does not form any part of my duties, I wish to bring this state of affairs to your attention ...'

All these texts portray an official dedicated to fulfilling his functions of maintaining public order and defending the political interests of the government. They do not support, without overstating the case, an assertion that Mr Junot supervised the camps or played a role in the deportation of the Jews.

The plea of good faith is accordingly rejected.”

The Court of Appeal noted the following in relation to the liability of the second applicant under section 93-3 of the 1982 Act:

“... This section is intended to absolve the publishing director of an audiovisual operator of liability for live broadcasts whose contents he is unable effectively to monitor and control. But this cannot be said of a rolling news bulletin whose content may be monitored and controlled by making the necessary arrangements to that effect. It is significant in this respect that such steps were taken from the morning of 1 February onwards, when the content of the offending statement was amended. Moreover, it would be stretching the concept of prior fixing to contend that it must involve mechanical recording. Content may also be fixed by a communication method based on repetition which effectively requires it to be fixed but not necessarily by mechanical means. Therein lies the difference from 'live' broadcasting involving no repetition.”

Moreover, by way of civil remedy, the court ordered the following announcement to be read out on France Info every two hours during a twenty-four hour period in the month following the date when the judgment became final:

“By a judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal (Eleventh Division – Section A), Mr Bertrand Gallicher, journalist, and Mr Michel Boyon, publishing director of Radio France, were each fined FRF 20,000 and ordered to pay damages for having defamed Mr Michel Junot, former Deputy Prefect of Pithiviers. This judgment follows the broadcasting, on 31 January and 1 February 1997, of news bulletins falsely alleging that Mr Michel Junot had played a part in the deportation of a thousand Jews and wrongly casting doubt on his membership of the Resistance.”

On the subject of the broadcasting of the above announcement, the judgment reads as follows:

“The Court is minded to uphold the order for the broadcasting of an announcement by France Info, which seems to be a remedy proportionate to the damage suffered but which the defence considers to be contrary to the provisions of Articles 6 and 10 of [the Convention] ...

The Court does not agree, because freedom of expression under Article 10 of [the Convention] may be subject to such restrictions as may be necessary ... for the protection of the reputation of others, which is the case here. It is true that the effect of this order, as indicated by the defence, will be to reduce the 'editorial space' available to France Info, but the written press are already in the same position and it is difficult to find a justification for discriminating between the various media in that respect.

Lastly, it would be wrong to deny the claimant, whose rights are equally important, the concrete remedy of broadcasting an announcement purely on the ground that the audiovisual medium is different from the traditional medium of the written press.

Further, nothing in the order to broadcast an announcement may be construed as infringing the right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention ...”

By a judgment of 8 June 1999, the Court of Cassation (Criminal Division) dismissed the appeal for the following reasons, inter alia:

“... In finding the publishing director liable as principal for the offence created by section 93-3 of the Audiovisual Communication Act of 29 July 1982, the Court of Appeal both for its own and for adopted reasons ruled that the broadcasts containing the offending remarks had been, with the exception of the first bulletin, systematically broadcast on a rolling basis in exactly the same or in condensed form over a twenty-four hour period.

It further found that this type of broadcasting allowed the publishing director to exercise control over the content before it was broadcast to the public.

The court applied the law correctly in so ruling.

The content of an announcement which is broadcast on a rolling basis must properly be construed as having been fixed prior to being communicated to the public within the meaning of section 93-3 [cited above]. ...

... although the criminal courts may order the publication of their judgments by way of penalty only if they are expressly authorised to do so by law, they may issue such an order by way of a remedy at the request of the civil party. Such a remedy, when ordered in a form achievable under the technical constraints of the medium in which publication is ordered, [does not breach] the Convention provisions cited in the appeal.”

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

Section 29

“It shall be defamatory to make any statement or allegation of a fact that damages the honour or reputation of the person or body of whom the fact is alleged. The direct publication or reproduction of such a statement or allegation shall be an offence, even if expressed in tentative terms or if made about a person or body not expressly named but identifiable by the terms of the disputed speeches, shouts, threats, written or printed matter, placards or posters.

It shall be an insult to use any abusive or contemptuous language or invective not containing an allegation of fact.”

