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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KASZCZYNIEC v. POLAND
(Application
no. 59526/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22
May 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kaszczyniec v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr J.
Casadevall,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr S.
Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 3 May 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 59526/00) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Leszek Kaszczyniec (“the
applicant”), on 16 June 2000.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr L. Cyrson and Mr W.
Michalski, lawyers practising in Poznań. The Polish Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mr
K. Drzewicki, and subsequently Mr J. Wołąsiewicz
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- On
1 April 2003 the Court declared the application partly inadmissible
and decided to communicate the complaints concerning the unreasonable
length of the applicant's detention and of his trial to the
Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, the Court decided to examine the merits of the
application at the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Szczecin.
- On
7 March 1996 the Szczecin Regional Prosecutor laid charges of
large-scale fraud against the applicant. On 17 April 1996 the
prosecutor ordered his detention on remand in connection with those
charges. He also issued a search and arrest warrant in respect of the
applicant. Subsequently, on an unspecified date the prosecution
received information that the applicant had left Poland.
- On
7 October 1996 the prosecutor stayed the investigation due to the
fact that the applicant was abroad. On the same day he issued an
international search and arrest warrant for the applicant.
- On
29 November 1996 the applicant was arrested in Germany.
- On
19 March 1997 the German authorities extradited the applicant to
Poland where he was placed in police custody. On 21 March 1997 the
Szczecin District Court ordered his detention on remand on suspicion
of large-scale fraud. His detention was subsequently prolonged on
16 September and 30 November 1997.
- On
15 November 1997 the prosecution filed a bill of indictment with the
Szczecin Regional Court. The applicant was charged with large-scale
fraud to the detriment of the State Treasury. There were two other
defendants in the case.
- The
Regional Court held hearings on the following dates: 22 January,
26 and 27 February, 2, 24 and 25 March, 20, 21 and 22 April, 16 June,
14 and 20 July 1998.
- In
the course of his original trial, the applicant lodged numerous
unsuccessful applications for release and appealed – likewise
unsuccessfully – against refusals to lift the detention. In his
applications, he argued that his detention was excessive and had, for
all practical purposes, amounted to serving a prison sentence. He
asked the courts to release him either on bail or under police
supervision, or to accept a guarantee from a responsible person or
persons who would undertake to ensure his presence at trial, or to
order him to surrender his passport, or to subject his release to all
those conditions.
- On
20 July 1998 the trial court gave judgment. It convicted the
applicant as charged and sentenced him to 9 years' imprisonment and a
fine. The court further ordered that the period spent by him in
pre-trial detention from 29 November 1996 up to the date of his
conviction be set off against the sentence imposed.
- On
15 April 1999, on an appeal lodged by the applicant, the Poznań
Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the
case. The subsequent proceedings were conducted only against two
defendants, including the applicant, as the third defendant had not
appealed against the first-instance judgment.
- On
28 December 1999 the Regional Court joined the proceedings in
question to the other set of proceedings. The number of
defendants increased to three.
- The
retrial was to begin on 28 March 2000 but was adjourned since one of
the defendants had to undergo a psychiatric examination. The next
hearing scheduled for 9 May 2000 had to be adjourned due to the
illness of a lay judge. The Regional Court held the first retrial
hearing on 20 June 2000. Subsequent hearings were held on
12, 18 and 19 July, 22 August, 20, 21 and 28 September, 17 and
18 October, 28 and 29 November and 20 December 2000.
- In
the meantime, on 20 May 1999 the Poznań Court of Appeal
dismissed the applicant's application for release on bail or under
police supervision, or under guarantee by a responsible person or
under the condition that he surrender his passport. The court found
that there was a considerable likelihood that he had committed the
offence with which he had been charged. The court further noted that
the applicant had already been detained on remand for some 30 months
but it considered that, given that he had previously been sought
under an international arrest warrant and that he was liable to a
severe penalty, there was a real risk that he might obstruct the
proper conduct of the trial. In the court's view, that risk justified
his being kept in custody. That decision was upheld on appeal.
- On 27 May 1999 the Court of Appeal prolonged the
applicant's detention pending trial until 30 November 1999. The
applicant appealed, invoking, inter alia, Article 5 § 3
of the Convention. He submitted that his right to trial within a
reasonable time or to release pending trial was not respected. He
also maintained that his detention was so excessive that it amounted
in reality to serving a prison sentence.
