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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KUC v. POLAND
(Application
no. 73102/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
17
July 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kuc v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr K.
Traja,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L.
Mijović, judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 26 June 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 73102/01) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Jan Kuc (“the
applicant”), on 24 June 2000.
- The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
- On
4 May 2004 the Court decided to communicate the application to the
Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Katowice. He is currently
detained in Racibórz Prison.
- On
2 June 1999 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of
having assisted an offender who was being sought pursuant to a
“wanted” notice. He was subsequently brought before the
Jastrzębie Zdrój District Prosecutor (Prokurator
Rejonowy) and charged with having intentionally impeded the
apprehension of an arrestable offender. The actual offender had been
charged with homicide. The prosecutor applied to the Jastrzębie
Zdrój District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) for the
applicant to be detained pending the investigation.
- On
4 June 1999 the District Court, after hearing evidence from the
applicant, remanded him in custody for 3 months in view of the
reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he
had been charged. The court also considered that, given that the
applicant had not confessed and that the evidence given by him
contradicted the material gathered by the prosecution, there was a
fear that he would induce witnesses to give false testimony or would
otherwise obstruct the proper course of the proceedings.
- The
applicant’s appeal against the detention order, as well as his
further appeals against decisions prolonging his detention and all
his subsequent repeated applications for release and appeals against
refusals to release him, were unsuccessful. In his applications and
appeals, he argued that the charge against him was based on
unreliable and contradictory evidence. He referred to his personal
circumstances, in particular his age (he was 63 at that time).
- In
the course of the investigation, on 30 September 1999, the applicant
was charged with attempted homicide and 2 counts of armed robbery.
The decision setting out the charges against the applicant was
further amended on four occasions.
- Between
17 August 1999 and 15 November 2000 the courts prolonged the
applicant’s pre-trial detention on 6 occasions. The relevant
decisions were given, respectively, by the Katowice Regional Court
(Sąd Okręgowy) on 17 August and 19 October
1999, the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny)
on 24 November 1999, 23 February and 15 November 2000 and
the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) on 25 May
2000. The Supreme Court prolonged the applicant’s detention
until 2 December 2000.
- In
all those decisions the courts relied on a strong suspicion that the
applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged,
which was supported by evidence from witnesses and experts. They
attached importance to the serious nature of those offences and the
likelihood of a heavy sentence being imposed on the applicant. They
further considered that the need to secure the proper conduct of the
investigation, especially the need to verify evidence from the
suspects and witnesses, justified holding him in custody.
- In
the course of the proceedings, the courts informed the prosecutor and
the applicant’s lawyer about the dates of the sessions
concerning the review of the applicant’s pre-trial detention.
Nevertheless, the applicant’s lawyer failed to appear at the
sessions.
- The
representatives of the prosecution participated in all court sessions
relating to the prolongation of the applicant’s detention and
were invited to state their position as to the necessity of keeping
the applicant in custody.
- In
the meantime, the relevant penitentiary court had ordered that the
applicant serve a sentence of imprisonment imposed in other criminal
proceedings. He served that sentence from 2 June 1999 (the date of
his arrest in the present case) to 27 July 2000.
- At
a session held on 15 November 2000, at which the applicant’s
lawyer was present, the Katowice Court of Appeal prolonged the
applicant’s detention until 2 March 2001, repeating the grounds
that had been given in the previous decisions and – more
particularly – relying on the need to secure and supplement
evidence gathered in the investigation. That decision and the reasons
therefor were upheld on appeal on 20 December 2000 at a session at
which the applicant’s lawyer was present.
- On
29 December 2000 the applicant was indicted before the Kielce
Regional Court on charges of attempted homicide, armed robbery,
burglary and having intentionally impeded the apprehension of an
arrestable offender. The bill of indictment comprised 9 accused. In
all, 49 charges were brought against them. The principal
accused, a certain J.P., was charged with 4 counts of homicide, 6
counts of attempted homicide, several counts of incitement to
homicide and several counts of armed robbery. The prosecution asked
the court to hear evidence from 162 witnesses.