Section 31

“Defamation by reference to the functions or capacity of one or more ministers or ministry officials, one or more members of one of the two legislative chambers, a civil servant, a representative or officer of the law, a minister of religion in receipt of a State salary, a citizen temporarily or permanently responsible for a public service or discharging a public mandate, a member of a jury or a witness on the basis of his witness statement [in speeches, shouts or threats made or uttered in public places or meetings, or in written or printed matter, drawings, engravings, paintings, emblems, images or any other written, spoken or pictorial medium sold or distributed, offered for sale or exhibited in public places or meetings, or on placards or posters on public display, or in any audiovisual medium] shall be punishable [by a fine of 45,000 euros].

Defamatory statements about the private lives of the above persons shall be punishable under section 32 below.”

Section 41

“The following persons shall be liable, as principals, in the following order, to penalties for offences committed via the press:

1.  Publishing directors and publishers, irrespective of their occupation or title ...”

“In the event of one of the offences provided for in Chapter IV of the Freedom of the Press Act of 29 July 1881 being committed by an audiovisual operator, the publishing director ...shall be prosecuted as the principal offender provided that the content of the offending statement has been fixed prior to being communicated to the public.

...

When the ... publishing director is prosecuted, the maker of the statement shall be prosecuted as an accessory.

...”

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

“1.  No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.”

By ruling that there was “prior fixing” where a statement was broadcast repeatedly, the courts had merely interpreted that concept. They had by no means adopted reasoning to the accused's detriment by analogy. In the Government's submission, the applicants' argument amounted to equating the concept of “prior fixing” with that of “recording”, only a prior “recording” being capable of enabling the publishing director to exercise his power of supervision. Yet in the present case the criminal courts had exonerated the second applicant, the publishing director of Radio France, of all responsibility for the first bulletin, broadcast live on France Info; the applicants' convictions had been based on the later bulletins only. In doing so the courts had made a reasonable interpretation of the concept of “prior fixing”, adapting the case-law to the changing situation, through reasoning which was purely teleological and devoid of any analogy. The Government further submitted that the text of section 93-3 of the 1982 Act made no distinction between live broadcasts and pre-recorded programmes. It followed that the domestic courts had not extended the normal scope of that provision to cover a situation not provided for in the legislation. Parliament had deliberately used the concept of “prior fixing” rather than that of “prior recording”, the former being broader than the latter. The word “fixation” in the French language referred to “what is determined in advance”, which could therefore be checked. In short, the courts had not created a new charge or autonomous offence by analogy.

In addition, the Government submitted that the interpretation of the term “prior fixing” in the present case had been “consistent with the essence of the offence”. Firstly, the intention had been to adapt the text to “new circumstances”, as France Info, the first European radio station to broadcast news programmes round-the-clock, had not been set up until 1987, quite some time after the enactment of the 1982 Act. Secondly, it was a reasonable reflection of the way the offence had originally been framed, since it was based on the possibility of supervision by the publishing director whenever a statement was repeated, whether live-to-air or not.

Lastly, the Government said that the interpretation complained of had been foreseeable. They pointed out in that connection that, as a lawyer and media professional, the second applicant could not have been unaware of the provisions of section 93-3 of the 1982 Act; by taking appropriate advice if necessary, he could reasonably have been expected to foresee how they would be interpreted.

It is true that, in the context of audiovisual communication, the words “fixed prior to being communicated to the public” may seem to indicate that a publishing director cannot be convicted of an offence under section 93-3 of the 1982 Act unless the offending statement has been recorded before being broadcast. Thus construed, section 93-3 cannot form the basis for the successful prosecution of a publishing director where the “statement” has been broadcast live. The Court notes moreover that the Government have not supplied any evidence that before the applicants' trial the domestic courts had applied section 93-3 in circumstances similar to those of the present case.

Nevertheless, Article 7 of the Convention does not outlaw the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation from case to case, “provided that the resultant development is consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen” (see Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany [GC], nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, § 50, ECHR 2001 II).

The Court notes that the presumption of the publishing director's responsibility established by section 93-3 of the 1982 Act is the corollary of the latter's duty to check the content of the “statements” put out through the medium for which he works. The reason, therefore, why the publishing director's responsibility is engaged only where the content of the offending “statement” has been “fixed” prior to being broadcast is that he is deemed on account of that “prior fixing” to have been placed in a position to apprise himself of its content and check it before it is broadcast.

