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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF RYDZ v. POLAND
(Application
no. 13167/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18
December 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Rydz v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr J.
Casadevall,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L.
Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
Mrs P. Hirvelä,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 27 November 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 13167/02) against the Republic
of Poland lodged on 1 March 2002 with the Court under Article 34 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Mr H. Rydz, (“the
applicant”).
- The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
- The
applicant alleged that the length of his detention was excessive and
that the length of the criminal proceedings in his case exceeded a
“reasonable time” within the meaning of the Convention.
- On
27 March 2006 the President of the Fourth Section of the Court
decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Under
the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it was
decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as
its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Brzeg.
- On
14 May 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having
committed multiple gang rape (including statutory rape), of inducing
the victims to take intoxicants and of persuading the victims not to
inform the police about those crimes.
- On
17 May 1999 the applicant was remanded in custody by the Brzeg
District Court. The decision was based on a reasonable suspicion,
confirmed by testimonies of the victims and of other suspects, that
the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been
charged, the severity of the sentence he faced and the need to secure
the proper conduct of the investigation. The court pointed to a
serious risk that the applicant, if not detained, might attempt to
influence the co-accused and the victims.
- Subsequently,
twelve other persons were charged with participation in the crime and
eight of them were remanded in custody.
- On
22 July 1999 the prosecutor decided to obtain an expert opinion on
the mental state of two witnesses, who were minors, and on their
ability to appreciate and recollect things they had witnessed. The
psychologist submitted his opinions on 6 and 11 October 1999.
- On
5 August 1999 the public prosecutor decided to prolong the
investigation.
-
The applicant's detention was extended on 11 August, 5 November and
13 December 1999, 24 May 2000, 12 June and 13 November 2000, 14
March, 27 April, 10 May, 28 June and 7 November 2001, 13
February, 8 May, 13 July and 13 November 2002, 11 February and 8
May 2003. The court found that the grounds for detention on remand
were still valid and owing to the fact that the crimes had been
committed in co-operation with other persons, there remained a high
risk that the applicant might interfere with the course of justice
and exert pressure on witnesses and victims. The courts also pointed
to the necessity of separating the suspects. As the investigation
continued, the court stated that there had been exceptional
circumstances which precluded the termination of the preparatory
proceedings, such as the complexity of the case, the need to obtain
further evidence and the multiplicity of plots, accused and charges.
The court also found that the applicant's case had not disclosed any
of the grounds for release provided for by Article 259 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
- On
19 and 29 September 1999 the prosecutor decided to include in the
case file the case files of other proceedings conducted against the
suspects.
- In
October 1999 the public prosecutor ordered expert opinions on the
kind of injuries the victims had suffered and whether these might
have resulted from the circumstances described by them, and on the
ability of the suspects to understand the meaning of their acts and
to control their behaviour at the time when the offences had been
committed. The opinions were submitted on 6 and 15 October 1999.
- On
11 October 1999 the Opole Regional Prosecutor charged the applicant,
in addition to the previous charges, with participation in an
organised criminal gang.
- By
decision of 29 October 1999 the investigation was prolonged until 31
December 1999.
- The
preparatory proceedings, during which the prosecutor examined a total
of 66 witnesses and obtained over 150 other items of evidence, were
closed on 3 December 1999. On the same date the public prosecutor
lodged a bill of indictment comprising 59 charges and five victims.
The applicant was charged with seven offences: participation in an
organised criminal gang, gang rape (including statutory rape)
committed with extreme cruelty and in conjunction with deprivation of
liberty, and with threatening the victims and persuading them not to
inform the police about the crimes.
-
In 2000 the first-instance court held 11 hearings during which the
evidence of the witnesses and defendants was heard: on 26 April,
24 May, 12 June, 10 and 28 July, 31 August, 17 November, 14, 15,
18 and 23 December. Seven other hearings scheduled in 2000 were
cancelled or adjourned for reasons not attributable to the court, in
particular the absence of the defendants, including the applicant, or
their representatives. The court remanded in custody one of the
defendants who had failed to appear at a hearing and lifted the
detention of another. It also dismissed from his function a legal-aid
lawyer who had failed to appear and appointed a new one in his place.