- On
24 January 2001 the Kielce Regional Court ordered that the applicant
and his 6 co-defendants be kept in custody until 2 June 2001. The
court referred to a strong likelihood that he had committed the
serious offences with which he had been charged and stressed that a
heavy penalty might be imposed on him. It considered that the
severity of the anticipated penalty could by itself be a sufficient
ground for continuing the detention in order to secure the proper
course of the proceedings. In that context, the court added that both
the gravity of the charges and the applicable sentence justified the
conclusion that the defendants, if released, would obstruct the trial
for fear of having that sentence executed.
- Subsequently,
the case was referred to the Katowice Regional Court, within whose
territorial jurisdiction the offences in question had been committed.
- On
23 May 2001 the Katowice Regional Court, under Article 263 § 3
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ordered that the applicant be kept
in custody until 2 December 2001. It reiterated the grounds
previously given for his detention. On 4 July 2001 the Katowice Court
of Appeal, ruling on the applicant’s appeal, upheld the
decision and added that it should be based on Article 263 § 4
since the applicant’s detention had already exceeded the
statutory time-limit of 2 years laid down in that provision, it being
immaterial that during most of that period he had served the earlier
sentence of imprisonment. The Court of Appeal fully shared the lower
court’s view that there were valid grounds for the applicant’s
detention.
- The
applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged under
Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on many
occasions.
- The
relevant decisions were given on the following dates.
- On
26 November 2001 the Katowice Regional Court ordered that the
applicant be held in custody until 2 March 2002. On 28 February 2002
that court ordered his continued detention until 2 July 2002 but then
amended its decision and set the deadline for 8 April 2002. This was
due to the fact that after the latter date only the Court of Appeal
could prolong his detention beyond the term laid down in Article 263
§ 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- On
13 March 2002 the Katowice Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant’s
detention until 30 November 2002. On 30 October 2002 it prolonged his
detention until 30 April 2003. On 23 April 2003 it ordered that the
applicant be kept in custody until 30 September 2003. The next
decision was given on 17 September 2003; it extended the applicant’s
detention until 30 December 2003. It was followed by the decision of
23 December 2003, whereby the Court of Appeal prolonged the
applicant’s detention until 30 April 2004.
- All
the decisions reiterated the grounds previously given for the
applicant’s detention, most notably the reasonable suspicion of
his having committed the offences in question and the severity of the
anticipated penalty which, in the courts’ opinion, justified
keeping him in custody to secure the proper conduct of the
proceedings. The Court of Appeal also held that the proceedings had
not been unduly protracted and that the frequent adjournments had
been caused by events for which the Regional Court could not be held
responsible.
- All
appeals and applications for release filed by the applicant –
who repeatedly contested the factual basis for the charges against
him and invoked the principle of the presumption of innocence –
were to no avail.
- In
the meantime, the court held a number of hearings scheduled for
various dates, some of which were cancelled or adjourned due to the
absence of the applicant’s co-defendants, some of whom had been
released, or the fact that the defendants still in detention had not
been brought to trial from prison. As of October 2002, the trial
court had heard evidence from over 160 witnesses.
- On
20 April 2004 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment. The
applicant was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years’
imprisonment. He appealed. The applicant’s detention was
subsequently prolonged on three occasions.
- On
1 June 2005 the Katowice Court of Appeal upheld the impugned
judgment. The applicant failed to inform the European Court whether
he lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.
- Neither
during the proceedings nor after their termination did the applicant
make use of domestic remedies for the excessive length of judical
proceedings under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints
about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time
(Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania
sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki)
(“the 2004 Act”).
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- The
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1997, which entered into force on 1
September 1998, defines detention on remand as one of the so called
“preventive measures” (środki zapobiegawcze).
Article
249 § 5 provides that the lawyer of a detained person should be
informed of the date and time of court sessions at which a decision
concerning the prolongation of detention on remand is to be taken.
- A
more detailed rendition of the relevant domestic law and practice
concerning the imposition of detention on remand (aresztowanie
tymczasowe), the grounds for its prolongation, release from
detention and rules governing other, so-called “preventive
measures are stated in the Court’s judgments in the cases of
Gołek v. Poland, no. 31330/02, §§ 27-33,
25 April 2006 and Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§
22-23, 4 August 2006.