Moreover, it is clear – and the parties did not disagree on this point – that there has been “prior fixing” where the offending “statement” has been recorded with a view to its being broadcast, and that, conversely, there has been no prior fixing where such a statement has been broadcast live. In the Court's opinion, the facts of the present case fall halfway between recording and live broadcasting. On the one hand, the offending statement was not recorded; on the other, in view of the way France Info operated, it was intended to be repeated live-to-air at regular intervals. As there had been no “prior fixing”, the criminal courts absolved the publishing director of all responsibility in respect of the first of the bulletins broadcast on France Info; on the other hand, they held that that first broadcast had constituted a “prior fixing” of the statement's content as regards subsequent broadcasts. They therefore ruled that from the second broadcast onwards the publishing director could be considered to have been placed in a position to check its content beforehand. The Court considers that, in the particular context of the way France Info operated, that interpretation of the concept “prior fixing” was consistent with the essence of the offence concerned and “reasonably foreseeable”.

There has accordingly been no violation of Article 7 of the Convention.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND 2 OF THE CONVENTION

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

The applicants further complained that, as interpreted by the domestic courts, section 93-3 of the 1982 Act entailed a breach of equality of arms in that the publishing director's guilt was automatically inferred from the mere objective fact that a statement had been broadcast repeatedly, the prosecution not being required to prove that he intended to commit the offence, whereas the defendant was deprived of the possibility of establishing facts “capable of exonerating him”. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

The Government further submitted that the Convention did not prohibit presumptions of fact or of law provided that they were kept within reasonable limits which took into account the gravity of what was at stake and maintained the rights of the defence. The presumption in section 93-3 of the 1982 Act respected such limits. Firstly, it came into play only with regard to the offences defined in Chapter IV of the 1881 Act, concerning the offences of defamation and insult. Secondly, the legal responsibility of each defendant was determined in strict proportion to the part he or she had actually played, with a legal distinction being drawn according to whether or not the content of the information had been fixed prior to its communication to the public. Where that was not the case, the publishing director, not having been in a position to intervene to prevent the broadcast, could not be prosecuted as a principal. Lastly, the Government submitted that the way in which section 93-3 of the 1982 Act had been applied in the present case had been compatible with the presumption of innocence. Firstly, the domestic courts had fully established the defamatory nature of the statements broadcast. Secondly, they had clearly proved the existence of intent on the part of the third applicant, after meticulously examining the documents and witness evidence he had adduced to prove his good faith. Thirdly, the second applicant's conviction as principal did not infringe the “principle of individual responsibility”, since the criminal responsibility contemplated in section 93-3 arose not from producing the statement but from publishing or broadcasting it, which formed part of the responsibilities of the publishing director; above all, in the present case, by emphasising that “a rolling news bulletin may be monitored and controlled ... by making the necessary arrangements to that effect”, the Paris Court of Appeal had in a sense established intent on the part of the second applicant even though in law it did not actually need to do so in order to find him guilty.

The Court next observes that the Convention does not prohibit presumptions of fact or of law in criminal cases. Nevertheless, it requires States “to remain within certain limits in this respect”: they must “confine them within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence” (see Salabiaku, cited above, pp. 15-16, § 28).

The result of section 93-3 of the 1982 Act and section 29 of the 1881 Act is that in the field of audiovisual communication a publishing director is criminally responsible – as principal – for any defamatory statement made on air, where the content of that statement has been “fixed prior to being communicated to the public”. In such a case, as soon as the statement's defamatory character has been established, the offence is made out as regards the publishing director – the maker of the statement being prosecuted as an accessory – without it being necessary to prove mens rea on his part. As pointed out above, section 93-3 is intended to punish a publishing director who has failed to perform his duty of overseeing the content of remarks made on air in those cases where he would have been able to exercise such oversight before they were broadcast.

A number of elements have to be proved before the publishing director can be convicted: he must have the status of publishing director; the offending statement must have been broadcast and must be defamatory; and the content of the statement must have been fixed before it was broadcast. The Government have stated that where there has been no “prior fixing” responsibility is no longer presumed and the rules of ordinary law apply instead, so that the prosecution has to prove that the publishing director had a personal hand in the broadcasting of the offending statement.

