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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF KARMAN v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 29372/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14
December 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Karman v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mrs S.
Botoucharova,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr R. Maruste,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mr J. Borrego Borrego,
Mrs R. Jaeger, judges,
and
Mrs C. Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 20 November 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 29372/02) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Anatoliy Vladimirovich
Karman (“the applicant”), on 28 May 2002.
- The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr P. Laptev, Representative of the Russian
Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
- On
4 January 2005 the Court decided to give notice of the application to
the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
- The Chamber decided, after consulting the parties, that
no hearing on the admissibility and/or merits was required (Rule 59 §
3 in fine).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Volgograd. He is the
director-general and editor-in-chief of the Gorodskiye Vesti
newspaper.
- On
2 September 1994 the applicant published an article under the
headline “In Blind Frenzy” (“V slepom ugare”).
It opened with a verse mocking Jewish last names, which the applicant
had overheard “at a meeting of the Russian National Unity
[movement] ... organised... by a local neofascist Mr Terentyev”.
The applicant wrote that at the meeting the verse had been recited by
a woman in the traditional Cossack clothing. He had not approached
her then, but later his curiosity was piqued when he saw that verse
printed in Mr Terentyev's newspaper Kolokol and he
decided to meet that woman.
The
applicant then related his discussion with the woman who was
aggrieved by her precarious living conditions resulting from profound
social and economic changes in Russia, and blamed the worsening of
her situation on Jews. She confessed to being an avid reader of the
Kolokol newspaper which the article described as “a
horrible brainchild of the 'Black Hundreds', deceitful beyond
belief”. The woman was a local distributor of that newspaper in
her village.
The
article concluded with the applicant's analysis of the current
political situation, critical of social parasitism and witch-hunting.
- On
24 September 1994 Mr Terentyev lodged a civil defamation action
against the applicant and the Gorodskiye Vesti newspaper in
connection with the applicant's description of him as a “neofascist”.
- On
20 December 1994 the Sovetskiy District Court of Volgograd granted
the action and ordered that the applicant pay non-pecuniary damages
to Mr Terentyev.
- The
applicant lodged an appeal. His appeal was supported by the Sovetskiy
district prosecutor who submitted, in particular, that the Volgograd
regional prosecutor had opened a criminal investigation into the
incitement of ethnic hatred by the Kolokol newspaper.
- On
27 February 1995 the Volgograd Regional Court quashed the judgment of
20 December 1994 on the ground that the District Court had not
commissioned an expert study of the publication and had not examined
the materials of the criminal investigation. The matter was remitted
for a new examination.
- On
22 August 1996 the applicant asked the District Court to commission a
composite linguistic and social-psychological expert study, to
examine ten issues of the Kolokol newspaper printed between
August 1993 and August 1994, and to adjourn the proceedings pending
investigation of the criminal case against Mr Terentyev.
- On
2 December 1996 the Sovetskiy District Court dismissed, by an interim
decision, the applicant's requests. It determined that there was no
need to commission a composite study or to examine the past issues of
the Kolokol newspaper as long as the expert reports made in
the context of criminal proceedings against Mr Terentyev were
available.
- On
the same day the Sovetskiy District Court gave judgment. It found in
favour of Mr Terentyev and awarded him damages against the applicant.
- On
24 April 1997 the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court, by way
of supervisory-review proceedings, quashed the judgment of 2 December
1996 on the ground that the District Court had not remedied the
defects identified by the Regional Court on 27 February 1995 (it had
not commissioned an expert study or examined the materials of the
criminal case against Mr Terentyev). The case was remitted for a new
examination.
- On 8 November 1999 the Volgograd regional prosecutor's
office discontinued the criminal proceedings against Mr Terentyev for
the lack of indication that he had committed a criminal offence. It
found as follows:
“An analysis of publications in the Kolokol
newspaper and public statements by S.V. Terentyev yields the
conclusion that their purpose is the 'elucidation' of the Judaic
religion and a negative appraisal of the Russian government, 'the
world Jewish masonry', Judaic cult and symbols. However, they do not
contain incitement to extermination of the Jewish people, humiliation
of national dignity, or violent overthrow of the existing government.
