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GRAND
CHAMBER
CASE OF
A. AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
(Application
no. 3455/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19
February 2009
This
judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of A. and Others v. the United Kingdom,
The
European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed
of:
Jean-Paul
Costa,
President,
Christos
Rozakis,
Nicolas
Bratza,
Françoise
Tulkens,
Josep
Casadevall,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ireneu
Cabral Barreto,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Lech
Garlicki,
Khanlar
Hajiyev,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Egbert
Myjer,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
George
Nicolaou,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nona
Tsotsoria,
Mihai
Poalelungi,
judges,
and
Michael O'Boyle, Deputy
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 21 May 2008 and on 4 February 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the last mentioned
date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 3455/05) against the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by eleven
non-United Kingdom nationals (“the applicants”), on 21
January 2005. The President acceded to the applicants' request not to
have their names disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).
- The
applicants were represented by Birnberg Pierce and Partners, a firm
of solicitors practising in London. The United Kingdom Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr D.
Walton, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- The
applicants alleged, in particular, that they had been unlawfully
detained, in breach of Articles 3, 5 § 1 and 14 of the
Convention and that they had not had adequate remedies at their
disposal, in breach of Articles 5 § 4 and 13.
- The
application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52
§ 1 of the Rules of Court). On 11 September 2007 a Chamber
of that Section, composed of the following judges: Josep Casadevall,
Nicolas Bratza, Giovanni Bonello, Kristaq Traja, Stanislav Pavloschi,
Lech Garlicki, Liliana Mijović and also of Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand
Chamber, neither of the parties having objected to relinquishment
(Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72).
- The
composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the
provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and
Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.
- The
applicants and the Government each filed written observations on the
merits. In addition, third-party comments were received from two
London-based non-governmental organisations, Liberty and Justice,
which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the
written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44
§ 2).
- A
hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building,
Strasbourg, on 21 May 2008 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the
Government
Mr D. Walton, Agent,
Mr P. Sales, QC
Ms C. Ivimy, Counsel,
Mr S. Braviner-Roman,
Ms K. Chalmers,
Mr E. Adams,
Mr J. Adutt,
Mr L. Smith, Advisers;
(b) for the
applicants
Ms G. Pierce,
Ms M. Willis Stewart,
Mr D. Guedalla, Solicitors,
Mr B. Emmerson, QC,
Mr R. Husain,
Mr D. Friedman, Counsel.
The
Court heard addresses by Mr Emmerson and Mr Sales and their answers
in reply to questions put by the Court.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as
follows.
A. The derogation
- On
11 September 2001 four commercial aeroplanes were hijacked over the
United States of America. Two of them were flown directly at the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center and a third at the Pentagon, causing
great loss of life and destruction to property. The Islamist
extremist terrorist organisation al'Qaeda, led by Osama Bin Laden,
claimed responsibility. The United Kingdom joined with the
United States in military action in Afghanistan, which had been used
as a base for al'Qaeda training camps.
- The
Government contended that the events of 11 September 2001
demonstrated that international terrorists, notably those associated
with al'Qaeda, had the intention and capacity to mount attacks
against civilian targets on an unprecedented scale. Further, given
the loose-knit, global structure of al'Qaeda and its affiliates and
their fanaticism, ruthlessness and determination, it would be
difficult for the State to prevent future attacks. In the
Government's assessment, the United Kingdom, because of its close
links with the United States, was a particular target. They
considered that there was an emergency of a most serious kind
threatening the life of the nation. Moreover, they considered that
the threat came principally, but not exclusively, from a number of
foreign nationals present in the United Kingdom, who were providing a
support network for Islamist terrorist operations linked to al'Qaeda.
A number of these foreign nationals could not be deported because of
the risk that they would suffer treatment contrary to Article 3 of
the Convention in their countries of origin.
- On 11 November 2001 the Secretary of State made a
Derogation Order under section 14 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the
1998 Act”: see paragraph 94 below) in which he set out the
terms of a proposed notification to the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe of a derogation pursuant to Article 15 of the
Convention. On 18 December 2001 the Government lodged
the derogation with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
The derogation notice provided as follows:
“Public emergency in the United Kingdom
The terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, D.C. and
Pennsylvania on 11th September 2001 resulted in several thousand
deaths, including many British victims and others from 70 different
countries. In its resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), the United
Nations Security Council recognised the attacks as a threat to
international peace and security.
The threat from international terrorism is a continuing
one. In its resolution 1373 (2001), the Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, required all States
to take measures to prevent the commission of terrorist attacks,
including by denying safe haven to those who finance, plan, support
or commit terrorist attacks.
There exists a terrorist threat to the United Kingdom
from persons suspected of involvement in international terrorism. In
particular, there are foreign nationals present in the United Kingdom
who are suspected of being concerned in the commission, preparation
or instigation of acts of international terrorism, of being members
of organisations or groups which are so concerned or of having links
with members of such organisations or groups, and who are a threat to
the national security of the United Kingdom.
As a result, a public emergency, within the meaning of
Article 15(1) of the Convention, exists in the United Kingdom.
The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
As a result of the public emergency, provision is made
in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, inter
alia, for an extended power to arrest and detain a
foreign national which will apply where it is intended to remove or
deport the person from the United Kingdom but where removal or
deportation is not for the time being possible, with the consequence
that the detention would be unlawful under existing domestic law
powers. The extended power to arrest and detain will apply where the
Secretary of State issues a certificate indicating his belief that
the person's presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national
security and that he suspects the person of being an international
terrorist. That certificate will be subject to an appeal to the
Special Immigration Appeals Commission ('SIAC'), established under
the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, which will have
power to cancel it if it considers that the certificate should not
have been issued. There will be an appeal on a point of law from a
ruling by SIAC. In addition, the certificate will be reviewed by SIAC
at regular intervals. SIAC will also be able to grant bail, where
appropriate, subject to conditions. It will be open to a detainee to
end his detention at any time by agreeing to leave the United
Kingdom.
The extended power of arrest and detention in the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is a measure which is
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. It is a
temporary provision which comes into force for an initial period of
15 months and then expires unless renewed by the Parliament.
Thereafter, it is subject to annual renewal by Parliament. If, at any
time, in the Government's assessment, the public emergency no longer
exists or the extended power is no longer strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, then the Secretary of State will, by
Order, repeal the provision.
Domestic law powers of
detention (other than under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001)
The Government has powers under the Immigration Act 1971
('the 1971 Act') to remove or deport persons on the ground that their
presence in the United Kingdom is not conducive to the public good on
national security grounds. Persons can also be arrested and detained
under Schedules 2 and 3 to the 1971 Act pending their removal or
deportation. The courts in the United Kingdom have ruled that this
power of detention can only be exercised during the period necessary,
in all the circumstances of the particular case, to effect removal
and that, if it becomes clear that removal is not going to be
possible within a reasonable time, detention will be unlawful (R.
v Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Singh [1984] All ER 983).
Article 5(1)(f) of the Convention
It is well established that Article 5(1)(f) permits the
detention of a person with a view to deportation only in
circumstances where 'action is being taken with a view to
deportation' (Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413 at
paragraph 112). In that case the European Court of Human Rights
indicated that detention will cease to be permissible under Article
5(1)(f) if deportation proceedings are not prosecuted with due
diligence and that it was necessary in such cases to determine
whether the duration of the deportation proceedings was excessive
(paragraph 113).
In some cases, where the intention remains to remove or
deport a person on national security grounds, continued detention may
not be consistent with Article 5(1)(f) as interpreted by the Court in
the Chahal case. This may be the case, for example, if the
person has established that removal to their own country might result
in treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. In such
circumstances, irrespective of the gravity of the threat to national
security posed by the person concerned, it is well established that
Article 3 prevents removal or deportation to a place where there is a
real risk that the person will suffer treatment contrary to that
article. If no alternative destination is immediately available then
removal or deportation may not, for the time being, be possible even
though the ultimate intention remains to remove or deport the person
once satisfactory arrangements can be made. In addition, it may not
be possible to prosecute the person for a criminal offence given the
strict rules on the admissibility of evidence in the criminal justice
system of the United Kingdom and the high standard of proof required.
Derogation under Article 15 of the Convention
The Government has considered whether the exercise of
the extended power to detain contained in the Anti-terrorism, Crime
and Security Act 2001 may be inconsistent with the obligations under
Article 5(1) of the Convention. As indicated above, there may be
cases where, notwithstanding a continuing intention to remove or
deport a person who is being detained, it is not possible to say that
'action is being taken with a view to deportation' within the meaning
of Article 5(1)(f) as interpreted by the Court in the Chahal case.
To the extent, therefore, that the exercise of the extended power may
be inconsistent with the United Kingdom's obligations under Article
5(1), the Government has decided to avail itself of the right of
derogation conferred by Article 15(1) of the Convention and will
continue to do so until further notice.”
The
derogation notice then set out the provisions of Part 4 of the
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill 2001.
- On 12 November 2001 the Anti-Terrorism Crime and
Security Bill, containing the clauses which were to eventually become
Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (“the
2001 Act”: see paragraph 90 below), was introduced into the
House of Commons. The Bill was passed by Parliament in two weeks,
with three days of debate on the floor of the House of Commons set
aside for its 125 clauses in a restrictive programming motion,
prompting both the Joint Committee of Human Rights and the Home
Affairs Select Committee to complain of the speed with which they
were being asked to consider the matter.
- The
2001 Act came into force on 4 December 2001. During the lifetime of
the legislation, sixteen individuals, including the present eleven
applicants, were certified under section 21 and detained. The
first six applicants were certified on 17 December 2001 and taken
into detention shortly thereafter. The seventh applicant was
certified and detained in early February 2002; the ninth applicant,
on 22 April 2002; the eighth applicant, on 23 October 2002; the tenth
applicant, on 14 January 2003; and the eleventh applicant was
certified on 2 October 2003 and kept in detention, having previously
been held under other legislation.
B. The derogation proceedings
- In
proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
(“SIAC”: see paragraphs 91-93 below), the first seven
applicants challenged the legality of the derogation, claiming that
their detention under the 2001 Act was in breach of their rights
under Articles 3, 5, 6 and 14 of the Convention. Each, in addition,
challenged the Secretary of State's decision to certify him as an
international terrorist.
- On
30 July 2002, having examined both open and closed material and heard
submissions from special advocates in addition to counsel for the
parties and for the third party, Liberty, SIAC delivered its ruling
on the legality of the derogation. It held that, on the basis of the
open material, it was satisfied that the threat from al'Qaeda had
created a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, within
the meaning of Article 15 of the Convention, and that the closed
material confirmed this view.
SIAC
further held that the fact that the objective of protecting the
public from international terrorists could possibly have been
achieved by alternative methods did not demonstrate that the measures
actually adopted were not strictly necessary. Moreover, since the
purpose of the detention was the protection of the United Kingdom,
the fact that the detainee was at liberty to leave demonstrated that
the measures were properly tailored to the state of emergency.
SIAC
rejected the applicants' complaints under Article 3 of the
Convention. It held that, insofar as they related to conditions of
detention, the applicants should bring proceedings in the ordinary
civil courts, and that SIAC had no jurisdiction to determine such a
complaint as it was not a “derogation issue”. It further
saw no merit in the applicants' argument that detention for an
indefinite period was contrary to Article 3. On this point, SIAC held
that the detention was not indefinite, since it was governed by the
time limits of the 2001 Act itself and since the 2001 Act provided
that each applicant's certification was subject to automatic review
by SIAC every six months. In any event, the mere fact that no term
had yet been fixed for preventive detention did not give rise to a
breach of Article 3.
SIAC
did not accept that Article 6 applied to the certification process.
The certification of each applicant as a suspected international
terrorist was not a “charge” but instead a statement of
suspicion and the proceedings before SIAC were not for the
determination of a criminal charge. Furthermore, there was no
relevant civil right at issue and Article 6 did not apply in its
civil limb either.
SIAC
did, however, rule that the derogation was unlawful because the
relevant provisions of the 2001 Act unjustifiably discriminated
against foreign nationals, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention.
The powers of the 2001 Act could properly be confined to
non-nationals only if the threat stemmed exclusively, or almost
exclusively, from non-nationals and the evidence did not support that
conclusion. In paragraphs 94-95 of its judgment SIAC held:
“94. If there is to be an effective derogation
from the right to liberty enshrined in Article 5 in respect of
suspected international terrorists - and we can see powerful
arguments in favour of such a derogation - the derogation ought
rationally to extend to all irremovable suspected international
terrorists. It would properly be confined to the alien section of the
population only if, as [counsel for the appellants] contends, the
threat stems exclusively or almost exclusively from that alien
section.
95. But the evidence before us demonstrates beyond
argument that the threat is not so confined. There are many British
nationals already identified - mostly in detention abroad - who fall
within the definition of 'suspected international terrorists', and it
was clear from the submissions made to us that in the opinion of the
[Secretary of State] there are others at liberty in the United
Kingdom who could be similarly defined. In those circumstances we
fail to see how the derogation can be regarded as other than
discriminatory on the grounds of national origin.”
SIAC
thus quashed the derogation order of 11 November 2001 and issued
a declaration of incompatibility in respect of section 23 of the 2001
Act under section 4 of the 1998 Act (see paragraph 94 below).
It
adjourned the first seven applicants' individual appeals against
certification (see paragraphs 24-69 below) pending the outcome
of the Secretary of State's appeal and the applicants' cross-appeal
on points of law against the above ruling.
- On
25 October 2002 the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment (A. and
Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1502).
It
held that SIAC had been entitled to find that there was a public
emergency threatening the life of the nation. However, contrary to
the view of SIAC, it held that the approach adopted by the Secretary
of State could be objectively justified. There was a rational
connection between the detention of non-nationals who could not be
deported because of fears for their safety, and the purpose which the
Secretary of State wished to achieve, which was to remove
non-nationals who posed a threat to national security. Moreover, the
applicants would be detained for no longer than was necessary before
they could be deported or until the emergency was resolved or they
ceased to be a threat to the country's safety. There was no
discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention, because
British nationals suspected of being terrorists were not in an
analogous situation to similarly suspected foreign nationals who
could not be deported because of fears for their safety. Such foreign
nationals did not have a right to remain in the country but only a
right, for the time being, not to be removed for their own safety.
The Court of Appeal added that it was well established in
international law that, in some situations, States could distinguish
between nationals and non-nationals, especially in times of
emergency. It further concluded that Parliament had been entitled to
limit the measures proposed so as to affect only foreign nationals
suspected of terrorist links because it was entitled to reach the
conclusion that detention of only the limited class of foreign
nationals with which the measures were concerned was, in the
circumstances, “strictly required” within the meaning of
Article 15 of the Convention.
The
Court of Appeal agreed with SIAC that the proceedings to appeal
against certification were not “criminal” within the
meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It found, however,
that the civil limb of Article 6 applied but that the proceedings
were as fair as could reasonably be achieved. It further held that
the applicants had not demonstrated that their detention amounted to
a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.
- The applicants were granted leave to appeal to the
House of Lords, which delivered its judgment on 16 December 2004
([2004] UKHL 56).
A
majority of the Law Lords, expressly or impliedly, found that the
applicants' detention under Part 4 of the 2001 Act did not fall
within the exception to the general right of liberty set out in
Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention (see Lord Bingham, at
paragraphs 8-9; Lord Hoffman, at paragraph 97; Lord Hope, at
paragraphs 103-105; Lord Scott, at paragraph 155; Lord Rodger, at
paragraph 163; Baroness Hale, at paragraph 222). Lord Bingham
summarised the position in this way:
“9. ... A person who commits a serious crime under
the criminal law of this country may of course, whether a national or
a non-national, be charged, tried and, if convicted, imprisoned. But
a non-national who faces the prospect of torture or inhuman treatment
if returned to his own country, and who cannot be deported to any
third country, and is not charged with any crime, may not under
article 5(1)(f) of the Convention and Schedule 3 to the Immigration
Act 1971 be detained here even if judged to be a threat to national
security”.
- The House of Lords further held, by eight to one
(Lords Bingham and Scott with considerable hesitation), that SIAC's
conclusion that there was a public emergency threatening the life of
the nation should not be displaced. Lord Hope assessed the evidence
as follows:
“118. There is ample evidence within [the open]
material to show that the government were fully justified in taking
the view in November 2001 that there was an emergency threatening the
life of the nation. ... [The] United Kingdom was at danger of attacks
from the Al Qaeda network which had the capacity through its
associates to inflict massive casualties and have a devastating
effect on the functioning of the nation. This had been demonstrated
by the events of 11 September 2001 in New York, Pennsylvania and
Washington. There was a significant body of foreign nationals in the
United Kingdom who had the will and the capability of mounting
co-ordinated attacks here which would be just as destructive to human
life and to property. There was ample intelligence to show that
international terrorist organisations involved in recent attacks and
in preparation for other attacks of terrorism had links with the
United Kingdom, and that they and others posed a continuing threat to
this country. There was a growing body of evidence showing
preparations made for the use of weapons of mass destruction in this
campaign. ... [It] was considered [by the Home Office] that the
serious threats to the nation emanated predominantly, albeit not
exclusively, and more immediately from the category of foreign
nationals.
119. The picture which emerges clearly from these
statements is of a current state of emergency. It is an emergency
which is constituted by the threat that these attacks will be carried
out. It threatens the life of the nation because of the appalling
consequences that would affect us all if they were to occur here. But
it cannot yet be said that these attacks are imminent. On 15 October
2001 the Secretary of State said in the House of Commons that there
was no immediate intelligence pointing to a specific threat to the
United Kingdom: see Hansard (HC Debates, col 925). On 5 March 2002
this assessment of the position was repeated in the government's
response to the Second Report of the House of Commons Select
Committee on Defence on the Threat from Terrorism (HC 348, para 13)
where it was stated that it would be wrong to say that there was
evidence of a particular threat. I would not conclude from the
material which we have seen that there was no current emergency. But
I would conclude that the emergency which the threats constitute is
of a different kind, or on a different level, from that which would
undoubtedly ensue if the threats were ever to materialise. The
evidence indicates that the latter emergency cannot yet be said to be
imminent. It has to be recognised that, as the attacks are likely to
come without warning, it may not be possible to identify a stage when
they can be said to be imminent. This is an important factor, and I
do not leave it out of account. But the fact is that the stage when
the nation has to face that kind of emergency, the emergency of
imminent attack, has not been reached”.
Lord
Hoffman, who dissented, accepted that there was credible evidence of
a threat of serious terrorist attack within the United Kingdom, but
considered that it would not destroy the life of the nation, since
the threat was not so fundamental as to threaten “our
institutions of government or our existence as a civil community”.
He concluded that “the real threat to the life of the nation
... comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these”.
- The other Law Lords (Lords Bingham, Nicholls, Hope,
Scott, Rodger, Carswell and Baroness Hale, with Lord Walker
dissenting) rejected the Government's submission that it was for
Parliament and the executive, rather than the courts, to judge the
response necessary to protect the security of the public. Lord
Bingham expressed his view as follows:
“42. It follows from this analysis that the
appellants are in my opinion entitled to invite the courts to review,
on proportionality grounds, the Derogation Order and the
compatibility with the Convention of section 23 [of the 2001 Act] and
the courts are not effectively precluded by any doctrine of deference
from scrutinising the issues raised. It also follows that I do not
accept the full breadth of the Attorney General's submissions. I do
not in particular accept the distinction which he drew between
democratic institutions and the courts. It is of course true that the
judges in this country are not elected and are not answerable to
Parliament. It is also of course true ... that Parliament, the
executive and the courts have different functions. But the function
of independent judges charged to interpret and apply the law is
universally recognised as a cardinal feature of the modern democratic
state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself. The Attorney General
is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial
authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as
in some way undemocratic. It is particularly inappropriate in a case
such as the present in which Parliament has expressly legislated in
section 6 of the 1998 Act to render unlawful any act of a public
authority, including a court, incompatible with a Convention right;
has required courts (in section 2) to take account of relevant
Strasbourg jurisprudence; has (in section 3) required courts, so far
as possible, to give effect to Convention rights and has conferred a
right of appeal on derogation issues. The effect is not, of course,
to override the sovereign legislative authority of the Queen in
Parliament, since if primary legislation is declared to be
incompatible the validity of the legislation is unaffected (section
4(6)) and the remedy lies with the appropriate minister (section 10),
who is answerable to Parliament. The 1998 Act gives the courts a very
specific, wholly democratic, mandate”.
- The
majority therefore examined whether the detention regime under Part 4
of the 2001 Act was a proportionate response to the emergency
situation, and concluded that it did not rationally address the
threat to security and was a disproportionate response to that
threat. They relied on three principal grounds: first, that the
detention scheme applied only to non-nationals suspected of
international terrorism and did not address the threat which came
from United Kingdom nationals who were also so suspected; secondly,
that it left suspected international terrorists at liberty to leave
the United Kingdom and continue their threatening activities abroad;
thirdly, that the legislation was drafted too broadly, so that it
could, in principle, apply to individuals suspected of involvement
with international terrorist organisations which did not fall within
the scope of the derogation.
On
the first point, Lord Bingham emphasised that SIAC's finding that the
terrorist threat was not confined to non-nationals had not been
challenged. Since SIAC was the responsible fact-finding tribunal, it
was unnecessary to examine the basis for its finding, but there was
evidence that “upwards of a thousand individuals from the UK
are estimated on the basis of intelligence to have attended training
camps in Afghanistan in the last five years”; that some British
citizens were said to have planned to return from Afghanistan to the
United Kingdom; and that the background material relating to the
applicants showed the high level of involvement of British citizens
and those otherwise connected with the United Kingdom in the
terrorist networks. Lord Bingham continued:
“33. ... It is plain that sections 21 and 23 of
the 2001 Act do not address the threat presented by UK nationals
since they do not provide for the certification and detention of UK
nationals. It is beside the point that other sections of the 2001 Act
and the 2000 Act do apply to UK nationals, since they are not the
subject of derogation, are not the subject of complaint and apply
equally to foreign nationals. Yet the threat from UK nationals, if
quantitatively smaller, is not said to be qualitatively different
from that from foreign nationals. It is also plain that sections 21
and 23 do permit a person certified and detained to leave the United
Kingdom and go to any other country willing to receive him, as two of
the appellants did when they left for Morocco and France respectively
.... Such freedom to leave is wholly explicable in terms of
immigration control: if the British authorities wish to deport a
foreign national but cannot deport him to country 'A' because of
Chahal their purpose is as well served by his voluntary
departure for country 'B'. But allowing a suspected international
terrorist to leave our shores and depart to another country, perhaps
a country as close as France, there to pursue his criminal designs,
is hard to reconcile with a belief in his capacity to inflict serious
injury to the people and interests of this country. ...
35. The fifth step in the appellants' argument permits
of little elaboration. But it seems reasonable to assume that those
suspected international terrorists who are UK nationals are not
simply ignored by the authorities. When [the fifth applicant] was
released from prison by SIAC on bail ..., it was on condition (among
other things) that he wear an electronic monitoring tag at all times;
that he remain at his premises at all times; that he telephone a
named security company five times each day at specified times; that
he permit the company to install monitoring equipment at his
premises; that he limit entry to his premises to his family, his
solicitor, his medical attendants and other approved persons; that he
make no contact with any other person; that he have on his premises
no computer equipment, mobile telephone or other electronic
communications device; that he cancel the existing telephone link to
his premises; and that he install a dedicated telephone link
permitting contact only with the security company. The appellants
suggested that conditions of this kind, strictly enforced, would
effectively inhibit terrorist activity. It is hard to see why this
would not be so.
36. In urging the fundamental importance of the right to
personal freedom, as the sixth step in their proportionality
argument, the appellants were able to draw on the long libertarian
tradition of English law, dating back to chapter 39 of Magna Carta
1215, given effect in the ancient remedy of habeas corpus, declared
in the Petition of Right 1628, upheld in a series of landmark
decisions down the centuries and embodied in the substance and
procedure of the law to our own day. ... In its treatment of article
5 of the European Convention, the European Court also has recognised
the prime importance of personal freedom. ...
43. The appellants' proportionality challenge to the
Order and section 23 is, in my opinion, sound, for all the reasons
they gave and also for those given by the European Commissioner for
Human Rights and the Newton Committee. The Attorney General could
give no persuasive answer.”
- In
addition, the majority held that the 2001 Act was discriminatory and
inconsistent with Article 14 of the Convention, from which there had
been no derogation. The applicants were in a comparable situation to
United Kingdom nationals suspected of being international terrorists,
with whom they shared the characteristics of being irremovable from
the United Kingdom and being considered a threat to national
security. Since the detention scheme was aimed primarily at the
protection of the United Kingdom from terrorist attack, rather than
immigration control, there was no objective reason to treat the
applicants differently on grounds of their nationality or immigration
status.
- Although
the applicants' appeal had included complaints under Articles 3 and
16 of the Convention, the House of Lords did not consider it
necessary to determine these complaints since it had found the
derogation to be unlawful on other grounds.