- On
4 August 1999 the Court of Appeal upheld the contested order.
Repeating the grounds previously given for the applicant's detention,
the court stressed that he had already evaded justice and an
international arrest warrant had had to be issued. It considered that
the trial had not progressed because of his conduct. In the court's
opinion, those circumstances clearly indicated that there was a
considerable risk that the applicant, if released, might again upset
the proper conduct of the proceedings. Lastly, the court noted that
he faced an exceptionally heavy sentence, which had already been
shown by the severity of the penalty originally imposed at first
instance.
- On
27 August 1999 the Szczecin Regional Court dismissed an application
for release on bail or subject to other guarantees or conditions. The
court repeated the grounds previously invoked, attaching particular
importance to the fact that he had earlier absconded and had already
been sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment. In view of the severity of
the sentence to which he was liable, the court considered that
neither bail, nor police supervision nor any other guarantee would
secure the proper course of the trial.
- On
16 November 1999 the Regional Court extended the applicant's
detention until 30 April 2000, repeating the grounds mentioned in the
previous decisions.
- The
applicant appealed, maintaining, among other things, that there was
no legal basis for keeping him in custody and that, pursuant to
Article 263 §§ 3 and 4 of the 1997 Code, his detention
could have been prolonged only by the Supreme Court because it had
exceeded the maximum statutory period of 2 years laid down in
paragraph 3 of that provision.
- On
11 January 2000 the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. It stressed
that both the fact that the applicant had earlier evaded justice and
the nature of his, in the court's words, “criminal relations”
with certain witnesses involved in the case, indicated that detention
was the only preventive measure which would effectively secure the
proper course of the trial. As regards the legal basis for his
detention, the court pointed out that – as had already been
mentioned in the previous detention decisions – his detention
continued on the grounds listed in Article 258 §§ 1
(2) and 2 of the 1997 Code as there was a risk that he might obstruct
the proper course of the trial and a heavy penalty was likely to be
imposed on him. Lastly, as to the question of which court was
competent to prolong his detention, the Court of Appeal stated that
the applicant had misconstrued Article 263 §§ 3
and 4 of the 1997 Code. That provision, the court added, indeed
imposed a statutory time-limit of 2 years on pre-trial detention and
laid down that only the Supreme Court could prolong it beyond that
term. However, that rule applied only as long as there had been no
conviction at first instance. Since the applicant had already been
convicted at first instance, no time-limit for detention applied to
his case, even though his original conviction had subsequently been
quashed on appeal.
- On
4 February 2000 the Regional Court dismissed a further application
for release filed by the applicant in January 2000. It reiterated the
grounds invoked in the previous detention decisions and added that,
in the light of the material before it, there was a considerable
likelihood that the applicant had committed the offence with which he
had been charged.
- On
25 February 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's
subsequent application for release. It recalled that it had already
ruled on numerous occasions on his detention. Noting that the
applicant had not adduced any new relevant circumstances, the court
found it unnecessary to address his arguments.
- On
26 April 2000 the Regional Court prolonged the applicant's detention
until 30 October 2000. It considered that the material gathered in
the case justified the opinion that the applicant had committed the
offence in question. It observed that a severe penalty (up to 9
years' imprisonment) might be imposed on him. Stressing that the
applicant had evaded justice at the initial stage of the proceedings,
the court also pointed out that his detention served the purpose of
securing the proper conduct of the trial. Furthermore, the court
found it necessary to extend his detention until 30 October 2000
because the summer holidays were approaching, which, for all
practical purposes, meant that the examination of the case would be
postponed.
- On
15 September 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's
further application for release.
- On
21 September 2000 the applicant requested that the three sets of
criminal proceedings conducted against him before the courts in
Szczecin, including the proceedings at issue, be transferred to other
courts. On 13 October 2000 his request was refused.
- On
18 October 2000 the Szczecin Regional Court prolonged the applicant's
detention until 30 January 2001. It reiterated all the grounds
previously given for his detention. The applicant's appeal, based on
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, was rejected by
the Court of Appeal on 31 October 2000.
- On
12 January 2001 the Regional Court extended the applicant's detention
until 30 July 2001. Upon the applicant's appeal, the Court of Appeal
reduced the prolongation to 23 February 2001.
- On
22 February 2001 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant be
kept in custody until 24 April 2001. It further held that he could be
released if he put up bail of PLN 40,000. The applicant appealed.