The court also decided to examine the case against one of the
co-accused separately since it was felt that his psychiatric
observation could lead to a delay in the proceedings.
- At
the hearing of 24 May 2000 the court prolonged the applicant's
detention until 15 November 2000. The court emphasised that the
absence of one of the defendants prevented the hearing of the other
accused and that detention was the only preventive measure which
could in those circumstances secure the proper conduct of the
proceedings.
- The
hearing scheduled for 30 January 2001 was adjourned in order to have
one of the victims heard with the assistance of a psychologist. On
26 February 2001 the psychologist submitted an opinion in which
he considered that it was inadvisable to hear the victim, since this
would oblige her to re-live her traumatic experience.
- In
2001 nineteen hearings were held and three had to be adjourned or
cancelled because of the illness of a judge, the absence of a witness
or the fact that the case file was with the Court of Appeal which was
deciding on the prolongation of the detention. The court requested
the police to determine the whereabouts of nine witnesses. Fines were
imposed on eleven absent witnesses.
- From
11 April 2001 until 10 April 2002 the applicant served a one-year
prison sentence imposed in separate proceedings.
- On
28 June 2001 the Wrocław Court of Appeal prolonged the
applicant's detention until 15 November 2001. It held that there had
been a serious risk that the applicant might try to hinder the proper
course of the proceedings. It was proved that two of the defendants
had exerted improper pressure on witnesses and thus caused them to
alter significantly their versions of the events. The court noted
that the case involved thirteen defendants and sixty-six witnesses.
Owing to the considerable amount of evidence to be taken, it was
inevitable that the proceedings had been prolonged, given the need to
ensure that the right to a fair trial was fully respected. At this
point the court emphasised that the defendants had been making
extensive use of their rights to question witnesses. Several
witnesses had changed their testimonies and the reading out of their
earlier statements had been justified. Almost thirty witnesses
remained to be heard at that stage of the proceedings and there was a
need to summon further witnesses and to cross-examine them.
- On
7 November 2001 the Wrocław Court of Appeal prolonged the
applicant's detention until 15 February 2002. The court endorsed the
reasoning of the first-instance court in the latter's decision of 28
June 2000. In addition, it dealt with the length of the proceedings.
The court noted that, since June 2000, the first-instance court had
held seven hearings and examined ten witnesses. The absence of other
witnesses was the major reason for the prolongation of the
proceedings; however, the trial court had taken proper measures to
speed up the trial. The appellate court also pointed to the fact that
the examination of the witnesses had been very time-consuming owing
to the complexity of the case and the mental state of the victims.
The parties had also requested additional witnesses to be heard.
- Three
hearings were held in January 2002, despite the absence of some of
the defendants at one of the hearings. A number of absent witnesses
were ordered to be brought to court.
-
Two further hearings were held in February 2002. The third hearing,
scheduled for 26 February 2002, had to be adjourned because of
the absence of a key witness. The court fixed a time-limit for
submission of the parties' motions for evidence. Consequently, the
defendants (among them the applicant) made almost twenty applications
for the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the ordering
of expert opinions and inspections of the crime scene.
- On
13 February and 8 May 2002 the Wrocław Court of Appeal decided
to prolong the applicant's detention. The court held that the
considerable length of the proceeding was due to the complexity of
the case coupled with the large number of accused and witnesses. The
court concluded that the prerequisites for detention provided for by
Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applied
in the particular circumstances of the case.
- On
5 March 2002 the court held a hearing despite the absence of two
defendants. A witness was ordered to come to the hearing. The court
also obliged the defendants to specify their reasons for requiring
the cross-examination of witnesses.
