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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF PIÓRO AND ŁUKASIK v. POLAND
(Application
no. 8362/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
2 December
2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Pióro and Łukasik v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján
Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Mihai
Poalelungi,
judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 13 November 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 8362/02) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by two Polish nationals, Mr Wiesław Pióro and
Mrs Barbara Łukasik (“the applicants”), on 20
April 2001.
- The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
- On
16 November 2006 the
President of the Chamber to which the case has been allocated decided
to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also
decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at
the same time (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
- The
applicants, Mr Wiesław Pióro, and Mrs Barbara
Łukasik, are siblings. They are Polish nationals who were born
in 1930 and 1933 respectively. The first applicant died on 4 November
2003. His wife, two daughters and his grandson expressed a wish to
continue the application in his stead. The second applicant lives in
Warsaw, Poland.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- On
22 November 1944 the applicants' father's land “Terebella”
was expropriated for the purpose of an agrarian reform programme.
On 8 May 1946 the Lublin Regional Land Office
(Wojewódzki Urząd Ziemski) declared that the
provisions on agrarian reform did not apply to the property in
question, and therefore the applicants' father was entitled to
compensation. On 29 January 1949 the Minister of Agriculture
quashed this decision and declared that “Terebella” had
been expropriated for the purpose of agrarian reform.
- On
20 May 1994 the applicants filed a motion for annulment of the
1949 decision.
- On
5 September 1996 the Minister of Agriculture refused to declare
the decision of 1949 null and void. On 8 October 1996 the
applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny
Sąd Administracyjny).
- On
27 April 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected their
appeal on the ground that they had failed to exhaust the available
remedies i.e. they had not filed a request with the Minister for
reconsideration of his decision.
- On
15 May 1998 the applicants applied to the Minister of
Agriculture for leave to file out of time a motion for
reconsideration (wniosek o ponowne rozpatrzenie sprawy)
of the decision of 5 September 1996.
- On
22 March 2000 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Supreme
Administrative Court alleging inactivity on the part of the Minister
of Agriculture.
- On
12 May 2000 the Minister upheld the decision of
5 September 1996. The applicants lodged an appeal against
that decision with the Supreme Administrative Court. On 3 November
2000 the court quashed the Minister's decision of 12 May 2000
and remitted the case.
- On
27 March 2001 the second applicant asked the Minister to comply
with the judgment of 3 November 2000 and to give a decision
without delay. On 24 May 2001 she complained to the Supreme
Administrative Court alleging inactivity on the part of the Minister
of Agriculture. On 19 October 2001 she again asked the court to
proceed with her case.
- On
14 November 2001 the Minister of Agriculture stayed the
proceedings in the applicants' case awaiting a report of an expert in
geology.
- On
3 December 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the
applicants' complaint about the Minister's inactivity. On
10 January 2002 the second applicant lodged a complaint
against the decision of the Minister of Agriculture to stay the
proceedings.
- On
7 February 2002 the Minister resumed the proceedings as the
awaited expert report had been submitted.
- On
25 June 2002 the Minister gave a decision on the merits
upholding his previous decision of 5 September 1996.
- On
23 July 2002 the second applicant appealed to the Supreme
Administrative Court against the decision of 25 June 2002.
- On
11 February 2004 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court gave
judgment quashing the challenged decision of the Minister.
- On
30 April 2004 the Minister of Agriculture refused to annul the
decision of 29 January 1949 on the ground that the contested decision
had been issued in accordance with the law. The Minister upheld his
decision on 18 November 2004.
- Upon
an appeal by the second applicant, on 24 May 2005 the Warsaw Regional
Administrative Court quashed both decisions of the Minister.
- On 3 November 2005 the Minister of Agriculture refused
once more to annul the original decision of 1949.
- On
20 April 2006 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court quashed that
decision on appeal.
- By
letter of 6 November 2006 the Minister of Agriculture asked the
Lublin Voivodeship Office (Urząd Wojewódzki) for
the clarification of certain issues concerning the “Terebella”
land.
- On
30 July 2007 the Minister of Agriculture acknowledged that the 1949
decision had been issued in breach of the procedural law but refused
to declare it null and void on the ground that it had produced
irreversible effects.
- On
14 November 2007 the Warsaw Administrative Court upheld the above
decision.
- The
authorities instructed the applicants to proceed with a claim for
compensation for the unlawfully expropriated land under Article 160
of the Code of Administrative Procedure, applicable to the
applicants' case by virtue of Article 5 of the Act of 17 June 2004 on
certain amendments to the Civil Code and other acts. The applicants
were further instructed that, in the event they were not satisfied
with the outcome of the administrative proceedings for compensation,
they were free to file with a civil court an action for tort under
Article 417 of the Civil Code.
- On 25 January 2008 the applicants filed with the
Minister of Agriculture a claim for compensation for the unlawfully
expropriated land. The proceedings are currently pending.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Inactivity on the part of the administrative
authorities
- The
relevant domestic law concerning inactivity on the part of
administrative authorities is set out in Grabiński v. Poland,
no. 43702/02, §§ 60-65, 17 October 2006.
B. Remedy against the excessive length of judicial
proceedings
- The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the
excessive length of judicial proceedings, in particular the
applicable provisions of the 2004 Act, are stated in the Court's
decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland no.
15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V and Ratajczyk
v. Poland no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005-VIII and the
judgment in the case of Krasuski v. Poland, no. 61444/00,
§§ 34 46, ECHR 2005-V.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF
THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS FOR ANNULMENT OF THE 1949 DECISION
- The applicants complained that the length of the
administrative proceedings for the annulment of the 1949
expropriation decision had been incompatible with the “reasonable
time” requirement, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 20 May 1994 and
ended on 14 November 2007. It thus lasted more than thirteen years.