Striving to awaken the Russian national self-consciousness, the
Kolokol newspaper personified by Mr Terentyev does not call
for violent actions. The publications do not proclaim nationalism,
that is the aspiration to declare the superiority of one nation. The
leaflets and statements which prompted the opening of the criminal
investigation do not call for ethnic cleansing, pogroms or any
persecution of persons of Jewish ethnic origin. Thus, Mr Terentyev's
actions do not aim at inciting ethnic or racial hatred or discord or
humiliating national honour or dignity, that is they lack the
constituent elements of a criminal offence...”.
- On 10 August 2001 the Sovetskiy District Court of
Volgograd gave a new judgment in the defamation case. It found that
the applicant had failed to show the accuracy of his designation of
Mr Terentyev as a “neofascist” for the following reasons:
“According to the [1981] Soviet encyclopaedic
dictionary, its authors interpret 'neofascism' as 'a notion
encompassing contemporary right-wing and most reactionary movements
which are, in their political and ideological aspects, successors to
fascist organisations disbanded after the Second World War'.
Taking into account that S.V. Terentyev is a son of
the Great Patriotic War
veteran and that he actively participates in the political life of
our town, the court considers that, by calling Terentyev a
'neofascist', [the applicant] insulted the honour and dignity of the
plaintiff, harmed his authority and caused him moral anxiety... The
court considers it established that S.V. Terentyev is not a
member of a political party that is a successor to fascist
organisations. It does not follow from the copies of the Kolokol
newspapers... that S.V. Terentyev belongs to a political party
advocating fascist principles.”
- The
District Court further had regard to the expert studies carried out
in the context of criminal proceedings against Mr Terentyev and noted
that on 8 November 1999 the criminal case had been discontinued
for the lack of indication of a criminal offence.
- The
District Court awarded Mr Terentyev RUR 30,000 against the applicant
and RUR 15,000 against the newspaper; the latter was also to bear the
court fees.
- The District Court did not refer to the opinions of
other experts, including that of the Judicial Chamber for Information
Disputes under the authority of the President of the Russian
Federation, which the applicant sought to adduce in support of his
statement that Mr Terentyev was notoriously anti-Semitic. On 20
January 1995 the Chamber found, in particular, as follows:
“...Pages of the newspaper are dedicated to a
search for those responsible for Russia's misfortunes and for its
enemies who are identified on the basis of their ethnic origin. The
editors seek to establish a pseudo-scientific causal link and to
create a stable ethnic stereotype of the enemy. To that end the
newspaper has published such notoriously false creations, as the
Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion, the Jew's Catechism, the Note on
Ritual Killings, etc...
The editor-in-chief S. Terentyev bolsters the
newspaper's core idea in his article 'Review before the exam' (issue
no. 46): 'The enemies have occupied all the key positions in Russia'.
And the conclusion follows: 'Russian people shall have Russian
governance'...
Thus, the authors of the Kolokol newspaper
actively use ethnic affiliation for advocating anti-Semitism,
fostering a negative attitude to Jewish persons, whom the editors
hold responsible for various unpleasant phenomena in today's Russia.”
- On 26 November 1995 a three-expert panel from the
Anthropology and Ethnography Research Institute of the Russian
Academy of Sciences found as follows:
“In general, the conception of the [Kolokol]
newspaper reflects the National Socialist perception of the cause of
human misfortunes – the global Jewish conspiracy – and of
the way to deal with it by cleansing the naturally creative Russian
ethnic community of biological and cultural influence by other
peoples, mainly by Jews. The process of cleansing implies ousting of
everything relating to the history of the Jewish people from public
discourse, exclusion of Jews from social fabric or restrictions on
their civil rights on the ground of inherent malignancy of Jews for
the humankind and the Russian people.”
- The
applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that the District
Court could not rely on the expert studies because they had only
concerned the charge of incitement to ethnic and racial hatred and
related issues, without addressing the notions of “fascism”
or “neofascism”. For the same reason it could not
legitimately refer to the decision to abandon criminal charges
against Mr Terentyev because the constituent elements of a criminal
offence imputed to him had been substantially different from the
scope of the defamation claim.
- On
28 November 2001 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the judgment of
10 August 2001. It endorsed the reasoning of the District Court but,
having regard to the applicant's financial situation, reduced the
award to RUR 5,000 against him and to RUR 10,000 against his
newspaper.
- On
25 January 2002 a court bailiff recovered the award from the
applicant.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Constitution of the Russian Federation
- Article
29 guarantees freedom of thought and expression, together with
freedom of the mass media.