-
Two further hearings were held in March 2002 and four in
April 2002. The court dismissed eight motions for evidence, having
found them irrelevant for proving the facts alleged.
- From
10 April 2002 until 9 December 2002 the applicant was serving a
prison sentence imposed on him in separate proceedings.
- Up
to 31 July 2002 nine hearings had been held during which the court
took evidence from further witnesses and an expert. One witness was
examined at his place of residence and the testimonies of four
other witnesses, who were abroad, were read out. The court dismissed
the defendant's request to summon other absent witnesses, having
found that their examination would not add anything to the case. The
police were ordered to determine the whereabouts of two defendants.
- On
31 July 2002 the Opole Regional Court found the applicant guilty as
charged and sentenced him to nine years' imprisonment and a four-year
period of deprivation of his civic rights. The time spent in
pre-trial detention was deducted from the sentence. All the accused
appealed.
- On
the same date the court prolonged the applicant's detention until 15
November 2002.
-
On 2 June 2003 the Wrocław Court of Appeal upheld the judgment
with respect to the applicant. The applicant appealed.
- On
14 February 2005 the Wrocław Court of Appeal rejected the
applicant's complaint of 25 January 2005 about the excessive length
of the proceedings before the Opole Regional Court, finding that it
had been lodged after the termination of the proceedings.
- On
24 February 2005 the applicant lodged a new complaint about the undue
length of the proceedings, referring to his application pending
before the Court. On 29 April 2005 the Court of Appeal dismissed the
complaint as ill-founded. The court admitted that the proceedings had
lasted a considerable period of time but stated that this fact alone
could not lead to the conclusion that the applicant's right to a
trial within a reasonable time had been violated. The court examined
solely the part of the proceedings conducted before the Opole
Regional Court.
- On
11 March 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's cassation
appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- The
relevant domestic law concerning the imposition of detention on
remand (aresztowanie tymczasowe), the grounds for its
prolongation, release from detention and rules governing other
so-called “preventive measures” (środki
zapobiegawcze) is set out in the Court's judgments in the cases
of Gołek v. Poland, no. 31330/02, §§ 27-33, 25
April 2006, and Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§
22-23, 4 August 2006.
- The
judgment Bąk v. Poland, no. 7870/04, §§
38-40, 16 January 2007, addresses more specifically the issue of
domestic practice in the area of pre-trial detention and organised
crime.
- For the relevant domestic law and practice concerning
the available remedies against excessive length of proceedings, see
Ratajczyk v. Poland (dec.), no. 11215/02, ECHR 2005;
Rybczyńscy v. Poland, no. 3501/02, judgment of 3 October
2006, and Białas v. Poland, no. 69129/01,
judgment of 10 October 2006.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of his pre-trial detention had
been in breach of Article 5 § 3, which in so far as relevant
provides:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
Merits
1. Submissions of the parties
- The
Government submitted that the applicant's detention was based
cumulatively on all the prerequisites of detention listed in the Code
of Criminal Procedure as applicable at the material time.
- The
Government pointed out that the charges against the applicant had
concerned several serious sexual crimes which had been committed in
co-operation with other persons. Some of the crimes had been
committed with extreme cruelty and involved minors. The applicant
faced a heavy sentence and there existed, in the Government's
opinion, a genuine public-interest requirement which, notwithstanding
the presumption of innocence, outweighed the rule of respect for
individual liberty and justified the applicant's continued detention.
They noted that the applicant was eventually sentenced to 9 years'
imprisonment and temporary deprivation of his civic rights.
- The
Government also argued that the applicant's detention had been aimed
at securing the proper conduct of the investigation as there had been
a risk that he would obstruct the proceedings and influence
witnesses, in particular since he had been charged (and later
sentenced) with threatening the victims. The Government emphasised
that the case concerned rape and the victims – women, some of
whom were minors – were especially vulnerable to violence and
required adequate protection. They concluded that only the detention
of the main perpetrators could secure the proper conduct of the
proceedings since in cases of that kind victims often refrained from
reporting the offence.
