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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KOZIMOR v. POLAND
(Application
no. 10816/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12
April 2007
This judgment will
become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Kozimor v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr G.
Bonello,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L.
Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
Mrs P. Hirvelä,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 20 March 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 10816/02) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Piotr Kozimor (“the
applicant”), on 22 December 2000.
- The
Polish Government were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- On
6 September 2005 the Court declared the application partly
inadmissible and decided to communicate the complaints concerning the
length of the applicant's pre-trial detention, lack of equality of
arms in the proceedings for prolonging his pre-trial detention and
the censorship of his correspondence to the Government. Under the
provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it
decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as
its admissibility.
- On 23 September 2005 the applicant's sister, Mrs Renata
Kozimor, informed the Court's Registry that the applicant had died on
12 August 2005. She stated that she wished to continue the
proceedings before the Court in her late brother's stead.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1971 and lived in Przemyśl, Poland.
1. The criminal proceedings
- On
14 August 1997 the applicant was arrested by the police. On 15 August
1997 the Przemyśl District Court (Sąd Rejonowy)
decided to detain the applicant on remand in view of the reasonable
suspicion that he had committed a homicide.
- Subsequently,
the applicant's pre-trial detention was prolonged on several
occasions, in particular at the hearing held on 5 November 1998.
- On
21 December 1998 the Przemyśl Regional Court (Sąd
Wojewódzki) convicted the applicant of homicide and
sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment.
- On
29 April 1999 the Court of Appeal quashed the impugned judgment and
remitted the case.
- On
2 June 1999 the Przemyśl Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy)
decided to prolong the applicant's pre-trial detention. The court
gave the following reasons:
“Prolongation of the applicant's detention on
remand is justified by the fact that the applicant has been accused
of homicide.”
- On
24 February 2000 the Przemyśl Regional Court dismissed the
applicant's request for release. The reasons of the decision are as
follows:
“[The applicant] has been accused of having
committed [a homicide] and the original reasons for keeping him in
detention are still valid.”
- On
3 March 2000 the Przemyśl Regional Court further prolonged the
applicant's pre-trial detention. The court found that keeping the
applicant in detention was necessary because he had been charged with
homicide and the trial court had started the process of obtaining
expert evidence.
- On
12 April 2000 the trial court held the first hearing. Subsequently,
ten hearings were held.
- On
2 June and 29 August 2000 the applicant's pre-trial detention was
prolonged as the courts considered that the necessity to secure the
proper conduct of the proceedings and the severity of the anticipated
penalty justified keeping him in custody.
- On
14 September 2000 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal dismissed the
applicant's appeal against the decision of 29 August 2000.
The
applicant submits that neither he nor his lawyer was informed about
the majority of scheduled court sessions at which his detention on
remand was prolonged and that he was not allowed to attend any of
these sessions.
- On
28 December 2000 the Rzeszów Regional Court gave judgment. The
court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to 25 years'
imprisonment. The applicant appealed.
- On
17 May 2001 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal (Sąd
Apelacyjny) amended the impugned judgment. The court sentenced
the applicant to 15 years' imprisonment. The applicant lodged a
cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy).
- On
28 February 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed his cassation appeal as
being manifestly ill-founded.
2. The monitoring of the applicant's correspondence
- On
28 February 2001 the Court's Registry sent to the applicant, who at
that time had been detained on remand in the Przemyśl Detention
Centre, an application form and accompanying documents in reply to
his letter in which he had notified his intention to lodge a
complaint with the Court. The Court's envelope delivered to the
applicant bears the stamp: Rzeszów Regional Court (Sąd
Okręgowy w Rzeszowie) and a hand written note: censo.,
21.03.2001 (cenzu. 21.03.01).
- The
envelope from the Chancellery of the Senate of the Republic of Poland
of 30 January 2001 bears the same stamp as above and a
hand written note: censored, 1 [February 20]01 (cenzurowano,
7.02.01) and an illegible signature.
- The
applicant also submitted that his correspondence with his
court appointed lawyer had been censored by the authorities of
the Przemyśl Detention Centre. He provided an envelope addressed
to his lawyer which bears the following stamps: the Rzeszów
Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy w Rzeszowie), a
hand-written note: censored, 19 [July 20]00 (cenzurowano,
19.07.2000) and an illegible signature. The envelope was posted
on 19 July 2000. The second envelope, also addressed to his
lawyer, bears the same stamp of the Regional Court, a date: 1.02.2001
and an illegible signature.