A. Admissibility
- The
Government raised a preliminary objection that the applicants had not
exhausted all domestic remedies available to them under the Polish
law, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They
maintained that the applicants had failed to lodge a compensation
claim with a civil court in order to seek redress for the alleged
damage which had resulted from the inactivity of the administrative
authorities and courts. They relied on Article 417¹ §
3 of the Civil Code.
In
addition, the Government argued that from 17 September 2004, the
date of entry into force of the 2004 Act, the applicants had a
possibility of seeking compensation for the damage resulting from the
excessive length of proceedings before Polish courts, under section
16 of the 2004 Act read in conjunction with Article 417 of the
Civil Code.
- The
applicants contested the Government's submissions.
- The
Court observes that according to Article 417¹ § 3 of the
Civil Code no claim for damages resulting from the unreasonable
length of administrative proceedings may arise unless it was formally
determined that there had been an unlawful failure to issue an
administrative decision within the relevant time-limits. The Court
also notes that the examples of domestic case-law furnished by the
Government do not constitute evidence of sufficiently established
judicial practice to show that a claim for compensation based on
Article 417¹ § 3 of the Civil Code was an effective remedy
and have thus failed to substantiate their contention (see
Grabiński v. Poland, no. 43702/02, § 74,
17 October 2006). It follows that this part of the Government's
objection must be rejected.
- Regarding
the remedy provided by the 2004 Act the Court notes that the law in
question provides for a complaint about the unreasonable length of
judicial proceedings and that proceedings before administrative
authorities other than administrative courts are not covered by its
provisions. The Court also observes that prior to the entry into
force of the 2004 Act the applicants had resorted to remedies
designed to accelerate the process of obtaining an administrative
decision, such as an appeal under Article 37 § 1 of
the Code of Administrative Procedure and two complaints lodged with
the Supreme Administrative Court about the inactivity of the
administrative authorities (see paragraphs 10, 12 and 14 above).
Moreover, the Court observes that the proceedings complained of
lasted over thirteen years. After the entry into force of the 2004
Act the proceedings were conducted by the Regional Administrative
Court in three separate periods, none of which exceeded six months
(see paragraphs 19-20, 21-22 and 24-25 above). Therefore, a domestic
court dealing with a complaint under the 2004 Act would not be able
to take into account the whole period of the administrative
proceedings and find a violation of the applicants' right to a trial
within a reasonable time. Consequently, in the present case a
complaint under the 2004 Act cannot be regarded as an effective
remedy with a sufficient degree of certainty.
- It
follows that the Government's plea of inadmissibility on the ground
of non exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed. The
Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court observes that the case involved a certain degree of complexity.
However, it considers that this in itself cannot justify the overall
length of the proceedings.
- As regards the conduct of the applicants, the Court,
having regard to the available evidence, does not find it established
that the applicants substantially contributed to the delays in the
proceedings. The Court acknowledges that the applicants lodged
several appeals in the course of the impugned proceedings. However,
following their appeals, the decisions given were several times
quashed by the administrative courts and the case was remitted for
further examination.
- As
regards the conduct of the relevant authorities, the Court notes that
there were long delays in handling the case and some periods of
inactivity. The Court observes that for the most part of the
proceedings each authority which examined the applicants' case took
on average two years to issue a decision on the merits. By way of
example, there was a period of two years and three months between the
applicants' initial motion for annulment of the 1949 decision and the
Minister's decision of 5 September 1996 (see paragraphs 6-7
above) and a period of two years when the Minister was deciding on
the applicants' motion for reconsideration (see paragraphs 9-11
above). Finally, there was a period of nineteen months of inactivity
between 23 July 2002 when the applicants appealed against
the decision of the Minister of Agriculture and 11 February 2004
when the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court quashed the challenged
decision and remitted the case (see paragraphs 17 18 above).
- The
foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to
conclude that the applicants' case has not been heard within a
reasonable time. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6
§ 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO
THE CONVENTION
- The
applicants also complained in general terms under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that they had been deprived of their
property. This provision provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
- The
Court first observes that Poland ratified Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention on 10 October 1994. In so far as the applicants'
complaint relates to the official decisions regarding their property
rights given prior to that date, namely in 1944 and 1949, the Court
reiterates that, in accordance with universally recognised principles
of international law, a State can only be held responsible in respect
of events after the ratification of the Convention. It follows that
the Court is competent ratione temporis only in respect of
events which occurred after that date.
- Secondly,
the Court notes that, in so far as the applicants may be understood
to have complained of the fact that their father's property had not
been restored to them, this part of the application is incompatible
ratione materiae since Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention does not guarantee a right of restitution of property (see
Rucińska v. Poland (dec.), no. 33752/96, 27 January
2000).
- Lastly,
the Court notes that the domestic
proceedings to determine the applicants' claim for compensation for
the expropriated land are currently pending before the Minister of
Agriculture. Therefore, in so far as the applicants' complaint under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention relates to the
fact that the applicants had not been compensated for the
expropriated land, the Court considers that it would be premature to
take a position on the substance of this complaint. It follows that
this complaint is inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic
remedies.
- Accordingly,
this part of the application must be rejected under Article 35
§§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention on grounds of
incompatibility and non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicants did not submit a claim for just satisfaction for pecuniary
and non-pecuniary damage in relation to their complaint under
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They explained that their
goal in bringing the instant application to the Court was not to
benefit from the malfunctioning of the State authorities and
judiciary but only to obtain a payment equal in value to the land
expropriated in 1944. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is
no call to award the applicants any sum on the account of the
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
- The
applicants did not make any claim for costs and expenses involved in
the proceedings.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 December 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