- It
granted a quashing order in respect of the derogation order, and a
declaration under section 4 of the Human Rights Act (see paragraph 94
below) that section 23 of the 2001 Act was incompatible with
Articles 5 § 1 and 14 of the Convention insofar as it was
disproportionate and permitted discriminatory detention of suspected
international terrorists.
C. The certification proceedings: the “generic”
judgment and appeals
- Meanwhile, SIAC's hearing of the applicants'
individual appeals against certification commenced in May 2003, after
the Court of Appeal had given judgment in the derogation proceedings
but before the above judgment of the House of Lords.
- For
the purposes of each appeal to SIAC, the Secretary of State filed an
“open statement” summarising the facts connected to the
decision to certify each applicant and as much of the supporting
evidence which the Secretary of State considered could be disclosed
without giving rise to any risk to national security. A further,
“closed” statement of facts and evidence was also placed
before SIAC in each case.
- On 29 October 2003 SIAC issued a “generic”
judgment in which it made a number of findings of general application
to all the appeals against certification.
As
regards preliminary issues, it found, inter alia, that it had
jurisdiction to hear an appeal against certification even where the
person certified had left the United Kingdom and the certificate had
been revoked. It held that the tests whether reasonable grounds
existed for suspicion that a person was a “terrorist” and
for belief that his presence in the United Kingdom was a risk to
national security, within the meaning of section 21 of the 2001 Act,
fell “some way short of proof even on the balance of
probabilities”. It further held that “reasonable grounds
could be based on material which would not be admissible in a normal
trial in court, such as hearsay evidence of an unidentified
informant”. The weight that was to be attached to any
particular piece of evidence was a matter for consideration in the
light of all the evidence viewed as a whole. Information which might
have been obtained by torture should not automatically be excluded,
but the court should have regard to any evidence about the manner in
which it was obtained and judge its weight and reliability
accordingly.
SIAC
held that the detention provisions in the 2001 Act should be
interpreted in the light of the terms of the derogation. The threat
to the life of the nation was not confined to activities within the
United Kingdom, because the nation's life included its diplomatic,
cultural and tourism-related activities abroad. Moreover, attacks on
the United Kingdom's allies could also create a risk to the United
Kingdom, given the interdependence of countries facing a global
terrorist threat. The derogation identified the threat as emanating
from al'Qaeda and its associates. It was therefore necessary, in
respect of both the “national security” and the
“international terrorist” limbs of section 21 of the 2001
Act, to show reasonable grounds for suspicion that the person
certified was part of a group which was connected, directly or
indirectly, to al'Qaeda. Even if the main focus of the group in
question was a national struggle, if it backed al'Qaeda for a part of
its agenda and the individual nonetheless supported the group, it was
a legitimate inference that he was supporting and assisting al'Qaeda.
SIAC
also made a number of findings of fact of general application
concerning organisations alleged by the Secretary of State to be
linked to al'Qaeda. These findings were based on both “open”
and “closed” material. Thus, it held, for example, that
the GSPC, or Salafist Group for Call and Combat, which was formed in
Algeria in 1998, was an international terrorist organisation linked
to al'Qaeda through training and funding, but that the earlier
Algerian organisation, Armed Islamic Group (GIA), was not. The
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) was either part of al'Qaeda or very
closely linked to it. The Chechen Arab Mujahaddin was an
international terrorist group, pursuing an anti-West agenda beyond
the struggle for Chechen independence, with close links to al'Qaeda.
SIAC also identified as falling within the terms of the derogation a
group of primarily Algerian extremists centred around Abu Doha, an
Algerian who had lived in the United Kingdom from about 1999. It was
alleged that Abu Doha had held a senior role in training camps in
Afghanistan and had many contacts in al'Qaeda, including a connection
with the Frankfurt cell which had been accused of plotting to bomb
the Strasbourg Christmas market in December 2000. Abu Doha was
arrested in February 2001, following an extradition request from the
United States of America, but his group remained active.
- The
applicants appealed against SIAC's ruling that evidence which might
have been obtained by torture was admissible. For the purposes of the
appeal, the parties agreed that the proceedings before SIAC to
challenge certification fell within Article 5 § 4 of the
Convention and as such had to satisfy the basic requirements of a
fair trial. It was not therefore necessary to decide whether Article
6 also applied and the issue was left open.
On 11
August 2004 the Court of Appeal, by a majority, upheld SIAC's
decision ([2004] EWCA Civ 1123).
On 8
December 2005 the House of Lords held unanimously that the evidence
of a suspect or witness which had been obtained by torture had long
been regarded as inherently unreliable, unfair, offensive to ordinary
standards of humanity and decency and incompatible with the
principles on which courts should administer justice. It followed
that such evidence might not lawfully be admitted against a party to
proceedings in a United Kingdom court, irrespective of where, by whom
and on whose authority the torture had been inflicted. Since the
person challenging certification had only limited access to the
material advanced against him in the proceedings before SIAC, he
could not be expected to do more than raise a plausible reason that
material might have been so obtained and it was then for SIAC to
initiate the relevant enquiries. The House of Lords therefore allowed
the applicants' appeals and remitted each case to SIAC for
reconsideration ([2005] UKHL 71).
- SIAC's
conclusions as regards each applicant's case are set out in
paragraphs 29-69 below. Of the sixteen individuals, including
the eleven applicants, detained under Part 4 of the 2001 Act, one had
his certificate cancelled by SIAC.
D. The certification proceedings: the individual
determinations
1. The first applicant
- The first applicant was born in a Palestinian refugee
camp in Jordan, is stateless, and was granted indefinite leave to
remain in the United Kingdom in 1997. On 17 December 2001
the first applicant was certified by the Secretary of State as a
suspected international terrorist under section 21 of the 2001 Act.
On 18 December 2001 a deportation order was made on the same grounds.
- The
first applicant was taken into detention on 19 December 2001. He
subsequently appealed to SIAC against certification and the decision
to make a deportation order. On 24 July 2002 he was transferred
to Broadmoor Secure Mental Hospital.
- The
first applicant and his representatives were served with the
Secretary of State's “open” material, including a police
report which showed that large sums of money had moved through the
four bank accounts in his name. SIAC and the special advocate
instructed on behalf of the first applicant were in addition
presented with “closed” evidence. The first applicant
gave oral evidence to SIAC, assisted by an interpreter and called one
witness to testify to his good character. He also filed four medical
reports concerning his mental health. SIAC observed in its judgment
of 29 October 2003:
“We are acutely aware that the open material
relied on against the applicant is very general and that the case
depends in the main upon assertions which are largely unsupported.
The central allegation is that he has been involved in fund raising
and distribution of those funds for terrorist groups with links to Al
Qa'eda. It is also said that he has procured false documents and
helped facilitate the movement of jihad volunteers to training camps
in Afghanistan. He is said to be closely involved with senior
extremists and associates of Osama Bin Laden both in the United
Kingdom and overseas. His case is and always has been that he is
concerned and concerned only with welfare projects, in particular a
school in Afghanistan for the children of Arab speakers there and
projects such as construction of wells and provision of food to
communities in Afghanistan. He has also raised money for refugees
from Chechnya. Any contact with so-called extremists has been in that
context and he had no reason to believe they were terrorists or were
interested in terrorism.
We recognise the real difficulties that the Appellant
has in making this appeal. We have made appropriate allowance for
those difficulties and his mental problems. We note [his counsel's]
concerns that there has been gross oversimplification by the Security
Service of the situation which is, he submits, highly complex and a
tendency to assume that any devout Muslim who believed that the way
of life practised by the Taliban in Afghanistan was the true way to
follow must be suspect. We note, too, that initially the Respondent
asserted that all the Appellant's fund raising activities were for
the purpose of assisting terrorism and that it was only when evidence
was produced by the Appellant to show that there were legitimate
charitable objectives that he accepted that at least some money was
raised for those purposes. Insofar as connections with named
individuals are relied on, we bear in mind that some of them, who are
alleged to be involved in terrorism, have appeals pending ... and
that allegations against others have not been tested nor have alleged
links been able to be explained.
...
[The first applicant's counsel] accepted, as he had to,
the unreliability of the Applicant's evidence about his movements in
the 1990s, but asked us not to hold it against him because of his
mental state. We do not accept that we can do that. The lies were a
deliberate attempt to rebut the allegation that he had been a mujahid
in Afghanistan, saying that he spent three years in a Jordanian
prison. There was an overstatement by the police of the amount
involved through the bank account. This we accept, but there was
still a substantial sum of money going through them. And [the
applicant's counsel] submitted that the allegation was that he had
provided false documents for others not for himself. Thus his false
Iraq passport was not material. It does however show an ability to
obtain a false passport. [The applicant's counsel] attacked the
reliability of the intelligence relied on against the Appellant since
it was only belatedly accepted that he had been involved in genuine
charitable work and that some of the money going through his account
and raised by him was for such a purpose. We recognise the danger
that all activities by one who is under suspicion may be regarded as
themselves suspicious and that there may not be a fair consideration
of all material to see whether it truly does support the suspicion.
We have considered all the material, in particular that which is
closed, with that danger in mind.
As we have said, the open evidence taken in isolation
cannot provide the reasons why we are dismissing this appeal and we
sympathise with [the first applicant's counsel's] concerns that he
had a most difficult task. We were not impressed with the appellant
as a witness, even making all allowances for his mental state and the
difficulties under which he was labouring. He was often evasive and
vague and has admittedly told lies in relation to his movements in
the 1990s. His explanations about some of the transactions recorded
in his bank accounts we have found difficult to follow or accept. We
should say that we do not consider that the Respondent's case is
significantly advanced by what has been said about the Appellant's
involvement with Algeria or Chechnya; the case depends essentially on
the evidence about the Appellant's dealings with Afghanistan and with
terrorists known to have links with Al Qa'eda.
It is clear that the Appellant was a very successful
fundraiser and, more importantly, that he was able to get the money
to Afghanistan. Whatever his problems, he was able to and was relied
on to provide an efficient service. His explanations both of who were
the well known terrorists whose children were at the school and of
the various of the more substantial payments shown in the bank
accounts are unsatisfactory. He was vague where, having regard to the
allegations made against him, we would have expected some detail.
...
We have considered all the evidence critically. The
closed material confirms our view that the certification in this case
was correct. There is both a reasonable belief that the Appellant's
presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national security and a
reasonable suspicion that he is a terrorist within the meaning of
section 21 of the 2001 Act. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.”
- In
accordance with the terms of the 2001 Act, the first applicant's case
was reviewed by SIAC six months later. In its judgment of 2 July 2004
SIAC found that:
“The updated open generic material ... continues
to show that there is a direct terrorist threat to the United Kingdom
from a group or groups of largely North African Islamic extremists,
linked in various ways to Al Qa'eda.
Although some of his contacts have been detained, the
range of extremists prominent in various groups was such that he
would have no difficulty and retains the will and ability to add his
considerable experience of logistic support to them in pursuit of the
extremist Islamic agenda in the UK. The certificate is properly
maintained.”
- SIAC
reviewed the case again on 15 December 2004 and again found that the
certificate should be maintained.
2. The second applicant
- The
second applicant is a citizen of Morocco born on 28 February 1963. He
entered the United Kingdom as a visitor in 1985 and was granted leave
to remain as a student. On 21 June 1988 he was granted indefinite
leave to remain on the basis of his marriage to a British citizen,
which marriage subsequently broke down. In 1990 and again in 1997 he
applied for naturalisation, but no decision was made on those
applications. In 2000 he remarried another British citizen, with whom
he has a child.
- On 17 December 2001 the second applicant was certified
by the Secretary of State as a suspected international terrorist
under section 21 of the 2001 Act. A deportation order was made on the
same date. The second applicant was taken into detention on
19 December 2001. He appealed against the certification and
deportation order but, nonetheless, elected to leave the United
Kingdom for Morocco on 22 December 2001. He pursued his appeals from
Morocco.
- The
“open” case against the second applicant was summarised
by SIAC in its judgment of 29 October 2003 as follows:
“(1) he has links with both the GIA and the GSPC
[Algerian terrorist groups: see paragraph 26 above] and is a close
associate of a number of Islamic extremists with links to Al Qa'eda
and/or Bin Laden.
(2) he has been concerned in the preparation and/or
instigation of acts of international terrorism by procuring high-tech
equipment (including communications equipment) for the GSPC and/or
Islamic extremists in Chechnya led by Ibn Khattab and has also
procured clothing for the latter group.
(3) he has supported one or more of the GIA, the GSPC
and the Ibn Khattab faction in Chechnya by his involvement in fraud
perpetrated to facilitate the funding of extremists and storing and
handling of propaganda videos promoting the jihad.
The Secretary of State's open case expands on those
allegations and further indicates the use of at least one alias and a
pattern of association with individuals known or assessed to be
involved in terrorism [five individuals were identified]. All these
were described by [counsel for the Secretary of State] as 'known
Algerian Islamic extremists'.
Witness B [for the Secretary of State] confirmed that
the allegation against [the second applicant] is that he is a member
of a network, rather than a member of any particular organisation
such as the GSPC or the GIA”.
SIAC
continued by explaining the findings it had made against the
applicant:
“Like the other Appellants, [the second applicant]
is not charged in these proceedings with a series of individual
offences. The issue is whether, taking the evidence as a whole, it is
reasonable to suspect him of being an international terrorist (as
defined). When we look at the material before us, as we do, we treat
it cumulatively. It might be that the material relating to fraud
alone, or to clothing alone, or to videos alone, or to associations,
would not by itself show that a person was in any way involved in
terrorism or its support. But we need to assess the situation when
various factors are found combined in the same person. Those factors
are as follows. First is his involvement in acts of fraud, of which
he must be aware but of which he seeks to provide no explanation,
excusing himself apparently on the ground that he is not aware which
particular act or acts the Secretary of State has in mind. Secondly,
he has been involved in raising consciousness (and hence in raising
money) about the struggle in Chechnya, and has been doing so in a
specifically Islamic (rather than a merely humanitarian) context,
using and distributing films which, according to the evidence before
us, tend to be found in extremist communities. In the generic
evidence, we have dealt with the Chechen Arab Mujahaddin and the
significance of support for it which we accepted is given in full
knowledge of its wider jihadist agenda. ... [He] has done so as a
close associate of Abu Doha. Given the information we have about Abu
Doha which, as we have said, we have no reason to doubt, we regard
[the second applicant's] claim that Abu Doha was doing nothing
illegal (save that he was hiding his activities from the Russians) as
entirely implausible. ... [He] has had associations with a number of
other individuals involved in terrorism. They are for the most part
specified by name in the open case but are not mentioned in his own
statement. ...
These are the five features which meet in [the second
applicant]. No doubt the Secretary of State could have made his case
by demonstrating various combinations of them in a single person.
With all five, we regard the case as compelling. We are entirely
satisfied that the Secretary of State is reasonable in his suspicion
that [the second applicant] supports or assists the GIA, the GSPC,
and the looser group based around Abu Doha, and in his belief that at
any time [the second applicant] is in the United Kingdom his presence
here is a risk to national security.”
3. The third applicant
- The
third applicant is of Tunisian nationality, born in 1963 and resident
in the United Kingdom from about 1994. He was certified by the
Secretary of State on 18 December 2001 and detained the following
day.
- In
its judgment of 29 October 2003, dismissing the third applicant's
appeal against certification, SIAC observed:
“The case against the Appellant, as framed in the
open material, is that he is a key member of an extreme Islamist
group known as the Tunisia Fighting Group (TFG). It is said that this
group was formed during 2000 and had its origins in the Tunisian
Islamic Front (known as the FIT since the name is in French). Its
ultimate aim is said to be to establish an Islamic State in Tunisia.
It is further asserted that the Appellant has been in regular contact
with a number of known extremists including some who have been
involved in terrorist activities or planning. Both the FIT and the
TFG are said to have links with Al Qa'eda.
The open material deployed against the Appellant is not
at all substantial. The evidence which is relied on against him is
largely to be found in the closed material. This has meant that he
has been at a real disadvantage in dealing with the case because he
is not aware of those with whom he is alleged to have been in
contact.
...
In his statement the Appellant says that he has never
heard of the TFG and is certainly not a member of it. ... We have no
doubts that the TFG exists ... [and] also that it has links to Al
Qa'eda. Our reasons for so concluding must be given in the closed
judgment.
In May 1998 the Appellant and some 10 others were
arrested in a joint Special Branch and Security Service operation
pursuant to warrants under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The
Appellant was released without charge and in due course received
£18,500 compensation for wrongful arrest. The arrests were in
connection with allegations of involvement in a plot to target the
World Cup in France. We of course give weight to the absence of any
admissible evidence to support the Appellant's involvement in the
alleged conspiracy, but it is not and cannot be the answer to this
appeal. We have to consider all the material to see whether there are
reasonable grounds for a belief or suspicion of the kind referred to
in section 21(a) or (b) of the 2001 Act.
...
We are satisfied that the Appellant is a member of the
TFG, itself an international terrorist organisation within the scope
of the 2001 Act, and that he has links with an international
terrorist group. We appreciate that our open reasons for being so
satisfied are sparse. That is because the material which drives us to
that conclusion is mainly closed. We have considered it carefully and
in the context of knowing the appellant denies any involvement in
terrorism or any knowing support for or assistance to terrorists. We
have therefore been careful only to rely on material which cannot in
our judgment have an innocent explanation.”
- SIAC
reached similar conclusions in its periodic reviews of the case on 2
July and 15 December 2004.
4. The fourth applicant
- The
fourth applicant was born in Algeria in 1971 and first entered the
United Kingdom in 1994. In May 1997 he was arrested and charged with
a number of offences, including a conspiracy to export to Algeria
material which it was alleged was to be used for the purposes of
terrorism. It was alleged that he was a member of GIA. The case
against the applicant was abandoned in March 2000 when a key witness,
a Security Service agent, who was to give evidence concerning the
need for civilians to defend themselves against atrocities allegedly
committed by the Algerian Government, decided that it was too
dangerous for him to give evidence.
- In 1998 the fourth applicant married a French
national. He became a French citizen in May 2001, although he did not
inform the United Kingdom authorities of this. The Secretary of State
certified him under section 21 of the 2001 Act on 17 December
2001 and he was detained on 19 December 2001. On 13 March
2002 he left for France, where he was interviewed on arrival by
security officials and then set at liberty. Since he had left the
United Kingdom, the certificate against him was revoked and the
revocation was back-dated to 22 March 2002.
- In
its judgment of 29 October 2003, SIAC held that the back-dating of
the revocation meant that the fourth applicant could not be regarded
as having been certified at the time he lodged his appeal and that,
therefore, he had no right of appeal. It nonetheless decided to
consider the appeal on the basis that this conclusion might be wrong.
Since the Secretary of State could not reasonably have known at the
time the certificate was issued that the applicant was a French
citizen and could safely be removed to France, it could not be said
on that ground that the certificate should not have been issued. SIAC
therefore continued by assessing the evidence against him:
“In reaching our decision, we will have to
consider not only the open but also the closed material. The
Appellant appears to have suspected that he was the subject of
surveillance over much of the relevant period.
We are conscious of the need to be very careful not to
assume guilt from association. There must be more than friendship or
consorting with those who are believed to be involved in
international terrorism to justify a reasonable suspicion that the
Appellant is himself involved in those activities or is at least
knowingly supporting or assisting them. We bear in mind [his
solicitor's] concerns that what has happened here is an attempt to
resurrect the prosecution with nothing to add from his activities
since. Detention must be regarded as a last resort and so cannot be
justified on the basis of association alone and in any event the
guilt of the associates has never been established. ...
Nonetheless, continued association with those who are
suspected of being involved in international terrorism with links to
Al Qa'eda in the light of the reasonable suspicion that the Appellant
was himself actively involved in terrorist activities for the GIA is
a matter which can properly be taken into account. The GSPC, which
broke away from the GIA, has links to Al Qa'eda and the Appellant has
continued to associate with those who took to the GSPC rather than
the GIA. We are in fact satisfied that not only was the Appellant
actively involved initially with the GIA and then with the GSPC but
also that he provided false documentation for their members and for
the Mujahaddin in Chechnya as is alleged in the open statement. But
we accept that his activities in 2000 and 2001 justify the use of the
expression that he had been maintaining a low profile, and we make
that observation having regard to both open and closed material.
Nonetheless, a low profile does not mean that he is not properly to
be regarded as an international terrorist within the meaning of
section 21. An assessment has to be made of what he may do in the
light of what he has done and the fact that he has shown willingness
and the ability to give assistance and support in the past and
continues the associations and to provide some help (e.g. the use of
his van) is highly relevant.
We have not found this aspect of the Appellant's case at
all easy. We have given full weight to all [his solicitor's]
submissions which were so persuasively put before us but in the end
have reached the view that, looking at the evidence as a whole, the
decision to issue a certificate was not wrong. Accordingly, we would
not have allowed the appeal on the facts.”
5. The fifth applicant
- The
fifth applicant was born in Algeria in 1969. In his statement to SIAC
he claimed to have developed polio as a child which left him with a
permanently weak and paralysed right leg. He was arrested and
tortured by the Algerian Government in 1991, whereupon he left
Algeria for Saudi Arabia. In 1992 he moved to Pakistan and travelled
to Afghanistan on several occasions. In August 1995 he entered the
United Kingdom and claimed asylum, alleging in the course of that
claim that his leg had been injured by a shell in Afghanistan in
1994. His asylum claim was refused and his appeal against the refusal
was dismissed in December 1999. The applicant married a French
citizen and had a child with her.
- He
was certified by the Secretary of State under section 21 of the 2001
Act on 17 December 2001 and detained on 19 December 2001. In its
judgment of 29 October 2003, dismissing the fifth applicant's appeal
against certification, SIAC observed:
“The open statements provided to justify the
certification do not refer to a great deal of source material and so
consist mainly of assertions. As with most of these appeals, the main
part of the evidence lies in closed material and so, as we are well
aware, the Appellants have been at a disadvantage in that they have
not been able to deal with what might be taken to be incriminating
evidence. The Special Advocates have been able to challenge certain
matters and sometimes to good effect. That indeed was the case in
relation to a camp in Dorset attended by a number of those, including
the Appellant, of interest to the Security Service. ...
The case against the Appellant is that he was a member
of the GIA and, since its split from the GIA, of the GSPC. He is
associated with a number of leading extremists, some of whom are also
members of or associated with the GSPC, and has provided active
support in the form of the supply of false documents and facilitating
young Muslims from the United Kingdom to travel to Afghanistan to
train for jihad. He is regarded as having undertaken an important
role in the support activities undertaken on behalf of the GSPC and
other Islamic extremists in the United Kingdom and outside it. All
this the Appellant denies and in his statement he gives innocent
explanations for the associations alleged against him. He was indeed
friendly with in particular other Algerians in the United Kingdom
and, so far as [the fourth applicant] was concerned, the families
were close because, apart from anything else, their respective wives
were French. He attended [the eighth applicant's] mosque. He was an
impressive preacher and the appellant says he listened but was never
involved. Indeed he did not know [the eighth applicant] except
through Chechen relief, which the Appellant and many hundreds of
other Muslims supported, and he had never spoken to him on the
telephone. He had on occasions approached [the eighth applicant] at
Friday prayers at the mosque if he wanted guidance on some social
problem.”
SIAC
referred to “open” surveillance reports which showed the
applicant to have been in contact with other alleged members of GIA
and the GSPC, including at a camp in Dorset in July 1999. Further
“open” evidence concerned his “unhelpful” and
“not altogether truthful” responses to questioning by
officers of the Security Service in July and September 2001. SIAC
continued:
“Reliance is placed on various articles found in
his house when he was arrested. These include a copy of the fatwa
issued by Bin Laden. The Appellant says he had never seen it and
could not explain its presence. A GSPC communiqué was, he
says, probably one handed out at the mosque. Analysis of the hard
drive of his computer showed it had visited an internet site that
specialised in United States military technology. This was not
something which could be relevant to the Appellant's studies. And a
hand drawn diagram of a missile rocket he has not seen before. It
might, he thinks, have been in a book about Islam he had bought
second hand from the mosque.
We note the denials, but we have to consider all the
evidence. As will be clear from this judgment, we have reason to
doubt some of the Appellant's assertions. But the closed material
confirms our view that there is indeed reasonable suspicion that the
Appellant is an international terrorist within the meaning of section
21 and reasonable belief that his presence in the United Kingdom is a
risk to national security. We have no doubt that he has been involved
in the production of false documentation, has facilitated young
Muslims to travel to Afghanistan to train for jihad and has actively
assisted terrorists who have links with Al Qa'eda. We are satisfied
too that he has actively assisted the GSPC. We have no hesitation in
dismissing his appeal.”