The
third envelope was addressed to the applicant by his lawyer. The
envelope, posted on 26 January 2001, bears the following stamps:
the Przemyśl Prison 29.01.2001 (Zakład Karny w
Przemyślu), the Rzeszów Regional Court, 1.02.2001,
and an illegible signature.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- The
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1997, which entered into force on
1 September 1998, defines detention on remand as one of the
so called “preventive measures” (środki
zapobiegawcze). Article 249 § 5 provides that the lawyer of
a detained person should be informed of the date and time of court
sessions at which a decision is to be taken concerning prolongation
of detention on remand.
- A
more detailed rendition of the relevant domestic law provisions is
set out in the Court's judgments in Kudła v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, § 75, ECHR 2000 XI, and Celejewski
v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§ 22 and 23, 4 May
2006.
- Rules relating to means of controlling correspondence
of persons involved in criminal proceedings are set out in the Code
of Execution of Criminal Sentences (Kodeks karny wykonawczy)
(“the 1997 Code”) which entered into force on 1 September
1998. Article 102 (11) of the 1997 Code provides that convicted
persons are entitled to uncensored correspondence with the State
authorities and with the Ombudsman. The relevant part of Article 103
§ 1 of the Code provides as follows:
“Convicts (...) have a right to lodge complaints
with institutions established by international treaties ratified by
the Republic of Poland concerning the protection of human rights.
Correspondence in those cases (...) shall be sent to the addressee
without delay and shall not be censored.”
Pursuant
to Article 214 § 1,
“Unless exceptions are provided for in the present
Chapter, a detainee shall enjoy at least the same rights as are
secured to a convicted person serving a sentence of imprisonment
under the ordinary regime in a closed prison....”
Article
73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a person detained
on remand has a right to communicate freely with his lawyer. A
prosecutor may order the control of the detainee's correspondence
with his lawyer; however, such measure cannot be maintained longer
than 14 days after the detention order has been imposed.
For a
more detailed rendition of the relevant domestic law provisions, see
the Court's judgments in Michta v. Poland, no. 13425/02, § 33,
4 May 2006 and Kwiek v. Poland, no. 51895/99, § 23,
30 May 2006.
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
- The
Court notes at the outset that the applicant died after the
introduction of his application. Subsequently, his sister,
Mrs Renata Kozimor, informed
the Court that she wished to pursue the application introduced by her
brother. She explained that, before his arrest, her brother had lived
with her in her apartment, which had been his registered address
until his death, and had taken care of her. Therefore, she had
suffered frustration and distress caused, in particular, by her
brother's three year long detention on remand.
- The
respondent Government submitted that the applicant's sister cannot be
considered a person entitled to pursue the proceedings before the
Court on the applicant's behalf and invited the Court to strike the
application out of its list of cases.
- The
Court recalls that when an applicant dies during the proceedings, the
next of kin of the applicant has a legitimate interest to
justify the continuation of the examination of the case (see, for
example, Lukanov v. Bulgaria,
judgment of 20 March 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1997 II, § 35; Fojcik v. Poland, no. 57670/00,
§ 46, 21 September 2004; X v. France judgment
of 31 March 1992, Series A no. 234-C, p. 89,
§ 26).
- The
Court thus accepts that the applicant's sister
has a legitimate moral interest to pursue the application on her
brother's behalf and to obtain a ruling whether, in particular, the
length of his detention and alleged censorship of his correspondence
had infringed his Convention rights, complaints which he relied on
before the Court.
- Accordingly,
the applicant's sister has standing to
continue the proceedings before the Court in the applicant's stead,
and the Government's preliminary objection should be dismissed.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of his detention on remand had
been unreasonable. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention,
which reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
- The
Government contested that argument. The Government considered that
the length of the applicant's pre-trial detention satisfied the
requirements of Article 5 § 3. The Government
submitted that his pre-trial detention was duly justified and that
during the entire period the authorities had given relevant and
sufficient reasons for prolonging it. Moreover, they maintained that
the applicant had been serving at the relevant time a prison sentence
of 2 years and 6 months resulting from a previous
conviction.