The Court takes the view that the difficulty in the present case stems from the fact that this presumption is combined with another, namely that defamatory remarks are presumed to have been made in bad faith. However, this second presumption is not irrebuttable; although defendants cannot seek to establish the truth of defamatory statements where, as in the present case, the events concerned have taken place more than ten years before (section 35 of the 1881 Act), they may overturn that presumption by establishing their good faith. Thus, as the Paris Court of Appeal observed in its judgment of 17 June 1998, the applicants could have established the third applicant's good faith by proving that the allegations complained of had been made in pursuit of a legitimate aim, without any personal animosity, after a serious investigation and in temperate language.

Therefore, as the Government submitted, a publishing director has a valid defence if he can establish the good faith of the person who made the offending remarks or prove that their content was not fixed before being broadcast; moreover, the applicants raised such arguments in the domestic courts.

That being the case, and having regard to the importance of what was at stake – effectively preventing defamatory or insulting allegations and imputations being disseminated through the media by requiring publishing directors to exercise prior supervision – the Court considers that the presumption of responsibility established by section 93-3 of the 1982 Act remains within the requisite “reasonable limits”. Noting in addition that the domestic courts examined with the greatest attention the applicants' arguments relating to the third applicant's good faith and their defence that the content of the offending statement had not been fixed in advance, the Court concludes that in the present case they did not apply section 93-3 of the 1982 Act in a way which infringed the presumption of innocence.

There has accordingly been no violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION

A.  The parties' submissions

“1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2.  The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

In the first place, they submitted that it was “prescribed by law”. The criminal convictions of the second and third applicants had been founded on sections 29 and 31 of the 1881 Act and section 93-3 of the 1982 Act. The order requiring the applicant company to broadcast an announcement by way of reparation for the damage caused to the civil party had been founded on Article 1382 of the Civil Code, relating to criminal liability, and on established case-law to the effect that the trial courts alone are empowered to decide what form reparation should take, being free to choose reparation in kind or pecuniary reparation (the Government referred to the following judgments: Cass., First Civil Division, 14 May 1962, Bulletin no. 241; Cass., Second Civil Division, 17 February 1972, Bulletin civ. II no. 50; Cass. crim., 9 April 1976, Bulletin no. 108; Cass., Third Civil Division, 9 December 1981, Bulletin civ. II no. 209; Cass., Second Civil Division, 11 October 1989, Bulletin no. 177; Cass. soc., 25 January 1989, Bulletin civ. no. 64; Cass. com., 5 December 1989). The Government submitted that this type of measure had already been used by the courts as a means of reparation in the context of audiovisual communication, citing – though without providing either a copy or a reference – a judgment given by the Paris tribunal de grande instance on 10 June 1983 requiring a television channel to broadcast an announcement.

The Government went on to say that the interference complained of had been intended to punish and provide a remedy for conduct which had damaged the reputation and honour of a person vested with public authority. They argued on that basis that it pursued two of the legitimate aims listed in the second paragraph of Article 10, namely protection of the reputation or rights of others and prevention of disorder.

Lastly, the Government submitted that, in respect of the three applicants, the interference in issue had been “necessary in a democratic society”, being based on grounds which were “sufficient and relevant” as regards the aims pursued and proportionate to those aims. On the first point, the Government said that the domestic courts had conducted a detailed examination of the case and the parties' arguments before finding that the information broadcast on France Info had damaged Mr Junot's honour and good name. In particular, the order requiring Radio France to broadcast an announcement by way of civil reparation had appropriately reflected the circumstances of the case. On the second point, the Government argued that the conviction of the second and third applicants had been proportionate on account of the particular gravity of the damage to Mr Junot's honour and good name – the bulletin complained of had been broadcast a large number of times on a station with a very large audience, it had incautiously referred without comment to unverified facts and it had suggested a parallel with the Papon case (which betrayed a lack of impartiality) – and of the moderate nature of the fines and the awards of damages. Nor was the order against Radio France disproportionate: the domestic courts had limited its obligation to the requirement that it broadcast the announcement every two hours for twenty-four hours (a total of twelve times, as compared with around sixty repetitions of the offending statement), and the content of the announcement had responded point by point to the defamatory imputations broadcast on France Info. The applicants' argument that this measure had unduly reduced the editorial space of France Info was invalid, since news was broadcast round the clock on that channel. Moreover, since the operation of France Info depended on public funds, it could not be affected by the broadcasting of a dozen announcements over a period of twenty-four hours.