- The
Government submitted that the above-mentioned circumstances had
remained valid during the whole period of the applicant's detention.
Moreover, in the course of the proceedings the prolongation of his
detention had been justified by the need to extend the scope of the
investigation. Further, the Government observed that the courts had
stressed on several occasions that it was necessary to prevent the
accused from contacting the victims, regard being had to the fact
that investigations concerning crimes committed by a group of
criminals were especially complex and required the isolation of the
alleged perpetrators.
- The
Government also submitted that the courts did not apply detention on
remand automatically but based their decisions on a careful
consideration of each individual case and indicated specific
investigatory or procedural steps which were to be taken. The courts
had decided to release one of the defendants as soon as they had
found that the reasons justifying his detention had ceased to
persist.
- The
applicant argued that the reasonableness of his detention had not
been sufficiently confirmed during the preparatory proceedings and
that the length of his detention had been excessive.
- As
to the complexity of the case, the Government argued that it was very
complex. They pointed out that both the prosecutor and the trial
court had conducted extensive evidentiary proceedings. In the course
of the investigation over 150 applications to hear evidence had been
made and a considerable number of witnesses had been interviewed. The
Government stated that the hearings of the victims before the court
had been very time-consuming and had lasted for many hours. Bearing
in mind the fear and stress suffered by the victims, the trial court
had to show special diligence and patience and to make exceptional
efforts in order to obtain detailed and adequate testimonies. The
victims were usually heard in the absence of the accused. Even then,
obtaining evidence had been extremely difficult.
- The
complexity of the case was, in the Government's opinion, increased by
the fact that at the same time other courts had conducted separate
proceedings against the applicant and six other defendants and the
courts had to co-operate in scheduling the hearings in their cases.
However, throughout the proceedings hearings had been held regularly
and had been fixed at reasonable intervals. Only a few scheduled
hearings had had to be cancelled, and on grounds for which the courts
could not be held responsible. In the Government's opinion the
proceedings had been concluded with reasonable speed and without any
undue delays. The courts had also taken proper measures to secure the
speedy progress of the proceedings, for example by requesting the
police to determine the witnesses' addresses and, if necessary,
ordering their appearance; by deciding to examine the case of one of
the co-accused separately since the need for his psychiatric
observation could have contributed to delays; by imposing fines on
absent witnesses; or by detaining one of the defendants who had
failed to attend the hearings.
- The
applicant disagreed with the Government's opinion and stated that the
authorities had failed to display due diligence in dealing with his
case.
- Lastly,
the Government concluded that the applicant's pre-trial detention in
the present proceedings had lasted from 14 May 1999 until 31 July
2002, when the first-instance court had given its judgment.
Meanwhile, the applicant had been serving two prison sentences
imposed on him in separate proceedings. He had been imprisoned from
11 April 2001 until 10 April 2002 and from 11 April 2002 until
9 December 2002. Therefore, the Government were of the opinion
that the applicant had effectively been detained only from 14 May
1999 until 10 April 2001 - that is, for 1 year and eleven months.
- The
applicant argued that the fact that his prison sentence had
overlapped with his detention in the present proceedings should have
been regarded as a factor which militated in favour of applying a
more lenient preventive measure.
2. Principles established under the Court's case-law
- Under
the Court's case-law, the issue of whether a period of detention is
reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto. Whether it is
reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed in
each case according to its special features. Continued detention can
be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications
of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding
the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for
individual liberty (see, among other authorities, W. v.
Switzerland, judgment of 26 January 1993, Series A
no. 254-A, p. 15, § 30).
- It
falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to
ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused
person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must
examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a
genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to
the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the
rule of respect for individual liberty and set them out in their
decisions dismissing the applications for release. It is essentially
on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the
established facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals that the
Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a
violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see
McKay v. the United Kingdom, [GC], no. 543/03, § 43, 6
October 2006).