- On
22 April 2004, because of concerns about his health, the fifth
applicant was released from prison on bail on strict conditions,
which amounted to house arrest with further controls. In its review
judgment of 2 July 2004, SIAC held:
“... in granting bail, [SIAC] did not revise its
view as to the strength of the grounds for believing he was an
international terrorist and a threat to national security. The threat
could be managed proportionately in his case in view of his severe
mental illness. That however is no reason to cancel the certificate.
There might be circumstances in which he breaches the terms of his
bail or for other reasons it was necessary to revoke it. The need for
the certificate to continue must depend on whether the terms of the
statute and of the derogation continue to be met.
A number of his contacts remain at large including some
who are regarded as actively involved in terrorist planning. There is
nothing to suggest that his mental illness has diminished his
commitment to the extremist Islamic cause; he has the experience and
capacity to involve himself once more in extremist activity. The bail
restraints on him are essential; those are imposed pursuant to his
certification and the SIAC dismissal of his appeal against it. The
certificate is properly maintained.”
- On
15 December 2004, SIAC again reviewed the case and decided that the
certificate should be maintained.
6. The sixth applicant
- The
sixth applicant was born in Algeria in 1967 and was resident in the
United Kingdom from 1989. The Secretary of State issued a certificate
against him on 17 December 2001 and he was taken into detention on
19 December 2001.
- In
its judgment of 29 October 2003 SIAC observed as follows:
“Although we have to make our decision on the
basis both of the open and of the closed material, it is important to
indicate the case against [the sixth applicant] as it has been set
out by the Secretary of State in open material, because that is the
case that [the sixth applicant] knows that he has to meet. In
assessing his statement and the other evidence and arguments
submitted on his behalf, we remind ourselves always that he is not
aware of the Secretary of State's closed material, but nevertheless
that he is not operating entirely in a vacuum because of the open
allegations; and we may test the Appellant's own case by the way he
deals with those allegations.
The Secretary of State's case against [the sixth
applicant] is summarised as follows:
(1) he belongs to and/or is a member of the GSPC, and
previously was involved with the GIA;
(2) he has supported and assisted the GSPC (and
previously the GIA) through his involvement in credit card fraud
which is a main source of income in the United Kingdom for the GSPC;
(3) from about August 2000, [the sixth applicant] took
on an important role in procuring telecommunication equipment for the
GSPC and the provision of logistical support for satellite phones by
way of purchase and allocation of airtimes for those phones;
(4) he has also played an important part in procuring
telecommunications equipment and other equipment for the Mujahedin
fighting in Chechnya – that is to say the faction which until
2002 was under the command of Ibn Khattab.”
SIAC
then reviewed the open evidence before it regarding the purchase by
Abu Doha, assisted by the sixth and seventh applicants, of a number
of satellite telephones and other telecommunications equipment to the
value of GBP 229,265 and the nature and extent of the connection
between the sixth and seventh applicants. It concluded:
“In the circumstances we have set out, it appears
to us that the Secretary of State has ample ground for suspicion that
[the sixth applicant's] procurement activities were directed to the
support of the extremist Arab Islamist faction fighting in Chechnya.
That support arises from [the sixth applicant's] connexions with and
support of the GSPC. We emphasise, as is the case with other appeals
as well, that it is the accumulation of factors, each lending support
to the others rather than undermining other points, providing colour
and context for the activities seen as a whole which is persuasive;
it would be wrong to take a piece in isolation, thereby to diminish
its significance and to miss the larger picture. The generic judgment
supports these conclusions. These are activities falling centrally
within the derogation. [The sixth applicant] has provided only
implausible denials and has failed to offer credible alternative
explanations. That is sufficient to determine his appeal, without
making any further reference to the Secretary of State's other
allegations which, as was acknowledged in the open statement and in
open evidence before [SIAC], can be properly sustained only by
examination of the closed material.”
- SIAC
reviewed the case on 2 July 2004 and 28 February 2005 and, on each
occasion, decided that there were still grounds for maintaining the
certificate.
7. The seventh applicant
- The
seventh applicant was born in Algeria in 1971 and apparently entered
the United Kingdom using false French identity papers in or before
1994. On 7 December 2001 he was convicted of a number of driving
offences and sentenced to four months' imprisonment. He was certified
by the Secretary of State on 5 February 2002 and taken into detention
pursuant to the certificate as soon as his prison sentence ended on 9
February 2002.
- In
its judgment of 29 October 2003, SIAC noted that the allegations
against the seventh applicant were that he had been a member of the
GSPC since 1997 or 1998, and before that a member of the GIA; that
his contacts with leading GSPC members in the United Kingdom showed
that he was a trusted member of the organisation; and that he had
been involved with Abu Doha and the sixth applicant in purchasing
telecommunications equipment for use by extremists in Chechnya and
Algeria. It further noted that:
“[The seventh applicant] did not give evidence
before [SIAC] and, indeed, chose not to attend the hearing of his
appeal. His statement, which we have of course read, is in the most
general terms, and, perhaps not surprisingly, [his counsel's]
submissions, both oral and written, were similarly general. [The
seventh applicant's] approach to the present proceedings of
themselves and the fact that he did not give oral evidence or make
any detailed written statement are not matters to be put in the scale
against him. We well understand the difficulty that Appellants have
in circumstances where the allegations against them are only
summarised and where much of the evidence on which those allegations
are based cannot, for reasons of national security, be communicated
to the Appellants themselves. However, [the seventh applicant] is in
the best position to know what his activities and motives have been
in the relevant period. Nothing prevents him from giving a full
description and account of those activities if he wishes to do so.
The fact that he has chosen to provide no detailed account of his
activities means that he has provided no material to counter the
evidence and arguments of others”.
SIAC
concluded that the open and closed material supported the allegations
against the seventh applicant and it dismissed his appeal.
- In
its review judgments of 2 July and 15 December 2004 SIAC decided that
the certificate should be maintained.
8. The eighth applicant
- The
eighth applicant is a Jordanian national, born in Bethlehem in 1960.
He arrived in the United Kingdom on 16 September 1993 and claimed
asylum. He was recognised as a refugee and granted leave to remain
until 30 June 1998. On 8 May 1998 he applied for indefinite
leave to remain but the application had not been determined at the
time of the coming into force of the 2001 Act.
- The
eighth applicant was convicted in absentia in Jordan
for his involvement in terrorist attacks there and in relation to a
plot to plant bombs to coincide with the millennium. He was
investigated in February 2001 by anti-terrorism police officers in
connection with a plot to cause explosions at the Strasbourg
Christmas market in December 2000, but no charges were brought
against him. When the 2001 Act was passed he went into hiding. He was
arrested on 23 October 2002 and was immediately made the subject of a
section 21 certificate and taken into detention. On the same date a
deportation order was made against him.
- In
its judgment of 8 March 2004, dismissing the eighth applicant's
appeal against certification, SIAC observed as follows:
“[The eighth applicant's counsel], on instructions
from the appellant, informed us that his client had chosen not to
attend the hearing or to participate in any way. He had read the
decisions relating to the appellants who had been certified when the
2001 Act came into force and the generic judgment and so felt certain
that the result of his appeal was a foregone conclusion. There had
been many references to his role in the other appeals and some had
been certified and detained, at least in part, on the basis that they
associated with him. Since that association was regarded as
sufficient to justify their continued detention, he considered that
the decision on his appeal had, in effect, already been taken. He had
chosen not to play any part precisely because he has no faith in the
ability of the system to get at the truth. He considered that the
SIAC procedure had deliberately been established to avoid open and
public scrutiny of the respondent's case, which deprived individuals
of a fair opportunity to challenge the case against them.
Having said that, [the eighth applicant's counsel] made
it clear that the appeal was not being withdrawn. It was accordingly
necessary for us to consider it and to take into account the
statement made by the appellant. [His counsel] emphasised a number of
matters which, he suggested, should be regarded as favourable to the
appellant's contention that he was not and never had been involved in
terrorism within the meaning of the 2001 Act. Furthermore, the
allegations showed that a distorted and over-simplified view was
being taken by the security services of the appellant's activities
and his role as a respected teacher and believer in the rights of
Islamic communication throughout the world.
We should make it clear that we have considered the case
against the appellant on its merits. We have not been influenced by
any findings made in other appeals or the generic judgments. One of
the reasons why this judgment has taken a long time to be prepared
was the need for us to read through and consider the evidence, both
open and closed, that has been put before us. There is much more of
it than in most of the other appeals. That is a reflection of the
fact that the appellant has been associated with and had dealings
with many of the others who have been certified and with individuals
and groups themselves linked to Al Qa'ida. We see no reason to
dissent from the views expressed in the generic judgment of the
significance of the various individuals and groups referred to in it.
But that does not mean we have therefore automatically accepted its
views. We draw attention to the fact that the panel which produced
the generic judgment was not the same constitution as this panel and
that such input as there was by the chairman of this panel to the
generic judgment was limited to issues of law. We have considered the
case against the appellant on the material put before us in this
appeal. ...
When it came to the closed session, the Special
Advocates informed us that after careful consideration they had
decided that it would not be in the appellant's interests for them to
take any part in the proceedings. We were very concerned at this,
taking the view that the decision was wrong. The appeal was still
being pursued and the appellant did not know what was relied on
against him in the closed material. We were unable to understand how
in the circumstances it could not be in his interests for the Special
Advocates, at their discretion, to elicit or identify matters
favourable to the appellant and to make submissions to us to seek to
persuade us that evidence was in fact unreliable or did not justify
the assessment made. When we asked [one of the two Special Advocates
appointed on behalf of the eighth applicant] to tell us why he had
decided as he had he told us that he could not do so since to do so
would not be in the appellant's interest. We adjourned to enable the
Special Advocates to seek to discover from the appellant through his
representatives whether he did wish them to do what they could on his
behalf and we also contacted the Solicitor General who had appointed
the Special Advocates to seek her help in trying to persuade them to
assist us. The appellant's representatives indicated that they had
nothing to say on the subject and the Solicitor General took the view
that it would be wrong for her to intervene in any way. Our further
attempts to persuade the Special Advocates to change their minds were
unsuccessful and since we could not compel them to act in any
particular way we had to proceed without them. [Counsel for the
Secretary of State], at our request, identified various matters which
might be regarded as possibly exculpatory and we ourselves raised
other matters in the course of the closed hearing.
We are conscious that the absence of a Special Advocate
makes our task even more difficult than it normally is and that the
potential unfairness to the appellant is the more apparent. We do not
doubt that the Special Advocates believed they had good reasons for
adopting the stance that they did and we are equally sure that they
thought long and hard about whether they were doing the right thing.
But we are bound to record our clear view that they were wrong and
that there could be no reason for not continuing to take part in an
appeal that was still being pursued. ... As it happens, the evidence
in this case against the appellant is so strong that no Special
Advocates, however brilliant, could have persuaded us that reasonable
suspicion had not been established so that the certification was not
justified. Thus the absence of Special Advocates has not prejudiced
the appellant. ...”
- SIAC
then summarised the open case against the applicant, which was that
he had associated with and acted as spiritual adviser to a number of
individuals and groups linked with al'Qaeda. He held extreme and
fundamentalist views and had been reported as having, in his speeches
at a London mosque, given his blessing to the killing of Jews and
Americans, wherever they were. SIAC concluded:
“We are satisfied that the appellant's activities
went far beyond the mere giving of advice. He has certainly given the
support of the Koran to those who wish to further the aims of Al
Qa'ida and to engage in suicide bombing and other murderous
activities. The evidence is sufficient to show that he has been
concerned in the instigation of acts of international terrorism. But
spiritual advice given in the knowledge of the purposes for which and
the uses to which it is to be put provides assistance within the
meaning of s.21(4) of the 2001 Act.
...
There are a large number of allegations made. We see no
point in dealing with them seriatim. We have indicated why we have
formed the view that the case made against the appellant is
established. Indeed, were the standard higher than reasonable
suspicion, we would have had no doubt that it was established. The
appellant was heavily involved, indeed was at the centre in the
United Kingdom of terrorist activities associated with Al Qa'ida. He
is a truly dangerous individual and these appeals are dismissed.”
9. The ninth applicant
- The
ninth applicant is Algerian, born in 1972. In 1991 he left Algeria
for Afghanistan, where he taught Arabic in a refugee camp. He claimed
asylum in the United Kingdom in 1993. In 1994 he was granted leave to
remain for four years and in 2000 he was granted indefinite leave to
remain, on the basis that he was to be regarded as a refugee. On four
occasions, the last in May 1998, the applicant was arrested and
released without charge. The first three arrests related to credit
card fraud. The arrest in May 1998 related to alleged terrorist
activities and the applicant was subsequently paid compensation by
the police for false arrest.
- The
ninth applicant was certified by the Secretary of State and made the
subject of a deportation order on 22 April 2002. He was detained
on the same day. According to the evidence of one of the witnesses
for the Secretary of State, he was not certified, with the other
applicants, in December 2001 because one of his files had been lost.
- In
its judgment of 29 October 2003, SIAC noted that the allegations
against the ninth applicant were that he was an active supporter of
the GSPC and had raised considerable sums of money for it through
fraud. There was evidence that the applicant had in the past been
found, by customs officers, attempting to enter the United Kingdom by
ferry with large amounts of cash and that he had close links with
others who had been convicted of credit card fraud. SIAC held that
evidence of involvement in fraud did not establish involvement in
terrorism. However, it noted that the applicant had been present at a
camp in Dorset in the company of the fifth applicant and a number of
others suspected of being GSPC supporters and that a telephone bill
had been found at his house at the time of his arrest in the name of
Yarkas, who had been arrested in Spain in November 2001 due to his
alleged links with al'Qaeda. The applicant had given evidence but had
not been a convincing witness and had not given a credible
explanation for the foregoing. The closed evidence supported the
Secretary of State's allegations and SIAC therefore dismissed the
applicant's appeal against certification.
- In
its review judgments of 2 July 2004 and 15 December 2004, SIAC held
that the certificate was properly maintained.
10. The tenth applicant
- The
tenth applicant is an Algerian national. Following a bomb explosion
in Algeria, his left hand was amputated at the wrist and his right
arm was amputated below the elbow. In 1999 he travelled to the United
Kingdom, via Abu Dhabi and Afghanistan, and claimed asylum. His claim
was refused on 27 February 2001. He was then in custody, having been
arrested on 15 February 2001 and charged with possession of articles
for suspected terrorist purposes, conspiracy to defraud and
conspiracy to make false instruments. At the time of his arrest he
was found to have in his possession approximately 40 blank French
driving licences, identity cards and passports, a credit card reader,
laminators and an embossing machine. The charges were not, however,
proceeded with and he was released on 17 May 2001.
- On
14 January 2003 the Secretary of State issued a certificate against
him under section 21 of the 2001 Act and he was taken into detention.
A deportation order was made against him on the same day.
- In
its judgment of 27 January 2004 SIAC noted that the essence of the
case against the tenth applicant was that since his arrival in the
United Kingdom he had been closely associated with a network of
extremists formerly led by Abu Doha (see paragraph 26 above).
In particular, it was alleged that he had provided logistical support
in the form of false documentation and money raised through credit
card fraud. He had spent a lot of time at the Finsbury Park Mosque, a
known centre of Islamist extremism, and was alleged to have attended
a meeting there in June 2001 at which threats were made against the
G8 summit in Genoa.
The
applicant submitted a written statement on 28 June 2003 in which he
denied the allegations against him. He did not, however, participate
in the hearing of his appeal, as SIAC explained in its judgment:
“He was, said [his counsel], a genuine refugee, a
member of no organisation or group and not involved in terrorism or
in advocating terrorism. He had no knowledge of any planned terrorist
attacks and could not understand why the accusations had been made
against him. He had seen none of the underlying material and had no
means of challenging it. In effect, he could do no more than assert
that it could not justify the conclusion that he was an international
terrorist within the meaning of the Act since he was not. He had had
read to him the decisions of [SIAC] in the previous appeals. Given
the relevance which was placed on the closed material and the
statutory test applicable, he felt that the result was a foregone
conclusion. He did not wish in participating in the appeal to give an
impression which was false that he could deal with the matters which
were being relied on against him. He had no confidence in the
proceedings. Accordingly he would take no active part in them beyond
the statement which [his counsel] made on his behalf.
He did not withdraw his appeal. While we appreciate the
handicap under which he and indeed all the appellants labour, we wish
to make it clear that no appeal is a foregone conclusion. We have to
and we do consider the evidence put before us, whether open or
closed, with care because we recognise that the result is detention
for an unspecified period without trial. While we recognise that the
Special Advocate has a difficult task when he has and can obtain no
instructions on closed material, he is able to test evidence from the
Security Service and to draw our attention to material which assists
the appellant's case.”
SIAC
found that there was ample evidence to support the view that the
applicant was involved in fraudulent activities. The evidence before
it, most of it closed, was sufficient to establish that he was doing
it to raise money for terrorist causes and to support those involved
in terrorism. It therefore dismissed the appeal against
certification.
- SIAC
reached similar decisions in its review judgments of 4 August 2004
and 16 February 2005. In the latter judgment, it noted that although
the applicant had been transferred to Broadmoor Secure Mental
Hospital because of mental health problems, that made no difference
to the assessment of the risk to national security which he would
pose if released.
11. The eleventh applicant
- The
eleventh applicant is an Algerian national. He entered the United
Kingdom in February 1998, using a false Italian identity card, and
claimed asylum the following week. While his claim was pending, in
July 2001, he travelled to Georgia using a false French passport and
was deported back to the United Kingdom, where he was informed that
his travel outside the United Kingdom had terminated his asylum
claim. He made a second claim for asylum, which was refused on 21
August 2001. The applicant absconded. He was arrested on 10 October
2001 and held in an Immigration Detention centre, from which he
absconded in February 2002. He was rearrested on 19 September 2002
and detained at Belmarsh Prison under immigration law provisions.
- On
2 October 2003 the Secretary of State certified him as an
international terrorist under section 21 of the 2001 Act and made a
deportation order against him on grounds of national security.
- In
its judgment of 12 July 2004, dismissing the eleventh applicant's
appeal against certification, SIAC set out the open case against him.
It was alleged that he was an established and senior member of the
Abu Doha group (see paragraph 26 above). In July 2001 he had
attempted to travel to Chechnya and, when arrested by the Georgian
police, he had been found in possession of telephone numbers
associated with a senior member of the Abu Doha group and a named
member of the GSPC, who was known to be involved in fundraising for
the Chechen Mujahaddin. He was alleged to have provided money and
logistical support to a North African extremist Islamist network
based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with links to al'Qaeda, and to
have assisted members of the Abu Doha group in travelling to
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chechnya. He had lived at the Finsbury Park
Mosque for over a year in 1999/2000. He was very security conscious
and during a trip to St Albans in September 2001 he had taken
measures to avoid being followed. When he was arrested in September
2002 he was found in possession of a false Belgian passport bearing
the photograph of a senior member of the Abu Doha group. He was
alleged to have been heavily involved in the supply of false
documents and the fraudulent use of cheque books and credit cards.
- The
applicant filed a written statement in which he denied being an
international terrorist. He admitted that he had travelled to
Afghanistan in 1999 and that he had attempted to go to Chechnya in
2001, but claimed that his interest in these countries was no more
than that shown by many devout Muslims. He refused to participate in
the hearing of his appeal or to be represented by a lawyer, in
protest at the fundamental unfairness of the procedure. In view of
the applicant's position, the Special Advocates decided that his
interests would best be served if they refrained from making
submissions on his behalf or asking questions of the witnesses in the
closed session.
- In dismissing the applicant's appeal, SIAC held as
follows:
“We recognise the difficulties faced by an
Appellant who only sees only the open material and can understand
[the eleventh applicant's] perception that the procedures are unfair.
However, each case will turn upon its own individual facts, and it
would be wrong to give the impression, which [his solicitor] sought
to do, that this particular appellant had been placed in a position
where he was prevented by reason of the procedures under the Act from
mounting an effective defence in response to the case made against
him.
We have summarised the information made available to
[the eleventh applicant] at the various stages of the procedure ...
and [his] response to this information in his Written Statement.
While some of the assessments in the open material can fairly be
described as general assertions unsupported by any documentary
evidence, in response to which [the eleventh applicant] would not
have been able to give any more than an equally general denial, it is
clear that in respect of other assessments [he] was provided with a
great deal of detailed information: names, dates, places and
supporting documents.
[The eleventh applicant] is in the best position to give
an account of his whereabouts and activities since he first claimed
asylum in 1998. His written statement is significant not so much for
what it says, as for what it does not say. To take one example: the
visit to St Albans and the photo-booth where [the eleventh applicant]
says that the Respondent's specific assertion is 'completely wrong'
... [The eleventh applicant] has not denied that he went to St
Albans. He knows who accompanied him and why they went there. He has
not explained why they went there, nor has he identified his
companion, despite having been provided with the photographs taken
during the surveillance operation. ...”
SIAC
continued by noting the inconsistencies in the applicant's various
accounts of his trips to Afghanistan, Georgia and Dubai and his
failure to deal with the Secretary of State's allegations that he had
associated with various members of the Abu Doha group, identified by
name. SIAC continued:
“The matters referred to ... are not an exhaustive
list, merely the most obvious examples of the way in which [the
eleventh applicant's] written statement fails to deal with the open
case made against him. Given the unsatisfactory nature of the
statement we do not feel able to give any significant weight to the
general denials contained within it ... We have dealt with these
matters in some detail because they are useful illustrations of the
extent to which [the eleventh applicant] would have been able to
answer the case against him, if he had chosen to do so. While we do
not draw any adverse inference from [his] failure to give evidence,
or otherwise participate in the hearing of his appeal, we do have to
determine his appeal on the evidence and we are left with the
position that there has been no effective challenge by way of
evidence, cross-examination or submission to the open material
produced by the Respondent.
...
The standard of proof prescribed by section 25(2) of the
2001 Act is relatively low: are there reasonable grounds for belief
or suspicion. As explained above, we are satisfied that this low
threshold is easily crossed on the basis of the open material alone.
If the totality of the material, both open and closed, is considered,
we have no doubt that [the eleventh applicant] was a senior, and
active, member of the Abu Doha group as described in the Respondent's
evidence.”
E. The conditions of detention and the effect of
detention on the applicants' health
- The detained applicants were all initially detained at
Belmarsh Prison in London. The sixth applicant was transferred to
Woodhill Prison and the first, seventh and tenth applicants were
transferred to Broadmoor Secure Mental Hospital.
- They were held in prison under the same regime as
other standard risk Category A prisoners, which was considered the
appropriate security classification on the basis of the risk they
posed. They were allowed visitors, once those visitors had been
security-cleared, and could associate with other prisoners, make
telephone calls and write and receive letters. They had access to an
imam and to their legal representatives. They had the same level of
access to health care, exercise, education and work as any other
prisoner of their security ranking.
Following
a recommendation of the inspector appointed under the 2001 Act to
review the detention regime, the Government created a Special Unit at
Woodhill Prison to house the 2001 Act detainees. The Unit, which was
refurbished in consultation with the detained applicants and their
representatives and had a specially selected and trained staff, would
have allowed for a more relaxed regime, including more out-of-cell
time. The applicants, however, chose not to move to the Unit, a
decision which the inspector found regrettable.
72 The
first applicant, who alleged a history of ill-treatment in Israeli
detention and who had first been treated for depression in May 1999,
suffered a severe deterioration in his mental health while detained
in Belmarsh Prison. He was transferred to Broadmoor Secure Mental
Hospital in July 2002.
- The
seventh applicant reported a family history of psychiatric disorder
and had experienced depression as an adolescent. He claimed to suffer
increasingly throughout his detention from depression, paranoia and
auditory hallucinations. He attempted suicide in May 2004 and was
transferred to Broadmoor Secure Mental Hospital on 17 November 2004.
- The
tenth applicant, a double amputee, claimed to have been detained and
tortured in Algeria. He suffered a deterioration in his physical and
mental health in Belmarsh Prison. He went on hunger strike in
May/June 2003 and refused to use the prostheses which had been issued
to him or to cooperate with his nurses. Early in November 2003, the
prison authorities withdrew his nursing care. His legal
representatives applied for judicial review of this decision and in
December 2003 nursing care was resumed following the order of the
Administrative Court. On 1 November 2004 the tenth applicant was
transferred to Broadmoor Secure Mental Hospital.
- The
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CPT”) visited the
detained applicants in February 2002 and again in March 2004, and
made a number of criticisms of the conditions in which the detained
applicants were held. The Government rejected these criticisms (see
paragraphs 101-102 below).
- In October 2004, at the request of the applicants'
legal representatives, a group of eight consultant psychiatrists
prepared a Joint Psychiatric Report on the detained applicants, which
concluded:
“The detainees originate from countries where
mental illness is highly stigmatized. In addition, for devout Muslims
there is a direct prohibition against suicide. This is particularly
significant given the number who have attempted or are considering
suicide. All of the detainees have serious mental health problems
which are the direct result of, or are seriously exacerbated by, the
indefinite nature of the detention. The mental health problems
predominantly take the form of major depressive disorder and anxiety.