They observed in particular that in Thoma v. Luxembourg (no. 38432/97, § 64, ECHR 2001-III; also cited by the Government) the Court had held that a general requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content of a quotation that might insult or provoke others or damage their reputation was not reconcilable with the press's role of providing information on current events, opinions and ideas.

They submitted that the bulletins broadcast on France Info pointed out that the information they contained came from the weekly magazine Le Point, and that from 11.04 a.m. on 1 February 1997 onwards they mentioned the fact that Mr Junot denied the accusations against him. The question of the role of the French State in the deportation operations during the Occupation was a question of general interest to society which lay “at the heart of contemporary debate”. The bulletins complained of had not been intended to damage Mr Junot's reputation but to shed further light on a period of history of interest to the public. The applicants also emphasised the fact that the article published in Le Point to which the bulletins referred had been based on serious documentary material made up of official correspondence written by Mr Junot “which revealed his participation in operations to maintain order around the camps at the time when the deportation transports were being put together”. In those circumstances, they submitted, “the channel had no obligation to 'distance itself' from the article in Le Point”.

B.  The Court's assessment

Such interference will breach the Convention if it fails to satisfy the criteria set out in the second paragraph of Article 10. The Court must therefore determine whether it was “prescribed by law”, whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate aims listed in that paragraph and whether it was “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve that aim or aims.

1.  “Prescribed by law”

The Court does not agree. It considers that, as its case-law requires (see, for example, Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A no. 316-B, pp. 71 et seq., §§ 37 et seq.), that measure had a basis in domestic law and was foreseeable. Firstly, the applicant company's civil liability for defamatory remarks broadcast on the radio channels it runs is founded on Article 1382 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Any act committed by a person that causes damage to another shall render the person through whose fault the damage was caused liable to make reparation for it”. Secondly, it is established French case-law that the trial courts alone have power to determine the manner in which damage is to be made good and that they may order reparation in kind. On this last point, although the Government have not established that the courts regularly order measures of this type in cases involving audiovisual communication – they merely mentioned a first-instance judgment but did not provide a copy or a reference – the publication of announcements about judicial decisions is nevertheless, in France, one of the usual forms of reparation for damage caused through the medium of the press (see, mutatis mutandis, Prisma Presse v. France (dec.), no. 71612/01, 1 July 2003).

In addition, the Court has previously held that “national laws concerning the calculation of damages for injury to reputation must make allowance for an open-ended variety of factual situations” and that accordingly the words “prescribed by law” do not require that a party to judicial proceedings should be able to “anticipate with any degree of certainty the quantum of damages that could be awarded in his particular case” (see Tolstoy Miloslavsky, cited above, p. 73, § 41). It considers that a similar approach may be followed, mutatis mutandis, where reparation in kind is concerned.

In short, the order requiring the applicant company, by way of civil reparation, to broadcast on France Info an announcement about the conviction of the second and third applicants was “prescribed by law”.

2.  Legitimate aim

The Court would observe that the right to protection of one's reputation is of course one of the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, as one element of the right to respect for private life.

3.  “Necessary in a democratic society”

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual's self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly.

The adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the existence of a “pressing social need”. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10.

The Court's task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”. In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.

The national authorities' margin of appreciation is thus circumscribed by the interest of democratic society in enabling the press to play its vital role of “public watchdog” (see, for example, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 59).

Although formulated in the first instance for the written press, these principles are applicable to the audiovisual media (see in particular Jersild v. Denmark, judgment of 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298, pp. 23-24, § 31).

There is no doubt that the attitude of senior French administrative officers during the Occupation is a question commanding the highest public interest and that the broadcasting of information about it forms an integral part of the task allotted to the media in a democratic society. Moreover, the information published in Le Point and the news bulletins complained of was a contribution to a public debate which was already going on at the material time and was focused on the trial of Maurice Papon, the chief executive officer at the prefecture of Gironde from May 1942 to August 1944, for aiding and abetting arbitrary arrests, false imprisonment, murders and attempted murders all constituting crimes against humanity.

Since the freedom of the press was thus in issue, the French authorities had only a limited margin of appreciation in determining whether there was a “pressing social need” to take the measures in question against the applicants. Consequently, the Court will examine in scrupulous detail the proportionality of these measures in relation to the legitimate aim pursued.

