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European Court of Human Rights |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> Karin Emma Alma ZIMMERMANN v Poland - 5239/07 [2008] ECHR 1873 (9 December 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1873.html Cite as: [2008] ECHR 1873 |
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FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no.
5239/07
by Karin Emma Alma ZIMMERMANN
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 9 December 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Ledi
Bianku,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and Lawrence
Early, Section
Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 19 January 2007,
Having regard to its decision in the case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (no. 47550/06) of 7 October 2008,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Ms Karin Emma Alma Zimmermann, is a German national who was born in 1941 and lives in Neunkirchen-Seelscheid. She is represented before the Court by Mr T. Gertner, a lawyer practising in Bad Ems.
A. Historical background
A summary account of historical events in which the present application originated can be found in the Court’s decision on admissibility in the case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (see Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (dec.), no. 47550/06, 7 October 2008, §§ 4-5, ECHR 2008-...).
B. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 26 July 1945 the applicant’s family were forced to leave their 40 hectares farm in Morrn (at present Murzynowo in Poland) by the Polish militia. They were given only 10 minutes to pack their barest personal essentials. They marched for days towards the Oder.
This region before and during the Second World War belonged to the German Reich. After the defeat of Germany at the end of the war, when the border between Germany and Poland was drawn along the Oder-Neisse line, it was included in the territory of Poland (see Preussische Treuh and GmbH & CO. Kg A. A., cited above, § 3).
The applicant has still not been allowed to return to her homeland and has been refused restitution of her family property.
C. Relevant international and domestic law
A detailed description of the relevant international and domestic law is set out in the above-mentioned case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (ibid. §§ 31-41).
COMPLAINTS
In support of both complaints, the applicant relied on the same arguments as those put forward by the applicants in the case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (ibid. §§ 42-44).
In her letter of 17 October 2008, in which she referred to, and contested, the Court’s decision of 7 October 2008 declaring the above case inadmissible, the applicant stressed that the events giving rise to her application occurred even before the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945.
THE LAW
The Court observes that the events that gave rise to this complaint started on 26 July 1945, when the applicant’s family had been expelled from their home by the Polish militia. The seizure and formal expropriation of their property took place in 1945-46, when the Polish State enacted several expropriation laws whereby all German property situated in the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, which were included in the territory of Poland following the Yalta Conference and the undertakings under the Potsdam Agreement in respect of war reparations and delimitation of borders, was taken over by the State (see Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A., cited above, §§ 3, 5 and 38-41).
The applicant argued that the situation complained of, although it originated before the entry into force of Protocol No. 1 in respect of Poland, produced continuing effects.
However, the Court has already dealt at length with the same arguments as to the alleged existence of a continuing violation of property rights, put forward by the applicants in the case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A.A. v. Poland, and rejected them. It held that the purported individual acts of violence, expulsion, dispossession and seizure or confiscation were instantaneous acts which occurred before the ratification of Protocol No. 1 by Poland and which did not produce any continuing effects that could have consequences for its jurisdiction ratione temporis (ibid. §§ 55-62). Having regard to the facts before it, the Court sees no reason to hold otherwise in the present case.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
However, as the Court has already held on many occasions, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cannot be interpreted as imposing any general obligation on the Contracting States to return property which was transferred to them before they ratified the Convention. Nor does this provision impose any restrictions on the Contracting States’ freedom to determine the scope of property restitution or rehabilitation laws. The Convention imposes no specific obligation on them to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior to their ratification of the Convention (see Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. cited above, §§ 63-64, with further references).
Accordingly, the Polish State has no duty under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to enact laws providing for rehabilitation, restitution of confiscated property or compensation for property lost by the applicant’s family.
It follows that the remainder of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President