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FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF PIOTR OSUCH v. POLAND
(Application no. 30028/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 November 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Piotr Osuch v. Poland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting
as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza, President,
Lech Garlicki,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana Mijović,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić, judges,
and Lawrence
Early, Section
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 13 October 2009,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The case originated in an
application (no. 30028/06) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Mr Piotr Osuch
(“the applicant”), on 17 July 2006.
- The applicant was
represented by Mr A. Banaszkiewicz, a lawyer practising in Lublin.
The Polish Government were represented by their Agent,
Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
- The applicant alleged, in particular, that his
detention on remand had exceeded a “reasonable time”
within the meaning of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention
and that the bail conditions imposed on him constituted
a breach of that provision.
- On 29 November 2007
the President of the Fourth Section of the Court decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Chełm.
He is currently detained in Lublin Remand Centre.
- On 25 February 2003 the applicant was arrested by the
police. On 27 February 2003 the Lublin District Court (Sąd
Rejonowy) decided to detain the applicant on remand in view
of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed several offences
of fraud, in different locations in Poland, Switzerland and Germany.
The court relied on the likelihood that a heavy sentence might be
imposed on the applicant and that there was a risk of his absconding.
It based its conclusion on the fact that the applicant had multiple
citizenship and permanent residence permits in Switzerland and
Monaco.
- On 16 May 2003 the Lublin District Court extended the
applicant’s detention until 25 February 2004, reiterating the
original grounds for the detention. The applicant appealed against
this decision, complaining in particular about the considerable
period of time for which his detention had been extended.
- On 12 June 2003 the Lublin Regional Court (Sąd
Okręgowy) dismissed the appeal, finding that there were
justifiable reasons to explain why the investigation had not yet been
terminated by the prosecutor.
- Subsequently, as the applicant’s detention
pending investigation had exceeded a period of one year, the Lublin
Appellate Prosecutor applied to the Lublin Court of Appeal to
extend further his pre-trial detention. On 18 February 2004
the court allowed the application, relying on the severity
of the sentence to which the applicant was liable and on the
necessity of continuing the complex investigation and evidence-taking
process, which required international co-operation.
- On 10 August 2004 the applicant was indicted before
the Lublin District Court. The trial court held the first hearing on
16 December 2004.
- The applicant’s pre-trial detention was
subsequently extended on 26 January 2005 by the trial court
and on 16 February 2005 by the Lublin Court of Appeal. The courts
relied on the grounds cited previously, namely the severity of the
possible sentence, which created a risk of the applicant’s
going into hiding, and the necessity of gathering evidence in this
particularly complex case. The courts also found that the applicant’s
state of health was not serious enough to justify the need for
his treatment outside prison. In the last of these decisions the
Court of Appeal also considered that it was not possible to release
the applicant on bail as he did not have sufficient assets to secure
his appearance at the trial.
- On 20 July 2005 the Court of Appeal extended the
applicant’s detention until 30 January 2006. The court based
its decision on the process of gathering evidence in this
particularly complex case and on the risk of the applicant’s
attempting to influence witnesses. As regards the latter argument,
the court noted that during the preparatory proceedings the applicant
had been smuggling notes from prison concerning illegal actions aimed
at interfering with the proceedings.
The court decided, however, that the applicant could be released upon
payment of bail in the amount of 40,000,000 Polish zlotys (PLN),
(approximately 10,000,000 euros (EUR) at the material time). It gave
the following reasons for its decision:
“...given the request to replace detention on
remand with bail [in an amount] that [the applicant] would be able to
pay, lodged by one of his lawyers, it is now possible to examine
again the issue of the application of another preventive measure [to
the applicant]. The Court of Appeal is convinced that the accused has
a substantial fortune; indeed, that can be deduced from the notes
smuggled out of prison (gryps), addressed to his wife, which
have been secured [by the authorities]. His means, not only
financial, which [the applicant] refers to in this note justify
[releasing the applicant on bail] and setting the amount of bail at
PLN 40,000,000. The amount of bail, based on the applicant’s
financial worth, is justified by the need to ensure the proper course
of the proceedings and takes into account the scale of the damage and
the type of offences committed.”
- On 28 July 2005 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an
appeal against that decision, complaining about the excessive amount
of bail fixed by the court. He requested the Lublin District Court to
impose bail in an amount that could be realistically paid by the
applicant, for example PLN 500,000 (EUR 125,000), or in the form
of a mortgage on his father’s real property.