A number of detainees have developed psychotic symptoms, as they have
deteriorated. Some detainees are also experiencing PTSD
[post-traumatic stress disorder] either as a result of their
pre-migration trauma, the circumstances around their arrest and
imprisonment or the interaction between the two.
Continued deterioration in their mental health is
affected also by the nature of, and their mistrust in, the prison
regime and the appeals process as well as the underlying and central
factor of the indefinite nature of detention. The Prison Health Care
system is unable to meet their health needs adequately. There is a
failure to perceive self harm and distressed behaviour as part of the
clinical condition rather than merely being seen as manipulation.
There is inadequate provision for complex physical health problems.
Their mental health problems are unlikely to resolve
while they are maintained in their current situation and given the
evidence of repeated interviews it is highly likely that they will
continue to deteriorate while in detention.
The problems described by the detainees are remarkably
similar to the problems identified in the literature examining the
impact of immigration detention. This literature describes very high
levels of depression and anxiety and eloquently makes the point that
the length of time in detention relates directly to the severity of
symptoms and that it is detention per se which is causing these
problems to deteriorate.”
- For the purposes of the present proceedings, the
Government requested a Consultant Psychiatrist, Dr. J., to comment on
the above Joint Psychiatric Report. Dr J. was critical of the
methodology and conclusions of the authors of the Joint Report. In
particular, he wrote (references to other reports omitted):
“I would comment that I find many of the
assertions made do not bear close inspection. For example in the case
of [the first applicant] it was my finding after a careful and
detailed assessment that his mental state after imprisonment and then
detention in Broadmoor Hospital was, overall, no worse and arguably
no better than it had been before he was arrested. Nor do his records
suggest initial improvement followed by deterioration in Broadmoor
Hospital. I found he deteriorated in HMP Belmarsh because he chose to
go on hunger strike and that he had a fluctuating course in Broadmoor
Hospital despite agreeing to eat, his histrionic behaviour in both
places being essentially the same. In his case I found the diagnosis
to be one of Personality Disorder, diagnoses of Major Depressive
Disorder, psychosis and PTSD not being sustainable. Moreover, it was
my finding that his frequent self-harming was indeed manipulative.
...
I am not alone in finding the diagnoses claimed by the
authors of this report to be mistaken and have drawn attention in my
own report to the scepticism of some others who have reported on [the
first and seventh applicants]. It is not the case therefore that
there is the consensus of opinion claimed in the report and I note
that in both the cases I assessed [the first and seventh applicants],
their so-called psychotic symptoms claimed by some reporters and said
not to be present before they were detained, were in fact present
before they were arrested.
An issue I find to be of the greatest concern relates to
the tacit acceptance of information gained by self-report. It appears
to be accepted by the authors of the report, for example, that three
of the detainees had been the victims of detention and torture and
all felt themselves seriously threatened prior to migration. Nowhere
have I seen any evidence to corroborate these claims or indeed any
attempt to check them. As it is the case that immigrants and
asylum-seekers need to justify their attempts to gain entry to
another country, is it not possible or even probable that some may
not always be entirely truthful in what they claim about their past
experiences or their current symptoms? Where alleged terrorists are
concerned it should be borne in mind that they have denied such
allegations in spite of the open and closed evidence against them,
which has been considered at the highest level. Surely this should
raise doubts about their truthfulness?”
F. The release of the fifth applicant on bail
- On 20 January 2004, SIAC decided that it should, in
principle, grant bail to the fifth applicant. The Secretary of State
attempted to appeal against this decision but was informed by the
Court of Appeal in an interim decision dated 12 February 2004 that it
had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal.
- SIAC
explained its reasons for granting bail in greater detail in a
judgment dated 22 April 2004. It held that under the 2001 Act it had
a power to grant bail only in an exceptional case, where it was
satisfied that if bail were not granted the detainee's mental or
physical condition would deteriorate to such an extent as to render
his continued detention a breach of Article 3 of the Convention,
because inhuman, or Article 8, because disproportionate.
- SIAC
noted that there had been concerns about the fifth applicant's mental
health amongst prison staff from May 2002, although these concerns
had not been communicated to his legal representatives. In December
2003 he had suffered a serious relapse into severe depression with
psychotic symptoms, including auditory hallucinations and suicide
ideation. A number of psychologists and psychiatrists had examined
him, at the request of his legal representatives and at the
initiative of the Home Office, and had agreed that he was seriously
ill and that his mental health would be likely to improve if he were
allowed to go home. SIAC concluded:
“We do not think that the threshold has been
crossed so that there is a breach of [the fifth applicant's] human
rights. The jurisprudence of the [European Court of Human Rights]
emphasises the high threshold which must be crossed and that
detention is unlikely to be regarded as disproportionate unless it at
least verges on treatment which would constitute a breach of Article
3. But we are satisfied that, if he were not released, there would be
such a breach. To permit someone to reach a state whereby he requires
treatment in a special hospital or continuous care and attention to
ensure he does not harm himself can constitute a breach of Article 8,
unless perhaps there is no possible alternative to detention, and
probably of Article 3. As we have said, we do not have to wait until
that situation exists. Provided that we are persuaded, as we are,
that the conditions we impose are sufficient to minimise the risk to
the security of the state if [the fifth applicant] is released, we
can act as we have.
We must emphasise that the grant of bail is exceptional.
We are only doing so because the medical evidence is all one way and
the detention has caused the mental illness which will get worse.
...”
- The
fifth applicant was, therefore, released on bail on 22 April 2004 on
conditions amounting to house arrest. He was not permitted to leave
his home address and had to wear an electronic tag at all times. He
had no internet access and a telephone link to the Security Service
only. He was required to report by telephone to the Security Service
five times a day and allow its agents access to his home at any time.
He was not permitted contact with any person other than his wife and
child, legal representative and a Home Office approved doctor or see
any visitor except with prior Home Office approval.
G. Events following the House of Lords' judgment of 16
December 2004
- The
declaration of incompatibility made by the House of Lords on
16 December 2004, in common with all such declarations, was not
binding on the parties to the litigation (see paragraph 94 below).
The applicants remained in detention, except for the second and
fourth applicants who had elected to leave the United Kingdom and the
fifth applicant who had been released on bail on conditions amounting
to house arrest. Moreover, none of the applicants were entitled,
under domestic law, to compensation in respect of their detention.
The applicants, therefore, lodged their application to the Court on
21 January 2005.
- At
the end of January 2005, the Government announced its intention to
repeal Part 4 of the 2001 Act and replace it with a regime of control
orders, which would impose various restrictions on individuals,
regardless of nationality, reasonably suspected of being involved in
terrorism.
- Those
applicants who remained in detention were released on 10-11 March
2005 and immediately made subject to control orders under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, which came into effect on 11 March
2005.
- The
Government withdrew the notice of derogation on 16 March 2005.
- On 11 August 2005, following negotiations commenced
towards the end of 2003 to seek from the Algerian and Jordanian
Governments assurances that the applicants would not be ill-treated
if returned, the Government served Notices of Intention to Deport on
the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh
applicants. These applicants were taken into immigration custody
pending removal to Algeria (the fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth
and eleventh applicants) and Jordan (the eighth applicant). On 9
April 2008 the Court of Appeal ruled that the eighth applicant could
not lawfully be extradited to Jordan, because it was likely that
evidence which had been obtained by torture could be used against him
there at trial, in flagrant violation of his right to a fair trial.
At the date of adoption of the present judgment, the case was pending
before the House of Lords.
B. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Detention pending deportation before the passing of
the 2001 Act
- Under section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971 the
Secretary of State could make a deportation order against a
non-national, on the ground that the deportation would be conducive
to the public good, for reasons of national security, inter alia.
A person who was the subject of a deportation order could be
detained pending deportation (1971 Act, Schedule 3, paragraph 2).
However, it was held in R. v. Governor of Durham Prison ex
parte Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704 that the power to detain
under the above provision was limited to such time as was reasonable
to enable the process of deportation to be carried out. Detention was
not, therefore, permissible under the 1971 Act where deportation was
known to be impossible, whether because there was no country willing
to take the person in question or because there would be a risk of
torture or other serious ill-treatment to the proposed deportee in
his or her country of origin.
B. The Terrorism Act 2000
- In July 2000 Parliament enacted the Terrorism Act
2000. As Lord Bingham noted in his judgment in the present case,
“this was a substantial measure, with 131 sections and 16
Schedules, intended to overhaul, modernise and strengthen the law
relating to the growing problem of terrorism”. “Terrorism”
was defined, in section 1 of the Act, as:
“... the use or threat of action where—
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the
government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public,
and
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of
advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it—
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the
person committing the action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of
the public or a section of the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously
to disrupt an electronic system.
(3) The use or threat of action falling within
subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is
terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.
(4) In this section—
(a) 'action' includes action outside the United Kingdom,
(b) a reference to any person or to property is a
reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated,
(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to
the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and
(d) 'the government' means the government of the United
Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than
the United Kingdom.
(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the
purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the
benefit of a proscribed organisation”.
For
the purposes of the Act, an organisation was “proscribed”
if:
3. (1) ...
(a) it is listed in Schedule 2, or
(b) it operates under the same name as an organisation
listed in that Schedule.
(2) Subsection (1)(b) shall not apply in relation to an
organisation listed in Schedule 2 if its entry is the subject of a
note in that Schedule.
(3) The Secretary of State may by order—
(a) add an organisation to Schedule 2;
(b) remove an organisation from that Schedule;
(c) amend that Schedule in some other way.
(4) The Secretary of State may exercise his power under
subsection (3)(a) in respect of an organisation only if he believes
that it is concerned in terrorism.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) an organisation
is concerned in terrorism if it—
(a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism,
(b) prepares for terrorism,
(c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or
(d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.”
- Part
II of the Act created offences of membership and support of
proscribed organisations; it created offences of fund raising, use
and possession of terrorist funds, entering into an arrangement for
the transfer of terrorist funds, money laundering and failing to
disclose suspect money laundering. There were a number of further
substantive offences in Part IV, including offences of weapons
training; directing terrorism; possession, without reasonable excuse,
of items likely to be useful to person committing or preparing an act
of terrorism; and collection, without reasonable excuse, of
information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing
an act of terrorism. By section 62, the Act had extra-territorial
scope, in that a person within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom
might be prosecuted for any of the above offences regardless of where
the acts in furtherance of those offences were committed.
C. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
- Part 4 of the 2001 Act (see paragraph 12 above), which
was headed “Immigration and Asylum”, set out powers which
enabled the detention of non-nationals suspected of being
international terrorists, even where their deportation was for the
time being impossible. The 2001 Act provided, so far as material:
“PART 4
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
Suspected international terrorists
21. Suspected international
terrorist: certification
(1) The Secretary of State may issue a certificate under
this section in respect of a person if the Secretary of State
reasonably-
(a) believes that the person's presence in the United
Kingdom is a risk to national security, and
(b) suspects that the person is a terrorist.
(2) In subsection (1)(b) 'terrorist' means a person who-
(a) is or has been concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism,
(b) is a member of or belongs to an international
terrorist group, or
(c) has links with an international terrorist group.
(3) A group is an international terrorist group for the
purposes of subsection (2)(b) and (c) if—
(a) it is subject to the control or influence of persons
outside the United Kingdom, and
(b) the Secretary of State suspects that it is concerned
in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of
international terrorism.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(c) a person has
links with an international terrorist group only if he supports or
assists it.
(5) In this Part—
“terrorism” has the meaning given by section
1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11), and
“suspected international terrorist” means a
person certified under subsection (1).
(6) Where the Secretary of State issues a certificate
under subsection (1) he shall as soon as is reasonably practicable-
(a) take reasonable steps to notify the person
certified, and
(b) send a copy of the certificate to the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission.
(7) The Secretary of State may revoke a certificate
issued under subsection (1).
(8) A decision of the Secretary of State in connection
with certification under this section may be questioned in legal
proceedings only under section 25 or 26.
(9) An action of the Secretary of State taken wholly or
partly in reliance on a certificate under this section may be
questioned in legal proceedings only by or in the course of
proceedings under-
(a) section 25 or 26, or
(b) section 2 of the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission Act 1997 (c. 68) (appeal).
22. Deportation, removal, etc.
(1) An action of a kind specified in subsection (2) may
be taken in respect of a suspected international terrorist despite
the fact that (whether temporarily or indefinitely) the action cannot
result in his removal from the United Kingdom because of-
(a) a point of law which wholly or partly relates to an
international agreement, or
(b) a practical consideration ...
(2) The actions mentioned in subsection (1) are –
...
(e) making a deportation order ...
(3) Action of a kind specified in subsection (2) which
has effect in respect of a suspected international terrorist at the
time of his certification under section 21 shall be treated as taken
again (in reliance on subsection (1) above) immediately after
certification.
23. Detention
(1) A suspected international terrorist may be detained
under a provision specified in subsection (2) despite the fact that
his removal or departure from the United Kingdom is prevented
(whether temporarily or indefinitely) by-
(a) a point of law which wholly or partly relates to an
international agreement, or
(b) a practical consideration
(2) The provisions mentioned in subsection (1) are—
(a) paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act
1971 (c. 77) (detention of persons liable to examination or removal),
and
(b) paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention
pending deportation).”
Part
4 of the 2001 Act included a provision that the legislation would
remain in force for five years only and was subject to an annual
affirmative resolution by both Houses of Parliament.
D. The Special Immigration Appeals Commission
- The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”)
was set up in response to the Court's judgment in Chahal v. the
United Kingdom [GC], judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1996-V). It is a tribunal composed of
independent judges, with a right of appeal against its decisions on a
point of law to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.
By
section 25 of the 2001 Act:
“(1) A suspected international terrorist may
appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission against his
certification under section 21.
(2) On an appeal [SIAC] must cancel the certificate if –
(a) it considers that there are no reasonable grounds
for a belief or suspicion of the kind referred to in section 21(1)(a)
or (b), or
(b) if it considers that for some other reason the
certificate should not have been issued.”
SIAC
was required to carry out a first review to ensure that the
certificate was still justified six months after the issue of the
certificate or six months after the final determination of an appeal
against certification, and thereafter at three-monthly intervals.
Under
section 30 of the 2001 Act, any legal challenge to the derogation
under Article 15 of the Convention had also to be made to SIAC.
- SIAC
has a special procedure which enables it to consider not only
material which can be made public (“open material”) but
also material which, for reasons of national security, cannot
(“closed material”). Neither the appellant nor his legal
advisor can see the closed material. Accordingly, one or more
security-cleared counsel, referred to as “special advocates”,
are appointed by the Solicitor General to act on behalf of each
appellant.
- In the certification appeals before SIAC at issue in
the present case, the open statements and evidence concerning each
appellant were served first, and the special advocate could discuss
this material with the appellant and his legal advisors and take
instructions generally. Then the closed material would be disclosed
to the judges and to the special advocate, from which point there
could be no further contact between the latter and the appellant
and/or his representatives, save with the permission of SIAC. It was
the special advocate's role during the closed sessions to make
submissions on behalf of the appellant, both as regards procedural
matters, such as the need for further disclosure, and as to the
substance of the case. In respect of each appeal against
certification, SIAC issued both an “open” and a “closed”
judgment. The special advocate could see both but the detainee and
his representatives could see only the open judgment.
E. Declarations of incompatibility under the Human
Rights Act 1998
- Section 4 of the 1998 Act provides that where a court
finds that primary legislation is in breach of the Convention, the
court may make a declaration of incompatibility. Such a declaration
does not affect the validity of the provision in respect of which it
is made and is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which
it is made, but special arrangements may be made (section 10) to
amend the provision in order to remove the incompatibility (see
further Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05,
§§ 21-24 and 40-44, ECHR 2008).
F. The Terrorism Act 2006
- The Terrorism Act 2006 came into force on 30 March
2006, creating a number of offences to extend criminal liability to
acts preparatory to the terrorist offences created by the Terrorism
Act 2000. The new offences were encouragement, dissemination of
publications, preparation and training. The offences were designed to
intervene at an early stage in terrorist activity and thus prevent
the development of more serious conduct. They were also designed to
be easier to prove.
G. Consideration of the use of special advocates under
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
- On 31 October 2007 the House of Lords gave judgment in
Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) v. MB (FC)
(Appellant) [2007] UKHL 46, which concerned a challenge to a
non-derogating control order made by the Secretary of State under
sections 2 and 3 (1)(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The
House of Lords had to decide, inter alia, whether procedures
provided for by section 3 of the 2005 Act, involving closed hearings
and special advocates, were compatible with Article 6 of the
Convention, given that, in the case of one of the appellants, they
had resulted in the case against him being in its essence entirely
undisclosed, with no specific allegation of terrorism-related
activity being contained in open material.
The
House of Lords was unanimous in holding that the proceedings in
question determined civil rights and obligations and thus attracted
the protection of Article 6. On the question of compliance, the
majority (Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carswell and Lord Brown of
Eaton-under-Heywood) held that although in many cases the special
advocate procedure would provide a sufficient counterbalance where
the Secretary of State wished to withhold material upon which she
wished to rely in order to establish the existence of reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the controlee was or had been involved in
terrorism-related activity, each case had to be considered
individually. Baroness Hale put it as follows:
“65. ... It would all depend upon the nature of
the case; what steps had been taken to explain the detail of the
allegations to the controlled person so that he could anticipate what
the material in support might be; what steps had been taken to
summarise the closed material in support without revealing names,
dates or places; the nature and content of the material withheld; how
effectively the special advocate had been able to challenge it on
behalf of the controlled person; and what difference its disclosure
might have made. All of these factors would be relevant to whether
the controlled person had been 'given a meaningful opportunity to
contest the factual basis' for the order.
66. I do not think that we can be confident that
Strasbourg would hold that every control order hearing in which the
special advocate procedure had been used, as contemplated by the 2005
Act and Part 76 of the Civil Procedure Rules, would be sufficient to
comply with article 6. However, with strenuous efforts from all,
difficult and time consuming though it will be, it should usually be
possible to accord the controlled person 'a substantial measure of
procedural justice'. Everyone involved will have to do their best to
ensure that the 'principles of judicial inquiry' are complied with to
the fullest extent possible. The Secretary of State must give as full
as possible an explanation of why she considers that the grounds in
section 2(1) are made out. The fuller the explanation given, the
fuller the instructions that the special advocates will be able to
take from the client before they see the closed material. Both judge
and special advocates will have to probe the claim that the closed
material should remain closed with great care and considerable
scepticism. There is ample evidence from elsewhere of a tendency to
over-claim the need for secrecy in terrorism cases: see Serrin Turner
and Stephen J Schulhofer, The Secrecy Problem in Terrorism Trials,
2005, Brennan Centre for Justice at NYU School of Law. Both judge and
special advocates will have stringently to test the material which
remains closed. All must be alive to the possibility that material
could be redacted or gisted in such a way as to enable the special
advocates to seek the client's instructions upon it. All must be
alive to the possibility that the special advocates be given leave to
ask specific and carefully tailored questions of the client. Although
not expressly provided for in CPR r 76.24, the special advocate
should be able to call or have called witnesses to rebut the closed
material. The nature of the case may be such that the client does not
need to know all the details of the evidence in order to make an
effective challenge.
67. The best judge of whether the proceedings have
afforded a sufficient and substantial measure of procedural
protection is likely to be the judge who conducted the hearing. ...”
Lord
Carswell observed:
“There is a very wide spectrum of cases in which
closed material is relied on by the Secretary of State. At one
extreme there may be cases in which the sole evidence adverse to the
controlee is closed material, he cannot be told what the evidence is
or even given its gist and the special advocate is not in a position
to take sufficient instructions to mount an effective challenge to
the adverse allegations. At the other end there may be cases where
the probative effect of the closed material is very slight or merely
corroborative of strong open material and there is no obstacle to
presenting a defence. There is an infinite variety of possible cases
in between. The balance between the open material and the closed
material and the probative nature of each will vary from case to
case. The special advocate may be able to discern with sufficient
clarity how to deal with the closed material without obtaining direct
instructions from the controlee. These are matters for the judge to
weigh up and assess in the process of determining whether the
controlee has had a fair trial. The assessment is ... fact-specific.
The judge who has seen both the open and the closed material and had
the benefit of the contribution of the special advocate is in much
the best position to make it. I do consider, however, that there is a
fairly heavy burden on the controlee to establish that there has been
a breach of article 6, for the legitimate public interest in
withholding material on valid security grounds should be given due
weight. The courts should not be too ready to hold that a
disadvantage suffered by the controlee through the withholding of
material constitutes a breach of article 6.”
Lord
Brown held as follows:
“There may perhaps be cases, wholly exceptional
though they are likely to be, where, despite the best efforts of all
concerned by way of redaction, anonymisation, and gisting, it will
simply be impossible to indicate sufficient of the Secretary of
State's case to enable the suspect to advance any effective challenge
to it. Unless in these cases the judge can nevertheless feel quite
sure that in any event no possible challenge could conceivably have
succeeded (a difficult but not, I think, impossible conclusion to
arrive at ...), he would have to conclude that the making or, as the
case may be, confirmation of an order would indeed involve
significant injustice to the suspect. In short, the suspect in such a
case would not have been accorded even 'a substantial measure of
procedural justice' (Chahal [cited above] § 131)
notwithstanding the use of the special advocate procedure; 'the very
essence of [his] right [to a fair hearing] [will have been] impaired'
(Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and McElduff and others v
United Kingdom [cited below] § 72).
Lord
Bingham did not dissent but employed different reasoning. He held
that it was necessary to look at the process as a whole and consider
whether a procedure had been used which involved significant
injustice to the controlee; while the use of special advocates could
help to enhance the measure of procedural justice available to a
controlled person, it could not fully remedy the grave disadvantages
of a person not being aware of the case against him and not being
able, therefore, effectively to instruct the special advocate.
Lord
Hoffmann, dissenting, held that once the trial judge had decided that
disclosure would be contrary to the public interest, the use of
special advocates provided sufficient safeguards for the controlee
and there would never in these circumstances be a breach of Article
6.
- In
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF [2008] EWCA Civ 1148, the Court of Appeal (Sir Anthony Clark MR and Waller LJ;
Sedley LJ dissenting), gave the following guidance, based on the
majority opinions in MB, regarding compliance with Article 6
in control order cases using special advocates (extract from the
head-note):
(1) In deciding whether the hearing under s 3(10) of the
2005 Act infringed the controlee's rights under art 6 the question
was whether, taken as a whole, the hearing was fundamentally unfair
to the controlee, or he was not accorded a substantial measure of
procedural justice or the very essence of his right to a fair hearing
was impaired. More broadly, the question was whether the effect of
the process was that the controlee was exposed to significant
injustice. (2) All proper steps ought to be taken to provide the
controlee with as much information as possible, both in terms of
allegation and evidence, if necessary by appropriate gisting. (3)
Where the full allegations and evidence were not provided for reasons
of national security at the outset, the controlee had to be provided
with a special advocate. In such a case the following principles
applied. (4) There was no principle that a hearing would be unfair in
the absence of open disclosure to the controlee of an irreducible
minimum of allegation or evidence. Alternatively, if there was, the
irreducible minimum could, depending on the circumstances, be met by
disclosure of as little information as was provided in AF's case,
which was very little indeed. (5) Whether a hearing would be unfair
depended on all the circumstances, including the nature of the case,
what steps had been taken to explain the detail of the allegations to
the controlled person so that he could anticipate what the material
in support might be, what steps had been taken to summarise the
closed material in support without revealing names, dates or places,
the nature and content of the material withheld, how effectively the
special advocate was able to challenge it on behalf of the controlee
and what difference its disclosure would or might make. (6) In
considering whether open disclosure to the controlee would have made
a difference to the answer to whether there were reasonable grounds
for suspicion that the controlee was or had been involved in
terrorist related activity, the court had to have fully in mind the
problems for the controlee and the special advocates and take account
of all the circumstances of the case, including what if any
information was openly disclosed and how effective the special
advocates were able to be. The correct approach to and the weight to
be given to any particular factor would depend upon the particular
circumstances. (7) There were no rigid principles. What was fair was
essentially a matter for the judge, with whose decision the Court of
Appeal would very rarely interfere.”
III. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COMMENT ON PART 4 OF THE
2001 ACT
A. The Newton Committee
- Part 4 of the 2001 Act provided for the creation of a
Committee of Privy Counsellors to review its operation. The
Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Newton, reported in
December 2003. Having recorded the Home Office's argument that the
threat from al'Qaeda terrorism was predominantly from foreigners, the
Newton Committee's report drew attention to:
“accumulating evidence that this is not now the
case. The British suicide bombers who attacked Tel Aviv in May 2003,
Richard Reid ('the Shoe Bomber'), and recent arrests suggest that the
threat from UK citizens is real. Almost 30% of Terrorism Act 2000
suspects in the past year have been British. We have been told that,
of the people of interest to the authorities because of their
suspected involvement in international terrorism, nearly half are
British nationals.”
