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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF ÖZDEN v. TURKEY
(Application
no. 11841/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3
May 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Özden v. Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr J.
Casadevall,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr K.
Traja,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mr J. Šikuta, judges,
and
Mrs F. Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 3 April 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 11841/02) against the Republic
of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr İzzet Cahit Özden
(“the applicant”), on 18 February 2002.
- The
applicant was represented by Ms Gerçel, a lawyer practising in
Istanbul. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) did
not designate an Agent for the purposes of the proceedings before the
Court.
- The
applicant complained in the first place about the length of domestic
proceedings and further alleged that he had been deprived of his
property. He invoked Article 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention.
- On
20 December 2005 the Court decided to give notice of the application
to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Istanbul.
- In
1950, in accordance with Law no. 4753 regarding the distribution of
lands to farmers in need, a plot of land measuring approximately
165,000 m2 on
Maden Island, in the Ayvalık District of the Balıkesir
Province, was sold to C.Ç. by the State authorities and
registered in his name.
- In
1968, pursuant to Law no. 6831, the Forest Cadastral Commission
conducted a boundary marking exercise (tahdit çalışması)
on Maden Island. The purpose of this exercise was to detect the
forest areas which had not been included on the cadastral map. The
outcome of the evaluation was publicly announced and as no opposition
was made, this decision became definitive in 1970. It was concluded
that the whole of Maden Island had the characteristics of a forest
and it therefore could not be the subject of private ownership. This
conclusion was annotated in the title deed registry in 1978.
- In 1985 C.Ç. signed an agreement with the
applicant, promising to sell the land in question.
- Between
1985 and 1987, the Forest Cadastral Commission conducted an
evaluation (aplikasyon çalışması) of the
area to detect the lands which had lost their characteristics as a
forest and to remove their forest status. The decision was announced
on 27 January 1988. It was concluded that the plot of land in
question had not lost its characteristics as a forest within the
meaning of Article 2 of the Law no.4785.
- On
20 September 1989 the applicant purchased the land in question and
registered it in his name.
The proceedings brought by C. Ç. against the Forestry
Directorate
- On 10 June 1988 C.Ç. filed an action before the
Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction against the Forestry
Directorate and the Forestry Ministry, objecting to the Forest
Cadastral Commission's decision of 27 January 1988.
- On
15 June 1989 the Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction
held that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and transferred
the file to the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. The Forestry
Directorate appealed against this decision. On 15 December 1989 the
Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court
on procedural grounds. The case was remitted to the Ayvalık
Civil Court of General Jurisdiction. On 30 May 1990 the
court declared that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and
transferred the file to the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. The
proceedings resumed before the Cadastral Court on 15 November 1991.
- On
9 December 1992 the Ayvalık Cadastral Court decided to annul the
Forest Cadastral Commission's decision of 27 January 1988 and remove
the land's forest status. Furthermore, it ordered that the land be
registered in the name of the Treasury.
- Both
parties appealed against the decision. On 15 February 1994 the Court
of Cassation quashed the decision of the first-instance court. It
held that forests could not be the subject of private ownership and
therefore could not be distributed to landless farmers for
agricultural purposes. Any property claim over a forest was therefore
considered legally invalid. The court found that C. Ç. was not
entitled to request the removal of the land's forest status.
- The
case was resumed before the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. On 3 April
1995 the Cadastral Court maintained its initial decision of
9 December 1992.
- The
Forestry Directorate and the Forestry Ministry filed an appeal. On 3
April 1996 the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation
supported the reasoning of the relevant chamber of the Court of
Cassation and quashed the decision of the Ayvalık Cadastral
Court. The case file was sent back to the Cadastral Court.
- On
26 November 1998 the Ayvalık Cadastral Court decided to abide by
the decision of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation.
It consequently dismissed C. Ç.'s case and held that there was
no legal benefit for private persons to act as a plaintiff in cases
concerning the revocation of forest status.
- On
28 May 2001 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the Ayvalık
Cadastral Court. This decision was served on the applicant on
21 August 2001.
The proceedings brought by the Forestry Directorate to annul the
registration of title
- On
12 August 1986 the Forestry Directorate initiated proceedings before
the Ayvalık Magistrate's Court against C.Ç. to annul the
registration of title and for an order preventing further use of the
land by C.Ç. On 23 February 1987 the applicant intervened
in the proceedings. On 25 June 1987 the Ayvalık
Magistrate's Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to examine the
case and transferred the file to the Ayvalık Civil Court of
General Jurisdiction.
