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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF BOBEL v. POLAND
(Application
no. 20138/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 January
2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Bobel v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Josep
Casadevall,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Kristaq
Traja,
Stanislav
Pavlovschi,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ján
Šikuta,
judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 4 January 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 20138/03) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by Mr Piotr Bobel on 26 May 2003.
- The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
- On
7 September 2006 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 §
3 of the Convention, it was decided to examine the merits of the
application at the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Olsztyn.
- The
facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised
as follows:
1. The applicant's pre-trial detention and proceedings
as to the merits of the criminal case
- On
30 June 2000 a wanted notice with a detention order was issued in
respect of the applicant.
- On
28 August 2000 the applicant was arrested on the strength of the
above-mentioned order and on 1 September 2000 the decision as to his
detention was given by the Olsztyn District Court. He was charged
with numerous counts of major financial fraud (several counts of
massive-scale bank fraud, deceiving private companies and other
financial offences) committed while acting in an organised criminal
group.
- The
applicant's detention was subsequently extended by the following
decisions: the Olsztyn District Court decisions of 7 November 2001, 7
February 2002, 21 February and 20 May 2003; and the Olsztyn Regional
Court's decision of 9 February 2001.
- The
courts repeatedly relied on the strong probability that the applicant
had committed the offences that he had been charged with and that
there was a real risk that he would receive a severe sentence,
thereby giving rise to a presumption that he would obstruct the
proper conduct of proceedings. They also referred to the risk of
absconding, deriving from the fact that the applicant had been sought
pursuant to a wanted notice.
- The
applicant challenged his detention. He lodged appeals against the
Olsztyn District Court decisions of 20 May and 24 July 2003,
which were dismissed by the Olsztyn Regional Court on 6 June and
8 August 2003 respectively.
- He
also lodged numerous requests for release from detention, which were
dismissed by the Olsztyn District Court decisions of 19 December
2001, 11 January and 13 February 2002, 10 January, 21 February,
27 March and 16 May 2003.
- Furthermore,
the applicant requested the application of a more lenient preventive
measure to replace his detention. That request was refused by the
Olsztyn District Court decision of 28 April 2003.
- Until
March 2002 the trial court effectively held eight hearings. The court
conducted extensive evidentiary proceedings; a considerable number of
witnesses was heard, evidence was obtained from documents, searches
and other sources.
- On
5 March 2002 the Olsztyn District Court found the applicant guilty of
fraud. It acquitted him of the charge of membership of a criminal
organisation, and imposed a sentence of five years' imprisonment. The
applicant appealed. Seven hearings were subsequently held by the
second-instance court.
- On
1 October 2002 the Olsztyn Regional Court quashed the judgment and
remitted the case for re-examination.
- On
24 July 2003 the Olsztyn District Court again found the applicant
guilty of financial fraud and sentenced him to five years'
imprisonment.
- On
20 July 2004 the Olsztyn Regional Court conditionally released the
applicant from serving the remaining part of the sentence, which was
due to end on 28 August 2005.
- On
several occasions between 2003 and 2004 the applicant requested
information as to whether a confirmation that the detention order of
30 June 2000 had been served on him was kept in the case file. On 6
June and 10 August 2004 he was informed by the Vice-President of
the Regional Court that no such confirmation had been found.
2. Censorship of the applicant's correspondence
- While
the applicant was detained, his correspondence was censored on
several occasions.
- A
letter dated 23 November 2001, which was sent to the applicant by his
lawyer, bears a “censored” stamp dated 29 November 2001,
a handwritten note “on the judge's behalf” and an
illegible signature.
- Two
Olsztyn Tax Office decisions, one dated 30 November 2001, informing
the applicant of the institution of tax proceedings against him, and
the other dated 3 December 2001, informing the applicant of his right
to be heard in the course of the tax proceedings, were also censored.
Both decisions bear a “censored” stamp with the date 10
December 2002 and an illegible signature of a judge. They also bear
another stamp of the same kind which is almost illegible, bearing the
date 11 December 2001 and an illegible signature.