- The
Court first notes that the applicant had been detained on remand on
15 August 1997 and that the first-instance judgment was given on
21 December 1998. Subsequently, on 29 April 1999, the appeal
court quashed the judgment and remitted the case. The applicant's
detention on remand lasted until 28 December 2000 when the trial
court again convicted him.
However,
according to the documents submitted by the Government, between 14
August 1997 and 14 February 2000 the applicant was serving a sentence
of 30 months' imprisonment resulting from a previous conviction by
the Przemyśl Regional Court (case no. II K 13/98). This period
should be deducted from the overall period of the applicant's
detention (see Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June
1968, Series A no. 7, pp. 23-24, § 9 and Czarnecki
v. Poland, no. 75112/01, § 33, 28 July 2005). The
detention thus lasted 10 months and 14 days.
- Under
the Court's case-law, the issue of whether a period of detention is
reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto. Whether it is
reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed in
each case according to its special features. Continued detention can
be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications
of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding
the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for
individual liberty (see, among other authorities, W. v.
Switzerland, judgment of 26 January 1993, Series A
no. 254 A, p. 15, § 30, and Kudła v.
Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 110, ECHR 2000 XI)
- The
Court observes that in the present case the authorities relied on the
reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the very
serious offence with which he had been charged and on the severity of
the sentence that might be imposed. The judicial authorities further
considered that the applicant's detention was necessary to secure the
proper conduct of the proceedings. Finally, the courts periodically
reviewed the need to prolong the applicant's detention.
Accordingly,
the Court considers that in the particular circumstances of the case
and in view of its above findings as to the total length of the
applicant's detention, the applicant's detention was in conformity
with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 5
§ 3 of the Convention.
It
follows that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4
of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained about the procedure relating to the prolongation
of his pre-trial detention, in particular that he and his lawyer
could not attend the sessions at which his detention was prolonged.
The Court will examine this complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
- The
Government submitted that according to Article 249 § 1 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, the lawyer of the accused was notified of
all the court's sessions at which detention on remand was prolonged
and was entitled to take part in them. The Government maintained that
the applicant's lawyer was summoned to those sessions and that on one
occasion the prolongation of the detention was ordered at a public
hearing at which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. The
Government submitted that, taking into consideration all the
proceedings devoted to the review of the lawfulness of the
applicant's pre-trial detention, the principles guaranteed in Article
5 § 4 of the Convention had been respected in the present case.
- The
Court reiterates the following principles which emerge from the
Court's case law on Article 5 § 4, so far as relevant in
the present case:
(a) Article
5 § 4 of the Convention entitles an arrested or detained person
to institute proceedings bearing on the procedural and substantive
conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, in
Convention terms, of their deprivation of liberty (see, among many
others, Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment
of 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145 B, pp. 34-35, §
65).
(b) Although
it is not always necessary that the procedure under Article 5
§ 4 be attended by the same guarantees as those required
under Article 6 of the Convention for criminal or civil
litigation, it must have a judicial character and provide guarantees
appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question (see,
for instance, Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of
28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VIII,
p. 3302, § 162, and Włoch v. Poland,
no. 27785/95, § 125, ECHR 2000 XI,
both with reference to Megyeri v. Germany, judgment of
12 May 1992, Series A no. 237-A, p. 11, § 22).
(c) The
proceedings must be adversarial and must always ensure “equality
of arms” between the parties. In the case of a person whose
detention falls within the ambit of Article 5 § 1(c) a hearing
is required (see Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96,
§ 58, ECHR 1999-II; Assenov and Others, cited above, §
162, with references to Schiesser v. Switzerland,
judgment of 4 December 1979, Series A no. 34, p. 13, §§ 30 31;
Sanchez Reisse v. Switzerland, judgment of 21
October 1986, Series A no. 107, p. 19, § 51; and
Kampanis v. Greece, judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A
no. 318-B, p. 45, § 47).
(d) Furthermore,
Article 5 § 4 requires that a person detained on remand be able
to take proceedings at reasonable intervals to challenge the
lawfulness of his detention (see Assenov and Others, cited
above, p. 3302, § 162, with a reference to Bezicheri
v. Italy, judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A no.
164, pp. 10-11, §§ 20-21).