- In
1988 the court decided to stay the proceedings as the determination
of the case depended on the outcome of the case pending before the
Ayvalık Cadastral Court (see paragraphs 11-18 above).
- Following
the decision of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation,
the proceedings before the Ayvalık Civil Court of General
Jurisdiction resumed (see paragraph 16 above). On 5 June 1998, in
view of the decision of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of
Cassation, the first-instance court held that the plot of land in
dispute was designated as part of a forest area and could not be the
subject of private occupation. It therefore decided to annul the
applicant's title and to register the land in question in the name of
the Treasury. The applicant appealed.
- On 22 May 2001 the Court of Cassation found the
applicant's grounds for appeal unfounded and upheld the decision of
the first-instance court. This decision was served on the applicant
on 23 August 2001.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that he had been deprived of his land in
circumstances that were incompatible with the requirements of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
- The
Government maintained that C.Ç. had lost possession of his
land in 1968 when his land was designated as part of a forest area.
As a result, they argued that the transaction between the applicant
and C.Ç. was not valid.
- The
Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which guarantees
the right to the protection of property, contains three distinct
rules: “the first rule, set out in the first sentence of the
first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle
of the peaceful enjoyment of property; the second rule, contained in
the second sentence of the first paragraph, covers deprivation of
possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; the third rule,
stated in the second paragraph, recognises that the Contracting
States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest... The three rules
are not, however, 'distinct' in the sense of being unconnected. The
second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of
interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and
should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle
enunciated in the first rule” (see Anheuser-Busch
Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, § 62, 11 January 2007).
- The Court further recalls that Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 applies only to a person's existing possessions. Thus, the hope
that a long-extinguished property right may be revived cannot be
regarded as a “possession”; nor can a conditional claim
which lapses as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition (see
Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 35
(c), ECHR 2004 IX).
- However,
in certain circumstances, a “legitimate expectation” of
obtaining an “asset” may also enjoy the protection of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Thus, where a proprietary interest
is in the nature of a claim, the person in whom it is vested may be
regarded as having a “legitimate expectation” if there is
a sufficient basis for the interest in national law, for example
where there is settled case-law of the domestic courts confirming its
existence. On the other hand, no legitimate expectation can be said
to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation
and application of domestic law and the applicant's submissions are
subsequently rejected by the national courts (Anheuser-Busch Inc.,
cited above, § 65 and Kopecký, cited above, §
50).
- In
the instant case, the Court is called upon to determine whether the
applicant had a legitimate expectation of obtaining the enjoyment of
the property in question in view of the above principles. In this
respect, the Court notes that following the evaluation made by the
Forest Cadastral Commission, the whole of Maden Island was designated
as forest area in 1968. Since no opposition was made, the decision
became definitive in 1970 and this conclusion was annotated in the
title deed registry (see paragraph 7 above). The Court also takes
note of the fact that the applicant signed an agreement with C.Ç.
in 1985, by which C.Ç. promised to sell the land in question
to the applicant (see paragraph 8 above). Thereafter, on 12 August
1986 the Forestry Directorate initiated proceedings before the
Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction against C.Ç.
to annul the registration of his title. The applicant intervened in
these proceedings on 23 February 1987 (see paragraph 19 above). It
was only on 20 September 1989 that the applicant purchased the land
in question and registered it in his name (see paragraph 10 above).
Having regard to the above, the Court concludes that the applicant
was aware that the land in question bore the characteristics of a
forest. It is also an undisputed fact, that under Turkish law,
private occupation of forests is prohibited.
- At
this point, the Court also notes that the applicant complains mainly
about the manner in which the domestic courts interpreted and applied
domestic law. The Court reiterates that it has only limited power to
deal with alleged errors of fact or law committed by the national
courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [G.C.] no. 30544/96, §
28, ECHR 1999-I and Kopp v. Switzerland, judgment of 25 March
1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1988-II, p. 540, §
59), and it cannot substitute its view for that of the domestic
authorities establishing the physical characteristics of the land in
question. It is true that, on 9 December 1992 and 3 April 1995
respectively, the Ayvalık Cadastral Court, which decided the
case at first instance, ordered the annulment of the Forest Cadastral
Commission's decision of 27 January 1988 and the removal of the
land's forest status, ordering that the land in dispute be registered
in the name of the Treasury. However, these judgments were
subsequently overturned, and thus did not have a final and binding
effect. Therefore, the judgments delivered by the Cadastral Court did
not invest the applicant with an enforceable right to acquire the
land.