- The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the
excessive length of judicial proceedings are stated in the Court’s
decisions in cases of Charzyński v. Poland no. 15212/03
(dec.), §§ 12 23, ECHR 2005-V and Ratajczyk
v. Poland no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005 VIII.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of his detention on remand had
been unreasonable. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention,
which reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
- The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
- The
applicant was arrested on 2 June 1999 and remanded in
custody on 4 June 1999. On 20 April 2004 the Katowice Regional Court
convicted the applicant and sentenced him to 15 years’
imprisonment (see paragraphs 5, 6 and 26 above). As from that
date he was detained “after conviction by a competent court”,
within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a) and
therefore that period of his detention falls outside the scope of
Article 5 § 3 (cf. Kudła v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, § 104, ECHR 2000 XI). However, the
period between 2 June 1999 and 27 July 2000 must be subtracted from
the total period of the applicant’s detention, as during this
time the applicant had been serving a prison sentence imposed in
other criminal proceedings (see paragraph 13 above).
Consequently,
the period to be taken into consideration under Article 5 § 3
lasted 3 years, 8 months and 23 days.
2. The
reasonableness of the length of detention
(a) The parties’ arguments
- The
Government submitted that the applicant’s pre-trial detention
satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 3. They stressed
that the applicant’s detention had been justified by the
persistence of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the
offences in question, the gravity of the charges against him and the
complexity of the case. The Government also argued that the
applicant’s detention had been justified in order to secure the
proper conduct of the investigation, as there had been a risk that he
would obstruct the proceedings by influencing witnesses.
- They
further pointed out that the applicant’s detention had been
reviewed at regular intervals. On each occasion the decisions had
been reasoned in a relevant and sufficient manner. They further
maintained that all the applicant’s requests for release and
his appeals against the decisions prolonging his detention had been
thoroughly and diligently examined by the competent courts.
- The
applicant contested these arguments. He submitted that his detention
had exceeded a “reasonable time”. He stressed that he had
not contributed to the length of the proceedings and that the
authorities had failed to exercise all due diligence when dealing
with his case.
(b) The Court’s assessment
(i) General principles
- Under
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the presumption is in favour of
release. As established in Neumeister v. Austria (judgment of
27 June 1968, Series A no. 8, p.37, § 4), the second limb
of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice
between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time
or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until conviction,
he must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under
consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once
his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable.
- Continued
detention therefore can be justified in a given case only if there
are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest
which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the
rule of respect for individual liberty laid down in Article 5 of the
Convention (see, among other authorities, Kudła v. Poland
[GC], cited above, § 110 et seq).
- The responsibility falls in the first place to the
national judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case, the
pre-trial detention of an accused person does not exceed a reasonable
time. To this end they must, paying due regard to the principle of
the presumption of innocence, examine all the facts arguing for or
against the existence of the above-mentioned demand of public
interest justifying a departure from the rule in Article 5 and
must set them out in their decisions on the applications for release.
It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in these
decisions and of the established facts stated by the applicant in his
appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there
has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 (see, for
example, Weinsztal v. Poland, no. 43748/98, judgment of 30 May
2006, § 50).
- The
persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has
committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the
lawfulness of the continued detention, but with the lapse of time
this no longer suffices and the Court must then establish whether the
other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify
the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were “relevant”
and “sufficient”, the Court must also be satisfied that
the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in
the conduct of the proceedings.
- In
sum, domestic courts are under an obligation to review the continued
detention of persons pending trial with a view to ensuring release
when circumstances no longer justify continued deprivation of
liberty. For at least an initial period, the existence of reasonable
suspicion may justify detention but there comes a moment when this is
no longer enough. As the question whether or not a period of
detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract but must
be assessed in each case according to its special features, there is
no fixed time-frame applicable to each case (see McKay v. the
United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR
2006-..., with further references).
(ii) Application of the above principles
in the present case
- The
Court observes that the judicial authorities, in addition to the
reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied principally on two
grounds, namely the severity of the penalty to which he was liable
given the serious nature of the charges against him and the risk
that, once released, he would obstruct the proper course of the
proceedings. In respect of the latter, they referred to the fact that
the applicant had not confessed. The domestic courts further
considered that there had been a risk that the applicant, if
released, might exert pressure on witnesses. Lastly, the judicial
authorities referred to the complexity of the case (see paragraphs 6,
10, 14, 16 and 23 above).