- On 3 August 2005 the appeal was dismissed by the
Lublin Court of Appeal. The court considered that the amount of
bail fixed by the trial court had been justified. The court again
referred to the applicant’s letter to his wife in which he
had informed her of substantial gains from international financial
operations. The court also submitted that the fraud of which the
applicant had been accused involved an amount of PLN 41,000,000.
- On 1 September 2005 the Lublin District Court
dismissed a further request by the applicant to lift the order for
his detention.
- On 18 January 2006 the Lublin Court of Appeal extended
the applicant’s detention. The court pointed to a number of
objective reasons which explained why the applicant’s trial had
not yet finished, for which the trial court could not be held
responsible. It also relied on the particular complexity of the case.
- On 16 March 2006 the Lublin District Court gave
judgment. It convicted the applicant and sentenced him to 14
years’ imprisonment. The court further extended the applicant’s
detention and discontinued the decision of 20 July 2005 concerning
the bail conditions.
The court established that between 1997 and 2003 the applicant had
created a false identity for himself and developed a model for
international frauds which had allowed him to commit a series of
offences. He had pretended to be a Cambridge or Oxford graduate, the
owner of huge wealth located in different parts of the world which
included 3,500 tons of gold deposited in a Zurich bank, the owner of
a company, W, and the holder of the title Prince Peter
von Hochburg – from an aristocratic Italian family. The
applicant claimed to be an international investment adviser and
broker able to secure bank guarantees of 150,000,000 United States
dollars (USD). He falsely claimed to be employed by
financial institutions. In reality the applicant did not have
a university education and was not even registered as a
taxpayer.
He was convicted of, inter alia, having obtained USD 4,800,000
under false pretences from a former footballer, R, and a further USD
5,000,000 from an Australian company, S. The
applicant was also convicted of a series of other investment frauds
and forgeries against individuals and companies in Poland and in
Germany.
- The applicant was notified of the reasoned judgment
on 13 September 2006 and he lodged an appeal against it.
- On 16 February 2007 the Lublin Regional Court, sitting
as an appeal court, held the first hearing in the case.
- On 31 August 2007 the Lublin Regional Court gave a
judgment in the applicant’s case. It partly upheld the
first-instance judgment and sentenced the applicant to eight years’
imprisonment.
- The applicant lodged a cassation appeal and the
proceedings are currently pending before the Supreme Court.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- The relevant domestic law and practice concerning the
imposition of detention on remand (aresztowanie tymczasowe),
the grounds for its extension, release from detention and rules
governing other so-called “preventive measures” (środki
zapobiegawcze) are set out in the Court’s judgments in the
cases of Gołek v. Poland (no. 31330/02, §§
27-33, 25 April 2006) and Celejewski v. Poland (no.
17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006).
- On 24 July 2006 the Constitutional Court, having
examined jointly two constitutional complaints (skarga
konstytucyjna) lodged by former detainees, declared
Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
unconstitutional in so far as it related to the investigation stage
of criminal proceedings (No. SK 58/03). The provision in question
provided that detention might be extended beyond two years if the
pre trial proceedings could not be completed because of
“important obstacles” which could not have been overcome.
The provision in question did not set any statutory time-limit for
extending the detention. The Constitutional Court considered that the
impugned provision, by its imprecise and broad wording, could lead to
arbitrary decisions by the courts on pre-trial detention, and thus
infringe the very essence of constitutional rights and freedoms.
Referring to other grounds for the extraordinary extension of
pre-trial detention under Article 263 § 4, namely
suspension of criminal proceedings, extended psychiatric observation
of the accused, extended preparation of an expert opinion,
evidence-gathering in a particularly complex case or a foreign
country, and intentional protraction of proceedings by the accused,
the Constitutional Court stated that although those criteria were to
some extent vague as well, their constitutionality could be secured
by formulating a precise definition through practice, making
reference, inter alia, to the well established case-law
of the European Court as regards violations of Article 5 §
3 of the Convention.