- As
a result, the Court concludes that, under the relevant law, as
applied and interpreted by domestic authorities, the applicant could
not claim to have a legitimate expectation in the sense of the
Court's case-law to obtain title to the property in question.
- It
follows that this complaint is inadmissible as being manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of
the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about
the excessive length of the civil proceedings. Article 6 § 1
provides as relevant:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
-
The Government argued that the national courts had complied with the
reasonable time requirement.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that the applicant's complaint regarding the length of
the proceedings is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It notes that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
Period to be taken into consideration
- The
Court notes that in the instant case, there are two sets of
proceedings which are closely linked to each other. The proceedings
to annul C.Ç.'s title deed were commenced on 12 August 1986
and the applicant intervened in these proceedings on 23 February
1987. However, in 1988 the Ayvalık Civil Court of General
Jurisdiction decided to stay the proceedings as the determination of
the case depended on the outcome of the case pending before the
Ayvalık Cadastral Court (see paragraphs 19-20 above). The
proceedings before the Cadastral Court, which were commenced on 10
June 1988, were terminated by the decision of the Court of Cassation
on 22 October 2001 (see paragraph 18 above).
In
the meantime, the proceedings before the Ayvalık Civil Court of
General Jurisdiction resumed following the decision of the Joint
Chambers of the Court of Cassation dated 3 April 1996 and the final
decision in these proceedings was delivered on 22 May 2001 (see
paragraphs 21 and 22 above).
- The
Court considers that as the first set of proceedings were stayed
pending the outcome of the second set of proceedings, in calculating
the length of the proceedings these two proceedings should be
considered as a whole. Furthermore, as the applicant intervened in
the proceedings on 23 February 1987, the period to be taken into
consideration should start running from that date.
- Having
regard to the above, the Court finds that the period to be taken into
consideration started on 23 February 1987 and ended on 22 May 2001
with the decision of the Court of Cassation. They have therefore
lasted approximately 14 years and 3 months for two sets of
proceedings.
The reasonableness of the length of proceedings
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
application (see for example Frydlender, cited above).
- The
Court notes that the Government contended that the length of the
proceedings could not be considered as unreasonable.
- The
Court does not find that the case is characterised by any exceptional
legal or factual complexity. It notes however that lengthy periods
elapsed between the decisions of the first-instance courts and appeal
courts. In this respect, it also takes note of the fact that it took
the national courts almost two years to determine the court which had
jurisdiction to examine the case brought against the Forestry
Directorate (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above). The Court is also
struck by the fact that while the Ayvalık Civil Court of General
Jurisdiction delivered its decision on 5 June 1998, the Court of
Cassation rendered its decision on 22 May 2001, almost 3 years later
(see paragraphs 21 and 22 above). The Government have not offered any
explanation for this state of affairs. Failing such an explanation,
and in the absence of any indication that the applicant was to blame,
the delay must be considered to be attributable to the domestic
courts' handling of the appeal proceedings.
- Recalling
that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention imposes on the Contracting
States the duty to organise their legal systems in such a way that
their courts can meet each of the requirements of that provision,
including the obligation to decide cases within a reasonable time
(see Arvelakis v. Greece, no. 41354/98, § 26, 12 April
2001), the Court considers that the domestic court should have
applied stricter measures to speed up the proceedings. It therefore
finds that the proceedings in the instant case were unnecessarily
prolonged as the national courts failed to act with the necessary
diligence.
In
view of the above, the Court considers that in the instant case the
length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the
“reasonable time” requirement.
- There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- In
respect of his Article 6 complaint, the applicant claimed
10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 10,000
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government contested these claims.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, the Court accepts that the applicant must have
suffered non-pecuniary damage, such as distress and frustration, on
account of the duration of the proceedings, which cannot be
sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation alone. Taking
into account the circumstances of the case and having regard to its
case-law, the Court awards the applicant a total sum of EUR 7,000
under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant did not request a particular amount for costs and expenses,
leaving it to the Court's discretion.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant
failed to submit any supporting documents. The Court therefore does
not award any sum under this head.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention inadmissible and the remainder of
the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 7,000
(seven thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be
converted into New Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date
of settlement and free of any taxes or charges that may be payable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 May 2007, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Nicolas Bratza
Deputy Registrar President