- The
Court agrees that the strong suspicion against the applicant of
having committed serious offences could have initially warranted his
detention. However, with the passage of time, the initial
grounds for pre-trial detention become less and less relevant and the
domestic courts should rely on other “relevant” and
“sufficient” grounds to justify the deprivation of
liberty.
- The Court reiterates that, if due to the particular
circumstances of the case, detention on remand is extended beyond the
period generally accepted under the Court’s case-law,
particularly strong reasons would be required for an applicant’s
lengthy detention to be justified under Article 5 § 3
(see Celejewski v. Poland, § 38, cited above).
- Moreover,
the authorities relied heavily on the likelihood that a heavy
sentence would be imposed on the applicant given the serious nature
of the offences at issue. In this respect, the Court agrees that the
severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the
assessment of the risk of absconding or re-offending. However, the
Court has repeatedly held that the gravity of the charges cannot by
itself serve to justify long periods of detention on remand (see
Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, §§ 80 81,
26 July 2001).
48 As
regards the risk of obstruction of the proceedings, the Court notes
that in its decision of 4 June 1999 the Jastrzebie Zdrój
District Court held that such risk was justified by the fact that the
applicant had not confessed (see paragraph 6 above). In so far as the
domestic courts appear to have drawn adverse inferences from the fact
that the applicant had not confessed, the Court considers that their
reasoning showed a manifest disregard of the principle of the
presumption of innocence and cannot, in any circumstances, be relied
on as a legitimate ground for deprivation of the applicant’s
liberty (see Górski v. Poland, no. 28904/02, § 58,
4 October 2005; Leszczak v. Poland, no. 36576/03, §
48, 7 March 2006). Secondly, the judicial authorities considered that
there had been a risk that the applicant might interfere with the
course of the proceedings by exerting pressure on witnesses. The
Court observes that it was legitimate for the authorities to consider
that factor as capable of justifying the applicant’s detention
at the initial stages of the proceedings. However, the Court
considers that that ground gradually lost its force and relevance as
the proceedings progressed and it cannot accept it as a justification
for holding the applicant in custody for the entire period.
- The
Court also notes that there is no specific indication that during the
entire period in question the authorities envisaged the possibility
of imposing other preventive measures on the applicant, such as bail
or police supervision.
In
this context the Court would emphasise that “other preventive
measures” are expressly foreseen by Polish law to secure the
proper conduct of criminal proceedings and that under Article 5
§ 3 the authorities, when deciding whether a person should
be released or detained, are obliged to consider alternative measures
for ensuring his appearance at the trial. Indeed, that Article lays
down not only the right to “trial within a reasonable time or
release pending trial” but also provides that “release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial” (see
Jablonski v. Poland, no. 33492/96, § 83, 21
December 2000 and McKay, § 41, cited above).
- In
the circumstances, the Court concludes that the grounds given by the
domestic authorities were not “relevant” and “sufficient”
to justify the applicant’s being kept in detention for 3 years
and over 8 months. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to
examine whether the proceedings were conducted with special
diligence.
- There
has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained about the procedure relating to the prolongation
of his pre-trial detention. In particular, he alleged that he and his
lawyer did not attend the sessions at which his detention was
prolonged. He relied on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
- The
applicant acknowledged that the Jastrzębie Zdrój District
Court had given the detention order after the session in which he had
participated. He also acknowledged that his lawyer had been present
at the court’s session held on 15 November 2000 at which
detention on remand was prolonged. He further conceded that he had
been informed of the court’s sessions concerning this matter
(see paragraphs 6 and 14 above).
- The
Government relied on the applicant’s above admissions. Indeed,
they submitted, the applicant’s lawyer had been notified of the
court’s sessions at which detention on remand had been
prolonged and had been entitled to take part in them. The lawyer was
summoned to those sessions, although he was absent from some of them.
Furthermore, the Government stressed that the Court of Appeal, when
examining the requests for a prolongation of the applicant’s
detention had had at its disposal both the requests of the Regional
Court and the applicant’s submissions. The Government
maintained that, taking into consideration all the proceedings for
the review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s pre-trial
detention, the principles guaranteed in Article 5 § 4
of the Convention had been respected in the present case.
- The
Court has recently stated the principles which emerge from its
case-law on Article 5 § 4 in the case of Celejewski v.