- On
15 March 2001 the Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court's
decision. It ordered that the applicant should be released on
condition that he put up bail of PLN 30,000 by 30 March 2001. The
Court of Appeal further placed the applicant under police supervision
and imposed on him a prohibition on leaving the country.
- On
27 March 2001 the Regional Court ordered the applicant's release as
he had paid the bail. He was released on the same day.
- On
28 March 2002 the Szczecin Regional Court convicted the applicant of
large-scale fraud and breach of official secrecy. It sentenced him to
a cumulative sentence of 8 years' imprisonment and a fine. The
applicant appealed.
-
On 12 February 2003 the Poznań Court of Appeal amended the
Regional Court's judgment by reducing the applicant's cumulative
sentence to 6 years' imprisonment. The applicant appealed.
- On
1 March 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's cassation
appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Detention on remand
- The relevant domestic law and practice concerning the
imposition of detention on remand (tymczasowe aresztowanie),
the grounds for its prolongation, release from detention and rules
governing other, so-called “preventive measures” (środki
zapobiegawcze) at the material time are stated in the Court's
judgments in the cases of Kudła v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, §§ 75-79, ECHR 2000-XI; Bagiński
v. Poland, no. 37444/97, §§ 42-45, 11 October
2005; and Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§
22-23, 4 August 2006.
B. Remedies against unreasonable length of the
proceedings
- The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the
excessive length of judicial proceedings are stated in the Court's
decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland no.
15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V and Ratajczyk v.
Poland no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005-VIII and the judgment in
the case of Krasuski v. Poland, no. 61444/00, §§
34-46, ECHR 2005-V.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The applicant complained that the length of his
detention on remand had been excessive. He relied on Article 5 §
3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
- The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
- The Court observes that the applicant was arrested in
Hamburg by the German authorities on 29 November 1996 under an
international search and arrest warrant. He was extradited to Poland
on 19 March 1997 and placed in custody. On 21 March 1997 the Szczecin
District Court ordered his detention on remand. The Government
submitted that they could not be held responsible for the period of
the applicant's detention between 29 November 1996 and 19 March 1997,
when he had been in the custody of the German authorities. The Court
shares that argument and accordingly finds that the starting point
for calculating the length of the applicant's detention under Article
5 § 3 is 19 March 1997.
- On 20 July 1998 the Szczecin Regional Court convicted
the applicant of large-scale fraud and sentenced him to 9 years'
imprisonment. As from that date he was detained “after
conviction by a competent court”, within the meaning of Article
5 § 1 (a) and therefore that period of his detention falls
outside the scope of Article 5 § 3 (cf. Kudła, cited
above, § 104). On 15 April 1999 the Court of Appeal quashed
the applicant's conviction. Following that date his detention was
again covered by Article 5 § 3. It continued until 27 March
2001 when the applicant was released on bail. Consequently, the
period to be taken into consideration lasted 3 years, 3 months and 13
days.
2. The reasonableness of the length of detention
(a) The parties' arguments
- The
Government argued that the length of the applicant's detention had
not been excessive and that there had been valid reasons for holding
him in detention for the entire period in question. The domestic
courts had given on each occasion relevant and sufficient reasons
justifying the applicant's detention and regularly supervised it.
- The
applicant's detention had been justified by the reasonable suspicion
that he had committed the offences with which he had been charged and
the fact that the charges against him attracted a heavy sentence. The
domestic courts had also relied on the risk that the applicant might
interfere with the proper course of the proceedings. In this respect,
they referred to the applicant's leaving the country and the need to
issue an international arrest warrant for him.
- The
Government further justified the length of the applicant's detention
by the particular complexity of the case, which stemmed from the
number of defendants and offences, and the fact that the court had
joined another set of criminal proceedings to the proceedings at
issue. Lastly, they maintained that the authorities had displayed
adequate diligence in dealing with the applicant's case.
- The
applicant maintained that the length of his detention on remand had
been unreasonable.
(b) The Court's assessment
(i) Principles established under the
Court's case-law
- The
presumption is in favour of release. As established in Neumeister
v. Austria (judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 8, p.37, §
4), the second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial
authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial
within a reasonable time or granting him provisional release pending
trial. Until conviction, he must be presumed innocent, and the
purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to
require his provisional release once his continuing detention ceases
to be reasonable (see McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC],
no. 543/03 , § 41, ECHR 2006-...).
- Continued
detention therefore can be justified in a given case only if there
are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest
which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the
rule of respect for individual liberty laid down in Article 5 of the
Convention (see, among other authorities, Kudła, cited
above, §§ 110-111).