Given
this evidence, the Newton Committee observed that not only were there
arguments of principle against having discriminatory provisions, but
there were also compelling arguments of limited efficacy in
addressing the terrorist threat. The Newton Committee therefore
called for new legislation to be introduced as a matter of urgency
which would deal with the terrorist threat without discrimination on
grounds of nationality and which would not require a derogation from
Article 5 of the Convention.
- In February 2004 the Government published its response
to the Newton Committee's report. It continued to accept that the
terrorist threat “came predominantly, but not exclusively from
foreign nationals” and made the following observation about the
Newton Committee's suggestion that counter-terrorist measures should
apply to all persons within the jurisdiction regardless of
nationality:
“While it would be possible to seek other powers
to detain British citizens who may be involved in international
terrorism it would be a very grave step. The Government believes that
such draconian powers would be difficult to justify. Experience has
demonstrated the dangers of such an approach and the damage it can do
to community cohesion and thus to support from all parts of the
public that is so essential to countering the terrorist threat”.
The
Government also indicated that work was under way to try to establish
framework agreements with potential destination countries for the
purposes of deportation of terrorist suspects.
B. The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights
- The Joint Committee has constitutional responsibility
in the United Kingdom for scrutinising legislation to ensure that it
is compatible with Convention rights. In its Second Report of the
Session 2001-2002, drawn up very shortly after publication of the
Bill which became the 2001 Act, the Joint Committee expressed concern
at the potentially discriminatory effect of the proposed measure, as
follows:
“38. Second, by relying on immigration legislation
to provide for the detention of suspected international terrorists,
the Bill risks discriminating, in the authorization of detention
without charge, between those suspected international terrorists who
are subject to immigration control and those who have an
unconditional right to remain in the United Kingdom. We are concerned
that this might lead to discrimination in the enjoyment of the right
to liberty on the ground of nationality. If that could not be shown
to have an objective, rational and proportionate justification, it
might lead to actions which would be incompatible with Article 5 of
the ECHR either taken alone or in combination with the right to be
free of discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights under
Article 14 of the ECHR. It could also lead to violations of the right
to be free of discrimination under Article 26 and the right to
liberty under Article 9 of the ICCPR.
39. We raised this matter with the Home Secretary in
oral evidence. Having considered his response, we are not persuaded
that the risk of discrimination on the ground of nationality in the
provisions of Part 4 of the Bill has been sufficiently taken on
board.”
In
its Sixth Report of the Session 2003-2004 (23 February 2004), the
Joint Committee expressed deep concern “about the human rights
implications of making the detention power an aspect of immigration
law rather than anti-terrorism law” and warned of “a
significant risk that Part 4 violates the right to be free of
discrimination under ECHR Article 14.” Following the Report of
the Newton Committee and the Secretary of State's discussion paper
published in response to it, the Joint Committee returned to this
subject in its Eighteenth Report of the Session 2003-2004 (21 July
2004), paragraphs 42-44:
“42. The discussion paper rejects the Newton
Report's recommendation that new legislation replacing Part 4 [of the
2001 Act] should apply equally to all nationalities including British
citizens. It states the Government's belief that it is defensible to
distinguish between foreign nationals and UK nationals because of
their different rights and responsibilities.
43. We have consistently expressed our concern that
the provisions of Part 4 [of the 2001 Act] unjustifiably discriminate
on grounds of nationality and are therefore in breach of Article 14
ECHR. Along with Lord Newton, we find it extraordinary that the
discussion paper asserts that seeking the same power to detain
British citizens would be 'a very grave step' and that 'such
draconian powers would be difficult to justify.'
44. The interests at stake for a foreign national
and a UK national are the same: their fundamental right to liberty
under Article 5 ECHR and related procedural rights. Article 1 of the
ECHR requires States to secure the Convention rights to everyone
within their jurisdiction. Article 14 requires the enjoyment of
Convention rights to be secured without discrimination on the ground
of nationality. The Government's explanation in its discussion paper
of its reluctance to seek the same powers in relation to UK nationals
appears to suggest that it regards the liberty interests of foreign
nationals as less worthy of protection than exactly the same
interests of UK nationals, which is impermissible under the
Convention.”
C. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CPT”)
- The CPT visited the detained applicants in February
2002 and again in March 2004. In its report published on 9 June 2005,
the CPT was critical of the conditions in which the applicants were
held in Belmarsh Prison and Broadmoor Hospital and reported
allegations of ill-treatment by staff. It found the regime in
Woodhill Prison to be more relaxed. The CPT found that the health of
the majority of the detained applicants had declined as a result of
their detention, in particular its indefinite character. The CPT
stated in its report:
“In fact, the information gathered during the 2004
visit reveals that the authorities are at a loss at how to manage
this type of detained person, imprisoned with no real prospect of
release and without the necessary support to counter the damaging
effects of this unique form of detention. They also highlight the
limited capacity of the prison system to respond to a task that is
difficult to reconcile with its normal responsibilities. The stated
objective, in the response to the CPT's report on the February 2002
visit, of formulating a strategy to enable the Prison Service to
manage most appropriately the care and detention of persons held
under the 2001 Act, has not been achieved.
Two years after the CPT visited these detained persons,
many of them were in a poor mental state as a result of their
detention, and some were also in poor physical condition. Detention
had caused mental disorders in the majority of persons detained under
the [2001 Act] and for those who had been subjected to traumatic
experiences or even torture in the past, it had clearly reawakened
the experience and even led to the serious recurrence of former
disorders. The trauma of detention had become even more detrimental
to their health since it was combined with an absence of control
resulting from the indefinite character of their detention, the
uphill difficulty of challenging their detention and the fact of not
knowing what evidence was being used against them to certify and/or
uphold their certification as persons suspected of international
terrorism. For some of them, their situation at the time of the visit
could be considered as amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment.”
- The Government published their response to the CPT's
2004 report on 9 June 2005. The Government strongly disputed the
allegations of ill-treatment by prison staff and pointed out that the
detained applicants had at their disposal the remedies provided by
administrative and civil law to all prisoners to complain of
ill-treatment. The Government's response continued:
“Although the Government respects the conclusions
reached by the delegates of the [CPT] based on the observations on
the day of visit, it categorically rejects the suggestion that at any
point during their detention the [2001 Act] detainees were treated in
an 'inhuman or degrading' manner that may have amounted to a breach
in the United Kingdom's international human rights obligations. The
Government firmly believes that at all times the detainees received
appropriate care and treatment in Belmarsh and had access to all
necessary medical support, both physical and psychological, from
medical support staff and doctors. The Government accepts that the
individuals had difficult backgrounds prior to detention, but does
not accept that 'detention had caused mental disorders'. Some of the
detainees had mental health issues prior to detention, but that did
not stop them engaging in the activities that led to their
certification and detention. Mental health issues do not prevent an
individual from posing a risk to national security.
...
The Government does not accept that those certified
under [the 2001 Act] were detained without any prospect of their
release. ...
...
On no occasion did SIAC, or any other court, find that
the conditions of detention breached the absolute obligation imposed
upon the Government by Article 3 of [the Convention]. It is the
Government's view that, given the extensive judicial safeguards
available to the detainees, the government would not have been able
to maintain the detention of these individuals had the powers
breached the detainees' Article 3 rights in any way. To suggest
otherwise would be to ignore the extensive contact the detainees had
with the British judicial system and the absolute obligation upon the
judiciary to protect against any such breach.”
D. The European Commissioner for Human Rights
- In August 2002 the European Commissioner for Human
Rights to the Council of Europe published his opinion on certain
aspects of the United Kingdom's derogation from Article 5 of the
Convention and Part 4 of the 2001 Act. In that Opinion he expressly
criticised the lack of sufficient scrutiny by Parliament of the
derogation provisions and questioned whether the nature of the
al'Qaeda threat was a justifiable basis for recognising a public
emergency threatening the life of the nation:
“Whilst acknowledging the obligations of the
governments to protect their citizens against the threat of
terrorism, the Commissioner is of the opinion that general appeals to
an increased risk of terrorist activity post September 11 2001
cannot, on their own be sufficient to justify derogating from the
Convention. Several European states long faced with recurring
terrorist activity have not considered it necessary to derogate from
Convention rights. Nor have any found it necessary to do so under the
present circumstances. Detailed information pointing to a real and
imminent danger to public safety in the United Kingdom will,
therefore, have to be shown.”
The
Commissioner continued, with reference to the detention scheme under
Part 4 of the 2001 Act:
“In so far as these measures are applicable only
to non-deportable foreigners, they might appear, moreover, to be
ushering in a two-track justice, whereby different human rights
standards apply to foreigners and nationals.”
- On
8 June 2005 the Commissioner published a report arising out of his
visit to the United Kingdom in November 2004. He specifically
referred to the House of Lords decision in the applicants' case and
noted the fact that the Government had not sought to renew the
relevant provisions of the 2001 Act in March 2005. He welcomed the
decision of the House of Lords, which corresponded with his own
previously published opinion, and also welcomed the release of the
applicants, emphasising that as a result of his visit he was in a
position personally to testify to “the extremely agitated
psychological state of many of them”. As a result of interviews
which he had conducted with, amongst others, the Home Secretary, the
Lord Chancellor, the Attorney General, the Lord Chief Justice and the
Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commissioner also expressed a
conclusion about the availability under the law of the United Kingdom
of alternative measures to combat the threat of terrorism:
“Terrorist activity not only must but can be
combated within the existing framework of human rights guarantees,
which provide precisely for a balancing, in questions concerning
national security, of individual rights and the public interest and
allow for the use of proportionate special powers. What is required
is well-resourced policing, international cooperation and the
forceful application of the law. It is to be noted, in this context,
that in the Terrorist Act 2000, the United Kingdom already has
amongst the toughest and most comprehensive anti-terror legislation
in Europe.”
E. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination
- The Committee's Concluding Observations on the United
Kingdom, dated 10 December 2003, stated at paragraph 17:
“17. The Committee is deeply concerned about
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act which provide
for the indefinite detention without charge or trial, pending
deportation, of non-nationals of the United Kingdom who are suspected
of terrorism-related activities.
While acknowledging the State party's national security
concerns, the Committee recommends that the State party seek to
balance those concerns with the protection of human rights and its
international legal obligations. In this regard, the Committee draws
the State party's attention to its statement of 8 March 2002 in which
it underlines the obligation of States to 'ensure that measures taken
in the struggle against terrorism do not discriminate in purpose or
effect on grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic
origin.'”
IV. OTHER RELEVANT COUNCIL OF EUROPE MATERIALS
A. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution
1271 (2002)
- On 24 January 2002 the Council of Europe's
Parliamentary Assembly passed Resolution 1271 (2002) which resolved,
in paragraph 9, that:
“In their fight against terrorism, Council of
Europe members should not provide for any derogations to the European
Convention on Human Rights.”
It
also called on all Member States (paragraph 12) to:
“refrain from using Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (derogation in time of emergency) to limit
the rights and liberties guaranteed under its Article 5 (right to
liberty and security).”
Apart
from the United Kingdom, no other Member State chose to derogate from
Article 5 § 1 after 11 September 2001.
B. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
- Following its meeting on 14 November 2001 to discuss
“Democracies facing terrorism” (CM/AS(2001) Rec 1534),
the Committee of Ministers adopted on 11 July 2002 “Guidelines
on human rights and the fight against terrorism”, which
provided, inter alia:
“I. States' obligation to protect everyone
against terrorism
States are under the obligation to take the measures
needed to protect the fundamental rights of everyone within their
jurisdiction against terrorist acts, especially the right to life.
This positive obligation fully justifies States' fight against
terrorism in accordance with the present guidelines.
II. Prohibition of arbitrariness
All measures taken by States to fight terrorism must
respect human rights and the principle of the rule of law, while
excluding any form of arbitrariness, as well as any discriminatory or
racist treatment, and must be subject to appropriate supervision.”
C. The European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance (“ECRI”)
- In its General Policy Recommendations published on 8
June 2004, ECRI considered it the duty of the State to fight against
terrorism; stressed that the response should not itself encroach on
the values of freedom, democracy, justice, the rule of law, human
rights and humanitarian law; stressed that the fight against
terrorism should not become a pretext under which racial
discrimination was allowed to flourish; noted that the fight against
terrorism since 11 September 2001 had in some cases resulted in the
adoption of discriminatory legislation, notably on grounds of
nationality, national or ethnic origin and religion; stressed the
responsibility of member States to ensure that the fight against
terrorism did not have a negative impact on any minority group; and
recommended States:
“to review legislation and regulations adopted in
connection with the fight against terrorism to ensure that these do
not discriminate directly or indirectly against persons or group of
persons, notably on grounds of 'race', colour, language, religion,
nationality or national or ethnic origin, and to abrogate any such
discriminatory legislation.”
V. THE NOTION OF A “PUBLIC EMERGENCY” UNDER
ARTICLE 4 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
(“ICCPR”)
- Article 4(1) of the ICCPR states as follows:
“In time of public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation and the existence of which is officially
proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other
obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or
social origin.”
In
Spring 1984, a group of 31 experts in international law, convened by
the International Commission of Jurists, the International
Association of Penal law, the American Association for the
International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute for
Human Rights and the International Institute of Higher Studies in
Criminal Sciences, met in Siracusa, Italy to consider the above
provision, inter alia. Paragraphs 39-40 of the resulting
“Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights” declare, under the heading “Public Emergency
which Threatens the Life of the Nation”:
“39. A state party may take measures derogating
from its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights pursuant to Article 4 (hereinafter called
'derogation measures') only when faced with a situation of
exceptional and actual or imminent danger which threatens the life of
the nation. A threat to the life of the nation is one that:
(a) affects the whole of the population and either the
whole or part of the territory of the State, and
(b) threatens the physical integrity of the population,
the political independence or the territorial integrity of the State
or the existence or basic functioning of institutions indispensable
to ensure and protect the rights recognised in the Covenant.
40. Internal conflict and unrest that do not constitute
a grave and imminent threat to the life of the nation cannot justify
derogations under Article 4.”
The
Siracusa Principles continue, in paragraph 54:
“54. The principle of strict necessity shall be
applied in an objective manner. Each measure shall be directed to an
actual, clear, present, or imminent danger and may not be imposed
merely because of an apprehension of potential danger.”
- The
United Nations Human Rights Committee, in “General Comment No
29 on Article 4 of the ICCPR (24 July 2001), observed in paragraph 2
that:
“Measures derogating from the provisions of the
Covenant must be of an exceptional and temporary nature.”
VI. OTHER MATERIALS CONCERNING NON-DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE
IN NATIONAL SECURITY CASES
- In
Charkaoui v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [2007]
1 SCR 350, McLachlin CJ, for the Supreme Court of Canada,
observed (§ 53):
“Last but not least, a fair hearing requires that
the affected person be informed of the case against him or her, and
be permitted to respond to it.”
That
right was not absolute and might be limited in the interests of
national security (§§ 57-58) but (§ 64):
“... The judge is therefore not in a position to
compensate for the lack of informed scrutiny, challenge and
counter-evidence that a person familiar with the case could bring.
Such scrutiny is the whole point of the principle that a person whose
liberty is in jeopardy must know the case to meet. Here that
principle has not merely been limited; it has been effectively
gutted. How can one meet a case one does not know?”
- In
Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 US 507 (2004), O'Connor J, writing for
the majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, said
(p. 533):
“We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking
to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decision-maker [authority cited]. 'For more than a century
the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear :
Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and
in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified
...' These essential constitutional promises may not be eroded.”
- The
Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights, in paragraph 21 of
his report of 8 June 2005 (see paragraph 104 above), and the Joint
Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights (see paragraph 100 above), in
paragraph 76 of its Twelfth Report of Session 2005-2006, (HL Paper
122, HC 915) had difficulty in accepting that a hearing could be fair
if an adverse decision could be based on material that the controlled
person has no effective opportunity to challenge or rebut.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION AND
ARTICLE 13 TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 3
- The
applicants alleged that their detention under Part 4 of the 2001 Act
breached their rights under Article 3 of the Convention, which
provides:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
They
further complained that they were denied an effective remedy for
their Article 3 complaints, in breach of Article 13 of the
Convention, which states:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. The parties' submissions
1. The applicants
- The
applicants stressed that each was in the United Kingdom because the
opportunity of a safe haven in his own country or elsewhere was
denied to him. The first applicant was a stateless Palestinian and
had nowhere else to go. Several had experienced torture before coming
to the United Kingdom. Under the 2001 Act they were put in the
position of having to choose between conditions of detention which
they found intolerable and the risk of whatever treatment they might
have to suffer if they consented to deportation. Moreover, their
previous experiences and pre-existing mental and physical problems
made them particularly vulnerable to the ill effects of arbitrary
detention. The discrimination they suffered, since only foreign
nationals were subject to detention under the 2001 Act, compounded
their anguish.
- The
high security conditions of detention, in Belmarsh Prison and
Broadmoor Hospital, were inappropriate and damaging to their
health. More fundamentally, however, the indeterminate nature of
the detention, with no end in sight, and its actual long duration
gave rise to abnormal suffering, in excess of that inherent in
detention. This was compounded by other unusual aspects of the
regime, such as the secret nature of the evidence against them. The
fact that the indifference of the authorities to the applicants'
situation was sanctioned by Parliamentary statute did not mitigate
their suffering.
- Taken
cumulatively, these factors caused the applicants an intense degree
of anguish. The medical evidence and reports of the CPT and group of
consultant psychiatrists (see paragraphs 101 and 76 above)
demonstrated that the detention regime also harmed or seriously
risked harming all of them and, in the case of the first, fifth,
seventh and tenth applicants, did so extensively.
- The
applicants claimed that SIAC's power to grant bail did not
effectively function during the period when they were detained:
first, because the scope of the remedy was jurisdictionally unclear;
secondly, because the procedure was subject to delay; thirdly,
because the threshold for granting bail was too high. An applicant
for bail was required to demonstrate an “overwhelming
likelihood” that his continued detention would lead to a
physical or mental deterioration, such as to constitute inhuman and
degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. The jurisdiction was
described as “exceptional”, requiring the “circumstances
to be extreme”. Even then, the only available remedy was to
substitute house arrest for detention (see paragraph 78 above).
2. The Government
- The
Government denied that the applicants' rights under Article 3 had
been infringed. They pointed out that SIAC and the Court of Appeal
had rejected the applicants' complaints under Article 3 and that the
House of Lords had not found it necessary to determine them (see
paragraphs 15, 16 and 22 above).
- Detention
without charge was not in itself contrary to Article 3 and in many
instances it was permitted under Article 5 § 1. The detention
was indeterminate but not indefinite. The legislation remained in
force for only five years and was subject to annual renewal by both
Houses of Parliament. Each applicant's detention depended on his
individual circumstances continuing to justify it, including the
degree of threat to national security which he represented and the
possibility to deport him to a safe country, and was subject to
review every six months by SIAC. Each applicant was informed of the
reason for the suspicion against him and given as much of the
underlying evidence as possible and provided with as fair a procedure
as possible to challenge the grounds for his detention. Moreover,
SIAC was able to grant bail if necessary. The applicants were not,
therefore, detained without hope of release: on the contrary there
was the opportunity to apply for release together with mandatory
review by the court to ensure detention remained both lawful and
proportionate in all the circumstances. It also remained open to the
applicants to leave the United Kingdom, as the second and fourth
applicants chose to do.
- The
applicants were judged to pose a serious threat to national security
and were accordingly held in high security conditions, which were not
inhuman or degrading. Each was provided with appropriate treatment
for his physical and mental health problems and the individual
circumstances of each applicant, including his mental health, were
taken into account in determining where he should be held and whether
he should be released on bail. A special unit was created at HMP
Woodhill of which the applicants refused to make use (see paragraph 71
above).
- To
the extent that the applicants relied upon their individual
conditions of detention and their personal circumstances, they had
not exhausted domestic remedies because they had not made any attempt
to bring the necessary challenges. Any specific complaint about the
conditions of detention could have been the subject of separate legal
challenge. The prison authorities were subject to the requirements of
the 1998 Act (see paragraph 94 above) and had an obligation under
section 6(1) to act compatibly with the Article 3 rights of the
applicants in their custody. Insofar as the applicants' complaints
under Article 3 were based on the indeterminate nature of their
detention, this was provided for by primary legislation (Part 4 of
the 2001 Act), and Article 13 did not import the right to challenge
in a domestic court a deliberate choice expressed by the legislature.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Admissibility
- The
Court observes that the second applicant was placed in detention
under Part 4 of the 2001 Act on 19 December 2001 and that he was
released on 22 December 2001, following his decision voluntarily to
return to Morocco (see paragraph 35 above). Since he was, therefore,
detained for only a few days and since there is no evidence that
during that time he suffered any hardship beyond that inherent in
detention, his complaint under Article 3 is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
Since
Article 13 requires the provision of a domestic remedy in respect of
“arguable complaints” under the Convention (see, for
example, Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450/00, §
157, ECHR 2006-IX), it follows that the second applicant's complaint
under Article 13 is also manifestly ill-founded.
Both
these complaints by the second applicant must therefore be declared
inadmissible.
- The
Court notes the Government's assertion that there was a remedy
available to the applicants under the 1998 Act, which they neglected
to use. However, since the applicants complain under Article 13
that the remedies at their disposal in connection with their
Article 3 complaints were ineffective, the Court considers that
it is necessary to consider the Government's objection concerning
non-exhaustion together with the merits of the complaints under
Articles 3 and 13.
- The
Court considers that, save those of the second applicant, the
applicants' complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention
raise complex issues of law and fact, the determination of which
should depend on an examination of the merits. It concludes,
therefore, that this part of the application is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. No other ground of inadmissibility has been raised and it
must be declared admissible.
2. The merits
a. General principles
- The
Court is acutely conscious of the difficulties faced by States in
protecting their populations from terrorist violence. This makes it
all the more important to stress that Article 3 enshrines one of the
most fundamental values of democratic societies. Unlike most of the
substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4,
Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation
from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 notwithstanding the
existence of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.
Even in the most difficult of circumstances, such as the fight
against terrorism, and irrespective of the conduct of the person
concerned, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment (Ramirez Sanchez,
cited above, §§ 115-116).
- Ill-treatment
must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the
scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the
circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its
physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state
of health of the victim (see Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no.
21906/04, § 95, ECHR 2008). The Court has considered
treatment to be “inhuman” because, inter alia, it
was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused
either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering.
It has deemed treatment to be “degrading” because it was
such as to arouse in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see, among
other authorities, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96,
§ 92, ECHR 2000-XI). In considering whether a punishment or
treatment was “degrading” within the meaning of Article
3, the Court will have regard to whether its object was to humiliate
and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the
consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her
personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3. However, the
absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of
a violation of Article 3. In order for a punishment or treatment
associated with it to be “inhuman” or “degrading”,
the suffering or humiliation involved must go beyond that inevitable
element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of
legitimate treatment or punishment (Ramirez Sanchez, cited
above, §§ 118-119).
- Where
a person is deprived of his liberty, the State must ensure that he is
detained under conditions which are compatible with respect for his
human dignity and that the manner and method of the execution of the
measure do not subject him to distress or hardship exceeding the
unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see Kudła,
cited above, §§ 92-94). Although Article 3 cannot be
construed as laying down a general obligation to release detainees on
health grounds, it nonetheless imposes an obligation on the State to
protect the physical and mental well-being of persons deprived of
their liberty, for example by providing them with the requisite
medical assistance (see Hurtado v. Switzerland, judgment of
28 January 1994, § 79 opinion of the Commission, Series A
no. 280-A; Mouisel v. France, no. 67263/01, § 40, ECHR
2002-IX; Aerts v. Belgium, judgment of 30 July 1998, §
66, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V; Keenan v.
the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, § 111, ECHR 2001-III).
When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of
the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as the specific
allegations made by the applicant (Ramirez Sanchez, cited
above, § 119). The imposition of an irreducible life
sentence on an adult, without any prospect of release, may raise an
issue under Article 3, but where national law affords the possibility
of review of a life sentence with a view to its commutation,
remission, termination or the conditional release of the prisoner,
this will be sufficient (Kafkaris, cited above, §§
97-98).
b. Application to the facts of the present
case
-
The Court notes that three of the applicants were held approximately
three years and three months while the others were held for shorter
periods. During a large part of that detention, the applicants could
not have foreseen when, if ever, they would be released. They refer
to the findings of the Joint Psychiatric Report and contend that the
indefinite nature of their detention caused or exacerbated serious
mental health problems in each of them. The Government dispute this
conclusion and rely on Dr J.'s Report, which criticised the
methodology of the authors of the Joint Report (see paragraphs 76-77
above).