- The
persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has
committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the
lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of
time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish
whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued
to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were
“relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must
also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed
“special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings
(see Labita v. Italy, (no. 26772/95, § 153, ECHR
2000-IV).
3. Application of the principles to the circumstances
of the present case
(a) Period to be taken into consideration
- The
Court considers that the applicant's pre-trial detention can be
divided into the two following periods:
(a) the
first period, lasting from 14 May 1999 until 11 April 2001;
(b) the
second period, lasting from 12 April 2001 until 31 July 2002 (the
date on which the first-instance judgment was given), during which
the applicant's detention coincided with the prison sentences imposed
in separate criminal proceedings.
The
Court recalls that, in view of the essential link between Article
5 § 3 of the Convention and paragraph 1 (c) of that
Article, a person convicted at first instance cannot be regarded as
being detained “for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed
an offence” and that the detention coinciding with detention
after conviction in separate criminal proceedings cannot be
considered on the same footing as a situation of a person in custody
awaiting his trial (see Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27
June 1968, Series A no. 7, pp. 23-24, § 9, B. v. Austria,
judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 175, pp. 14-16, §§
36-39, Bąk v. Poland, no. 7870/04, judgment of 16
January 2007, § 54).
- The
Court consequently finds that the period to be taken into
consideration in the present case lasted from 14 May 1999 until 10
April 2001 and amounted to almost 1 year and 11 months.
(b) Reasonableness of the length of
detention
- The
Court notes that detention pending trial was imposed on the applicant
in view of the severity of the charges against him, the fact that he
had committed the crime in co-operation with other persons and the
risk that he would obstruct the proceedings and exert unlawful
pressure on witnesses, in particular since he had been charged with
threatening the victims.
- The
Court observes that in their decisions to remand the applicant in
custody the judicial authorities relied on the following principal
grounds: the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, the serious
nature of the offences with which he had been charged, the severity
of the penalty to which he was liable, the risk of his influencing
the testimonies of witnesses and of the co-accused and the need to
obtain extensive evidence (see paragraphs 7, 22 and 23 above).
Furthermore, the Government stated that the particular complexity of
the case, since it concerned gang rape, was an additional
justification for the applicant's detention.
- The
suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences was confirmed
in particular by the testimonies of the victims and the co-accused
and initially warranted his detention. Therefore, the only question
which remains is whether and when the continuation of his detention
ceased to be warranted by “relevant” and “sufficient”
reasons.
- The
Court considers that the authorities were faced with the difficult
task of determining the facts and the degree of alleged
responsibility of each of the defendants. In these circumstances, the
Court also accepts that the difficulties in obtaining evidence from
victims, some of whom were minors, coupled with the existence of a
risk of exerting pressure on them by the perpetrators of the rapes,
constituted relevant and sufficient grounds for prolonging his
detention during the time necessary to complete the investigation, to
draw up the bill of indictment and to hear evidence from the victims,
the witnesses and the accused.
- As
regards the risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses or of
the obstruction of the proceedings by other unlawful means, the Court
notes that this risk stemmed from the fact that the applicant had
been charged with persuading the victims not to report the crimes to
the police. In addition, the victims were especially vulnerable to
violence and required special protection. The subsequent decisions to
prolong the applicant's detention pending trial underlined the fact
that these fears were well-founded, since it had been proved that two
of the defendants had exerted pressure on witnesses and caused them
to alter significantly their version of events (see paragraph
22 above). The Court accepts that, in the special circumstances
of the case, the risk of collusion actually existed and justified
holding the applicant in custody for the relevant period.
- It
must be noted that the domestic courts when ordering the prolongation
of the applicant's remand referred to the continuing need for that
measure and did not merely rely on the grounds previously given (see
paragraphs 11, 18, 22 and 26 above).
- The
foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude
that the grounds given for the applicant's pre-trial detention were
“relevant” and “sufficient” to justify
holding him in custody for the entire period at issue. That being
said, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national
authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct
of the criminal proceedings against the applicant.