- The relevant statistical data, recent amendments to
the Code of Criminal Procedure designed to streamline criminal
proceedings and references to the relevant Council of Europe
materials including the 2007 Interim Resolution of the Committee of
Ministers can be found in the Court’s judgment in the case of
Kauczor v. Poland (no. 45219/06, §§ 27-28 and
30-35, 3 February 2009).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The applicant complained that the length of his
detention on remand had been excessive. He further complained that
the amount of bail requested from him had been excessive and had not
been proportionate to his financial means. He relied on Article 5
§ 3 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant,
reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
- The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
- The Government submitted that the applicant had not
exhausted all the remedies provided for by Polish law in that he had
failed to lodge a constitutional complaint under Article 79 §
1 of the Polish Constitution and question the constitutionality of
those provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure that had
served as a basis for extending his pre-trial detention, in
particular Article 263 of the Code.
- The applicant did not submit any comments on this
point.
- The Court observes that the rule of exhaustion of
domestic remedies contained in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention
requires that an applicant should have normal recourse to remedies
which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of
the breaches alleged.
- The Court notes that the Constitutional Court in its
judgment of 24 July 2006 found Article 263 § 4 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional in so far as it provided
for detention to be extended beyond two years if the pre trial
proceedings could not be completed because of “important
obstacles” (see paragraph 23 above).
- The Court observes, however, that in the present case
the domestic courts did not base their decisions extending the
applicant’s pre-trial detention on the part of Article 263 §
4 which was declared unconstitutional. They relied only on the
necessity of gathering evidence in a particularly complex case,
a prerequisite that the Constitutional Court considered compatible
with the Constitution (see paragraphs, 11, 12, 16 and 23 above).
The Court is therefore of the opinion that it is doubtful whether the
applicant could have successfully lodged a constitutional complaint
in respect of the provisions which had been vetted and found
to be compatible with the Polish Constitution in the
judgment of 24 July 2006.
- Furthermore, the Court observes that the facts giving
rise to the alleged violation of Article 5 § 3 concern the
period from 23 February 2003 to 16 March 2006. It further notes that
at the relevant time the practice of the Constitutional Court in
respect of the admissibility of a constitutional complaint against an
ancillary decision adopted in the context of criminal proceedings was
not clearly established (see Łaszkiewicz v. Poland,
no. 28481/03, §§ 69-70, 15 January 2008). In addition,
the Court is not persuaded that at the relevant time a constitutional
complaint could have satisfied the second part of the test
established in the Szott-Medyńska decision
(Szott-Medyńska v. Poland (dec.), no. 47414/99,
9 October 2003). Thus, the Court considers that in the present case
the constitutional remedy lacked the requisite effectiveness.
- Finally, the Court notes that the applicant appealed
against all decisions extending his pre-trial detention and applied
for this preventive measure to be lifted. The Court has already
considered that those remedies, namely an appeal against a detention
order or a request for release, whether submitted to the prosecutor
or to the court, depending on the stage of the proceedings, and also
an appeal against a decision to extend detention, serve the same
purpose under Polish law (see, for example, Wolf v. Poland,
nos. 15667/03 and 2929/04, § 78, 16 January 2007). Their
objective is to secure the review of the lawfulness of
detention at any given time in the proceedings, both in their
pre-trial and trial stage, and to obtain release if the circumstances
of the case no longer justify continued detention (see Iwańczuk
v. Poland (dec.), no. 25196/94, 9 November 2000, and
Wolf, cited above, nos. 15667/03 and 2929/04, § 78,
16 January 2007). According
to the Court’s established case-law, having exhausted the
available remedy, the applicant was not required to embark on another
attempt to obtain redress by bringing a constitutional complaint (see
for example Cichla v. Poland, no. 18036/03,
§ 26, 10 October 2006).
- It follows that the Government’s plea of
inadmissibility on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies
must be dismissed.
- The Court further notes that the complaint is not
manifestly ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
- The applicant submitted in general terms that he had
been kept in pre-trial detention for an unjustified length of
time. He further argued that the amount of bail imposed on him to
ensure his attendance at the trial had been excessively high. The
applicant submitted that the highest amount of bail imposed by
the Polish courts to date, in the most drastic cases, had never
exceeded one-third of the amount ordered in his case.
- The Government considered that the applicant’s
pre-trial detention satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 3.
It was justified by “relevant” and “sufficient”
grounds. These grounds were, in particular, the gravity of the
charges against the applicant and the fact that he had previously
been convicted. The Government considered that there had been a risk
of the applicant’s going into hiding or otherwise interfering
with the proper course of the proceedings. The Government argued that
the domestic authorities had shown due diligence, as required in
cases against detained persons.