- The
applicant further submitted an envelope in which the correspondence
with the tax office was sent to him. It bears a “censored”
stamp with the date 11 December 2001 and an illegible signature of a
judge. There are also further notes on it: “it is not subject
to censorship” (nie podlega cenzurze) and “I annul
subjection to censorship” (uchylam) and “submit to
censorship” (poddać cenzurze), followed by an
illegible signature.
- Finally,
the applicant provided two envelopes from letters sent by him to his
family and bearing “censored” stamps dated 14 December
2000 and 31 May 2001.
- On
16 December 2001, in reply to a complaint by the applicant, the judge
admitted that he had stamped the letter of 30 November 2001 sent by
the tax office as “censored”, had written a date on it
and had signed it.
- On
17 March 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint to a higher authority,
namely with the Vice-President of the Olsztyn Regional Court, about
the censorship of his correspondence by the President of the Criminal
Division.
- On
17 April 2003 he sent a letter to the Vice-President of the Olsztyn
Regional Court requiring just satisfaction for the breach of his
right to unrestricted correspondence with his lawyer.
- On
7 May 2003 the applicant was informed by the Vice-President of the
Olsztyn Regional Court that the letter sent by his lawyer had been
censored by mistake and thus the applicant did not have any right to
just satisfaction.
- On
26 March 2003 he was informed by the Vice-President of the Olsztyn
Regional Court that the judge should not have subjected the
applicant's correspondence with the tax authorities to censorship, as
it was covered by the notion of “official correspondence”,
and that he had done so by mistake.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning the imposition of
detention (aresztowanie tymczasowe), the grounds for its
extension, release from detention and rules governing other
“preventive measures” (środki zapobiegawcze)
are stated in the Court's judgments in the cases of Kudła v.
Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 75-79, ECHR 2000-XI;
Bagiński v. Poland, no. 37444/97, §§
42-46, 11 October 2005; Golek v. Poland, no. 31330/02, §§
27-33, 25 April 2006; and Celejewski v. Poland, no.
17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006.
- The
relevant domestic law concerning the censorship of correspondence is
set out in the Court's judgment in the case of Michta v. Poland,
no. 13425/02, §§ 33-39, 4 May 2006.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of his detention had been
excessive. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
- The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
- The
applicant's detention started on 28 August 2000, when he was arrested
on suspicion of financial fraud committed while acting as part of a
criminal gang. On 5 March 2002 the Olsztyn District Court convicted
him of fraud and acquitted him of the charge of membership of a
criminal organisation, having concluded that the applicant had acted
in co-operation with other persons.
From
that date he was placed in detention “after conviction by a
competent court”, within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a)
and, consequently, that period of his detention falls outside the
scope of Article 5 § 3 (see Kudła, cited above, §
104).
On 1
October 2002 the Olsztyn Regional Court quashed the applicant's
conviction. Following that date his detention was again covered by
Article 5 § 3. It continued until 24 July 2003
when the applicant was again convicted.
- Accordingly,
the period to be taken into consideration amounts to two years, three
months and twenty-eight days.
2. The parties' submissions
- The
Government submitted that the applicant's pre-trial detention had
been justified by the existence of substantial evidence of his guilt,
the nature of the offences with which he had been charged and the
severity of the anticipated penalty. They underlined that the
applicant had gone into hiding and had been arrested two months after
a wanted notice had been issued. The risk that the applicant and the
co-defendants might obstruct the proceedings or tamper with the
evidence was aggravated by the fact that they were members of an
organised criminal gang. Thus, the domestic courts had considered it
necessary to remand the applicant and his co-defendants in custody
until all relevant witnesses had been heard.
- The
Government emphasised that the serious nature of the charges as well
as the fact that there had been seven defendants charged with
numerous offences committed in a criminal gang required that the
proper conduct of the proceedings be secured with particular
diligence. Some of the charges against them were subjected to a
separate set of proceedings. The Government stressed that although
the applicant had finally been acquitted of the charges of acting
within a criminal gang, it had been necessary to confront him with
other persons whose actions had been closely related to the charges
against the applicant. These persons had also been detained in the
course of relevant criminal proceedings against them.
