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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF RYCKIE v. POLAND
(Application
no. 19583/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
30
January 2007
FINAL
30/04/2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Ryckie v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr G.
Bonello,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L.
Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
Mrs P. Hirvelä,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 9 January 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 19583/05) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) on 12 May 2005 by Mr P. Ryckie (“the
applicant”). The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was
represented by Ms R. Orlikowska-Wrońska, a lawyer
practising in Sopot.
- The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
- On
10 October 2005 the Court decided to give notice of the application
to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Gdansk.
- On
24 May 1999 the applicant was detained on remand on suspicion of
having committed numerous offences, inter alia kidnapping and
aggravated robbery.
- The
court based its detention order on a reasonable suspicion that the
applicant had committed the offences and on the severity of the
likely penalty, which gave rise to a fear that the applicant would
obstruct the proceedings.
- His
pre-trial detention was extended by decisions of 15 July 1999,
20 October 1999, 24 January 2000, 27 June 2000, 10 November
2000, 3 January 2001, 26 March 2001, 30 April 2001, 21 November
2001, 25 April 2002, 16 July 2002, 8 July 2003, 20 January 2004,
13 July 2004, 28 July 2004, 6 August 2004, 20 August 2004, 27 August
2004, 3 September 2004, 12 October 2004, 11 January 2005, 19
July 2005 and 27 October 2005.
- In
all the above-mentioned decisions the courts relied on the same
grounds for detention as those given in the first detention order. In
some the courts also referred to the complexity of the case, the need
to conduct further investigations, the probability of collusion
between the applicant and the co-accused and exertion of unlawful
pressure on witnesses by the applicant and the fear that the
applicant would go into hiding.
- On
many occasions the applicant requested release or that a more lenient
preventive measure be applied. Each time his requests were dismissed.
- The
applicant appealed against the decisions extending his detention on
several occasions. Only one of his appeals was allowed to the effect
that the period of extension of his detention was reduced by two
months (the Gdańsk Court of Appeal decision of 17 August 2005).
- On
24 January 2000 the prosecution service filed with the Gdańsk
Regional Court a bill of indictment. The applicant was charged with
twelve offences, including aggravated robbery, kidnapping and illegal
possession of a weapon.
- The
first hearing planned for 10 April 2000 was adjourned. Subsequent
hearings were held on 26 May 2000, 27 June 2000, 7 August 2000, 6
October 2000, 10 November 2000, 3 January 2001, 2 February 2001 and
26 March 2001. The hearing of 17 April 2001 was adjourned. As a
consequence of the court’s exceeding the permissible period of
the length of intervals between hearings, the proceedings had to be
conducted anew.
- Subsequent
hearings were held on 6 June 2001, 8 June 2001, 13 June 2001, 3 July
2001, 18 September 2001, 24 September 2001, 10 October 2001 and 15
October 2001. The hearing of 31 October 2001 was adjourned due
to a lay judge’s illness. Subsequent hearings were held on 7
November 2001, 13 November 2001, 20 November 2001, 10 December 2001,
14 December 2001 and 17 December 2001. A hearing of 21 December
2001 was adjourned due to the absence of witnesses. The next hearings
took place on 27 December 2001, 7 January 2002, 14 January 2002 and
21 January 2002.
- On
28 January 2002 the Gdańsk Regional Court convicted the
applicant of nine offences, acquitted him of the remaining three and
sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment. The applicant and
other accused appealed.
- On
9 April 2003 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and
remitted the case as it found that the judges deciding on the case
had not been impartial.
- The
hearings of 22 August 2003, 7 October 2003, 18 November 2003 and 19
December 2003 were adjourned since the applicant had so requested and
since one of the accused had been absent.
- A
subsequent hearing was held on 24 February 2004. A hearing of 6 April
2004 was postponed due to the absence of a lawyer representing one of
the accused. Hearings were held on 6 July 2004, 28 July 2004, 6
August 2004, 20 August 2004, 27 August 2004, 3 September 2004, 7
September 2004, 12 October 2004, 3 December 2004, 7 December 2004 and
14 December 2004.
- On
28 December 2004 the Court of Appeal found that the length of
proceedings had been excessive in the applicant’s case and
awarded him compensation. In its reasoned grounds the court stated
that as a result of the fact that the trial court had exceeded the
permissible length of time between the hearings of 26 March 2001 and
6 June 2001, the proceedings had to be conducted anew. It also noted
that the adjournment of the hearing of 17 April 2001 had been
unjustified.