Poland. In the context of the present case, it would reiterate,
in particular, that although it is not always necessary that the
procedure under Article 5 § 4 be attended by the same guarantees
as those required under Article 6 of the Convention for criminal or
civil litigation, it must have a judicial character and provide
guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in
question. Furthermore, the proceedings must be adversarial and must
always ensure “equality of arms” between the parties. In
the case of a person whose detention falls within the ambit of
Article 5 § 1(c) a hearing is required (see Celejewski,
cited above, § 43, with further references).
- In
the present case the applicant was remanded in custody by the
decision of 4 June 1999 given by the Jastrzębie Zdrój
District Court. The applicant acknowledged that the court had issued
the detention order after having held a session in his presence, as
required by the law in force at the material time. Moreover, he
lodged an appeal against this decision to contest the detention
order. He also acknowledged that his lawyer had been present at the
court’s sessions held on 15 November 2000 at which his
detention on remand was prolonged (see paragraphs 6, 14 and 53
above).
- The
procedure for the prolongation of the applicant’s pre trial
detention during the period under consideration was based on
Article 249 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which requires the domestic courts to inform the lawyer of a detained
person of the date and time of court sessions at which a decision was
to be taken concerning prolongation of detention on remand, or an
appeal against a decision to impose or to prolong detention on remand
was to be considered. It was open to the lawyer to attend such
sessions. In this connection the Court observes that in the present
case there is no evidence that the courts departed from the normal
procedure and that the applicant’s lawyer was not duly summoned
to the court sessions. Moreover, the applicant has not advanced any
argument that his defence, as assured by his lawyer or at any other
stage, was inadequate.
- In
view of the above, the Court is of the opinion that the proceedings
in which the prolongation of the applicant’s detention was
examined satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 4 (see
Telecki v. Poland, (dec.), no. 56552/00, 3 July
2003 and Celejewski, cited above).
- It
follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly
ill founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
-
The applicant further complained that the length of the proceedings
in his case had exceeded a “reasonable time” within the
meaning of Article 6 § 1, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
-
The Government maintained that the applicant had failed to exhaust
domestic remedies, as he had not lodged a complaint about the breach
of the right to a trial within a reasonable time under the 2004 Act.
- The
applicant, for his part, submitted that this remedy was not effective
and stated that he had no intention to lodge a complaint under the
relevant provisions.
- Pursuant
to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention:
“The Court may only deal with the matter after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally
recognised rules of international law...”
- The
Court observes that the applicant failed to avail himself of any of
the following remedies provided for by Polish law. When the
proceedings were pending he could have made a complaint under
sections 5 and 18 of the Law of the 2004 Act. After the
termination of the trial, he could have brought a civil action under
Article 417 of the Civil Code read together with section 16 of the
above-mentioned Law (as to the effectiveness of the latter remedy,
see Krasuski v. Poland, judgment of 14 June 2005,
no. 61444/00, § 72, ECHR 2005 V (extracts)).
- It
follows that the complaint under Article 6 § 1 must be rejected
under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 14,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage
and 25,000 EUR in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government maintained that the applicant’s claims were
excessive. They asked the Court to rule that a finding of a violation
of Article 5 § 3 constituted in itself sufficient just
satisfaction. In the alternative, they invited the Court to assess
the amount of just satisfaction on the basis of its case-law in
similar cases and having regard to national economic circumstances.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant has suffered
non-pecuniary damage – such as distress resulting from the
protracted length of his detention – which is not sufficiently
compensated by the finding of a violation of the Convention.
Considering the circumstances of the case and making its assessment
on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,500
under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed EUR 1,500 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the domestic courts and in the proceedings before the Court.
This sum concerned in particular translation and postage expenses.
- The
Government argued that any award under this head should be limited to
those costs and expenses that had actually and necessarily been
incurred and were reasonable as to quantum.
- According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant
is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far
as it has been shown that these have actually and necessarily been
incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case,
regard being had to the information in its possession and the above
criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant,
who was not represented by a lawyer, the sum of EUR 100 under
this head.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the length of
the applicant’s pre-trial detention admissible and the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,500 (one
thousand five hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and
EUR 100 (one hundred euros) for costs and expenses, plus any tax that
may be chargeable, to be converted into Polish zlotys at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 July 2007, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
