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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF KALMÁR AND LORENCZ v. HUNGARY
(Application
no. 31692/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
7
October 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kalmár and Lorencz v. Hungary,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise
Tulkens,
President,
Ireneu
Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro
Zagrebelsky,
Danutė
Jočienė,
András
Sajó,
Nona
Tsotsoria,
Işıl
Karakaş,
judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 September 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 31692/06) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by two Hungarian nationals, Mr László Kalmár and
his mother, Ms Terézia Lorencz (“the applicants”),
on 17 May 2006.
- The
Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
- On
14 February 2008 the
President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicants were born in 1960 and 1928 respectively and live in
Budapest.
A. The first set of proceedings
- On
8 November 1996 the applicants brought an action against Mr M.,
claiming moral damages for the latter's insulting behaviour. The
Dombóvár District Court initially suspended the
proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal case being conducted
against the respondent. A first judgment was eventually given on 15
April 1998 but was quashed on appeal on 27 May 1999.
Subsequently, the case was assigned to the Szekszárd District
Court. This court joined two further cases pending between the same
parties to the principal action.
- The
joint proceedings later continued before the Buda Surroundings
District Court. This court held numerous hearings between 24 January
2002 and 27 March 2007. Although the applicants did not attend
several hearings, it appears that they requested the court to
continue with their case in their absence. Ultimately, the District
Court found for the applicants on 31 May 2007.
B. The second set of proceedings
- On
10 June 1999 Mr Kalmár brought an official liability action
against the Attorney General's Office. The case was assigned to the
Pest County Regional Court. On 17 September 2000 this court
adjudicated some of the plaintiff's claims and disjoined others, the
examination of which was suspended pending the outcome of another
case. In the latter connection, the proceedings were resumed on 19
December 2001. However, no hearing took place until 4 October
2006. Further hearings took place on 14 March 2007 and 14 April 2008.
According to the information in the case file, this case is still
pending.
C. The third set of proceedings
- In
2001 Mr Kalmár was found guilty of making false accusations.
On 30 July 2003 he requested a retrial. According to the information
in the case file, that request is still pending.
D. The fourth set of proceedings
- On
5 August 2004 Ms J. filed a criminal report against Mr Kalmár,
accusing him of libel. A hearing took place on 20 March 2006, at
which Mr Kalmár complained that he had not been properly
informed of the charges against him. His motion for bias against the
police authority dealing with the case was dismissed, and his ensuing
complaint, filed on 3 December 2004, does not appear to have
been answered.
- On
17 May 2006 Mr Kalmár challenged the Budapest XX/XXI/XXIII
District Court for bias. His motion was rejected on 2 June 2006.
According to the information in the case file, these proceedings are
still pending.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicants complained that the length of the civil proceedings,
described under points “A” and “B” above, had
been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In addition, Mr Kalmár
complained in general terms about the inefficient conduct of the
authorities in the criminal proceedings under point “D”,
and submitted in particular that his complaint lodged on 3 December
2004 against the dismissal of his motion for bias had never been
dealt with. For the Court, the essence of these submissions is a
complaint concerning the protracted nature of the criminal
proceedings.
Article
6 § 1 reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is
entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ...
tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
period to be taken into consideration in proceedings “A”
began on 8 November 1996 and ended on 31 May 2007. It thus lasted
over ten and a half years for one level of jurisdiction.
- The
periods to be taken into consideration in proceedings “B”
and “D” began on 10 June 1999 and 5 August 2004
respectively and, according to the information in the case file
provided by the parties, have not yet ended at the date of the
adoption of the present judgment. They have thus lasted nine years
and three months and four years and one month respectively, for one
level of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds.
They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of criminal
proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the
case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of
the case and the conduct of the applicants and the relevant
authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier
and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
In addition, in civil cases, the Court may take into account what was
at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
application.
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject,
the Court finds that the length of the both the civil and criminal
proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable
time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- Mr
Kalmár also complained about the protracted nature of
proceedings under point “C”. However, the Court
observes that Article 6 is not applicable to proceedings with a view
to the reopening of terminated criminal cases. This complaint is
therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of
the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be
rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
- Mr
Kalmár further complained under Article 6 § 3 of the
Convention that in proceedings under point “D” there had
been an absence of proper information about the charges against him.
However, the Court observes that those proceedings are still pending
and, therefore, any complaint about their unfairness is premature.
This complaint must therefore be declared inadmissible, pursuant to
Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention, for non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If
the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or
the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be
made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the
injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicants claimed 2,000 euros (EUR) jointly in respect of pecuniary
damage. In addition, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, Mr Kalmár
claimed EUR 30,000 and Ms Lorencz EUR 16,000.
- The
Government contested these claims.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
However, it considers that the applicants must have sustained some
non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards Mr
Kalmár EUR 12,000 and Ms Lorencz EUR 6,000 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicants also claimed EUR 200 jointly for the costs and expenses
incurred before the Court.
- The
Government did not express an opinion on the matter.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
finds it reasonable to award the sum claimed in full.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaints concerning the excessive
length of proceedings under points “A”, “B”
and “D” admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, the respondent State is to pay the following sums, to be
converted into Hungarian forints at the rate applicable at the date
of settlement:
(i)
EUR 12,000 (twelve thousand euros) to Mr Kalmár, plus any
tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non pecuniary damage;
(ii)
EUR 6,000 (six thousand euros) to Ms Lorencz, plus any tax that
may be chargeable, in respect of non pecuniary damage;
(iii)
EUR 200 (two hundred euros) to the applicants, jointly, in respect of
costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 October 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-Passos Françoise Tulkens
Deputy
Registrar President