- The
Government further submitted that the need for the applicant's
continued detention had been thoroughly examined by the courts, which
on each occasion had given sufficient reasons for their decisions.
Lastly, they maintained that the authorities had displayed special
diligence in dealing with the applicant's case. The trial court had
effectively held eight hearings during the first examination of the
case and seven hearings during the second examination. The hearings
had been held regularly and at short intervals.
- The
applicant's case has been particularly complex on account of the
number of charges and the defendants and the volume of evidence. The
proceedings were conducted against members of a criminal gang and
although the applicant was acquitted of the charge of being a member,
the examination of the charges required particular diligence.
- The
applicant argued that the length of his detention had been
unreasonable. He also alleged that it had been unknown to him that he
had been sought pursuant to a wanted notice and that no notice had
been sent to his home address.
3. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
- The
Court reiterates that the general principles regarding the right “to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial, as
guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention” have been
stated in a number of its previous judgements (see, among many other
authorities, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96,
§ 110 et seq., ECHR 2000 XI, and McKay v. the
United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR
2006-..., with further references).
(b) Application of the above principles in
the present case
- In
their detention decisions, the authorities, in addition to the
reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied on the following
principal grounds: the severity of the penalty to which he was liable
and the consequential risk that he might obstruct the trial by
influencing witnesses or going into hiding (see paragraph 9 above).
- The
Court notes that the applicant was charged with financial fraud,
committed with others, as a member of an organised criminal gang. In
this regard, the Court reiterates that the existence of a general
risk flowing from the organised nature of the alleged criminal
activities of the applicant may be accepted as the basis for his
detention at the initial stages of the proceedings (see Górski
v. Poland, no. 28904/02, § 58, 4 October 2005) and
in some circumstances also for subsequent extensions of the detention
(see Celejewski, cited above, § 37). It is also accepted
that in such cases, involving numerous accused, the process of
gathering and hearing evidence is often a difficult task. In these
circumstances, the Court considers that the need to obtain voluminous
evidence from many sources and to determine the facts and degree of
alleged responsibility of each of the co-defendants constituted
relevant and sufficient grounds for the applicant's detention during
the period necessary to terminate the investigation, to draw up the
bill of indictment and to hear evidence from the accused.
- The
Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had
committed the serious offence may initially have warranted his
detention. However, with the passage of time that ground inevitably
became less and less relevant. It must then establish whether the
other grounds advanced by the judicial authorities were “relevant”
and “sufficient” to continue to justify the deprivation
of liberty.
- The
Court notes that the judicial authorities relied on the likelihood
that a severe sentence would be imposed on the applicant given the
serious nature of the offences at issue. According to them, that
likelihood created a presumption that the applicant would obstruct
the proceedings. In this respect, the Court reiterates that the
severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the
assessment of the risk of absconding or reoffending. It acknowledges
that in view of the seriousness of the accusations against the
applicant the authorities could justifiably consider that such an
initial risk had been established.
-
Furthermore, the judicial authorities relied on the fact that the
applicant had been charged with being a member of an organised
criminal gang, had gone into hiding and had been arrested pursuant to
a wanted notice. The foregoing considerations are
sufficient for the Court to conclude that the grounds given for the
applicant's pre-trial detention were “relevant” and
“sufficient” to justify holding him in custody for the
entire relevant period, that is two years, three months and
twenty-eight days.
- It
therefore remains to be ascertained whether the national authorities
displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the
proceedings. In this regard, the Court observes that the proceedings
were of considerable complexity, regard being had to the number of
defendants, the extensive evidentiary proceedings and the
implementation of special measures required in cases concerning
organised crime. Nevertheless, hearings in the applicant's case were
held regularly and at fairly short intervals. For these reasons, the
Court considers that the domestic authorities handled the applicant's
case with relative expedition.
- Having
regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that there has been no
violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant also raised a complaint under Article 8 of the Convention,
alleging that his correspondence during the detention had been
subjected to censorship. This provision, in its relevant part, reads:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for ... his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
- The
Government, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case
and the Court's case-law, refrained from expressing their opinion on
the admissibility and merits of the complaint.