- The
Court considers that the uncertainty regarding their position and the
fear of indefinite detention must, undoubtedly, have caused the
applicants great anxiety and distress, as it would virtually any
detainee in their position. Furthermore, it is probable that the
stress was sufficiently serious and enduring to affect the mental
health of certain of the applicants. This is one of the factors which
the Court must take into account when assessing whether the threshold
of Article 3 was attained.
- It
cannot, however, be said that the applicants were without any
prospect or hope of release (see Kafkaris, cited above, §
98). In particular, they were able to bring proceedings to challenge
the legality of the detention scheme under the 2001 Act and were
successful before SIAC, on 30 July 2002, and the House of Lords on
16 December 2004. In addition, each applicant was able to bring
an individual challenge to the decision to certify him and SIAC was
required by statute to review the continuing case for detention every
six months. The Court does not, therefore, consider that the
applicants' situation was comparable to an irreducible life sentence,
of the type designated in the Kafkaris judgment as capable of
giving rise to an issue under Article 3.
- The
applicants further contend that the conditions in which they were
held contributed towards an intolerable level of suffering. The Court
notes in this respect that the Joint Psychiatric Report also
contained criticisms of the Prison Health Care system and concluded
that there was inadequate provision for the applicants' complex
health problems. These concerns were echoed by the CPT, which made
detailed allegations about the conditions of detention and concluded
that for some of the applicants, “their situation at the time
of the visit could be considered as amounting to inhuman and
degrading treatment”. The Government strongly disputed these
criticisms in their response to the CPT's report (see paragraphs 101-102
above).
- The
Court observes that each detained applicant had at his disposal the
remedies available to all prisoners under administrative and civil
law to challenge conditions of detention, including any alleged
inadequacy of medical treatment. The applicants did not attempt to
make use of these remedies and did not therefore comply with the
requirement under Article 35 of the Convention to exhaust
domestic remedies. It follows that the Court cannot examine the
applicants' complaints about their conditions of detention; nor can
it, in consequence, take the conditions of detention into account in
forming a global assessment of the applicants' treatment for the
purposes of Article 3.
- In
all the above circumstances, the Court does not find that the
detention of the applicants reached the high threshold of inhuman and
degrading treatment.
- The
applicants also complained that they did not have effective domestic
remedies for their Article 3 complaints, in breach of Article 13. In
this connection, the Court repeats its above finding that civil and
administrative law remedies were available to the applicants had they
wished to complain about their conditions of detention. As for the
more fundamental aspect of the complaints, that the very nature of
the detention scheme in Part 4 of the 2001 Act gave rise to a breach
of Article 3, the Court recalls that Article 13 does not guarantee a
remedy allowing a challenge to primary legislation before a national
authority on the ground of being contrary to the Convention (James
and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, §
85, Series A no. 98; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.
32555/96, § 137, ECHR 2005-X).
- In
conclusion, therefore, the Court does not find a violation of Article
3, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 13.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicants contended that their detention was unlawful and
incompatible with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
- In
their first set of written observations, following the communication
of the application by the Chamber, the Government indicated that they
would not seek to raise the question of derogation under Article 15
of the Convention as a defence to the claim based on Article 5 § 1,
but would leave that point as determined against them by the House of
Lords. Instead, they intended to focus argument on the defence that
the applicants were lawfully detained with a view to deportation,
within the meaning of Article 5 § 1(f).
However,
in their written observations to the Grand Chamber, dated 11 February
2008, the Government indicated for the first time that they wished to
argue that the applicants' detention did not in any event give rise
to a violation of Article 5 § 1 because the United Kingdom's
derogation under Article 15 was valid.
- Article
5 § 1 of the Convention provides, so far as relevant:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law:
...
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person ... against whom action is being taken with a view to
deportation or extradition.”
Article
15 of the Convention states:
“1. In time of war or other public
emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting
Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under [the]
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its
other obligations under international law.
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in
respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from
Articles 3, 4 (§ 1) and 7 shall be made under
this provision.
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself
of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken
and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate
and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.”
A. The parties' submissions
1. The applicants
- The
applicants objected that before the domestic courts the Government
had not sought to argue that they were detained as “person[s]
against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or
extradition”, but had instead relied on the derogation under
Article 15. In these circumstances, the applicants contended that it
was abusive and contrary to the principle of subsidiarity for the
Government to raise a novel argument before the Court and that they
should be stopped from so doing.
- In
the event that the Court considered that it could entertain the
Government's submission, the applicants emphasised that the guarantee
in Article 5 was of fundamental importance and exceptions had to be
strictly construed. Where, as in their case, deportation was not
possible because of the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in
the receiving country, Article 5 § 1(f) would not authorise
detention, irrespective of whether the individual posed a risk to
national security. Merely keeping the possibility of deportation
under review was not “action ... being taken with a view to
deportation”; it was action, unrelated to any extant
deportation proceedings, that might make the deportation a
possibility in the future. Detention pursuant to such vague and
non-specific “action” would be arbitrary. Moreover, it
was clear that during the periods when the applicants' cases were
being considered by SIAC on appeal (July 2002-October 2003), the
Government's position was that they could not be deported compatibly
with Article 3 and that no negotiations to effect deportation should
be attempted with the proposed receiving States. As a matter of fact,
therefore, the Government were not keeping the possibility of
deporting the applicants “under active review”.
- The
applicants further contended that it was abusive of the Government,
so late in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, to challenge the
House of Lords' decision quashing the derogation. In the applicants'
view, it would be inconsistent with Article 19 and the principle of
subsidiarity for the Court to be asked by a Government to review
alleged errors of fact or law committed by that Government's own
national courts. The Government's approach in challenging the
findings of its own supreme court about legislation which Parliament
had chosen to repeal aimed to limit the human rights recognised under
domestic law and was thus in conflict with Article 53 of the
Convention. Since the legislation had been revoked and the derogation
withdrawn, the Government were in effect seeking to obtain from the
Court an advisory opinion to be relied on potentially at some later
stage. To allow the Government to proceed would impact substantially
on the right of individual petition under Article 34 by deterring
applicants from making complaints for fear that Governments would try
to upset the decisions of their own supreme courts.
- In
the event that the Court decided to review the legality of the
derogation, the applicants contended that the Government should not
be permitted to rely on arguments which they had not advanced before
the domestic courts. These included, first, the contention that it
was justifiable to detain non-national terrorist suspects while
excluding nationals from such measures, because of the interest in
cultivating loyalty amongst Muslim citizens, rather than exposing
them to the threat of detention and the risk that they would thereby
become radicalised and, secondly, the argument that the use of
detention powers against foreign nationals freed up law enforcement
resources to concentrate on United Kingdom nationals (see paragraph
151 below). Since the Government was seeking to introduce these
justifications for the derogation which were never advanced before
the domestic courts, the Court was being asked to act as a
first-instance tribunal on highly controversial matters.
- Again,
if the Court decided to examine the legality of the derogation, there
was no reason to give special deference to the findings of the
national courts on the question whether there was an emergency within
the meaning of Article 15. In the applicants' submission, there were
no judicial precedents for recognising that an inchoate fear of a
terrorist attack, which was not declared to be imminent, was
sufficient. All the examples in the Convention jurisprudence related
to derogations introduced to combat ongoing terrorism which quite
clearly jeopardized the entire infrastructure of Northern Ireland or
the South-East of Turkey. The domestic authorities were wrong in
interpreting Article 15 as permitting a derogation where the threat
was not necessarily directed at the United Kingdom but instead at
other nations to which it was allied.
- In
any event, the enactment of Part 4 of the 2001 Act and the power
contained therein to detain foreign nationals indeterminately without
charge was not “strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation”, as the House of Lords found. The impugned measures
were not rationally connected to the need to prevent a terrorist
attack on the United Kingdom and they involved unjustifiable
discrimination on grounds of nationality. SIAC – which saw both
the closed and open material on the point – concluded that
there was ample evidence that British citizens posed a very
significant threat. There could be no grounds for holding that the
fundamental right of liberty was less important for a non-national
than a national. Aliens enjoyed a right of equal treatment outside
the context of immigration and political activity, as a matter of
well established domestic, Convention and public international law.
There were other, less intrusive, measures which could have been used
to address the threat, for example, the use of control orders as
created by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; the creation of
additional criminal offences to permit for the prosecution of
individuals engaged in preparatory terrorist activity; or the lifting
of the ban on the use of material obtained by the interception of
communications in criminal proceedings.
2. The Government
- The
Government contended that States have a fundamental right under
international law to control the entry, residence and expulsion of
aliens. Clear language would be required to justify the conclusion
that the Contracting States intended through the Convention to give
up their ability to protect themselves against a risk to national
security created by a non-national. As a matter of ordinary language,
“action being taken with a view to deportation” covered
the situation where a Contracting State wished to deport an alien,
actively kept that possibility under review and only refrained from
doing so because of contingent, extraneous circumstances. In Chahal,
cited above, a period of detention of over six years, including over
three years where the applicant could not be removed because of an
interim measure requested by the Commission, was held to be
acceptable under Article 5 § 1(f).
- Each
applicant was served a Notice of Intention to Deport at the same time
as he was certified under the 2001 Act. The second and fourth
applicants elected to go to Morocco and France, respectively, and
were allowed to leave the United Kingdom as soon as could be
arranged, so no issue could arise under Article 5 § 1 in their
respect. The possibility of deporting the other applicants was kept
under active review throughout the period of their detention. This
involved monitoring the situation in their countries of origin.
Further, from the end of 2003 onwards the Government were in
negotiation with Algeria and Jordan, with a view to entering into
memoranda of understanding that the applicants who were nationals of
those countries would not be ill-treated if returned.
- The
Government relied upon the principle of fair balance, which underlies
the whole Convention, and reasoned that sub-paragraph (f) of Article
5 § 1 had to be interpreted so as to strike a balance between
the interests of the individual and the interests of the State in
protecting its population from malevolent aliens. Detention struck
that balance by advancing the legitimate aim of the State to secure
the protection of the population without sacrificing the predominant
interest of the alien to avoid being returned to a place where he
faced torture or death. The fair balance was further preserved by
providing the alien with adequate safeguards against the arbitrary
exercise of the detention powers in national security cases.
- In
the alternative, the detention of the applicants was not in breach of
the Convention because of the derogation under Article 15. There was
a public emergency threatening the life of the nation at the relevant
time. That assessment was subjected to full scrutiny by the domestic
courts. The evidence in support, both open and closed, was examined
by SIAC in detail, with the benefit of oral hearings at which
witnesses were cross-examined. SIAC unanimously upheld the
Government's assessment, as did the unanimous Court of Appeal and
eight of the nine judges in the House of Lords. In the light of the
margin of appreciation to be afforded to the national authorities on
this question, there was no proper basis on which the Court could
reach a different conclusion.
- The
Government explained that they accorded very great respect to the
House of Lords' decision and declaration of incompatibility and that
they had repealed the offending legislation. Nonetheless, when the
decision was made to refer the case to the Grand Chamber, they
decided that it was necessary to challenge the House of Lords'
reasoning and conclusions, bearing in mind the wide constitutional
importance of the issue and the ongoing need for Contracting States
to have clear guidance from the Grand Chamber as to the measures they
might legitimately take to try to prevent the terrorist threat from
materialising. They submitted that the House of Lords had erred in
affording the State too narrow a margin of appreciation in assessing
what measures were strictly necessary; in this connection it was
relevant to note that Part 4 of the 2001 Act was not only the product
of the judgment of the Government but was also the subject of debate
in Parliament. Furthermore, the domestic courts had examined the
legislation in the abstract, rather than considering the applicants'
concrete cases, including the impossibility of removing them, the
threat each posed to national security, the inadequacy of enhanced
surveillance or other controls short of detention and the procedural
safeguards afforded to each applicant.
- Finally,
the House of Lords' conclusion had turned not on a rejection of the
necessity to detain the applicants but instead on the absence of a
legislative power to detain also a national who posed a risk to
national security and was suspected of being an international
terrorist. However, there were good reasons for detaining only
non-nationals and the Convention expressly and impliedly recognised
that distinction was permissible between nationals and non-nationals
in the field of immigration. The primary measure which the Government
wished to take against the applicants was deportation, a measure
permitted against a non-national but not a national. The analogy
drawn by the House of Lords between “foreigners [such as the
applicants] who cannot be deported” and “British
nationals who cannot be deported” was false, because the
applicants at the time of their detention were not irremovable in the
same way that a British citizen is irremovable. Furthermore, at the
relevant time the Government's assessment was that the greater risk
emanated from non-nationals and it was legitimate for a State, when
dealing with a national emergency, to proceed on a step-by-step basis
and aim to neutralise what was perceived as the greatest threat
first, thereby also freeing resources to deal with the lesser threat
coming from British citizens. In addition, it was reasonable for the
State to take into account the sensitivities of its Muslim population
in order to reduce the chances of recruitment amongst them by
extremists.
3. The third party, Liberty
- Liberty
(see paragraph 6 above) submitted that, by reserving before the
domestic courts the issue whether the detention was compatible with
Article 5 § 1, the Government had deprived the Court of the
benefit of the views of the House of Lords and had pursued a course
of action which would not be open to an applicant. In any event, the
detention did not fall within the exception in Article 5 § 1(f),
since Part 4 of the 2001 Act permitted indefinite detention and since
there was no tangible expectation of being able to deport the
applicants during the relevant time. If the Government were unable to
remove the applicants because of their Article 3 rights, they could
not properly rely on national security concerns as a basis for
diluting or modifying their Article 5 rights. Instead, the proper
course was either to derogate from Article 5 to the extent strictly
required by the situation or to prosecute the individuals concerned
with one of the plethora of criminal terrorist offences on the United
Kingdom's statute books, which included professed membership of a
proscribed organisation, failure to notify the authorities of
suspected terrorist activity, possession of incriminating articles
and indirect encouragement to commit, prepare or instigate acts of
terrorism (see paragraphs 89 and 95 above).
B. The Court's assessment
1. The scope of the case before the Court
- The
Court must start by determining the applicants' first preliminary
objection, that the Government should be precluded from raising a
defence to the complaints under Article 5 § 1 based on the
exception in subparagraph 5 § 1(f), on the ground that they did
not pursue it before the domestic courts.
- The
Court is intended to be subsidiary to the national systems
safeguarding human rights. It is, therefore, appropriate that the
national courts should initially have the opportunity to determine
questions of the compatibility of domestic law with the Convention
and that, if an application is nonetheless subsequently brought
before the Court, it should have the benefit of the views of the
national courts, as being in direct and continuous contact with the
forces of their countries (see Burden, cited above, §
42). It is thus of importance that the arguments put by the
Government before the national courts should be on the same lines as
those put before this Court. In particular, it is not open to a
Government to put to the Court arguments which are inconsistent with
the position they adopted before the national courts (see, mutatis
mutandis, Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v. Ireland,
judgment of 29 November 1991, § 47, Series A no. 222;
Kolompar v. Belgium, judgment of 24 September 1992, §§
31-32, Series A no. 235-C).
- The
Court does not, however, consider that the Government are estopped
from seeking to rely on sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 § 1 to
justify the detention. It is clear that the Government expressly kept
open, in the text of the derogation and during the derogation
proceedings before the domestic courts, the question of the
application of Article 5. Moreover, the majority of the House of
Lords either explicitly or impliedly considered whether the detention
was compatible with Article 5 § 1 before assessing the validity
of the derogation (see paragraph 17 above).
- The
applicants further contended that the Government should not be
permitted to dispute before the Court the House of Lords' finding
that the derogation was invalid.
- The
present situation is, undoubtedly, unusual in that Governments do not
normally resort to challenging, nor see any need to contest,
decisions of their own highest courts before this Court. There is
not, however, any prohibition on a Government making such a
challenge, particularly if they consider that the national supreme
court's ruling is problematic under the Convention and that further
guidance is required from the Court.
- In
the present case, because a declaration of incompatibility under the
Human Rights Act is not binding on the parties to the domestic
litigation (see paragraph 94 above), the applicants' success
in the House of Lords led neither to their immediate release nor to
the payment of compensation for unlawful detention and it was
therefore necessary for them to lodge the present application. The
Court does not consider that there is any reason of principle why,
since the applicants have requested it to examine the lawfulness of
their detention, the Government should not now have the chance to
raise all the arguments open to them to defend the proceedings, even
if this involves calling into question the conclusion of their own
supreme court.
- The
Court therefore dismisses the applicants' two preliminary objections.
2. Admissibility
- The
Court considers that the applicants' complaints under Article 5 §
1 of the Convention raise complex issues of law and fact, the
determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits.
It concludes, therefore, that this part of the application is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. No other ground of inadmissibility has been raised
and it must be declared admissible.
3. The merits
- The
Court must first ascertain whether the applicants' detention was
permissible under Article 5 § 1(f), because if that subparagraph
does provide a defence to the complaints under Article 5 § 1, it
will not be necessary to determine whether or not the derogation was
valid (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18
January 1978, § 191, Series A no. 25).
a. Whether the applicants were lawfully
detained in accordance with Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention
- Article
5 enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the
individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or
her right to liberty (Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment of 18 December
1996, § 76, Reports 1996-VI). The text of Article 5 makes
it clear that the guarantees it contains apply to “everyone”.
- Sub-paragraphs
(a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1 contain an exhaustive list of
permissible grounds on which persons may be deprived of their liberty
and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within
one of those grounds (Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.
13229/03, § 43, ECHR 2008). One of the
exceptions, contained in subparagraph (f), permits the State to
control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context (idem.,
§ 64). The Government contend that the applicants'
detention was justified under the second limb of that subparagraph
and that they were lawfully detained as persons “against whom
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition”.
- Article
5 § 1(f) does not demand that detention be reasonably considered
necessary, for example to prevent the individual from committing an
offence or fleeing. Any deprivation of liberty under the second limb
of Article 5 § 1(f) will be justified, however, only for as
long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress. If
such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention
will cease to be permissible under Article 5 § 1(f) (Chahal,
cited above, § 113). The deprivation of liberty must also
be “lawful”. Where the “lawfulness” of
detention is in issue, including the question whether “a
procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention
refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to
conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law.
Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 §
1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in
keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from
arbitrariness. It is a fundamental principle that no detention which
is arbitrary can be compatible with Article 5 § 1 and the notion
of “arbitrariness” in Article 5 § 1 extends beyond
lack of conformity with national law, so that a deprivation of
liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary
and thus contrary to the Convention (Saadi v. the United Kingdom,
cited above, § 67). To avoid being branded as arbitrary,
detention under Article 5 § 1(f) must be carried out in good
faith; it must be closely connected to the ground of detention relied
on by the Government; the place and conditions of detention should be
appropriate; and the length of the detention should not exceed that
reasonably required for the purpose pursued (see, mutatis
mutandis, Saadi v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 74).
- The
first, third, and sixth applicants were taken into detention under
the 2001 Act on 19 December 2001; the seventh applicant was detained
on 9 February 2002; the eighth applicant, on 23 October 2002; the
ninth applicant, on 22 April 2002; the tenth applicant, on 14 January
2003; and the eleventh applicant, on 2 October 2003. None of
these applicants was released until 10-11 March 2005. The fifth
applicant was detained between 19 December 2001 and 22 April
2004, when he was released on bail subject to stringent conditions.
The second and fourth applicants were also detained on 19 December
2001 but the second applicant was released on 22 December 2001,
following his decision to return to Morocco, and the fourth applicant
was released on 13 March 2002, following his decision to go to
France. The applicants were held throughout in high security
conditions at either Belmarsh or Woodhill Prisons or Broadmoor
Hospital. It cannot, therefore, be disputed that they were deprived
of their liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (see Engel
and Others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A
no. 22).
- The applicants were foreign nationals whom the
Government would have deported from the United Kingdom had it been
possible to find a State to receive them where they would not face a
real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of
the Convention (Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, §§
125 and 127, ECHR 2008). Although the respondent State's obligations
under Article 3 prevented the removal of the applicants from the
United Kingdom, the Secretary of State nonetheless considered it
necessary to detain them for security reasons, because he believed
that their presence in the country was a risk to national security
and suspected that they were or had been concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism and
were members of, belonged to or had links with an international
terrorist group. Such detention would have been unlawful under
domestic law prior to the passing of Part 4 of the 2001 Act, since
the 1984 judgment in Hardial Singh entailed that the power of
detention could not be exercised unless the person subject to the
deportation order could be deported within a reasonable time (see
paragraph 87 above). Thus, it was stated in the derogation notice
lodged under Article 15 of the Convention that extended powers were
required to arrest and detain a foreign national “where removal
or deportation is not for the time being possible, with the
consequence that the detention would be unlawful under existing
domestic law powers” (see paragraph 11 above).
- One
of the principal assumptions underlying the derogation notice, the
2001 Act and the decision to detain the applicants was, therefore,
that they could not be removed or deported “for the time being”
(see paragraphs 11 and 90 above). There is no evidence that during
the period of the applicants' detention there was, except in respect
of the second and fourth applicants, any realistic prospect of their
being expelled without this giving rise to a real risk of
ill-treatment contrary to Article 3. Indeed, the first applicant is
stateless and the Government have not produced any evidence to
suggest that there was another State willing to accept him. It does
not appear that the Government entered into negotiations with Algeria
or Jordan, with a view to seeking assurances that the applicants who
were nationals of those States would not be ill-treated if returned,
until the end of 2003 and no such assurance was received until August
2005 (see paragraph 86 above). In these circumstances, the Court does
not consider that the respondent Government's policy of keeping the
possibility of deporting the applicants “under active review”
was sufficiently certain or determinative to amount to “action
... being taken with a view to deportation”.
- The
exceptions to this conclusion were the second applicant, who was
detained for only three days prior to his return to Morocco, and the
fourth applicant, who left the United Kingdom for France on 13 March
2002, having been detained for just under three months (see
paragraphs 35 and 41 above). The Court considers that during these
periods of detention it could reasonably be said that action was
being taken against these applicants with a view to deportation, in
that it appears that the authorities were still at that stage in the
course of establishing their nationalities and investigating whether
their removal to their countries of origin or to other countries
would be possible (see Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France,
no. 25389/05, § 74, 26 April 2007). Accordingly, there has been
no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of
the second and fourth applicants.
- It
is true that even the applicants who were detained the longest were
not held for as long as the applicant in Chahal (cited above),
where the Court found no violation of Article 5 § 1
despite his imprisonment for over six years. However, in the Chahal
case, throughout the entire period of the detention, proceedings
were being actively and diligently pursued, before the domestic
authorities and the Court, in order to determine whether it would be
lawful and compatible with Article 3 of the Convention to
proceed with the applicant's deportation to India. The same cannot be
said in the present case, where the proceedings have, instead, been
primarily concerned with the legality of the detention.
- In
the circumstances of the present case it cannot be said that the
first, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and
eleventh applicants were persons “against whom action [was]
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition”. Their
detention did not, therefore, fall within the exception to the right
to liberty set out in paragraph 5 § 1(f) of the Convention. This
is a conclusion which was also, expressly or impliedly, reached by a
majority of the members of the House of Lords (see paragraph 17
above).
- It
is, instead, clear from the terms of the derogation notice and Part 4
of the 2001 Act that the applicants were certified and detained
because they were suspected of being international terrorists and
because it was believed that their presence at liberty in the United
Kingdom gave rise to a threat to national security. The Court
does not accept the Government's argument that Article 5 § 1
permits a balance to be struck between the individual's right to
liberty and the State's interest in protecting its population from
terrorist threat. This argument is inconsistent not only with the
Court's jurisprudence under sub-paragraph (f) but also with the
principle that paragraphs (a) to (f) amount to an exhaustive list of
exceptions and that only a narrow interpretation of these exceptions
is compatible with the aims of Article 5. If detention does not fit
within the confines of the paragraphs as interpreted by the Court, it
cannot be made to fit by an appeal to the need to balance the
interests of the State against those of the detainee.
- The
Court recalls that it has, on a number of occasions, found internment
and preventive detention without charge to be incompatible with the
fundamental right to liberty under Article 5 § 1, in the absence
of a valid derogation under Article 15 (see Lawless v. Ireland
(No. 3), judgment of 1 July 1961, §§ 13 and
14, Series A no. 3; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited
above, §§ 194-196 and 212-213). It must now, therefore,
consider whether the United Kingdom's derogation was valid.
b. Whether the United Kingdom validly
derogated from its obligations under Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention
i. The Court's approach
- The Court recalls that it falls to each Contracting
State, with its responsibility for “the life of [its] nation”,
to determine whether that life is threatened by a “public
emergency” and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in
attempting to overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct and
continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the
national authorities are in principle better placed than the
international judge to decide both on the presence of such an
emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to
avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation
should be left to the national authorities.