- Turning
to the circumstances of the instant case, the Court firstly notes
that it cannot examine events complained of by the applicant which
took place before 22 June 2000, that is more than six months before
the date on which this complaint was submitted to the Court.
- The
procedure for the prolongation of the applicant's pre trial
detention during the period under consideration was based on
Article 249 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
which requires the domestic courts to inform the lawyer of a detained
person of the date and time of court sessions at which a decision was
to be taken concerning prolongation of detention on remand, or an
appeal against a decision to impose or to prolong detention on remand
was to be considered. It was open to the lawyer to attend such
sessions.
- The
Court notes that, as it appears from the Government's submissions, at
least on one occasion the decision to prolong the applicant's
detention was given at a public hearing at which the applicant was
present and was legally represented. He was therefore able to
personally support his application for release. The applicant has not
advanced any evidence that would establish that the authorities
departed from the general rule and failed to summon the lawyer to
other sessions at which the applicant's detention was prolonged. In
this connection the Court reiterates that in cases where
characteristics pertaining to the applicant's personality and level
of maturity and reliability are of importance in deciding on his
dangerousness, Article 5 § 4 requires an oral hearing
in the context of an adversarial procedure involving legal
representation (see Waite v. the United Kingdom, no. 53236/99,
§ 59, 10 December 2002). On the basis of the material
before it the Court considers, however, that in the present case the
questions of assessment of the applicant's character or mental state
did not arise and that his personal attendance at all of the sessions
at which his detention on remand had been prolonged was therefore not
required.
- In
view of the above, the Court is of the opinion that the proceedings
in which the prolongation of his detention was examined satisfied the
requirements of Article 5 § 4 (see Telecki v. Poland,
(dec.), no. 56552/00, 3 July 2003 and Celejewski v.
Poland, no. 17584/04, § 47, 4 May 2006).
- It
follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly
ill founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained about censorship of his correspondence with the
Chancellery of the Senate and with his lawyer. The Court also
considered it appropriate to raise ex officio the issue of
Poland's compliance with Article 8 of the Convention on account
of the monitoring of the applicant's correspondence with the Court.
This
Article, in its relevant part, reads:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his ... correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
- The
Government refrained from expressing their opinion on the
admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 8.
A. Admissibility
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Principles established under the Court's case-law
- The
Court recalls that any “interference by a public authority”
with the right to respect for correspondence will contravene Article
8 of the Convention unless it is “in accordance with the law”,
pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2
of that Article and is “necessary in a democratic society”
in order to achieve them (see, among many other authorities, Silver
and Others v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, Series A
no. 61, p. 32, § 84; Campbell v. the United
Kingdom, 25 March 1992, Series A no. 233, p. 16, §
34 and Niedbała v. Poland no. 27915/95, § 78).
- As
to the expression “in accordance with the law”, the Court
has established three fundamental principles. The first one is that
the interference in question must have some basis in domestic law.
The second principle is that “the law must be adequately
accessible”, a person must be able to have an indication that
is adequate, in the circumstances, of the legal rules applicable to
his case. The third principle is that “a norm cannot be
regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient precision
to enable a person to regulate his conduct; he must be able if
need be with appropriate advice to foresee, to a degree that
is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given
action may entail” (see Silver, cited above, §§ 86-88).
- It
is important to respect the confidentiality of correspondence with
the Court since it may concern allegations against prison authorities
or prison officials. The opening of letters both to and from the
Convention organs undoubtedly gives rise to the possibility that they
will be read and may conceivably, on occasion, also create the risk
of reprisals by prison staff against the prisoner concerned (see
Campbell, cited above, p. 22, § 62). No
compelling reasons have been found to exist for monitoring or
delaying an applicant's correspondence with the Court (see Campbell,
cited above, §§ 48 and 62; and Peers
v. Greece, no. 28524/95, § 84, ECHR 2001 III
and Drozdowski v. Poland, no. 20841/02, §§
27-31, 6 December 2005).
2. Application of the principles to the circumstances
of the present case
(a) Existence of an interference
- The
applicant submitted an envelope from the Court, addressed to him,
which bears a stamp of the Rzeszów Regional Court and a
hand written note: censo[red], 21.03.2001 (see paragraph 19
above).