The Government decided not to comment on the issue of the bail
conditions imposed on the applicant.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) General principles
- The Court reiterates that the general principles
regarding the right “to trial within a reasonable time or to
release pending trial”, as guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of
the Convention, have been set out in a number of its previous
judgments (see, among many other authorities, Kudła v. Poland
[GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 110 et seq., ECHR
2000 XI, and McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.
543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR 2006-X, with further references).
- The Court further reiterates that according to its
case-law, the amount of bail must be assessed principally by
reference to the accused, his assets and his relationship with the
persons who are to provide the security, in other words to the extent
to which it is felt that the prospect of loss of the security or of
action against the guarantors in the event of his non appearance
at the trial will act as a sufficient deterrent to dispel any wish on
his part to abscond (see Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968,
§ 14, Series A no. 8).
- An accused in respect of whom the judicial authorities
declare themselves prepared to release on bail must furnish
sufficient information in good faith, which can be checked if
need be, about the amount of bail to be fixed. As the
fundamental right to liberty as guaranteed by Article 5 of the
Convention is at stake, the authorities must take as much care
in fixing an appropriate amount of bail as in deciding whether
or not the accused’s continued detention is indispensable (see
Iwańczuk v.
Poland, no. 25196/94, § 66, 15 November 2001, and Skrobol v.
Poland, no. 44165/98, § 57, 13 September
2005).
(b) Application of the above principles in
the present case
- The applicant’s detention started on 25 February
2003, when he was arrested on suspicion of having committed fraud,
and ended on 16 March 2006, when the Regional Court
convicted him as charged.
Accordingly, the period to be taken into consideration amounts to
three years and 20 days.
- In their detention decisions, the authorities, in
addition to the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied
principally on three grounds, namely the severity of the penalty to
which he was liable, the need to ensure the proper conduct of the
proceedings, in particular to collect evidence in a particularly
complex case, and the risk that the applicant might go into hiding.
As regards the latter, they relied on the fact that the applicant had
multiple citizenship and permanent residence permits in Switzerland
and Monaco.
- The Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion
against the applicant of having committed serious offences could
initially have warranted his detention. Also, the need to obtain
voluminous evidence constituted a valid ground for the applicant’s
initial detention.
- The Court observes that throughout the entire relevant
period the judicial authorities based their finding that there
existed a risk of the applicant’s evading trial on the fact
that he had been using identity documents issued by several countries
and thus could easily go into hiding. The Court agrees that this
factor justified keeping him in custody in the initial stages of the
proceedings. However, the Court considers that that ground gradually
lost its force and relevance as the proceedings progressed (see
Czajka v. Poland, no. 15067/02, § 46,
13 February 2007, and Michalak v. Poland, no. 16864/02, §
35, 18 September 2007).
- It is to be noted that the
judicial authorities presumed that there was a risk of pressure being
exerted on witnesses or of the proceedings being obstructed, basing
that presumption on the serious nature of the offences and the fact
that some evidence had to be collected by means of international
judicial assistance. The Court acknowledges that in view of the
seriousness and the nature of the accusations against the applicant,
the authorities could justifiably have considered that such an
initial risk was established. Regard being had to the complexity of
the proceedings and their international character, the difficulty
faced by the authorities must in particular be seen as relevant.
The Court also notes that the domestic court in its decision of 20
July 2005 referred to illegal notes intercepted by the
authorities from which it appeared that the applicant had at least
attempted to influence witnesses. Accordingly, the risk of pressure
being brought to bear on witnesses or other co-accused can reasonably
be considered to have been high, as found by the domestic
courts.
Nevertheless, with the passage of time, and
given the authorities’ failure to advance any new grounds for
extending the applicant’s detention on remand, the grounds
relied on became less relevant and cannot justify the total period of
over three years during which the most serious preventive measure was
imposed against the applicant (see Michalak,
cited above, § 36).
- The Court lastly notes that the judicial authorities
relied heavily on the consideration that the likelihood of a
severe sentence being imposed on the applicant created a presumption
that he would obstruct the proceedings. However, the Court would
reiterate that, while the severity of the sentence faced is a
relevant element in the assessment of the risk of absconding or
reoffending, the gravity of the charges cannot by itself justify long
periods of pre-trial detention (see Michta v. Poland, no.