A. Admissibility
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Principles established under the Court's case-law
- An
“interference by a public authority” with the exercise of
the right to respect for his correspondence will contravene Article 8
unless it is “in accordance with the law”, pursues one or
more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 and
furthermore is “necessary in a democratic society” in
order to achieve them (see, among other authorities, the Labita
judgment, cited above, § 179).
- The
expression “in accordance with the law” requires that the
interference in question must have some basis in domestic law. A law
must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an
indication that is adequate, in the circumstances, of the legal rules
applicable to a given case. Moreover, a norm cannot be regarded as a
“law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision
to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if
need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is
reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given
action may entail. Finally, a law which confers discretion must
indicate the scope of that discretion. However, the Court has
recognised the impossibility of attaining absolute certainty in the
framing of laws and the risk that the search for certainty may entail
excessive rigidity (see, among other authorities, Silver and
Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1983,
Series A no. 61, p. 33, §§ 86 88, and
Kozimor v. Poland, no. 10816/02, § 48,
12 April 2007).
2. Application of the principles to the circumstances
of the present case
(a) Existence of interference
- The
Court notes that a letter dated 23 November 2001, which was sent to
the applicant by his lawyer, bears a “censored” stamp, a
handwritten note: “on the judge's behalf” and an
illegible signature. Also, two Olsztyn Tax Office decisions, one
dated 30 November 2001 and the other dated 3 December 2001, bear
“censored” stamps dated 10 December 2002 and an illegible
signature of a judge. Finally, the applicant's correspondence with
the tax office and with members of his family bear “censored”
stamps and judges' illegible signatures. There are also further notes
on the correspondence: “it is not subject to censorship”
(nie podlega cenzurze) and “I annul subjection to
censorship” (uchylam) and “submit to censorship”
(poddać cenzurze), followed by an illegible signature.
- The
Court firstly observes that the Government refrained from taking a
position on the question whether there has been an interference with
the applicant's right to respect for his correspondence. The Court
has held on many occasions that as long as the Polish authorities
continue the practice of marking detainees' letters with the
ocenzurowano stamp, the Court has no alternative but to
presume that those letters have been opened and their contents read,
even if there is no separate stamp on the letter as such (see
Matwiejczuk v. Poland, no. 37641/97, § 99,
2 December 2003; Pisk Piskowski v. Poland,
no. 92/03, § 26, 14 June 2005; and Michta
v. Poland, no. 13425/02, § 58, 4 May
2006).
It
follows that censoring of the applicant's letters amounted to an
“interference” with his right to respect for his
correspondence under Article 8.
(b) Compliance with the requirements of
Article 8 § 2
- The
Government did not indicate a specific legal basis in domestic law
for the impugned interference. The Court notes that the interference
took place in 2001 when the applicant had been detained pending
trial.
- The
Court observes that, according to Article 214 of the Code of
Execution of Criminal Sentences, detained persons should enjoy the
same rights as those convicted by a final judgment.
- As
regards the censorship of the letter from the tax office addressed to
the applicant, the Court notes that it has previously held that the
censorship of an applicant's correspondence with a State authority
was contrary to the statutory prohibition laid down in
Article 102 (11) of the 1997 Code read in conjunction with
Article 214 (see Kwiek v. Poland, no. 51895/99, judgment
of 30 May 2006, § 41).
- As
regards the censorship of the letter from the applicant's lawyer, the
Court reiterates that the confidentiality of the applicant's letters
addressed to and sent by his legal counsel must be respected - save
for reasonable cause. It is clearly in the general interest that any
person who wishes to consult a lawyer should be free to do so under
conditions which favour full and uninhibited discussion. It is for
this reason that the lawyer-client relationship is, in principle,
privileged. Similar considerations apply to a prisoner's
correspondence with a lawyer concerning contemplated or pending
proceedings where the need for confidentiality is equally pressing.