Nonetheless,
Contracting Parties do not enjoy an unlimited discretion. It is for
the Court to rule whether, inter alia, the States have gone
beyond the “extent strictly required by the exigencies”
of the crisis. The domestic margin of appreciation is thus
accompanied by a European supervision. In exercising this
supervision, the Court must give appropriate weight to such relevant
factors as the nature of the rights affected by the derogation and
the circumstances leading to, and the duration of, the emergency
situation (Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, §
207; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, judgment of
26 May 1993, § 43, Series A no. 258; Aksoy, cited
above, § 68).
- The
object and purpose underlying the Convention, as set out in Article
1, is that the rights and freedoms should be secured by the
Contracting State within its jurisdiction. It is fundamental to the
machinery of protection established by the Convention that the
national systems themselves provide redress for breaches of its
provisions, with the Court exercising a supervisory role subject to
the principle of subsidiarity (Z. and Others v. the United
Kingdom, no. 29392/95, § 103, ECHR 2001-V). Moreover,
the domestic courts are part of the “national authorities”
to which the Court affords a wide margin of appreciation under
Article 15. In the unusual circumstances of the present case, where
the highest domestic court has examined the issues relating to the
State's derogation and concluded that there was a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation but that the measures taken in
response were not strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, the Court considers that it would be justified in reaching
a contrary conclusion only if satisfied that the national court had
misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the Court's jurisprudence
under that Article or reached a conclusion which was manifestly
unreasonable.
ii. Whether there was a “public
emergency threatening the life of the nation”
- The
applicants argued that there had been no public emergency threatening
the life of the British nation, for three main reasons: first, the
emergency was neither actual nor imminent; secondly, it was not of a
temporary nature; and, thirdly, the practice of other States, none of
which had derogated from the Convention, together with the informed
views of other national and international bodies, suggested that the
existence of a public emergency had not been established.
- The
Court recalls that in Lawless, cited above, § 28, it held
that in the context of Article 15 the natural and customary meaning
of the words “other public emergency threatening the life of
the nation” was sufficiently clear and that they referred to
“an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects
the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life
of the community of which the State is composed”. In the Greek
Case (1969) 12 YB 1, § 153, the Commission held that, in
order to justify a derogation, the emergency should be actual or
imminent; that it should affect the whole nation to the extent that
the continuance of the organised life of the community was
threatened; and that the crisis or danger should be exceptional, in
that the normal measures or restrictions, permitted by the Convention
for the maintenance of public safety, health and order, were plainly
inadequate. In Ireland v United Kingdom, cited above, §§
205 and 212, the parties were agreed, as were the Commission and the
Court, that the Article 15 test was satisfied, since terrorism had
for a number of years represented “a particularly far-reaching
and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom,
the institutions of the six counties and the lives of the province's
inhabitants”. The Court reached similar conclusions as regards
the continuing security situation in Northern Ireland in Brannigan
and McBride, cited above, and Marshall v. the United Kingdom
(dec.), no. 41571/98, 10 July 2001. In Aksoy, cited above,
it accepted that Kurdish separatist violence had given rise to a
“public emergency” in Turkey.
-
Before the domestic courts, the Secretary of State adduced evidence
to show the existence of a threat of serious terrorist attacks
planned against the United Kingdom. Additional closed evidence was
adduced before SIAC. All the national judges accepted that the danger
was credible (with the exception of Lord Hoffmann, who did not
consider that it was of a nature to constitute “a threat to the
life of the nation”: see paragraph 18 above). Although when the
derogation was made no al'Qaeda attack had taken place within the
territory of the United Kingdom, the Court does not consider that the
national authorities can be criticised, in the light of the evidence
available to them at the time, for fearing that such an attack was
“imminent”, in that an atrocity might be committed
without warning at any time. The requirement of imminence cannot be
interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to
strike before taking measures to deal with it. Moreover, the
danger of a terrorist attack was, tragically, shown by the bombings
and attempted bombings in London in July 2005 to have been very real.
Since the purpose of Article 15 is to permit States to take
derogating measures to protect their populations from future risks,
the existence of the threat to the life of the nation must be
assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known at
the time of the derogation. The Court is not precluded, however, from
having regard to information which comes to light subsequently (see,
mutatis mutandis, Vilvarajah and others v. the United
Kingdom, judgment of 30 October 1991, § 107(2), Series
A no. 215).
- While
the United Nations Human Rights Committee has observed that measures
derogating from the provisions of the ICCPR must be of “an
exceptional and temporary nature” (see paragraph 109 above),
the Court's case-law has never, to date, explicitly incorporated the
requirement that the emergency be temporary, although the question of
the proportionality of the response may be linked to the duration of
the emergency. Indeed, the cases cited above, relating to the
security situation in Northern Ireland, demonstrate that it is
possible for a “public emergency” within the meaning of
Article 15 to continue for many years. The Court does not consider
that derogating measures put in place in the immediate aftermath of
the al'Qaeda attacks in the United States of America, and reviewed on
an annual basis by Parliament, can be said to be invalid on the
ground that they were not “temporary”.
- The
applicants' argument that the life of the nation was not threatened
is principally founded on the dissenting opinion of Lord Hoffman, who
interpreted the words as requiring a threat to the organised life of
the community which went beyond a threat of serious physical damage
and loss of life. It had, in his view, to threaten “our
institutions of government or our existence as a civil community”
(see paragraph 18 above). However, the Court has in
previous cases been prepared to take into account a much broader
range of factors in determining the nature and degree of the actual
or imminent threat to the “nation” and has in the past
concluded that emergency situations have existed even though the
institutions of the State did not appear to be imperilled to the
extent envisaged by Lord Hoffman.
- As
previously stated, the national authorities enjoy a wide margin of
appreciation under Article 15 in assessing whether the life of their
nation is threatened by a public emergency. While it is striking that
the United Kingdom was the only Convention State to have lodged a
derogation in response to the danger from al'Qaeda, although other
States were also the subject of threats, the Court accepts that it
was for each Government, as the guardian of their own people's
safety, to make their own assessment on the basis of the facts known
to them. Weight must, therefore, attach to the judgment of the United
Kingdom's executive and Parliament on this question. In addition,
significant weight must be accorded to the views of the national
courts, who were better placed to assess the evidence relating to the
existence of an emergency.
- On
this first question, the Court accordingly shares the view of the
majority of the House of Lords that there was a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation.
Iii Whether the measures were strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation
-
Article 15 provides that the State may take measures derogating from
its obligations under the Convention only “to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”. As
previously stated, the Court considers that it should in principle
follow the judgment of the House of Lords on the question of the
proportionality of the applicants' detention, unless it can be shown
that the national court misinterpreted the Convention or the Court's
case-law or reached a conclusion which was manifestly unreasonable.
It will consider the Government's challenges to the House of Lords'
judgment against this background.
- The
Government contended, first, that the majority of the House of Lords
should have afforded a much wider margin of appreciation to the
executive and Parliament to decide whether the applicants' detention
was necessary. A similar argument was advanced before the House of
Lords, where the Attorney General submitted that the assessment of
what was needed to protect the public was a matter of political
rather than judicial judgment (see paragraph 19 above).
- When
the Court comes to consider a derogation under Article 15, it allows
the national authorities a wide margin of appreciation to decide on
the nature and scope of the derogating measures necessary to avert
the emergency. Nonetheless, it is ultimately for the Court to rule
whether the measures were “strictly required”. In
particular, where a derogating measure encroaches upon a fundamental
Convention right, such as the right to liberty, the Court must be
satisfied that it was a genuine response to the emergency situation,
that it was fully justified by the special circumstances of the
emergency and that adequate safeguards were provided against abuse
(see, for example, Brannigan and McBride, cited above,
§§ 48-66; Aksoy, cited above, §§
71-84; and the principles outlined in paragraph 173 above). The
doctrine of the margin of appreciation has always been meant as a
tool to define relations between the domestic authorities and the
Court. It cannot have the same application to the relations between
the organs of State at the domestic level. As the House of Lords
held, the question of proportionality is ultimately a judicial
decision, particularly in a case such as the present where the
applicants were deprived of their fundamental right to liberty over a
long period of time. In any event, having regard to the careful way
in which the House of Lords approached the issues, it cannot be said
that inadequate weight was given to the views of the executive or of
Parliament.
- The
Government also submitted that the House of Lords erred in examining
the legislation in the abstract rather than considering the
applicants' concrete cases. However, in the Court's view, the
approach under Article 15 is necessarily focussed on the general
situation pertaining in the country concerned, in the sense that the
court - whether national or international - is required to examine
the measures that have been adopted in derogation of the Convention
rights in question and to weigh them against the nature of the threat
to the nation posed by the emergency. Where, as here, the measures
are found to be disproportionate to that threat and to be
discriminatory in their effect, there is no need to go further and
examine their application in the concrete case of each applicant.
- The
Government's third ground of challenge to the House of Lords'
decision was directed principally at the approach taken towards the
comparison between non-national and national suspected terrorists.
The Court, however, considers that the House of Lords was correct in
holding that the impugned powers were not to be seen as immigration
measures, where a distinction between nationals and non-nationals
would be legitimate, but instead as concerned with national security.
Part 4 of the 2001 Act was designed to avert a real and imminent
threat of terrorist attack which, on the evidence, was posed by both
nationals and non-nationals. The choice by the Government and
Parliament of an immigration measure to address what was essentially
a security issue had the result of failing adequately to address the
problem, while imposing a disproportionate and discriminatory burden
of indefinite detention on one group of suspected terrorists. As the
House of Lords found, there was no significant difference in the
potential adverse impact of detention without charge on a national or
on a non-national who in practice could not leave the country because
of fear of torture abroad.
- Finally,
the Government advanced two arguments which the applicants claimed
had not been relied on before the national courts. Certainly, there
does not appear to be any reference to them in the national courts'
judgments or in the open material which has been put before the
Court. In these circumstances, even assuming that the principle of
subsidiarity does not prevent the Court from examining new grounds,
it would require persuasive evidence in support of them.
- The
first of the allegedly new arguments was that it was legitimate for
the State, in confining the measures to non-nationals, to take into
account the sensitivities of the British Muslim population in order
to reduce the chances of recruitment among them by extremists.
However, the Government has not placed before the Court any evidence
to suggest that British Muslims were significantly more likely to
react negatively to the detention without charge of national rather
than foreign Muslims reasonably suspected of links to al'Qaeda. In
this respect the Court notes that the system of control orders, put
in place by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, does not
discriminate between national and non-national suspects.
- The
second allegedly new ground relied on by the Government was that the
State could better respond to the terrorist threat if it were able to
detain its most serious source, namely non-nationals. In this
connection, again the Court has not been provided with any evidence
which could persuade it to overturn the conclusion of the House of
Lords that the difference in treatment was unjustified. Indeed, the
Court notes that the national courts, including SIAC, which saw both
the open and the closed material, were not convinced that the threat
from non-nationals was more serious than that from nationals.
- In
conclusion, therefore, the Court, like the House of Lords, and
contrary to the Government's contention, finds that the derogating
measures were disproportionate in that they discriminated
unjustifiably between nationals and non-nationals. It follows there
has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of the first,
third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh
applicants.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 TAKEN IN
CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicants complained that it was discriminatory, and in breach of
Article 14 of the Convention, to detain them when United Kingdom
nationals suspected of involvement with al'Qaeda were left at
liberty.
Article
14 provides:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
- In
the light of its above reasoning and conclusion in relation to
Article 5 § 1 taken alone, the Court does not consider it
necessary to examine these complaints separately.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicants contended that the procedure before the domestic courts to
challenge their detention did not comply with the requirements of
Article 5 § 4, which states:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
The
Government denied that there had been a violation of Article 5 §
4.
A. The parties' submissions
1. The applicants
- The
applicants advanced two main arguments under Article 5 § 4.
First, they emphasised that although it was open to them to argue
before SIAC, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords that their
detention under Part 4 of the 2001 Act was unlawful under the
Convention, the only remedy which they were able to obtain was a
declaration of incompatibility under the 1998 Act. This had no
binding effect on the Government and the detention remained lawful
until legislative change was effected by Parliament. There was thus
no court with power to order their release, in breach of Article 5 §
4.
- Secondly,
the applicants complained about the procedure before SIAC for appeals
under section 25 of the 2001 Act (see paragraph 91 above) and in
particular the lack of disclosure of material evidence except to
special advocates with whom the detained person was not permitted to
consult. In their submission, Article 5 § 4 imported the fair
trial guarantees of Article 6 § 1 commensurate with the gravity
of the issue at stake. While in certain circumstances it might be
permissible for a court to sanction non-disclosure of relevant
evidence to an individual on grounds of national security, it could
never be permissible for a court assessing the lawfulness of
detention to rely on such material where it bore decisively on the
case the detained person had to meet and where it had not been
disclosed, even in gist or summary form, sufficiently to enable the
individual to know the case against him and to respond. In all the
applicants' appeals, except that of the tenth applicant, SIAC relied
on closed material and recognised that the applicants were thereby
put at a disadvantage.
2. The Government
- The
Government contended that Article 5 § 4 should be read in the
light of the Court's established jurisprudence under Article 13, of
which it was the lex specialis as regards detention, that
there was no right to challenge binding primary legislation before a
national court. This principle, together with the system of
declarations of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act, reflected
the democratic value of the supremacy of the elected Parliament.
- On
the applicants' second point, the Government submitted that there
were valid public interest grounds for withholding the closed
material. The right to disclosure of evidence, under Article 6 and
also under Article 5 § 4, was not absolute. The Court's case-law
from Chahal (cited above) onwards had indicated some support
for a special advocate procedure in particularly sensitive fields.
Moreover, in each applicant's case, the open material gave sufficient
notice of the allegations against him to enable him to mount an
effective defence.
3. The third party, Justice
- Justice (see paragraph 6 above) informed the Court
that at the time SIAC was created by the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission Act 1997, the use of closed material and special advocates
in the procedure before it was believed to be based on a similar
procedure in Canada, applied in cases before the Security
Intelligence Review Committee (“SIRC”), which considered
whether a Minister's decision to remove a permanently resident
foreign national on national security grounds was well-founded.
However, although the SIRC procedure involved an in-house counsel
with access to the classified material taking part in ex parte
and in camera hearings to represent the appellant's
interests, it differed substantially from the SIAC model,
particularly in that it allowed the special advocate to maintain
contact with the appellant and his lawyers throughout the process and
even after the special advocate was fully apprised of the secret
information against the appellant.
- In
contrast, the SIAC procedures involving closed material and special
advocates had attracted considerable criticism, including from the
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, the House of Commons
Constitutional Affairs Committee, the Parliamentary Joint Committee
on Human Rights, the Canadian Senate Committee on the Anti-Terrorism
Act, and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.
Following the judgment of the House of Lords in December 2004,
declaring Part 4 of the 2001 Act incompatible with Articles 5 and 14
of the Convention, the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs
Committee commenced an inquiry into the operation of SIAC and its use
of special advocates. Among the evidence received by the Committee
was a submission from nine of the thirteen serving special advocates.
In the submission, the special advocates highlighted the serious
difficulties they faced in representing appellants in closed
proceedings due to the prohibition on communication concerning the
closed material. In particular, the special advocates pointed to the
very limited role they were able to play in closed hearings given the
absence of effective instructions from those they represented.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that Article 5 § 4 guarantees a right to “everyone
who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention” to bring
proceedings to test the legality of the detention and to obtain
release if the detention is found to be unlawful. Since the second
and fourth applicants were already at liberty, having elected to
travel to Morocco and France respectively, by the time the various
proceedings to determine the lawfulness of the detention under the
2001 Act were commenced, it follows that these two applicants'
complaints under Article 5 § 4 are manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention (see Fox,
Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 30 August
1990, § 45, Series A no. 182) and must be declared
inadmissible.
- The
Court considers that the other applicants' complaints under this
provision raise complex issues of law and fact, the determination of
which should depend on an examination of the merits. It concludes,
therefore, that this part of the application is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. No other ground of inadmissibility has been raised and it
must be declared admissible.
2. The merits
a. The principles arising from the
case-law
- Article
5 § 4 provides a lex specialis in relation to the more
general requirements of Article 13 (see Chahal, cited above, §
126). It entitles an arrested or detained person to institute
proceedings bearing on the procedural and substantive conditions
which are essential for the “lawfulness” of his or her
deprivation of liberty. The notion of “lawfulness” under
paragraph 4 of Article 5 has the same meaning as in paragraph 1, so
that the arrested or detained person is entitled to a review of the
“lawfulness” of his detention in the light not only of
the requirements of domestic law but also of the Convention, the
general principles embodied therein and the aim of the restrictions
permitted by Article 5 § 1. Article 5 § 4 does not
guarantee a right to judicial review of such a scope as to empower
the court, on all aspects of the case including questions of pure
expediency, to substitute its own discretion for that of the
decision-making authority. The review should, however, be wide enough
to bear on those conditions which are essential for the “lawful”
detention of a person according to Article 5 § 1 (E. v.
Norway, judgment of 29 August 1990, § 50, Series A no.
181). The reviewing “court” must not have merely advisory
functions but must have the competence to “decide” the
“lawfulness” of the detention and to order release if the
detention is unlawful (Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited
above, § 200; Weeks v. the United Kingdom judgment of 2
March 1987, § 61, Series A no. 114; Chahal, cited above,
§ 130).
- The
requirement of procedural fairness under Article 5 § 4 does not
impose a uniform, unvarying standard to be applied irrespective of
the context, facts and circumstances. Although it is not always
necessary that an Article 5 § 4 procedure be attended by
the same guarantees as those required under Article 6 for criminal or
civil litigation, it must have a judicial character and provide
guarantees appropriate to the type of deprivation of liberty in
question (see, for example, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands,
judgment of 24 October 1979, § 57, Series A no. 33; Bouamar
v. Belgium, judgment of 29 February 1988, §§ 57 and 60,
Series A no. 129; Włoch v. Poland, no. 27785/95, §
125, ECHR 2000-XI; Reinprecht v. Austria, no. 67175/01, §
31, ECHR 2005).
- Thus, the proceedings must be adversarial and must
always ensure “equality of arms” between the parties
(Reinprecht, § 31). An oral hearing may be necessary, for
example in cases of detention on remand (Nikolova v. Bulgaria
[GC], no. 31195/96, § 58, ECHR 1999-II). Moreover, in
remand cases, since the persistence of a reasonable suspicion that
the accused person has committed an offence is a condition sine
qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, the
detainee must be given an opportunity effectively to challenge the
basis of the allegations against him (Becciev v. Moldova,
no. 9190/03, §§ 68-72, 4 October 2005). This may
require the court to hear witnesses whose testimony appears prima
facie to have a material bearing on the continuing lawfulness of
the detention (Becciev, cited above, §§ 72-76;
Ţurcan and Ţurcan v. Moldova, no. 39835/05,
§§ 67-70, 23 October 2007). It may also require
that the detainee or his representative be given access to documents
in the case-file which form the basis of the prosecution case against
him (Włoch, cited above, § 127; Nikolova,
cited above, § 58; Lamy v. Belgium, judgment of 30 March
1989, § 29, Series A no. 151; Fodale v. Italy, no.
70148/01, 1 June 2006).
- The
Court has held nonetheless that, even in proceedings under Article 6
for the determination of guilt on criminal charges, there may be
restrictions on the right to a fully adversarial procedure where
strictly necessary in the light of a strong countervailing public
interest, such as national security, the need to keep secret certain
police methods of investigation or the protection of the fundamental
rights of another person. There will not be a fair trial, however,
unless any difficulties caused to the defendant by a limitation on
his rights are sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures
followed by the judicial authorities (see, for example, Doorson v.
the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1996, § 70, Reports
1996 II; Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands,
judgment of 23 April 1997, § 58, Reports 1997-III;
Jasper v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27052/95, §§
51-53, ECHR 2000-II; S.N. v. Sweden, no. 34209/96, §
47, ECHR 2002-V; Botmeh and Alami v. the United Kingdom, no.
15187/03, judgment of 7 June 2007, § 37).
- Thus,
while the right to a fair criminal trial under Article 6 includes a
right to disclosure of all material evidence in the possession of the
prosecution, both for and against the accused, the Court has held
that it might sometimes be necessary to withhold certain evidence
from the defence on public interest grounds. In Jasper, cited
above, §§ 51-53, it found that the limitation on the rights
of the defence had been sufficiently counterbalanced where evidence
which was relevant to the issues at trial, but on which the
prosecution did not intend to rely, was examined ex parte by
the trial judge, who decided that it should not be disclosed because
the public interest in keeping it secret outweighed the utility to
the defence of disclosure. In finding that there had been no
violation of Article 6, the Court considered it significant that it
was the trial judge, with full knowledge of the issues in the trial,
who carried out the balancing exercise and that steps had been taken
to ensure that the defence were kept informed and permitted to make
submissions and participate in the decision-making process as far as
was possible without disclosing the material which the prosecution
sought to keep secret (ibid., §§ 55-56). In contrast, in
Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39647/98
and 40461/98, §§ 46-48, ECHR 2004-X, the Court found
that an ex parte procedure before the trial judge was not
sufficient to secure a fair trial where the undisclosed material
related, or may have related, to an issue of fact which formed part
of the prosecution case, which the trial judge, rather than the jury,
had to determine and which might have been of decisive importance to
the outcome of the applicants' trials.
- In
a number of other cases where the competing public interest entailed
restrictions on the rights of the defendant in relation to adverse
evidence, relied on by the prosecutor, the Court has assessed the
extent to which counterbalancing measures can remedy the lack of a
full adversarial procedure. For example, in Lucà v. Italy,
no. 33354/96, § 40, ECHR 2001 II, it held that it
would not necessarily be incompatible with Article 6 § 1 for the
prosecution to refer at trial to depositions made during the
investigative stage, in particular where a witness refused to repeat
his deposition in public owing to fears for his safety, if the
defendant had been given an adequate and proper opportunity to
challenge the depositions, either when made or at a later stage. It
emphasised, however, that where a conviction was based solely or to a
decisive degree on depositions that had been made by a person whom
the accused had had no opportunity to examine or to have examined,
whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the
defence would be restricted to an extent incompatible with the
guarantees provided by Article 6.
- Similarly,
in Doorson, cited above, §§ 68-76, the Court
found that there was no breach of Article 6 where the identity of
certain witnesses was concealed from the defendant, on the ground
that they feared reprisals. The fact that the defence counsel, in the
absence of the defendant, was able to put questions to the anonymous
witnesses at the appeal stage and to attempt to cast doubt on their
reliability and that the Court of Appeal stated in its judgment that
it had treated the evidence of the anonymous witnesses with caution
was sufficient to counterbalance the disadvantage caused to the
defence. The Court emphasised that a conviction should not be based
either solely or to a decisive extent on anonymous statements (and
see also Van Mechelen, cited above, § 55). In each case,
the Court emphasised that its role was to ascertain whether the
proceedings as a whole, including the way in which evidence was
taken, were fair (Doorson, cited above, § 67).
- The
Court has referred on several occasions to the possibility of using
special advocates to counterbalance procedural unfairness caused by
lack of full disclosure in national security cases, but it has never
been required to decide whether or not such a procedure would be
compatible with either Article 5 § 4 or Article 6 of the
Convention.
- In
Chahal, cited above, the applicant was detained under Article
5 § 1(f) pending deportation on national security grounds and
the Secretary of State opposed his applications for bail and habeas
corpus, also for reasons of national security. The Court
recognised (§§ 130-131) that the use of confidential
material might be unavoidable where national security was at stake
but held that this did not mean that the executive could be free from
effective control by the domestic courts whenever they chose to
assert that national security and terrorism were involved. The Court
found a violation of Article 5 § 4 in the light of the fact that
the High Court, which determined the habeas corpus application,
did not have access to the full material on which the Secretary of
State had based his decision. Although there was the safeguard of an
advisory panel, chaired by a Court of Appeal judge, which had full
sight of the national security evidence, the Court held that the
panel could not be considered as a “court” within the
meaning of Article 5 § 4 because the applicant was not entitled
to legal representation before it and was given only an outline of
the national security case against him and because the panel had no
power of decision and its advice to the Home Secretary was not
binding and was not disclosed. The Court made reference (§§
131 and 144) to the submissions of the third parties (Amnesty
International, Liberty, the AIRE Centre and the Joint Council for the
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants; and see the submissions
of Justice in the present case, paragraph 198 above) in connection
with a procedure applied in national security deportation cases in
Canada, whereby the judge held an in camera hearing of
all the evidence, at which the proposed deportee was provided with a
statement summarising, as far as possible, the case against him and
had the right to be represented and to call evidence. The
confidentiality of the security material was maintained by requiring
such evidence to be examined in the absence of both the deportee and
his representative. However, in these circumstances, their place was
taken by a security-cleared counsel instructed by the court, who
cross-examined the witnesses and generally assisted the court to test
the strength of the State's case. A summary of the evidence obtained
by this procedure, with necessary deletions, was given to the
deportee. The Court commented that it:
“attaches significance to the fact that, as the
intervenors pointed out in connection with Article 13, ... in Canada
a more effective form of judicial control has been developed in cases
of this type. This example illustrates that there are techniques
which can be employed which both accommodate legitimate security
concerns about the nature and sources of intelligence information and
yet accord the individual a substantial measure of procedural
justice”.
