BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you
consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it
will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free
access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[New search]
[Contents list]
[Printable RTF version]
[Help]
FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF LANDGREN v. FINLAND
(Application
no. 17889/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10
November 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Landgren v. Finland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján
Šikuta,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Mihai
Poalelungi, judges,
and Lawrence
Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 20 October 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 17889/07) against the
Republic of Finland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Finnish national, Mr Timo Elias
Landgren (“the applicant”), on 25 April 2007.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr Joonia Streng, a lawyer practising in
Helsinki. The Finnish Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- On
27 August 2008 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government, insofar as it concerned the length of
the proceedings. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and
merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 §
3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Malaga, Spain.
- The
applicant's company was building houses on a plot bordering on
parkland in the city of Espoo. On 19 October 2000 the city filed a
criminal complaint requesting the police to investigate whether the
applicant, or other persons, had committed an offence by cutting down
trees on city grounds and removing them without authorisation.
- On
31 October 2000 the applicant was questioned by the police for the
first time in that connection. On 5 July 2001, having questioned the
applicant on three further occasions, as well as other suspects and
witnesses, and having obtained written evidence, the police referred
the investigation report to the public prosecutor.
- The
applicant subsequently requested an additional pre-trial
investigation. The prosecutor acceded to the request and referred the
case back to the police on 14 November 2001. The report on that
investigation was sent to the prosecutor on 13 March 2002.
- In
August 2001 two more criminal complaints were filed and the applicant
was questioned on suspicion of having made unauthorised alterations
to a listed building situated on the construction site and having
used the city grounds as a storage area for soil and building
materials. The reports on these investigations were referred to the
prosecutor on 19 and 20 June 2002, respectively.
- The
applicant was provided with an opportunity to submit final statements
to the investigation reports, which he did. The police referred the
last two statements to the prosecutor on 22 August 2002.
- On
24 September 2002 the prosecutor brought charges against the
applicant and three other defendants in the Espoo District Court
(käräjäoikeus, tingsrätt). He accused the
applicant of damage to the environment, aggravated criminal damage, a
building offence and criminal trespass. The city joined most of the
charges. After having held preliminary hearings on 8 January 2003,
the court held an oral hearing comprising ten sessions between 7 and
22 May 2003. In addition to written evidence the court received
testimony from all defendants and nearly 30 witnesses. On 7 May 2003
the court also made an on-site inspection.
- On
18 June 2003 the court dismissed all the charges. Regarding the
applicant, it stated, inter alia, that in cutting down the
trees he had acted in good faith, relying on an agreement between the
city and the owner of the building plot. According to the said
agreement, the constructor was required to trim and tidy up the
bordering parkland. The court further found that, in the particular
circumstances of the case, the applicant had justifiably believed
that no authorisation was needed to renovate the listed building and
that he had not used the city grounds in an unlawful manner. In
assessing the amount of costs and expenses awarded to defence
counsel, the District Court noted that the case material had been
extensive and the court's oral hearing had comprised ten long
sessions.
- On
30 June 2003 the prosecutor requested an extension of the time-limit
set for an appeal. Having regard to the extent of the case material
and the prosecutor's annual leave, the District Court extended the
time-limit to 15 September 2003.
- On
that date, the prosecutor lodged his appeal with the Helsinki Court
of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten). On 14 November 2003
the letter of appeal was sent to the applicant for comments. On 3
December 2003 the applicant requested an extension of the time-limit
set for his reply. The court acceded to the request and extended the
time-limit to 30 January 2004. The applicant filed his reply on 22
January 2004.
- On
12 September 2005 the court held a preliminary hearing. On
14 November 2005 it made an on-site inspection. An oral hearing
comprising four sessions was held between 17 and 24 January
2006. In addition to written evidence the court received testimony
from all four defendants and 19 witnesses. On 18 May 2006
the court issued its judgment, where it deviated from the lower
court's conclusion about the legality of the applicant's actions. It
convicted him of damaging the environment and of a building offence.
It sentenced him to 80 unit fines and ordered him to pay damages and
legal expenses to the city and to reimburse witness fees to the
State.
