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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF GUBER v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 34171/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
23 October
2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Guber v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nina Vajić,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Dean
Spielmann,
Sverre Erik Jebens,
Giorgio
Malinverni,
George Nicolaou, judges,
and André
Wampach, Deputy
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 2 October 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 34171/04) against the
Russian Federation lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Russian national, Mr Georgiy
Edmundovich Guber (“the applicant”), on 18 July 2003.
- The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr P. Laptev, former Representative of the Russian Federation at the
European Court of Human Rights.
- On
24 March 2006 the
President of the First Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1946 and currently lives in New Portland, the
United States.
- In
March 1996 a third person on the applicant’s behalf sold his
car to another third person. The sale was carried out on the basis of
a power of attorney issued by the applicant to the third person in
1993.
- On
11 November 1996 the applicant asked the Syktyvkar Town Court to
declare null and void the sale of his car claiming that it had been
performed contrary to his will and on the basis of a revoked and thus
invalid power of attorney.
- On
14 May 1998 the Town Court held the first hearing of the case. It
appears that the proceedings were adjourned at least on five
occasions: on 18 September 1998, 12 July and 2 November 1999, on 27
June 2001 and on 26 August 2002, when on the latter date, the case
was, according to the Government, adjourned as the judge was busy in
unrelated proceedings.
- On
30 January 2003 the Town Court examined and dismissed the
applicant’s claim in absentia. The applicant received a
copy of the reasoned version of the judgment on 12 February 2003 and
introduced a notice of appeal. Since the applicant failed to pay the
court fee and to make the relevant number of copies of his statement
of appeal, the court twice refused to examine his appeal and set new
time-limits for lodging it. The applicant was requested to comply
with the procedural requirements.
- On
25 March 2003 the applicant’s appeal was disallowed due to his
failure to comply with the procedural requirements and to pay the
court fee.
- The
applicant unsuccessfully attempted to contest this decision. His
further appeals were disallowed as they were introduced outside the
time-limit. The requests to extend the time-limit were rejected as
unsubstantiated.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
proceedings lasted from 11 November 1996, when the applicant
introduced his claim, to 25 March 2003 when the applicant’s
appeal was dismissed, i.e. six years, four months and thirteen days.
The Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration
began on 5 May 1998, when the Convention came into force in respect
of Russia. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that
elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the state of
proceedings at the time, which by then had been pending for
approximately one year and six months.
- The
Court observes that in the present case four years, ten months and
twenty days fall within the Court’s competence ratione
temporis.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court considers that the case at hand was not difficult to determine.
Consequently, it takes the view that an overall period of over six
years for one level of jurisdiction could not, in itself, be deemed
to satisfy the “reasonable time” requirement in Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention.
- As
to the applicant’s conduct, the Government did not claim that
the applicant had contributed to any delays in the proceedings. The
Court concludes, therefore, that no delays in the present case were
attributable to the applicant.
- The
Court observes, on the other side, that substantial periods of
inactivity, for which the Government have not submitted any plausible
explanation, are attributable to the domestic authorities. First, the
Court notes that the Government did not provide the Court with any
reasons as to why the applicant’s case had not been examined
until 30 January 2003. The only explanation offered by the Government
concerned the hearing on 26 August 2002 when it was adjourned
because the judge was busy in unrelated proceedings. Second, the
Court notes that the Government’s explanations submitted to the
Court primarily concerned the proceedings in respect of the
applicant’s appeal and his requests to extend the time-limits
for lodging it. However, these proceedings concerned only a very
limited period of time which cannot, in the Court’s view,
justify the overall length of the proceedings in which the
applicant’s claim was determined.
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
Court has examined the remainder of the applicant’s complaints
as submitted by him. However, having regard to all the material in
its possession, it finds that these complaints do not disclose any
appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the
application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded,
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 1,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage
and EUR 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government considered the claim for non-pecuniary damage to be
reasonable. In respect of pecuniary damage the Government did not see
any causal link between the claim and the violation found and
suggested rejecting it.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects the claim for
pecuniary damage. On the other hand, the Court accepts that the
applicant suffered distress, anxiety and frustration exacerbated by
the unreasonable length of the proceedings. In this respect it awards
the applicant EUR 1,000 as non-pecuniary
damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant did not make any claims for the costs and expenses incurred
before the domestic courts and before the Court.
- Accordingly,
the Court does not award anything under this head.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one
thousand euros), in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 October 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Nina Vajić
Deputy Registrar President