B. Civil Code of the Russian Federation
- Article 152 provides that an individual may apply to a
court with a request for the rectification of “statements”
(“сведения”)
that are damaging to his or her honour, dignity or professional
reputation if the person who disseminated such statements does not
prove their truthfulness. The aggrieved person may also claim
compensation for losses and non-pecuniary damage sustained as a
result of the dissemination of such statements.
C. Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation, no. 11 of 18 August 1992 (amended on 25
April 1995)
- The Resolution (in force at the material time)
provided that, in order to be considered damaging, statements
(“сведения”)
had to be untrue and contain allegations of a breach of laws or moral
principles (commission of a dishonest act, improper behaviour at the
workplace or in everyday life, etc.). Dissemination of statements was
understood as the publication of statements or their broadcasting,
inclusion in professional references, public speeches, applications
to State officials and communication in other forms, including oral,
to at least one another person (section 2). The burden of proof was
on the defendant to show that the disseminated statements had been
true and accurate (section 7).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained about a violation of his right to freedom of
expression provided in Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
- In
the applicant's view, his description of Mr Terentyev as a
“neofascist” was a value-judgment, an indication of
Terentyev's political affiliation, used in the same way as another
politician could be described as a “democrat”,
“communist”, “conservative”, etc. His
judgment rested on the publications in the Kolokol newspaper
that propagated hatred towards Jews and contained quotations from
Hitler.
- The
Government submitted that the impugned publication had been a
provocation because it might have created an ambiguous impression
about Mr Terentyev's personality. The domestic judgments only
concerned Mr Terentyev's designation as a “local
neofascist” rather than the publication as a whole. Referring
to the Constantinescu v. Romania case (no. 28871/95, ECHR
2000 VIII), the Government claimed that the applicant had had a
real opportunity to criticise Mr Terentyev's conduct without
resorting to the insulting word “neofascist”. In their
view, the interference was “undoubtedly necessary in a
democratic society”.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court notes that it is common ground between the parties that the
judgments pronounced in the defamation action constituted an
interference with the applicant's
right to freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 § 1.
It is not contested that the interference was prescribed by law,
notably Article 152 of the Civil Code, and pursued a legitimate aim,
that of protecting the reputation or rights of others, within the
meaning of Article 10 § 2. The dispute in the case relates to
whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic
society”.
- The
test of necessity requires the Court to determine whether the
interference corresponded to a “pressing social need”,
whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and
whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it
were relevant and sufficient. In assessing whether such a need exists
and what measures should be adopted to deal with it, the national
authorities are left a certain margin of appreciation. This power of
appreciation is not however unlimited, but goes hand in hand with a
European supervision by the Court, whose task it is to give a final
ruling on whether a restriction is reconcilable with freedom of
expression as protected by Article 10. The Court's task in exercising
its supervisory function is not to take the place of the national
authorities, but rather to review under Article 10, in the light of
the case as a whole, the decisions they have taken pursuant to their
margin of appreciation. In so doing, the Court has to satisfy itself
that the national authorities applied standards which were in
conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and,
moreover, that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment
of the relevant facts (see, most recently, Grinberg v. Russia,
no. 23472/03, §§ 26-27, 21 July 2005, with further
references).
- In
examining the particular circumstances of the case, the Court will
take the following elements into account: the position of the
applicant, the position of the plaintiff in the defamation claim, the
subject matter of the publication and qualification of the contested
statement by the domestic courts (see Jerusalem v. Austria,
no. 26958/95, § 35, ECHR 2001 II).
- As
regards the applicant's position, the Court observes that he was a
journalist and founder of a newspaper. It reiterates in this
connection that the press fulfils an essential function in a
democratic society. Although it must not overstep certain bounds,
particularly as regards the reputation and rights of others, its duty
is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its
obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all
matters of public interest (see De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium,
judgment of 24 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1997 I, § 37; and Bladet Tromsø and
Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 59, ECHR
1999 III). Journalistic freedom covers possible recourse to a
degree of exaggeration, or even provocation (see Prager and
Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 1), judgment of 26
April 1995, Series A no. 313, § 38).