“According to the weekly magazine Le Point, a former deputy mayor of Paris supervised the deportation of a thousand French and foreign Jews in 1942. Michel Junot, now aged 80, was Deputy Prefect of Pithiviers at the time. He admits that he organised the departure of a transport of deportees to Drancy. Michel Junot, whom General de Gaulle removed from office at the end of the war, claims to have been in the Resistance and subsequently rose through the ranks of the civil service. In his defence, the former deputy mayor of Paris between 1977 and 1995 maintains, like Maurice Papon, that he knew nothing of the fate of the deported Jews and says that the discreet veil of history should be drawn over the crimes of those days.”

This item was broadcast for the first time at 5 p.m. on 31 January 1997 and repeated by the third applicant and other journalists sixty-two times between 6 p.m. on 31 January and 11.04 a.m. on 1 February, either in the same form or with slightly different wording, but in each case it was pointed out that the information concerned had been published in Le Point. From 11 p.m. onwards a number of bulletins and newsflashes included the information that, “unlike Maurice Papon”, Mr Junot had not ordered anyone to be arrested, interned or transferred to Drancy, sometimes adding that he had only been responsible for “maintaining order”. Beginning at 5.45 a.m. on 1 February, a number of newsflashes and bulletins (broadcast at 6.45, 7, 7.15, 8, 8.15, 8.23, 8.30, 8.45 and 9.33 a.m.) mentioned that Mr Junot denied the accusations in Le Point. According to the applicants, that detail was systematically included after 11.04 a.m.

The bulletins complained of reported on a detailed article, backed up by documentary research, and an interview, to be published in a weekly magazine whose standing as a serious publication is not open to doubt, and they systematically included an acknowledgment of that source. It cannot therefore be validly maintained that merely by broadcasting those bulletins the third applicant failed to discharge his obligation to act in good faith. In that respect the Court finds the Paris Court of Appeal's reasoning unpersuasive.

The Court does not believe that this can be taken as an example of the “degree of exaggeration” or “provocation” which is permissible in the exercise of journalistic freedom. It considers that it amounted to the dissemination of incorrect information about the content of the article and the interview published in Le Point.

Although in other respects the bulletins, as was right and proper, went no further than repeating the information published by Le Point and systematically attributed it to that source, they summarised in that way in a few sentences a six-page feature article, highlighting its most striking parts. That gave the account of the conduct imputed to Mr Junot a categorical tone not present to the same extent in the original publication.

Admittedly, more nuanced wording, and eventually the information that Mr Junot denied the allegations, were gradually introduced into the text of the bulletins. However, by that time, in any event, the previous version had already been broadcast repeatedly.

It considers, however, that in the present case the extreme gravity of the conduct imputed to Mr Junot and the fact that the France Info bulletin was intended to be broadcast repeatedly – as indeed it was – required the third applicant to exercise the utmost care and particular moderation.

That was all the more relevant in the Court's opinion because the bulletin was put out over the radio on a channel which could be received throughout French territory. In that connection, it reiterates that in considering the “duties and responsibilities” of a journalist, the potential impact of the medium concerned is an important factor, and it is commonly acknowledged that the audiovisual media have often a much more immediate and powerful effect than the print media (ibid.).

Within those limits, the Court considers that the reasons given by the Court of Appeal for its ruling that Mr Junot's honour and dignity had been damaged and its judgment against the applicants were “relevant and sufficient”.

That being so, the Court notes that the amount of the fine imposed on the second and third applicants was moderate: FRF 20,000 each, equivalent to 3,048.98 euros (EUR). The same is true of the damages they were jointly ordered to pay Mr Junot: FRF 50,000, or EUR 7,622.45.

The applicant company was ordered, by way of civil reparation, to broadcast on France Info every two hours for twenty-four hours an announcement about the conviction of the second and third applicants. The Court considers that in so doing the domestic courts quite clearly intended to find the appropriate level of reparation for the damage caused to Mr Junot by the defamation that they had found him to have suffered. Be that as it may, the Court considers that the obligation to broadcast a 118-word announcement twelve times formed only a moderate restriction on France Info's editorial freedom.

Having regard to the extreme gravity of the conduct imputed to Mr Junot and the fact that the bulletin in question was, in its successive versions, broadcast sixty-two times by a radio station which could be received throughout French territory, the Court considers that the measures taken against the applicants were not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

Done in French, and notified in writing on 30 March 2004, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

S. Dollé A.B. Baka
Registrar President