- It
falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to
ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused
person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must,
paying due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence,
examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of the
above-mentioned requirement of public interest justifying a departure
from the rule in Article 5 and must set them out in their decisions
on the applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of
the reasons given in these decisions and of the established facts
stated by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon
to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 §
3 (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, §
152, ECHR 2000-IV, and Kudła, cited above, § 110).
- The
persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has
committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness
of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no
longer suffices. The Court must then establish whether the other
grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the
deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were “relevant”
and “sufficient”, the Court must also be satisfied that
the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in
the conduct of the proceedings. The complexity and special
characteristics of the investigation are factors to be considered in
this respect (see, for example, Scott v. Spain, judgment of 18
December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI,
pp. 2399-2400, § 74, and I.A. v. France, judgment of
23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VII, p. 2978, §
102).
- In
sum, domestic courts are under an obligation to review the continued
detention of persons pending trial with a view to ensuring release
when circumstances no longer justify continued deprivation of
liberty. For at least an initial period, the existence of reasonable
suspicion may justify detention but there comes a moment when this is
no longer enough. As the question whether or not a period of
detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract but must
be assessed in each case according to its special features, there is
no fixed time-frame applicable to each case (see McKay, cited
above, § 45).
(ii) Application of the principles to the
circumstances of the present case
- The
Court observes that the judicial authorities, in addition to the
reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied principally on two
grounds, namely (1) the severity of the penalty to which he was
liable and (2) the risk of obstruction of the proceedings. In respect
of the latter, they underlined that the applicant had evaded justice
at the early stages of the proceedings by having left the country.
That had resulted in the issue of an international search and arrest
warrant. Furthermore, the Government submitted that the applicant's
detention was additionally justified by the complexity of the case.
- The
Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had
committed the offences with which he had been charged may have
warranted his detention in the early stage of the proceedings.
However, with the passage of time that ground inevitably became less
relevant. In particular, the Court considers that that ground cannot
suffice to justify the entire period in issue. It must then establish
whether the other grounds advanced by the judicial authorities were
“relevant” and “sufficient” to continue to
justify the deprivation of the applicant's liberty.
- The
Court notes that the judicial authorities continuously relied on the
likelihood that a heavy sentence might be imposed on the applicant,
given the nature of the offences with which he had been charged. In
this respect, the Court recalls that the severity of the sentence
faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of
absconding or re-offending. It acknowledges that in view of the
seriousness of the charges against the applicant the authorities
could justifiably consider that such a risk existed. However, the
Court has repeatedly held that the gravity of the charges cannot by
itself serve to justify long periods of detention on remand (see
Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, §§ 80-81,
26 July 2001 and Lachowski v. Poland, no. 27556/03,
§ 34, 5 December 2006). In the circumstances of the present
case, the Court finds that the severity of the anticipated penalty
alone, or in conjunction with the other grounds relied on by the
authorities, cannot constitute a “relevant and sufficient
ground” for holding the applicant in detention for a period of
3 years and over 3 months.
- As regards the risk of obstruction of the proceedings,
the Court observes that throughout the entire relevant period the
judicial authorities based their findings in this respect on the fact
that the applicant had left the country in order to avoid criminal
responsibility. The Court agrees that the applicant's absconding
justified keeping him in custody at the initial stages of the
proceedings. However, the Court considers that that ground gradually
lost its force and relevance as the proceedings progressed. In
particular, given the absence of any further attempt on the part of
the applicant to obstruct the proceedings, it is difficult to accept
that that circumstance could justify the conclusion that the risk of
his interfering with the proper course of the proceedings persisted
during the entire period that he spent in custody (see mutatis
mutandis, Harazin v. Poland, no. 38227/02, § 42,
10 January 2006). Furthermore, the Court notes that after the
applicant's release on bail on 27 March 2001 it appears that he did
not attempt to obstruct the proper conduct of the proceedings.
- The
Court further observes that the applicant was primarily detained on
charges of large-scale fraud to the detriment of the State Treasury
committed together with an accomplice. The defendants had not
been formally charged with acting in an organised criminal gang. In
these circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that the instant case
presented particular difficulties for the investigation authorities
and for the courts to determine the facts and mount a case against
the perpetrators as would undoubtedly have been the case had the
proceedings concerned organised crime (see Celejewski, cited
above and Bąk v. Poland, no. 7870/04, § 56,
16 January 2007).
- The
Court would also emphasise that under Article 5 § 3
the authorities, when deciding whether a person should be released or
detained, are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring
his appearance at trial. Indeed, that provision proclaims not only
the right to “trial within a reasonable time or to release
pending trial” but also lays down that “release may be
conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial” (see Neumeister,
cited above, p. 36, § 3; and Jabłoński v.