- The
plaintiff in the defamation action, Mr Terentyev, was also the
editor-in-chief of a newspaper. It follows from the applicant's
publication that Mr Terentyev also organised a public gathering and
spoke about his views to the audience. His behaviour suggested that
he had courted popular support for his ideas. The District Court
noted that Mr Terentyev actively participated in the political
life of the town (see paragraph 16 above). Since he was active in
this manner in the public domain, he should have had a higher degree
of tolerance to criticism (see Jerusalem, § 39, cited
above).
- The
subject matter of the publication was the author's personal
experience of talking to a partisan of the Russian nationalist
movement who had been present at the meeting organised by Mr
Terentyev. The applicant offered his assessment of the current
political situation through the prism of his discussion with that
woman. That publication was part of a political debate on a matter of
general and public concern. The Court recalls in this connection that
it has been its constant approach to require very strong reasons for
justifying restrictions on political speech, for broad restrictions
imposed in individual cases would undoubtedly affect respect for the
freedom of expression in general in the State concerned (see Feldek
v. Slovakia, no. 29032/95, § 83, ECHR 2001 VIII;
and Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95,
§ 61, ECHR 1999-IV).
- The
Court notes that the scope of the defamation proceedings extended not
to the publication in its entirety but solely to the use of the term
“local neofascist” in respect of Mr Terentyev. As regards
the qualification of that term by the domestic courts, the Court
observes that they did not accept the applicant's argument that it
was a value-judgment but considered it to be a statement of fact,
indicating that Mr Terentyev was a member of a neofascist political
party. In the Russian courts' view, being designated a “neofascist”
was defamatory for Mr Terentyev as a public figure and the son of the
Second World War veteran. As Mr Terentyev was not a member of any
neofascist party and the criminal charge of incitement to ethnic
hatred was not maintained against him, they held the applicant
responsible for having failed to prove the truthfulness of that
expression (see paragraph 16 above).
- The
Court observes, firstly, that the domestic courts, considering the
term “neofascist” to be a statement of fact, had never
examined the question whether it could be considered as a
value-judgment. Their failure to embark on that analysis is accounted
for by the state of the Russian law on defamation at the material
time. As the Court has already found, it made no distinction between
value-judgments and statements of fact, referring uniformly to
“statements” (“svedeniya”), and
proceeded from the assumption that any such “statement”
was amenable to proof in civil proceedings (see Grinberg,
cited above, § 29, and the domestic law cited in paragraphs 25
and 26 above).
- The
Court further recalls that use of the term “Nazi” –
or, as in the present case, a derivative term “neo-fascist”
– does not automatically justify a conviction for defamation on
the ground of the special stigma attached to it (see Scharsach and
News Verlagsgesellschaft v. Austria, no. 39394/98, § 43,
ECHR 2003 XI).
- The
Court cannot subscribe to the restrictive definition of the term
“neofascist” adopted by the Russian courts, as solely
designating membership in a neo-fascist party. It has already noted
in respect of a similar term “fascist past” that it is a
wide one, capable of evoking in those who read it different notions
as to its content and significance (see Feldek, cited above, §
86). In the applicant's publication Mr Terentyev's name was mentioned
in the context of a meeting of the Russian nationalist movement. The
regional prosecutor determined that the publications in Mr
Terentyev's newspaper targeted the Jewish religion and symbols,
describing them in an inimical way, and propagated fallacious stories
about the “world Jewish masonry” (see paragraph 15
above). Against this background, the Court considers that the term
“local neofascist”, taken in its context, should be
understood in the sense given to it by the applicant, namely
describing a general political affiliation with the ideology of
racial distinctions and anti-Semitism (see, mutatis mutandis,
Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft, cited above, §
39, and also paragraph 28 above).
- The
Court finds that, contrary to the view of the Russian courts, the
term “local neofascist” is to be regarded as a
value-judgment rather than a statement of fact. It has been the
Court's constant view that, while the existence of facts can be
demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of
proof. The requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is
impossible to fulfil and infringes freedom of opinion itself, which
is a fundamental part of the right secured by Article 10 (see
Grinberg, cited above, §§ 30-31, with further
references). Nevertheless, even a value-judgment without any factual
basis to support it may be excessive. The question therefore remains
whether a sufficient factual basis for such a value-judgment existed
(see Jerusalem, §§ 44-45; Scharsach and News
Verlagsgesellschaft, § 40; and Feldek, § 86, all
cited above). In this regard, the Court notes that the applicant
offered documentary evidence, including the past issues of the
Kolokol newspaper published by Mr Terentyev and several
reports by independent experts. Having examined these publications,
the experts unanimously concluded to their marked anti-Semitic nature
and their propinquity with the ideals of the National Socialism (see
paragraphs 19 and 20 above).