- Subsequent
hearings were held on 11 January 2005, 25 January 2005, 11 February
2005, 18 March 2005, 5 April 2005, 12 April 2005, 17 May 2005,
28 June 2005, 3 July 2005, 19 July 2005, 19 August 2005, 6 September
2005, 11 October 2005, 4 November 2005, 25 November 2005, 9 December
2005 and 20 December 2005.
- In
the course of the proceedings the applicant and other accused lodged
numerous requests for exclusion of several judges from the case,
hearing of additional witnesses, commissioning expert opinions,
transfer of the case to a different court, re reading of the
bill of indictment, drawing up a new bill of indictment, the
appointment of a new legal-aid lawyer, correction of the record of a
hearing, etc.
- On
27 December 2005 the Gdansk Regional Court sentenced the applicant to
15 years’ imprisonment. The reasoned grounds for this judgment
are being drawn up. The applicant expressed his intention to lodge an
appeal.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of his pre-trial detention had
violated Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
- The Government accepted that the applicant had
exhausted domestic remedies.
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
-
Neither the Government nor the applicant specified the period to be
taken into consideration.
- The Court notes that the relevant period lasted from
24 May 1999 to 28 January 2002 (when the applicant was convicted by
the first-instance court) and from 9 April 2003 (when the conviction
was quashed) to 27 December 2005 (when he was again convicted by
the first-instance court). According to the Convention organs’
case-law, a person convicted at first instance cannot be regarded as
being detained “for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed
an offence”, as specified in Article 5 § 1 (c), but is in
the position provided for by Article 5 § 1 (a), which authorises
deprivation of liberty “after conviction by a competent court”
(see, for example, B. v. Austria, judgment of 28
March 1990, Series A no. 175, pp. 14-16, §§ 36 39).
- The
period to be taken into consideration lasted therefore 5 years,
4 months and 26 days.
2. The
reasonableness of the length of detention
(a) Arguments before the Court
-
The Government were of the opinion that the whole period of the
applicant’s detention had been justified. They stressed that
the domestic courts dealing with the applicant’s case had found
his detention to be compatible with the provisions of Article 258 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure and that no grounds warranting the
applicant’s release from detention as provided for by Article
259 of the Code had been established. The evidence obtained in the
proceedings indicated that there was a reasonable suspicion that the
applicant had committed the offences.
- The
Government also argued that the applicant’s detention had been
aimed at securing the proper conduct of the investigation, as there
had been a risk that he would obstruct the proceedings and influence
witnesses and other co-accused.
- With
regard to the review of the applicant’s detention, the
Government pointed out that the applicant’s detention had been
reviewed at regular intervals. On each occasion the decisions had
been reasoned in a relevant and sufficient manner.
- With
regard to the proceedings on the merits, the Government argued that
these had been very complex. They submitted that over forty witnesses
had been examined, four accused had been involved in the proceedings,
numerous expert opinions had been ordered and the first-instance
judgment comprised one hundred and ninety-six pages.
- They
also noted that the applicant and other accused had contributed
significantly to the length of the proceedings by their excessive use
of procedural rights.
- The
Government further noted that hearings had been held at regular and
brief intervals. They pointed out that some hearings had had to be
postponed for reasons beyond the courts’ control such as the
absence of a co-accused or witnesses and that measures to expedite
the proceedings had been employed.
- The
applicant contested the Government’s arguments and maintained
that no reasons could justify the length of his pre-trial detention.
Nonetheless, he agreed with the Government that the proceedings had
been complex.
- He
stressed that he had not intended to contribute to the length of the
proceedings by the use of his procedural rights.
- He
maintained that it had been the inefficient organisation of the
courts’ work which had contributed to the length of
proceedings. He pointed out that the courts had failed to make use of
the procedural possibility to hold hearings for several days in a
row, instead of one-day hearings, and that hearings ought to have
been planned earlier in advance.
(b) The Court’s assessment
(i) Principles established under the
Court’s case-law
- Under
the Court’s case-law, the issue of whether a period of
detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto.
Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must
be assessed in each case according to its special features. Continued
detention can be justified in a given case only if there are specific
indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which,
notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of
respect for individual liberty (see, among other authorities, W.
v. Switzerland, judgment of 26 January 1993, Series A
no. 254 A, p. 15, § 30, and Kudła v.
Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 110, ECHR 2000 XI)
- It
falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to
ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused
person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must
examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a
genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to
the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the
rule of respect for individual liberty and set them out in their
decisions dismissing the applications for release. It is essentially
on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the
established facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals, that the
Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a
violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see the
Contrada v. Italy judgment of 24 August 1998, Reports
1998-V, p. 2185, § 54; Mc Kay v. the United Kingdom [GC],
no. 543/03, § 43, ECHR 2006-).