- In
assessing the conduct of the authorities in the present case, the
Court will take into account the special circumstances deriving from
the fact that it concerned charges of rape committed by a group of
criminals.
- The
Court observes that the applicant was convicted on 31 July 2002. The
case was of considerable complexity, regard being had to the number
of defendants, the need to separate them during the extensive
evidentiary proceedings and to implement special measures required by
the victims' vulnerability. Nevertheless, the hearings in the
applicant's case were held regularly and at short intervals. The
courts also took proper measures to ensure the speedy progress of the
proceedings (see paragraphs 17, 20, 24 and 27 above). The Court
further notes that the trial court took all necessary steps to
resolve difficulties in hearing witnesses in the course of the
proceedings and applied adequate measures to discipline them. It
decided to examine the charges against one of the accused in separate
proceedings, having considered that it would contribute to a prompt
examination of the case (see paragraph 17 above). The Court therefore
concludes that the national authorities displayed special diligence
in the conduct of the proceedings. The length of the investigation
and of the trial was justified by the exceptional complexity of the
case. It should not be overlooked that, while an accused person in
detention is entitled to have his case given priority and conducted
with particular expedition, this must not stand in the way of the
efforts of the judges to clarify fully the facts in issue, to provide
both the defence and the prosecution with all necessary facilities
for putting forward their evidence and stating their case and to give
judgment only after careful reflection on whether the offences were
in fact committed and on the sentence to be imposed.
- Having
regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that there has been no
violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained of a violation of his right to a trial within a
reasonable time. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention,
which in so far as relevant provides:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government admitted that the applicant had exhausted remedies
available under Polish law.
- The
Court notes that the applicant could not avail himself of any remedy
with respect to the pre-trial proceedings, such proceedings not being
covered by the 2004 Act.
- The
Court further notes that the applicant filed an unsuccessful
complaint under the 2004 Act on 24 February 2005 about the length of
the proceedings before the Opole Regional Court. The Wrocław
Court of Appeal examined the conduct of the proceedings before the
Opole Regional Court from 3 December 1999 (the date on which the bill
of indictment was submitted to the trial court) to 31 July 2002. It
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the proceedings had not
lasted an unreasonable time.
- The
Court can but note that it would have been open to the applicant to
use the 2004 Act with respect to the length of proceedings before the
Court of Appeal or the cassation proceedings before the Supreme Court
(see Becova v. Slovakia, no. 23788/06 (dec).). The Court
observes that the domestic courts should have the possibility under
the 2004 Act to examine the conduct of the proceedings before all
judicial instances which dealt with the case. However, in the present
case the Government have not pleaded the applicant's failure to
exhaust the 2004 remedy with respect to the phase of the proceedings
after 31 July 2002 and it is not for the Court to consider this
matter of its own motion (see Urbanczyk v. Poland, no.
33777/96 (dec).).
It
follows that this part of the complaint cannot be rejected under
Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
- Having
regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that that the
complaint about the length of the proceedings is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Submissions of the parties
- The
Government submitted that in the particular circumstances of the
applicant's case there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention.
They repeated the submissions they had made with regard to the
allegedly unreasonable length of the applicant's detention (see
paragraphs 47-49 above) and argued that the case had been very
complex. They recalled that the case had concerned multiple charges
of gang rape (including statutory rape) committed with extreme
cruelty and in conjunction with deprivation of liberty, and that the
perpetrators had threatened the victims and attempted to exert
pressure on them not to inform the police about the crimes.
- As
to the conduct of the domestic authorities, the Government further
argued that, regardless of the total length of the proceedings, there
had been no delays attributable to the State. The proceedings had
been concluded swiftly and the judicial authorities had shown due
diligence in ensuring their proper conduct.