- On
23 November 2006 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta
domstolen) refused the applicant leave to appeal.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 31 October 2000, when
the applicant was first questioned by the police, and ended on
23 November 2006 when the Supreme Court refused him leave to
appeal. It thus lasted six years and 24 days for three levels of
jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among
many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France
[GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
- The
Government argued that the applicant had contributed to the length of
the proceedings, firstly by requesting an additional investigation
and secondly by requesting an extension of the time-limit set for his
written reply to the Court of Appeal. This had caused delays of some
four months and one month, respectively. In the Government's view all
stages of the proceedings, excluding the proceedings before the Court
of Appeal, had been completed swiftly. The Government pointed out
that the case had not been considered urgent by the Court of Appeal,
which had partly contributed to the time taken by that court. The
Government further submitted that the case had been complex. In
conclusion, the Government argued that the overall length of the
proceedings had not exceeded reasonable time.
- The
applicant contested the Government's arguments. In his view, the case
had not been complex. He had admitted to the conduct described in the
prosecutor's indictment and the trial courts had mainly been called
upon to make a judicial assessment of his criminal liability in that
connection. Some of the oral evidence produced by the prosecution had
been unnecessary. Moreover, the proceedings would have been conducted
more speedily had the different charges against the applicant been
dealt with in separate proceedings.
- The
Court finds no reason to question the District Court's view on the
extent of the case material (see paragraph 11 above). It also takes
note of the number of defendants and alleged offences as well as the
number of witnesses heard before the domestic courts. However, there
is nothing to suggest that the case presented any particular
difficulty. Thus, the length of the proceedings cannot, in the
Court's view, be explained by the complexity of the case alone.
- The
Court observes that, as far as the applicant was concerned, the
pre-trial investigation and the consideration of charges lasted one
year, 11 months and 13 days, which can be considered reasonable
under the circumstances of the case. The Court is not convinced by
the Government's argument that the applicant was partly responsible
for the length of the pre-trial stage by requesting an additional
investigation. It notes that at the time of the request, the police
were still investigating other offences allegedly committed by the
applicant, and those investigations were closed later than the one
conducted at the applicant's request. In any case, the Court finds
that making full use of the various procedures available to pursue
his defence cannot be held against the applicant. There is nothing to
suggest that the applicant attempted to impede the proceedings in any
way.
- The
Court further observes that the case was pending before the District
Court for eight months and 23 days, which can also be considered
reasonable. Nor do the leave to appeal proceedings before the Supreme
Court, some six months, appear excessively long.
- However,
the Court finds no justification for the length of the proceedings
before the Court of Appeal. After the delivery of the District
Court's judgment, it took two years and eleven months until the Court
of Appeal issued its judgment. This delay cannot be explained by the
oral hearing, nor the on-site inspection, having regard, in
particular, to the fact that the same procedural measures were taken
by the lower court in a much shorter time. In the Court's view, the
applicant's request for an extension of the time-limit set for his
written reply did not significantly contribute to the total time
taken before the Court of Appeal. By contrast, the Court notes that
the Government have failed to offer a satisfactory explanation for
the period of inactivity of almost one year and eight months which
elapsed between the receipt of the applicant's written reply and that
court's preliminary hearing.
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Pélissier and Sassi, cited above).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION
- The
applicant also complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention
that the presumption of innocence had been breached at the pre-trial
investigation stage in that the police had taken into account mainly
material submitted by the city, including a document containing false
information. The presumption had also been breached by the Court of
Appeal when convicting the applicant without grounds.
- The
Court notes that the applicant has not even alleged that he or his
counsel were in any way prevented from adducing evidence in support
of the defence, either during the pre-trial investigation or before
the trial courts. He was also fully able to contest any evidence
submitted by other parties. Furthermore, the Court finds no
indication that the Court of Appeal, contrary to Article 6 § 2
of the Convention, started from the presumption that the applicant
had committed the offences with which he had been charged.
- It
follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3
and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage
for loss of business opportunities during the proceedings. He further
claimed EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government contested these claims. In their view, there was no causal
link between the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention and the pecuniary damage claimed. As to the claim for
non-pecuniary damage, the Government found it excessive as to
quantum. Any award under that head should not exceed EUR
3,000.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant must have
sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis it
awards award him EUR 1,000 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed EUR 3,385.88 for the costs and expenses
incurred before the Court.
- The
Government contested the claim. They pointed out that the Court had
invited observations only in respect of the alleged breach of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention. The total award for costs and expenses
should not exceed EUR 2,500.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,000 (inclusive of
value-added tax) for the proceedings before the Court. In this
connection the Court notes that only one of the applicant's
complaints was communicated to the Government for observations.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts:
(i)
EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable,
in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii)
EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable
to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 November 2009,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
