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SECOND SECTION
CASE OF KALMÁR v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 32783/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 October 2006
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Kalmár v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P. Costa,
President,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Mrs A.
Mularoni,
Mrs E. Fura-Sandström,
Ms D. Jočienė,
Mr D.
Popović, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 12 September 2006,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The case originated in an
application (no. 32783/03) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Hungarian national, Mr László
Kalmár (“the applicant”), on 16 August 2003.
- The Hungarian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and
Law Enforcement.
- On 15 September 2005
the Court decided to give notice of the application to the
Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it
decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at
the same time.
THE FACTS
- The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Budapest.
A. Civil proceedings
- On 23 January 1996 the applicant brought an action in
the Budapest Regional Court against the Budapest VII District
Municipality, requesting it to find that his personality rights had
been infringed by certain employees of the Municipality who had made
allegedly untrue statements about him in the press.
- On 26 January 1996 the Regional Court transferred the
case to the Pest Central District Court. On 10 October 1996 the
applicant extended his action and, on 20 November 1996, he identified
further respondents. On 10 January 1997 the District Court
requested another court to make available to it the case file of a
related case. After the latter had been terminated, the file was sent
to the District Court on 22 September 1998.
- The District Court held hearings on 26 April 1999, 2
February, 14 June and 29 November 2000 and 24 June 2002.
- On 30 June 2003 the court invited the applicant to
recapitulate his action.
- The hearings scheduled for 2 September and 7 December
2004 were adjourned. Meanwhile, on 6 October 2004 the Budapest
Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias, filed
on 8 October 2003.
- Further hearings were held on 22 March, 27 June and 3
November 2005. The proceedings are still pending at first instance.
B. Criminal proceedings
- On 25 January 1994 a preliminary investigation was
opened against the applicant. He was charged with causing unlawful
damage (rongálás). He was also prosecuted for
making a false accusation (hamis vád) and attempted
subornation to perjury (hamis tanúzásra felhívás
kísérlete). On 20 July 1994 and 19 September
1995, respectively, bills of indictment were preferred. In another
case of false accusation, a bill of indictment was preferred on 21
December 1995. The applicant was entitled to copies of the bills of
indictment under section 146(6) of the (Old) Code of Criminal
Procedure.
- The Pest Central District Court held hearings on 16
October 1995, 4 January and 20 March 1996. By decisions of 28
February and 21 June 1996, it joined all three cases.
- Following a procedural dispute essentially concerning
bias on the part of certain judges involved in the case, which
started on 19 November 1997, the Supreme Court eventually
assigned the case to the Buda Surroundings District Court on 1 March
1999.
- On 28 July 1999 a further bill of indictment was
preferred against the applicant in yet another case concerning 11
counts of false accusation. On 27 January 2000 these proceedings were
joined to the existing ones.
- The District Court held hearings on 20 April, 28
August and 17 November 2000, at which apparently only procedural
steps were taken. After a hearing on 25 January 2001, at which five
witnesses were interrogated, on 31 January 2001 the court acquitted
the applicant of all charges save that of subornation to perjury, in
respect of which it issued a reprimand. Although one witness, Mr M.,
whose testimony might have been relevant to this offence, could not
be found and three further witnesses summoned had not appeared, the
court was satisfied that the applicant’s guilt was proven
beyond reasonable doubt by Mr M.’s testimony given during the
investigation and by the letters in which the applicant had made the
incriminated statement.
- On appeal by the prosecution, on 27 November 2001 the
Pest County Regional Court partly amended the first-instance judgment
and convicted the applicant of one count of false accusation (an
offence punishable by imprisonment of up to three years) and one
count of subornation to perjury. As a cumulative sanction, it
sentenced him to a fine of 30,000 Hungarian forints.
In the reasoning, it was specified that:
“[...A]s another mitigating factor, the
second-instance court also appreciated the very significant lapse of
time [since the commission of the offences] ...”