Poland, no. 33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000).
- The
Court observes that in the present case the authorities gave
consideration to other non-custodial preventive measures with a view
to ensuring the applicant's presence at trial (see paragraphs 16 and
19 above). They found nonetheless that those measures would not be
sufficient to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, relying,
in particular, on the fact that the applicant had earlier absconded.
The Court notes that the applicant was eventually released on bail on
27 March 2001. However, it has not been explained to the Court's
satisfaction why the risk previously relied on by the authorities
ceased to exist on that date, namely 3 years and over 3 months since
he was first remanded in custody.
- Having
regard to the foregoing, the Court hence concludes that the reasons
relied on by the courts in their decisions were not sufficient to
justify the applicant's being held in custody for 3 years and over 3
months.
- That
finding would, as a rule, absolve the Court from determining whether
the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in
the conduct of the proceedings. However, in that context the Court
cannot but note that even though the Court of Appeal quashed the
first-instance judgment and remitted the case on 15 April 1999, the
first hearing at the retrial stage of the proceedings took place only
14 months later, i.e. on 20 June 2000. In addition, the Court cannot
accept that the Szczecin Regional Court in its decision of 26 April
2000 took into account the summer holidays as a factor which
warranted further prolongation of the applicant's detention. Having
regard to the foregoing, it cannot be said that the authorities
displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the
criminal proceedings against the applicant.
- There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of criminal proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement,
provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a]
... tribunal...”
- However,
pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention:
“The Court may only deal with the matter after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally
recognised rules of international law ...”
- With
respect to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the
Court notes that the Government did not refer to the remedies
introduced by the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of
the right to a trial within a reasonable time (“the 2004 Act”).
- The
applicant for his part, maintained that those remedies were not
effective and stated explicitly that he had no wish to lodge a
complaint about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable
time under the relevant provisions.
- The
Court notes that the criminal proceedings against the applicant were
terminated on 1 March 2004. On 16 June 2000, the date on which the
application was lodged with the Court, they were pending before the
Szczecin Regional Court. It further observes that, pursuant to
section 18 of the 2004 Act, it was open to persons such as the
applicant in the present case whose case was pending before the Court
to lodge, within six months from 17 September 2004, a complaint
about the unreasonable length of the proceedings with the relevant
domestic court, provided that their application to the Court had been
lodged in the course of the impugned proceedings and that it had not
yet been declared admissible.
- The
Court has already examined that remedy for the purposes of Article 35
§ 1 of the Convention and found it effective in respect of
complaints about the excessive length of judicial proceedings in
Poland. In particular, it considered that it was capable both of
preventing the alleged violation of the right to a hearing within a
reasonable time or its continuation, and of providing adequate
redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Charzyński,
cited above, §§ 36-42).
- The
applicant, having been informed by the Registrar of the possibility
of lodging a complaint about the length of the proceedings under the
2004 Act, has chosen not to avail himself of this remedy.
Accordingly, the complaint about the unreasonable length of the
proceedings must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1
and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 200,000 Polish zlotys (approx. EUR 50,000) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage related to his unlawful imprisonment
and the excessive length of proceedings.
- The
Government submitted that the applicant's claim related to the
alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 was exorbitant and should be
rejected.
- The
Court notes that the applicant's complaint under Article 6 § 1
has been declared inadmissible and thus there is no basis for making
any award under that head. In respect of the claim regarding the
applicant's unlawful imprisonment, the Court considers that that
claim in substance is related to the finding of a violation of
Article 5 § 3 in the present case. The Court finds in this
connection that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage which
is not sufficiently compensated by the finding of the violation.
Considering the circumstances of the case and making its assessment
on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,000
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant's lawyers claimed costs and expenses in an unspecified
amount for the proceedings before the Court. However, the Court
observes that they failed to produce any documents in support of the
claim. In those circumstances, the Court rejects the claim for costs
and expenses (see, Adamiak v. Poland, no. 20758/03, § 49,
19 December 2006).
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the
unreasonable length of detention admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 May 2007, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