The
identical stamp and inscription “censored, 7.02.2001” can
be found on the letter addressed to the applicant from the
Chancellery of the Senate of the Republic of Poland (see paragraph 20
above).
Finally,
the applicant provided an envelope, sent by him to his lawyer, which
bears the identical stamp of the Rzeszów Regional Court, the
inscription “censorship”, an illegible signature and the
date 19 July 2000. The remaining two envelopes, the first one
addressed to his lawyer, and the second from the latter addressed to
the applicant, bear only the above described stamps of the
Rzeszów Regional Court, illegible signatures and dates.
- The
Court firstly observes that the Government refrained from taking a
position on the question whether there had been an interference with
the applicant's right to respect for his correspondence. The Court
has held on many occasions that as long as the Polish authorities
continue the practice of marking detainees' letters with the
ocenzurowano stamp, the Court has no alternative but to
presume that those letters have been opened and their contents read,
even if there is no separate stamp on the letter as such (see
Matwiejczuk v. Poland, no. 37641/97, § 99,
2 December 2003 and Pisk Piskowski v. Poland,
no. 92/03, § 26, 14 June 2005, Michta v. Poland,
no. 13425/02, § 58, 4 May 2006).
It
follows that censoring of the applicant's letters with the Court, the
Chancellery of the Senate of the Republic of Poland, and, at least on
one occasion, with his lawyer, amounted to an “interference”
with the applicant's right to respect for his correspondence under
Article 8.
(b) Whether the interference was “in
accordance with the law”
- The
Government did not indicate a concrete legal basis in the domestic
law for the impugned interference. The Court notes that the
interference took place between July 2000 and February 2001 when the
applicant had been detained on remand prior, and shortly after, the
first instance judgment.
- As
regards the interference with the right to respect for the
applicant's correspondence with the Court, it further observes that,
according to Article 214 of the Code of Execution of Criminal
Sentences, persons detained on remand should enjoy the same rights as
those convicted by a final judgment. Accordingly, the prohibition of
censorship of correspondence with the European Court of Human Rights
contained in Article 103 of the 1997 Code, which expressly
relates to convicted persons, was also applicable to detained persons
(see Michta v. Poland, cited above, § 61,
Kwiek v. Poland, no. 51895/99, § 44,
30 May 2006). Thus, censorship of the letter from the Registry
of the Court to the applicant was contrary to the domestic law.
- As
regards the censorship of the letter from the Chancellery of the
Senate of the Republic of Poland addressed to the applicant, the
Court notes that it has previously held that the censorship of an
applicant's correspondence with a State authority, the Constitutional
Court, was contrary to the statutory prohibition laid down in
Article 102 (11) of the 1997 Code read in conjunction with
Article 214 of the 1997 Code (see Kwiek, cited above, §
41). The Court sees no reason to distinguish the instant case from
the Kwiek case, and in the absence of any comment by the
Government, it concludes that the interference with the applicant's
correspondence with the Chancellery of the Senate, being a State
authority too, was contrary to the domestic law.
- Finally,
the Court reiterates that the confidentiality of the applicant's
letters addressed to and sent by his legal counsel must be respected
- save for reasonable cause (see, Campbell, cited above, pp.
16-21, §§ 32-54). In the present case, regard being
had to the explicit prohibition of censorship of detained persons'
correspondence with their lawyers, provided for in Article 73 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considers that the
interference complained of was contrary to the domestic law.
- It
follows that the interference with the
applicant's correspondence with the Court, the Chancellery of the
Senate and his lawyer was not “in accordance with the law”.
Having
regard to that finding, the
Court does not consider it necessary to ascertain whether the other
requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 were complied
with.
Consequently,
the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of
the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 15,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in respect of
non pecuniary damage.
- The
Government did not comment on the applicant's claim.
- The
Court considers that in the particular circumstances of the case, the
finding of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention would not
constitute sufficient just satisfaction for the non pecuniary
damage sustained by the applicant. Having regard to the extent of the
violation found, the Court awards the applicant's sister,
Mrs Renata Kozimor, EUR 1,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant did not make any claim for the costs and expenses incurred
before the domestic courts or before the Court.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the monitoring
of the applicant's correspondence admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
8 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant's sister,
Mrs Renata Kozimor, within three months from the date on
which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2
of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Polish zlotys at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 April 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