- In reply to the applicant’s petition for review,
on 12 June 2003 the Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the
second instance judgment. In a detailed, lengthy analysis of the
merits, it concluded that the applicant’s conviction had been
justified.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LENGTH OF THE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
- The applicant complained that the length of the civil
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is
entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ...
tribunal...”
- The Government contested that argument.
- The period to be taken into consideration began on 23
January 1996 and has not yet ended. It has thus lasted over ten years
and seven months for one level of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the
length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the
circumstances of the case and with reference to the following
criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant
and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant
in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v.
France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one
in the present application (see Frydlender, cited above).
- Having examined all the material submitted to it, the
Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or
convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different
conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its jurisprudence on
the subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings
in the instant case was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable
time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The applicant also complained that the criminal
proceedings against him had lasted an unreasonably long time.
- The Government argued that the applicant could not
claim to be a victim of a violation of his Convention rights in this
respect, since the Regional Court had expressly acknowledged that the
proceedings had been unusually long and, consequently, had provided
redress by substantially reducing the applicant’s sentence. In
any event, the authorities had displayed the requisite diligence in
handling the case, complicated on account of the quadruple joinder.
The applicant contested these views.
- The Court notes that the Regional Court took account
of the considerable lapse of time from the commission of the offences
for which the applicant was convicted, and that this was one of the
reasons for applying a lighter, cumulative sentence than the
statutory minimum sanction for one of the offences alone. Against
this background, the Court finds that the applicant obtained adequate
redress for the alleged violation of his right under Article 6 §
1 of the Convention to the determination within a reasonable time of
the criminal charges against him. Accordingly, he can no longer claim
to be a victim, for the purposes of Article 34, of a violation of
Article 6 § 1 in this respect. This complaint is therefore
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and
must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention
(see Morby v. Luxembourg (dec.), no. 27156/02, ECHR 2003-XI;
Lie and Bernsten (dec.), no. 25130/94; Tamás Kovács
v. Hungary, no. 67660/01, § 26, 28 September 2004).
- The applicant also complained about the decisions
given. In particular, he submitted that his conviction had been
unfounded, because the courts had only heard a fraction of the
relevant testimony, that he had learnt about the charge of
subornation to perjury only at the hearing of 20 April 2000,
and that this charge had been upheld by the courts without hearing
any witnesses. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3. The
latter paragraph provides as relevant:
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for
the preparation of his defence; ...
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
...”
- As regards the fairness of the criminal proceedings,
in so far as the applicant’s complaints may be understood to
concern the assessment of the evidence and the result of the
proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that,
according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the
observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties
to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with
errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless
and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms
protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the
Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay
down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should
be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by
national law and the national courts (García Ruiz v. Spain
[GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999 I).
- In the present case, there is nothing in the case file
indicating that the courts lacked impartiality or that the
proceedings were otherwise unfair. In particular, the Court notes
that the charge of subornation to perjury was contained in the bill
of indictment filed on 19 September 1995, a copy of which the
applicant had been entitled to. The applicant has not substantiated
his claim that he was only informed of it in April 2000. Moreover,
once convicted, the applicant had the possibility to challenge his
conviction on this charge before the Regional and Supreme Courts,
which both made a full review of the case. Furthermore, the Court
reiterates that Article 6 cannot be interpreted as giving a defendant
the right to have an infinite number of witnesses called. In the
circumstances, it is satisfied that the fact that the courts heard
some five witnesses and convicted the applicant of subornation to
perjury, relying on clear documentary evidence, did not render the
proceedings unfair as a whole. These complaints are therefore also to
be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35
§§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
- The Government contested the claim.
- The Court considers that the applicant must have
sustained some non-pecuniary damage and that it should award the full
sum claimed.
B. Costs and expenses
- The applicant also claimed EUR 100 for the costs and
expenses incurred before the Court.
- The Government did not express an opinion on the
matter.
- The Court considers that the sum claimed should be
awarded in full.
C. Default interest
- The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the civil proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage and EUR 100 (one hundred euros) in respect of
costs and expenses, to be converted into the national currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement,
plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the
applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 October 2006, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
S. Dollé J.-P. Costa
Registrar President