- The
persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has
committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the
lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of
time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish
whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued
to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were
“relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must
also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed
“special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings
(see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 153,
ECHR 2000 IV, and Jablonski v. Poland, no. 33492/96,
§ 80, 21 December 2000).
(ii) Application of the principles to the
circumstances of the present case
- At
the outset the Court notes that the applicant was detained for a very
long time, which can only be justified by special circumstances.
- Further,
the Court accepts that the case was complex and that hearings were on
the whole held fairly regularly. Nonetheless, it also notes that on
one occasion an interval between hearings resulted in the need to
conduct the proceedings anew.
- The
Court also observes that the applicant’s detention was
supervised by the courts at regular intervals. However, in their
decisions extending the applicant’s detention the domestic
authorities repeatedly relied on the same grounds, namely a
reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in
question, the severity of the likely penalty and the risk that the
applicant would obstruct the proper conduct of the proceedings, in
particular by influencing the witnesses and other co-accused and
going into hiding. No other grounds for detention were given in those
decisions, notwithstanding the lapse of time.
- The
Court notes that although the applicant made extensive use of his
procedural rights, some of his motions proved to be justified. In
this respect the Court observes that although the applicant’s
requests for exclusion of judges from the case had all been dismissed
at an early stage of the proceedings, the court examining the
applicant’s appeal took a different view of the matter and
quashed the first-instance judgment on the basis of the trial court’s
lack of impartiality.
- Moreover,
the domestic court allowed in part the applicant’s claim for
compensation for the excessive length of proceedings. In the reasoned
grounds for this decision the domestic court found that the
adjournment of a hearing, which subsequently resulted in the need to
conduct the proceedings anew, had been unjustified.
- The
Court therefore considers that, in the particular circumstances of
the instant case, the grounds given by the judicial authorities for
the applicant’s detention did not satisfy the requirement of
being “relevant” and “sufficient”.
- In
view of the above considerations, the Court finds that the
applicant’s detention for over five years was in breach of the
“reasonable time” requirement of Article 5 § 3 of
the Convention.
- There
has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained in substance under Article 13 that Polish law
did not provide for an effective remedy against the excessive length
of pre-trial detention, comparable to a complaint under the Law of 17
June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within
a reasonable time.
- The
Court notes that in Polish law, like in the domestic law of many
other Contracting States, there is no specific remedy for “excessive
length of detention on remand”, comparable to the
above-mentioned complaint about excessive length of proceedings.
However, there are numerous remedies provided by the Polish law by
means of which the applicant could have challenged his detention on
remand.
- Firstly,
he had an appeal against a decision extending his detention on remand
at his disposal, of which he had availed himself on numerous
occasions. Such an appeal was available in respect of every decision
extending the applicant’s detention on remand.
- Secondly,
the applicant had a possibility to apply for release from detention
under Article 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He availed
himself of this remedy on several occasions. By virtue of this
provision, the applicant could have challenged his detention at any
time on the ground that his continued detention on remand posed a
danger to his life or health or a particularly serious harm to him
and his family.
- Thirdly,
he could have applied under Article 254 in conjunction with Article
253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for release from detention or
for the application of a more lenient measure in its stead. This
remedy could have been relied on by the applicant where the basis for
his detention ceased to exist or when new circumstances occurred
which would justify his release from detention or a change of a
preventive measure. He also availed himself of this remedy.
- The
fact that the courts did not decide in the applicant’s favour
does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the
above-mentioned remedies were ineffective.
- Moreover,
the Court notes that there were two possibilities available to the
applicant under Polish law to claim compensation in relation to his
detention on remand. He could have instituted proceedings for
compensation for unjustified detention (Article 552 § 4 of the
Criminal Code of Procedure) or he could have claimed compensation
from the State Treasury for damage caused by the unlawful action of a
State official carried out in the course of performing his duties
(Article 417 of the Civil Code).
- In
view of the above, the applicant’s complaint is manifestly
ill-founded and must be declared inadmissible according to Article 35
§§3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non pecuniary
damage.
- The
Government found this amount exorbitant and suggested that the
finding of a violation was of itself sufficient just satisfaction.
- The
Court awards the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant, who was granted legal aid, also claimed EUR 1,000 for the
costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
- The
Government reiterated that an applicant is entitled to reimbursement
of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that
these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable
as to quantum.
- In
the present case, regard being had to the information in its
possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable
to award the sum of EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court,
less EUR 850 received by way of legal aid from the Council of Europe.
It therefore awards EUR 150 (one hundred and fifty euros).
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the length of
the applicant’s pre-trial detention admissible and the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,000 (two
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 150 (one
hundred and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses to be
converted into Polish zlotys at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 30 January 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