That such correspondence be susceptible to routine scrutiny is not in
keeping with the principles of confidentiality and professional
privilege attaching to relations between a lawyer and his client. In
the Campbell v the United Kingdom judgment of 25 March
1992 Series A no. 233, § 48, the Court found no
reason to distinguish between the different categories of
correspondence with lawyers which, whatever their purpose, concern
matters of a private and confidential character. In the present case,
regard being had to the explicit prohibition of censorship of
detained persons' correspondence with their lawyers provided for in
Article 73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court
considers that the interference complained of was contrary to the
domestic law.
- To
sum up, the Court sees no reason to distinguish the instant case from
the Kwiek case cited above, and in the absence of any comment
by the Government, it concludes that the interference with the
applicant's correspondence with the tax office and with his lawyer
was contrary to domestic law.
- Having
regard to that finding, the
Court does not consider it necessary to ascertain whether the other
requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 were complied with.
62. As
regards the applicant's letter to his family, the Court observes
that, according to Article 217 paragraph 1 of the Code of Execution
of Criminal Sentences detainee's correspondence can be censored by
the authority at whose disposal he remains. Thus, censorship of that
letter was in accordance with domestic law.
- It
remains to be ascertained whether the interference was necessary in a
democratic society in line with the requirements of Article
8 § 2
of the Convention.
64. Having
regard to the fact that the Government failed to submit any arguments
making it possible to assess the need for censorship of the
applicant's correspondence with his family the
Court cannot but conclude that the
requirements of Article 8 § 2 were
not complied with.
- Consequently,
the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of
the Convention.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
A. Alleged violation of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention
- The applicant also complained under Article 5 § 2
of the Convention that he had not been informed of the reasons for
his arrest as the detention order of 30 June 2000 had not been served
on him.
Article 5 § 2 reads, in so far as
relevant, as follows:
“2. Everyone who is arrested shall be
informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons
for his arrest and of any charge against him”.
- Under
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the Court may only deal with
the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted.
- Having
said that, the Court observes that although there is no proof in the
case file that the contested decision had been served on the
applicant, he did not contest this fact until 2003. Neither has he
challenged his detention of 28 August 2000, imposed by
virtue of the order of 30 June 2000. The detention decision was
subsequently issued on 1 September 2000 and duly served on the
applicant; however, he did not challenge it.
- It
follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35
§§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of
domestic remedies.
B. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
- The
applicant also complained that the length of proceedings in his case
had been unreasonable. He also complained of the unfairness of these
proceedings. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
provides, in so far as relevant:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- On
1 March 2005 the Court gave decisions in two leading cases:
Charzynski v. Poland no. 15212/03 (criminal proceedings) and
Michalak v. Poland no. 24549/03 (civil proceedings),
holding that persons complaining about the length of proceedings
before the Polish courts were required by Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention to lodge a complaint of breach of the right to a trial
within a reasonable time under the 2004 Act. Under section 2 of this
Act, a party to the judicial proceedings is entitled to lodge a
complaint of a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable
time. Under section 5 of the 2004 Act, such a complaint must be
lodged while the proceedings are still pending before the domestic
courts. A party may seek, under Section 12, a finding that there was
an unreasonable delay and ask for just satisfaction and acceleration
of the impugned proceedings.
- The
Court reiterates that under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention,
the Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies
have been exhausted.
- In
the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant
was required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to lodge a
complaint of a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable
time with the domestic court under the 2004 Act. However, he did not
avail himself of this remedy.
- With
respect to the applicant's complaint of the unfairness of the
criminal proceedings, the Court observes that in the present case the
applicant failed to prove that he had lodged an appeal against the
Olsztyn District Court's judgment of 24 July 2003.
- It
follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35
§§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
A. Damage
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicant did not claim any compensation in respect of non pecuniary
damage. He left the assessment of amount of just satisfaction to the
Court's discretion.
- The
Court considers that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage
which is not sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation
of the Convention. Considering the circumstances of the case and
making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the
applicant 500 euros (EUR) under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer in the proceedings
before the Court, did not claim reimbursement of his costs and
expenses.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaints concerning the length of
the applicant's detention and the censorship of his correspondence
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
8 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 500 (five
hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage,
to be converted into Polish zlotys, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 January 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