- In the Court's view, that material may have been
relevant to show a prima facie case that the value-judgment expressed
by the applicant had been an acceptable comment. Apart from that
documentary evidence, the applicant also proposed that a further
expert opinion be sought. The domestic courts, nevertheless, refused
to consider this evidence and relied instead on a study carried out
in the criminal proceedings against Mr Terentyev on the charge
of incitement to ethnic hatred. The Court is struck by the
inconsistent approach of the Russian courts on the one hand requiring
proof of a statement and on the other hand refusing to consider the
readily available evidence (see Jerusalem, cited above, §
45). It further recalls that the degree of precision for establishing
the well-foundedness of a criminal charge by a competent court can
hardly be compared to that which ought to be observed by a journalist
when expressing his opinion on a matter of public concern, for the
standards applied when assessing someone's political opinions in
terms of morality are quite different from those required for
establishing an offence under criminal law (see Scharsach,
loc. cit.; Unabhängige Initiative
Informationsvielfalt v. Austria, no. 28525/95,
§ 46, ECHR 2002 I; and Wirtschafts-Trend
Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH v. Austria, no. 58547/00,
§ 39, 27 October 2005).
- In
the light of the above considerations and taking into account the
role of a journalist and press of imparting information and ideas on
matters of public concern, even those that may offend, shock or
disturb, the Court finds that the use of the term “local
neofascist” for describing Mr Terentyev's political
leaning did not exceed the acceptable limits of criticism. That the
proceedings were civil rather than criminal in nature and the final
award was relatively small does not detract from the fact that the
standards applied by the Russian courts were not compatible with the
principles embodied in Article 10 since they did not adduce
“sufficient” reasons justifying the interference at
issue. Therefore, the Court considers that the domestic courts
overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them for
restrictions on debates of public interest and that the interference
was disproportionate to the aim pursued and not “necessary in a
democratic society”.
There
has been, accordingly, a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that
the domestic judgments had been founded on the expert study carried
out in separate criminal proceedings. He had not been a party to
those proceedings and had not been able to have a say in the
nomination of experts and formulation of questions. He also
complained that on 2 December 1996 the District Court had rejected
his request for a composite social-psychological study. Article 6
provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by
[a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government submitted that the expert study performed in the framework
of a criminal case against Mr Terentyev had not found any indication
of incitement to ethnic or racial hatred or violence. It had not been
necessary to commission further expert studies because there had been
no need to clarify the word “neofascism”. In any event,
the applicant had failed to adduce any evidence showing that Mr
Terentyev had been a “local neofascist”.
- The
applicant, relying on copies of past issues of the Kolokol
newspaper, submitted that the anti-Semitic and extremist nature
of these publications had been revealed by a number of expert
studies, including that by the Judicial Chamber for Information
Disputes. The Government's contention that the District Court had not
needed a further expert study was unconvincing, for it had founded
the judgment on expert studies, but on those that had been carried
out in criminal proceedings. The studies produced by the applicant
had been ignored by the District Court.
- The
Court considers that the applicant's complaints under Article 6 are
closely linked to the issues raised under Article 10 and that they
must therefore be declared admissible. However, having regard to its
finding under Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph 42 above),
it is not necessary to consider these matters again from the
standpoint of Article 6 of the Convention (see Jerusalem,
cited above, § 51).
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage. He did not make a claim for pecuniary damage.
- The
Government submitted that the applicant's claim was unsubstantiated
and excessive.
- The
Court considers that the applicant has suffered the non-pecuniary
damage as a result of the domestic judgments incompatible with the
Convention principles. The damage cannot be sufficiently compensated
by a finding of a violation. The Court considers, however, that the
particular amount claimed by the applicant is excessive. Making its
assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards him EUR 1,000,
plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant did not claim costs and expenses. Accordingly, there is no
call to make an award under this head.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
10 of the Convention;
- Holds that there is no need for a separate
examination of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the
applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 December 2006,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