- In
Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and Others and McElduff and Others v. the
United Kingdom, judgment of 10 July 1998, § 78, Reports
1998-IVand in Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, judgment of
20 June 2006, §§ 93-97 and 137, the Court made reference to
its comments in Chahal about the special advocate procedure
but without expressing any opinion as to whether such a procedure
would be in conformity with the Convention rights at issue.
b. Application to the facts of the present
case
- Before
the domestic courts, there were two aspects to the applicants'
challenge to the lawfulness of their detention. First, they brought
proceedings under section 30 of the 2001 Act to contest the validity
of the derogation under Article 15 of the Convention and thus the
compatibility with the Convention of the entire detention scheme.
Secondly, each applicant also brought an appeal under section 25 of
the 2001 Act, contending that the detention was unlawful under
domestic law because there were no reasonable grounds for a belief
that his presence in the United Kingdom was a risk to national
security or for a suspicion that he was a terrorist.
- The
Court does not consider it necessary to reach a separate finding
under Article 5 § 4 in connection with the applicants'
complaints that the House of Lords was unable to make a binding order
for their release, since it has already found a violation of Article
5 § 1 arising from the provisions of domestic law.
- The
applicants' second ground of complaint under Article 5 § 4
concerns the fairness of the procedure before SIAC under section 25
of the 2001 Act to determine whether the Secretary of State was
reasonable in believing each applicant's presence in the United
Kingdom to be a risk to national security and in suspecting him of
being a terrorist. This is a separate and distinct question, which
cannot be said to be absorbed in the finding of a violation of
Article 5 § 1, and which the Court must therefore examine.
- The
Court recalls that although the judges sitting as SIAC were able to
consider both the “open” and “closed”
material, neither the applicants nor their legal advisers could see
the closed material. Instead, the closed material was disclosed to
one or more special advocates, appointed by the Solicitor General to
act on behalf of each applicant. During the closed sessions before
SIAC, the special advocate could make submissions on behalf of the
applicant, both as regards procedural matters, such as the need for
further disclosure, and as to the substance of the case. However,
from the point at which the special advocate first had sight of the
closed material, he was not permitted to have any further contact
with the applicant and his representatives, save with the permission
of SIAC. In respect of each appeal against certification, SIAC issued
both an open and a closed judgment.
- The
Court takes as its starting point that, as the national courts found
and it has accepted, during the period of the applicants' detention
the activities and aims of the al'Qaeda network had given rise to a
“public emergency threatening the life of the nation”. It
must therefore be borne in mind that at the relevant time there was
considered to be an urgent need to protect the population of the
United Kingdom from terrorist attack and, although the United Kingdom
did not derogate from Article 5 § 4, a strong public interest in
obtaining information about al'Qaeda and its associates and in
maintaining the secrecy of the sources of such information (see also,
in this connection, Fox, Campbell and Hartley, cited above, §
39).
- Balanced
against these important public interests, however, was the
applicants' right under Article 5 § 4 to procedural
fairness. Although the Court has found that, with the exception
of the second and fourth applicants, the applicants' detention did
not fall within any of the categories listed in subparagraphs (a) to
(f) of Article 5 § 1, it considers that the case-law relating to
judicial control over detention on remand is relevant, since in such
cases also the reasonableness of the suspicion against the detained
person is a sine qua non (see paragraph 204 above). Moreover,
in the circumstances of the present case, and in view of the dramatic
impact of the lengthy - and what appeared at that time to be
indefinite - deprivation of liberty on the applicants' fundamental
rights, Article 5 § 4 must import substantially the same fair
trial guarantees as Article 6 § 1 in its criminal aspect (Garcia
Alva v. Germany, no. 23541/94, § 39, 13 February 2001 and
see also see Chahal, cited above, §§ 130-131).
- Against
this background, it was essential that as much information about the
allegations and evidence against each applicant was disclosed as was
possible without compromising national security or the safety of
others. Where full disclosure was not possible, Article 5 §
4 required that the difficulties this caused were counterbalanced in
such a way that each applicant still had the possibility effectively
to challenge the allegations against him.
- The
Court considers that SIAC, which was a fully independent court (see
paragraph 91 above) and which could examine all the relevant
evidence, both closed and open, was best placed to ensure that no
material was unnecessarily withheld from the detainee. In this
connection, the special advocate could provide an important,
additional safeguard through questioning the State's witnesses on the
need for secrecy and through making submissions to the judge
regarding the case for additional disclosure. On the material before
it, the Court has no basis to find that excessive and unjustified
secrecy was employed in respect of any of the applicants' appeals or
that there were not compelling reasons for the lack of disclosure in
each case.
- The
Court further considers that the special advocate could perform an
important role in counterbalancing the lack of full disclosure and
the lack of a full, open, adversarial hearing by testing the evidence
and putting arguments on behalf of the detainee during the closed
hearings. However, the special advocate could not perform this
function in any useful way unless the detainee was provided with
sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable
him to give effective instructions to the special advocate. While
this question must be decided on a case-by-case basis, the Court
observes generally that, where the evidence was to a large extent
disclosed and the open material played the predominant role in the
determination, it could not be said that the applicant was denied an
opportunity effectively to challenge the reasonableness of the
Secretary of State's belief and suspicions about him. In other cases,
even where all or most of the underlying evidence remained
undisclosed, if the allegations contained in the open material were
sufficiently specific, it should have been possible for the applicant
to provide his representatives and the special advocate with
information with which to refute them, if such information existed,
without his having to know the detail or sources of the evidence
which formed the basis of the allegations. An example would be the
allegation made against several of the applicants that they had
attended a terrorist training camp at a stated location between
stated dates; given the precise nature of the allegation, it would
have been possible for the applicant to provide the special advocate
with exonerating evidence, for example of an alibi or of an
alternative explanation for his presence there, sufficient to permit
the advocate effectively to challenge the allegation. Where, however,
the open material consisted purely of general assertions and SIAC's
decision to uphold the certification and maintain the detention was
based solely or to a decisive degree on closed material, the
procedural requirements of Article 5 § 4 would not be satisfied.
- The
Court must, therefore, assess the certification proceedings in
respect of each of the detained applicants in the light of these
criteria.
- It
notes that the open material against the sixth, seventh, eighth,
ninth and eleventh applicants included detailed allegations about,
for example, the purchase of specific telecommunications equipment,
possession of specific documents linked to named terrorist suspects
and meetings with named terrorist suspects with specific dates and
places. It considers that these allegations were sufficiently
detailed to permit the applicants effectively to challenge them. It
does not, therefore, find a violation of Article 5 § 4 in
respect of the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and eleventh applicants.
- The
principal allegations against the first and tenth applicants were
that they had been involved in fund-raising for terrorist groups
linked to al'Qaeda. In the first applicant's case there was open
evidence of large sums of money moving through his bank account and
in respect of the tenth applicant there was open evidence that he had
been involved in raising money through fraud. However, in each case
the evidence which allegedly provided the link between the money
raised and terrorism was not disclosed to either applicant. In these
circumstances, the Court does not consider that these applicants were
in a position effectively to challenge the allegations against them.
There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 4 in respect
of the first and tenth applicants.
- The
open allegations in respect of the third and fifth applicants were of
a general nature, principally that they were members of named
extremist Islamist groups linked to al'Qaeda. SIAC observed in its
judgments dismissing each of these applicants' appeals that the open
evidence was insubstantial and that the evidence on which it relied
against them was largely to be found in the closed material. Again,
the Court does not consider that these applicants were in a position
effectively to challenge the allegations against them. There has
therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 4 in respect of the
third and fifth applicants.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 IN CONJUNCTION
WITH ARTICLE 13
- The
applicants argued in the alternative that the matters complained of
in relation to Article 5 § 4 also gave rise to a violation of
Article 13. In the light of its findings above, the Court does not
consider it necessary to examine these complaints separately.
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 5 OF THE
CONVENTION
- Finally,
the applicants complained that, despite having been unlawfully
detained in breach of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4, they had no
enforceable right to compensation, in breach of Article 5 § 5,
which provides:
“Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or
detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.”
- The
Government reasoned that there had been no breach of Article 5
in this case, so Article 5 § 5 did not apply. In the event that
the Court did find a violation of Article 5, Article 5 § 5
required “an enforceable right to compensation”, but not
that compensation be awarded in every case. Since the Secretary of
State was found by the national courts reasonably to suspect that the
applicants were “international terrorists”, as a matter
of principle they were not entitled to compensation from the national
courts.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that it has found a violation of Article 5 § 1 in
respect of all the applicants except the second and fourth
applicants, and that it has found a violation of Article 5 § 4
in respect of the first, third, fifth and tenth applicants. It
follows that the second and fourth applicants' complaints under
Article 5 § 5 are inadmissible, but that the other applicants'
complaints are admissible.
B. The merits
- The
Court notes that the above violations could not give rise to an
enforceable claim for compensation by the applicants before the
national courts. It follows that there has been a violation of
Article 5 § 5 in respect of all the applicants save the second
and fourth applicants (see Brogan and Others v. the United
Kingdom, judgment of 29 November 1988, § 67, Series A no.
145-B and Fox, Campbell and Hartley, cited above, § 46).
VII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicants argued in the alternative that the procedure before SIAC
was not compatible with Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the
Convention, which provide:
“1. In the determination of his civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals,
public order or national security in a democratic society, where the
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the
parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would
prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
- The
applicants contended that Article 6 was the lex specialis of
the fair trial guarantee. The regime under consideration represented
the most serious form of executive measure against terrorist suspects
adopted within the Member States of the Council of Europe in the
post-2001 period. It was adopted to enable the United Kingdom to take
proceedings against individuals on the basis of reasonable suspicion
alone, deriving from evidence which could not be deployed in the
ordinary courts. That alone warranted an analysis under Article 6.
The proceedings were for the determination of a criminal charge,
within the autonomous meaning adopted under Article 6 § 1, and
also for the determination of civil rights and obligations. The use
of closed material gave rise to a breach of Article 6.
- In
the Government's submission, Article 5 § 4 was the lex
specialis concerning detention and the issues should be
considered under that provision. In any event, Article 6 did not
apply, because SIAC's decision on the question whether there should
be detention related to “special measures of immigration
control” and thus determined neither a criminal charge nor any
civil right or obligation. Even if Article 6 § 1 did apply,
there was no violation, for the reasons set out above in respect of
Article 5 § 4.
- Without
coming to any conclusion as to whether the proceedings before SIAC
fell within the scope of Article 6, the Court declares these
complaints admissible. It observes, however, that it has examined the
issues relating to the use of special advocates, closed hearings and
lack of full disclosure in the proceedings before SIAC above, in
connection with the applicants' complaints under Article 5 § 4.
In the light of this full examination, it does not consider it
necessary to examine the complaints under Article 6 § 1.
VIII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicants sought compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damage sustained as a result of the violations, together with costs
and expenses, under Article 41 of the Convention, which provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The
Government contended that an award of just satisfaction would be
neither necessary nor appropriate in the present case.
A. Damage
1. The applicants' claims
- The applicants submitted that monetary just
satisfaction was necessary and appropriate. When assessing quantum,
guidance could be obtained from domestic court awards in respect of
unlawful detention and also from awards made by the Court in past
cases (they referred, inter alia, to Perks and Others v.
the United Kingdom, nos. 25277/94, 25279/94, 25280/94, 25282/94,
25285/94, 28048/95, 28192/95 and 28456/95, judgment of 12 October
1999, where GBP 5,500 was awarded in respect of six days' unlawful
imprisonment, and Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece, judgment
of 29 May 1995, Reports 1997-III, where the applicants were
awarded the equivalent of 17,890 pounds sterling (GBP) and GBP
16,330, respectively, in relation to periods of 13 and 12 months'
imprisonment for refusing to perform military service).
- The
first applicant claimed compensation for his loss of liberty between
19 December 2001 and 11 March 2005, a period of three years and 83
days, and the consequent mental suffering, including mental illness.
He submitted that the award should in addition take account of the
suffering experienced by his wife and family as a result of the
separation and the negative publicity. He proposed an award of GBP
234,000 to cover non-pecuniary damage. In addition he claimed
approximately GBP 7,500 in pecuniary damages to cover the costs of
his family's visits to him in detention and other expenses.
- The
third applicant claimed compensation for his loss of liberty between
19 December 2001 and 11 March 2005 and the consequent mental
suffering, including mental illness, together with the distress
caused to his wife and children. He proposed a figure of GBP 230,000
for non-pecuniary damages, together with pecuniary damages of GBP 200
travel costs, incurred by his wife, and a sum to cover his lost
opportunity to establish himself in business in the United Kingdom.
- The
fifth applicant claimed compensation for his detention between 19
December 2001 and 22 April 2004, his subsequent house arrest until
11 March 2005 and the consequent mental suffering, including
mental illness, together with the distress caused to his wife and
children. He proposed a figure of GBP 240,000 for non-pecuniary
damages, together with pecuniary damages of GBP 5,500, including
travel and child-minding costs incurred by his wife and money sent by
her to the applicant in prison.
- The
sixth applicant claimed compensation for his detention between 19
December 2001 and 11 March 2005 and the consequent mental suffering,
together with the distress caused to his wife and children. He
proposed a figure of GBP 217,000 for non-pecuniary damages, together
with pecuniary damages of GBP 51,410, including his loss of earnings
as a self-employed courier and travel costs incurred by his wife.
- The
seventh applicant claimed compensation for his detention between 8
February 2002 and 11 March 2005 and the consequent mental suffering,
including mental illness. He proposed a figure of GBP 197,000 for
non-pecuniary damages. He did not make any claim in respect of
pecuniary damage.
- The
eighth applicant claimed compensation for his loss of liberty between
23 October 2002 and 11 March 2005 and the consequent mental
suffering, together with the distress caused to his wife and
children. He proposed a figure of GBP 170,000 for non-pecuniary
damages, together with pecuniary damages of GBP 4,570, including
money sent to him in prison by his wife and her costs of moving house
to avoid unwanted media attention.
- The
ninth applicant claimed compensation for his loss of liberty between
22 April 2002 and 11 March 2005, and the consequent mental suffering,
including mental illness, together with the distress caused to his
wife and children. He proposed a figure of GBP 215,000 for
non-pecuniary damages, together with pecuniary damages of GBP 7,725,
including money he had to borrow to assist his wife with household
expenses, money sent to him in prison by his wife and her travel
expenses to visit him. He also asked for a sum to cover his lost
opportunity to establish himself in business in the United Kingdom.
- The
tenth applicant claimed compensation for his loss of liberty between
14 January 2003 and 11 March 2005 and the consequent mental
suffering, including mental illness. He proposed a figure of GBP
144,000 for non-pecuniary damages, together with pecuniary damages of
GBP 2,751, including the loss of a weekly payment of GBP 37 he
was receiving from the National Asylum Support Service prior to his
detention and the cost of telephone calls to his legal
representatives.
- The
eleventh applicant claimed compensation for his loss of liberty
between 2 October 2003 and 11 March 2005 and the consequent mental
suffering. He proposed a figure of GBP 95,000 for non-pecuniary
damages but did not claim any pecuniary damages.
2. The Government's submissions
- The
Government, relying on the Court's judgment in McCann and Others
v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1995, § 219,
Series A no. 324, contended that, as a matter of principle, the
applicants were not entitled to receive any form of financial
compensation because they were properly suspected, on objective and
reasonable grounds, of involvement in terrorism and had failed to
displace that suspicion.
- The
Government pointed out that Part 4 of the 2001 Act was passed and the
derogation made in good faith, in an attempt to deal with what was
perceived to be an extremely serious situation amounting to a public
emergency threatening the life of the nation. The core problem with
the detention scheme under the 2001 Act, as identified by SIAC and
the House of Lords, was that it did not apply to United Kingdom as
well as foreign nationals. Following the House of Lords' judgment,
urgent consideration was given to the question what should be done
with the applicants in the light of the public emergency and it was
decided that a system of control orders should be put in place.
Against this background, it could not be suggested that the
Government had acted cynically or in flagrant disregard of the
individuals' rights.
- In
addition, the Government submitted that no just satisfaction should
be awarded in respect of any procedural violation found by the Court
(for example, under Article 5 §§ 4 or 5), since it was not
possible to speculate what would have happened had the breach not
occurred (Kingsley v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35605/97,
ECHR 2002-IV; Hood v. the United Kingdom, no. 27267/95, ECHR
1999-I).
- In
the event that the Court did decide to make a monetary award, it
should examine carefully in respect of each head of claim whether
there was sufficient supporting evidence, whether the claim was
sufficiently closely connected to the violation and whether the claim
was reasonable as to quantum.
3. The Court's assessment
- The
Court recalls, first, that it has not found a violation of Article 3
in the present case. It follows that it cannot make any award in
respect of mental suffering, including mental illness, allegedly
arising from the conditions of detention or the open-ended nature of
the detention scheme in Part 4 of the 2001 Act.
- It
has, however, found violations of Article 5 §§ 1 and 5 in
respect of the first, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth,
tenth and eleventh applicants and a violation of Article 5 § 4
in respect of the first, third, fifth and tenth applicants. In
accordance with Article 41, it could, therefore, award these
applicants monetary compensation, if it considered such an award to
be “necessary”. The Court has a wide discretion to
determine when an award of damages should be made, and frequently
holds that the finding of a violation is sufficient satisfaction
without any further monetary award (see, among many examples,
Nikolova, cited above, § 76). In exercising its
discretion the Court will have regard to all the circumstances of the
case including the nature of the violations found as well as any
special circumstances pertaining to the context of the case.
- The
Court recalls that in the McCann and Others judgment, cited
above, § 219, it declined to make any award in respect of
pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage arising from the violation of
Article 2 of the Convention, having regard to the fact that the three
terrorist suspects who were killed had been intending to plant a bomb
in Gibraltar. It considers that the present case is distinguishable,
since it has not been established that any of the applicants has
engaged, or attempted to engage, in any act of terrorist violence.
- The
decision whether to award monetary compensation in this case and, if
so, the amount of any such award, must take into account a number of
factors. The applicants were detained for long periods, in breach of
Article 5 § 1, and the Court has, in the past, awarded large
sums in just satisfaction in respect of unlawful detention (see, for
example, Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, ECHR
2004-II, or the cases cited by the applicants in paragraph 235
above). The present case is, however, very different. In the
aftermath of the al'Qaeda attacks on the United States of
11 September 2001, in a situation which the domestic courts and
this Court have accepted was a public emergency threatening the life
of the nation, the Government were under an obligation to protect the
population of the United Kingdom from terrorist violence. The
detention scheme in Part 4 of the 2001 Act was devised in good faith,
as an attempt to reconcile the need to prevent the commission of acts
of terrorism with the obligation under Article 3 of the Convention
not to remove or deport any person to a country where he could face a
real risk of ill-treatment (see paragraph 166 above). Although the
Court, like the House of Lords, has found that the derogating
measures were disproportionate, the core part of that finding was
that the legislation was discriminatory in targeting non-nationals
only. Moreover, following the House of Lords' judgment, the detention
scheme under the 2001 Act was replaced by a system of control orders
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. All the applicants in
respect of whom the Court has found a violation of Article 5 § 1
became, immediately upon release in March 2005, the subject of
control orders. It cannot therefore be assumed that, even if the
violations in the present case had not occurred, the applicants would
not have been subjected to some restriction on their liberty.
- Against
this background, the Court finds that the circumstances justify the
making of an award substantially lower than that which it has had
occasion to make in other cases of unlawful detention. It awards
3,900 euros (EUR) to the first, third and sixth applicants; EUR 3,400
to the fifth applicant; EUR 3,800 to the seventh applicant; EUR
2,800 to the eighth applicant; EUR 3,400 to the ninth applicant; EUR
2,500 to the tenth applicant; and EUR 1,700 to the eleventh
applicant, together with any tax that may be chargeable.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicants made no claim for costs in respect of the domestic
proceedings, since these had been recovered as a result of the order
made by the House of Lords. Their total claim for the costs of the
proceedings before the Court totalled GBP 144,752.64, inclusive of
value added tax (“VAT”). This included 599 hours worked
by solicitors at GBP 70 per hour plus VAT, 342.5 hours worked by
counsel at GBP 150 per hour plus VAT and 85 hours worked by senior
counsel at GBP 200 per hour plus VAT in preparing the application,
observations and just satisfaction claim before the Chamber and Grand
Chamber, together with disbursements such as experts' reports and the
costs of the hearing before the Grand Chamber. They submitted that it
had been necessary to instruct a number of different counsel, with
different areas of specialism, given the range of issues to be
addressed and the evidence involved, concerning events which took
place over a ten-year period.
- The
Government submitted that the claim was excessive. In particular, the
number of hours spent by solicitors and counsel in preparing the case
could not be justified, especially since each of the applicants had
been represented throughout the domestic proceedings during which
detailed instructions must have been taken and consideration given to
virtually all the issues arising in the application to the Court. The
hourly rates charged by counsel were, in addition, excessive.
- The
Court recalls that an applicant is entitled to be reimbursed those
costs actually and necessarily incurred to prevent or redress a
breach of the Convention, to the extent that such costs are
reasonable as to quantum (Kingsley, cited above, § 49).
While it accepts that the number of applicants must, inevitably, have
necessitated additional work on the part of their representatives, it
notes that most of the individualised material filed with the Court
dealt with the applicants' complaints under Article 3 of the
Convention and their claims for just satisfaction arising out of
those complaints, which the Court has rejected. In addition, it
accepts the Government's argument that a number of the issues,
particularly those relating to the derogation under Article 15 of the
Convention, had already been aired before the national courts, which
should have reduced the time needed for the preparation of this part
of the case. Against this background, it considers that the
applicants should be awarded a total of EUR 60,000 in respect of
costs and expenses, together with any tax that may be chargeable to
the applicants.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the second applicant's complaints under
Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention inadmissible and the first,
third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and
eleventh applicants' complaints under Articles 3 and 13 admissible
(see paragraphs 123-125 of the judgment);
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 3 of the Convention, taken alone or in conjunction with
Article 13, in respect of the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth,
seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh applicants (paragraphs
126-136);
- Dismisses the applicants' preliminary objections
that the Government should be precluded from raising a defence under
Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention or challenging the House of
Lords' finding that the derogation under Article 15 was invalid
(paragraphs 153-159);
- Declares the applicants' complaints under
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention admissible (paragraph 160);
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the second
and fourth applicants (paragraphs 162-168);
- Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the first,
third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh
applicants (paragraphs 162-190);
- Holds that it is not necessary to examine the
applicants' complaints under Articles 5 § 1 and 14 taken
together (paragraph 192);
- Declares the second and fourth applicants'
complaints under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention inadmissible
and the first, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and
eleventh applicants' complaints under Article 5 § 4
admissible (paragraphs 200-201);
- Holds that it is not necessary to examine the
first, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and
eleventh applicants' complaints under Articles 5 § 4 that the
House of Lords could not make a binding order for their release
(paragraph 213);
- Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in respect of the first,
third, fifth and tenth applicants but that there was no violation of
Article 5 § 4 in respect of the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth
and eleventh applicants (paragraphs 202-224);
- Holds that it is not necessary to examine the
applicants' complaints under Articles 5 § 1 and 13 taken
together (paragraph 225);
- Declares the second and fourth applicants'
complaints under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention
inadmissible and the first, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth,
ninth, tenth and eleventh applicants' complaints under Article 5 §
5 admissible (paragraph 228);
- Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 5 § 5 of the Convention in respect of the first,
third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh
applicants (paragraph 229);
- Declares the applicants' complaints under
Article 6 of the Convention admissible (paragraph 233);
- Holds that it is not necessary to examine the
applicants' complaints under Article 6 of the Convention (paragraph
233);
- Holds that the respondent State is to pay,
within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into
pounds sterling at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(a) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, EUR 3,900
(three thousand nine hundred euros) to the first, third and sixth
applicants; EUR 3,400 (three thousand four hundred euros) to the
fifth applicant; EUR 3,800 (three thousand eight hundred euros)
to the seventh applicant; EUR 2,800 (two thousand eight hundred
euros) to the eighth applicant; EUR 3,400 (three thousand four
hundred euros) to the ninth applicant; EUR 2,500 (two thousand five
hundred euros) to the tenth applicant; and EUR 1,700 (one
thousand seven hundred euros) to the eleventh applicant, plus any tax
that may be chargeable;
(b) to the applicants jointly, in respect of costs and expenses, EUR
60,000 (sixty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to
the applicants;
(c) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points
(paragraphs 249-257);
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicants'
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in
the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 19 February 2009.
Michael O'Boyle Jean-Paul Costa
Deputy Registrar President