- As
to the conduct of the applicant, the Government were of the opinion
that he had significantly contributed to the length of the
proceedings. In particular, the applicant and other defendants had
lodged various applications and appeals, which had to be dismissed on
several occasions owing to their irrelevance or lack of
justification. The Government argued, relying on Malicka-Wąsowska
v. Poland ((dec.), no. 41413/98, 5 April 2001), that in
exercising his procedural rights, the applicant must have been aware
that such applications and appeals might contribute to delays in the
proceedings.
- The
applicant contested these arguments and argued that the length of the
proceedings had been excessive.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) Period to be taken into consideration
- Having
regard to its considerations set out in paragraphs 70-72, the Court
recalls that the period under examination for the purposes of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention lasted from 14 May 1999 to 11 March 2005
and amounts to 5 years and 9 months for three levels of jurisdiction.
(b) Reasonableness of the length of
proceedings
- The
Court will examine the reasonableness of the length of proceedings in
the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the
criteria established by its case-law, particularly the complexity of
the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant
authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute
(see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC],
no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII, and Humen v. Poland
[GC], no. 26614/95, § 60, 15 October 1999).
80. As
regards the nature of the case, the Court observes that, having
regard to the seriousness of the crimes and their sexual character,
as well as the mental state of the victims and the number of
witnesses and accused, it was of considerable complexity. The Court's
attention has particularly been drawn to the significant number of
witnesses and victims questioned by the first-instance court, as well
as to the number of defendants. The Court also refers to its
above findings in respect of the complaint under Article 5 § 3
of the Convention (see, in particular, paragraphs 61 and 66 above).
- With regard to the conduct of
the authorities and of the applicant, the Court reiterates that only
delays attributable to the State may justify a finding of a failure
to comply with the "reasonable time" requirement (see,
among other authorities, Proszak
v. Poland, judgment of 16
December 1997, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1997 VIII, § 40)
and that in civil proceedings the parties too must show "due
diligence" (see the Pretto and
Others v. Italy judgment of
8 December 1983, Series A no. 71, pp. 14-15, § 33).
82. The
evidence before the Court does not disclose any significant period of
inactivity that could be attributable to the domestic courts. During
the period under consideration the case the case was heard by courts
at three instances. The hearings were held regularly and the trial
court made efforts to conduct the proceedings promptly and swiftly
(see paragraphs 17, 20, 24 and 27 above). The trial court also took
all necessary steps to resolve difficulties in hearing witnesses in
the course of the proceedings and applied adequate disciplinary
measures, given the fact that when the hearings were adjourned it
was, on many occasions, as the accused or their representatives
failed to attend them for various reasons (see paragraph 17 above).
The Court observes the absences must have
contributed to their overall length of the proceedings in the present
case at the hearings and could be regarded as delaying
tactics.
- The
Court also observes that the Wrocław Court of Appeal thoroughly
analysed the proceedings after the applicant had lodged a complaint
under the 2004 Act on the breach of the right to a trial within a
reasonable time. In that court's opinion, the proceedings had not
breached the reasonable-time requirement. The court pointed to the
extreme complexity of the case and to the applicant's attitude with
respect to the proceedings. It noted that the number of the
applicant's belated, ill-founded or meaningless motions filed by the
applicant had contributed significantly to the length of the
proceeding (see paragraph 35 above).
- Having
regard to the fact that the national courts are in principle better
placed than the international judge to assess the particular
circumstances of the case before them, in particular the complexity
of the case or the applicant's attitude towards the proceedings, the
Court will not depart from the Wrocław Court of Appeal's finding
that the applicant's right to a trial within a reasonable time had
not been violated, there being no evidence that its conclusion was
without reasonable foundation.
- Having regard also to its findings under Article 5 §
3 above as to the conduct of the criminal case against the applicant,
the Court concludes that the proceedings complained of did not exceed
the “reasonable time” requirement within the meaning of
Article 6 § 1.
There
has accordingly been no breach of that provision.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 December 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T. L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