13425/02, § 49, 4 May 2006).
- The Court also notes that there is no specific
indication that during the first 24 months of the applicant’s
pre-trial detention the authorities envisaged the possibility of
imposing other preventive measures on him – such as bail or
police supervision – expressly provided for by Polish law
to ensure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings.
Not until 16 February 2005 did the court for the first time examine
the possibility of releasing the applicant on bail and dismiss it,
having considered that he did not have sufficient assets.
Subsequently, on 20 July 2005 the domestic court agreed to release
the applicant on bail but fixed its amount at the equivalent of EUR
10,000,000. However, there is no evidence that before deciding on
that sum the domestic court made any effort to determine what
would be an appropriate amount of bail in the circumstances, for
example by requiring the applicant to furnish information on his
financial standing.
In this context the Court would emphasise that under Article 5
§ 3, the authorities, when deciding whether a person should
be released or detained, are obliged to consider alternative measures
of ensuring his appearance at trial. Indeed, that Article lays
down not only the right to “trial within a reasonable time
or release pending trial” but also provides that “release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial” (see
Jabłoński v. Poland, no. 33492/96,
§ 83, 21 December 2000).
- Having regard to the foregoing, the Court concludes
that the grounds given by the domestic authorities could not justify
the overall period of the applicant’s detention.
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention that the length of the proceedings in his case had
exceeded a “reasonable time” within the meaning of this
provision.
- However, pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention:
“The Court may only deal with the matter after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally
recognised rules of international law...”
- The Court observes that after the entry into force, on
17 September 2004, of the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints
about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time
(Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy
w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki
– “the 2004 Act”) it was open to the applicant
to lodge a complaint about the unreasonable length of the
proceedings with the relevant domestic court.
However, the applicant informed the Court that he had chosen not
to avail himself of the possibility of lodging a complaint about
the length of the proceedings under the 2004 Act.
- The Court has already examined that remedy for the
purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and found
it to be effective in respect of complaints about the excessive
length of judicial proceedings in Poland. In particular, it has
considered that that remedy is capable both of preventing the
alleged violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable
time or its continuation, and of providing adequate redress for any
violation that has already occurred (see Charzyński v. Poland
(dec.), no. 15212/03, §§ 36 42, ECHR 2005-V).
- It follows that this part of the application must be
rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the
Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 46 of the Convention provides:
“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to
abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they
are parties.
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise
its execution.”
A. The parties’ submissions
- The applicant did not submit any observations
concerning this provision.
- The Government referred to the
arguments submitted previously in the case of Figas
v. Poland (no. 7883/07,
§§ 41-44, 23 June 2009).
- The Government concluded that,
bearing in mind the efforts of the Polish authorities and the
legislative reforms which were being and had been undertaken by them
to solve the problem of the length of detention on remand,
Poland could not be said to have failed to comply with its
obligations under Article 46 of the Convention to abide by the
Court’s judgments.
B. The Court’s assessment
- Recently, in the case of Kauczor v. Poland
(cited above, §§ 58 et seq., with further references)
the Court held that the Interim Resolution adopted by the Committee
of Ministers on 6 June 2007, taken together with the number of
judgments already delivered and the number of pending cases raising
an issue of excessive detention incompatible with Article 5 § 3,
demonstrated that the violation of the applicant’s right under
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention had originated in a widespread
problem arising out of the malfunctioning of the Polish criminal
justice system which had affected, and might still affect in the
future, an as yet unidentified, but potentially considerable number
of persons charged in criminal proceedings.
- In the present case, as in other
numerous similar detention cases, the authorities did not justify the
applicant’s continued detention by
relevant and sufficient reasons (see paragraphs 44-46 above).
Consequently, the Court sees no reason to diverge from the findings
it made in Kauczor
as to the existence of a structural problem and the need
for the Polish State to adopt measures to remedy the situation (see
Kauczor,
cited above, §§ 60 62).
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The applicant claimed PLN 1,800,000,000 in respect of
pecuniary damage and PLN 1,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
- The Government contested these claims, considering
them excessive.
- The Court does not discern any causal link between the
violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore
dismisses this claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant
1,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, did
not submit any claims for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
- The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the
unreasonable length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Polish zlotys at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 November 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
