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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF
GÖBEL v. GERMANY
(Application
no. 35023/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
8 December
2011
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Göbel v. Germany,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Dean
Spielmann,
President,
Karel
Jungwiert,
Boštjan
M. Zupančič,
Mark
Villiger,
Ann
Power-Forde,
André
Potocki,
judges,
Klaus
Köpp, ad
hoc judge,
and
Claudia Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 15 November 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the last mentioned
date:
PROCEDURE
- The case originated in an application (no. 35023/04)
against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged on 24 September 2004
with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a German national, Mr Gerd Göbel (“the
applicant”), who was born in 1948 and lives in Aljezur
(Portugal).
- The
applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr W.
Uckert, a lawyer (Ass. Jur.) practising in Kassel (Germany).
The German Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mrs A. Wittling-Vogel, Ministerialdirigentin,
of the Federal Ministry of Justice, and also by Professor J.A.
Frowein, Director (emeritus) of the Max Planck Institute of
Heidelberg.
- The
applicant alleged in particular that the decisions of the domestic
courts, based on the relevant provisions of the Property Act, had
infringed his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, as
guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
- Renate
Jaeger, the judge elected in respect of Germany who was in office at
the time of the application, decided to withdraw from the case (Rule
28 of the Rules of Court). The Government accordingly appointed
Mr Klaus Köpp, a lawyer practising in Bonn, to sit as ad
hoc judge (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29
§ 1 as in force at the time).
- By
a decision of 13 October 2009, the Chamber declared the application
admissible.
- The
applicant and the Government each filed further written observations
(Rule 59 § 1) on the merits.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
facts of the case, as set out by the parties, can be summarised as
follows.
A. Background to the case
- The
disputed land, having a surface area of 759 sq.m., including a
dwelling house and business premises, is situated in Erfurt, on the
territory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).
- Under
a notarially-registered agreement of 4 October 1938, the S. brothers,
who were Jewish, sold this land for 256.000 reichsmarks (RM) to an
industrialist, M. D. The S. brothers subsequently National-Socialist
Germany and took refuge in Australia.
- After
1945, the land, which was situated in the Soviet-occupied zone, was
temporarily requisitioned by the State.
- On
28 February 1946 the President of the Land of Thuringia (GDR)
appointed an administrator and indicated that the land, which had
been sold under duress, fell within the scope of the Reparations Act
(Wiedergutmachungsgesetz) of 14 September 1945. It was thus
supposed to be returned to the former owners or to their heirs.
- Subsequently
the restitution procedure was suspended, with a view to the amendment
of the Reparations Act and to the systematic expropriation of the
plots of land concerned.
- On
18 October 1948 the administrator of the disputed property entered
into a friendly settlement on behalf of the S. brothers with the
widow and heir of M. D., under which the latter would remain the
owner of two thirds of the land and the S. brothers would obtain the
remaining one third, whilst in return waiving any claims against Mrs
D.
- Subsequently
the S. brothers challenged this friendly settlement, arguing that
they had not been consulted.
- After
the death of Mrs D., the two thirds of the property still owned by
her was left to a community of heirs.
B. Situation after German reunification
- Under
a notarially-registered agreement of 11 April 1992, one of Mrs
D.’s heirs sold an initial share in the joint
property (Anteil an der Miterbengemeinschaft) to the applicant
for 90,000 deutschmarks (DM) and a second share to another purchaser,
M. P., for the same amount. The agreement indicated that the
applicant had been provided with a description of the events leading
to the current property regime of the property in question (“wie
es zu den momentanen Eigentumsverhältnissen gekommen ist”)
and that this description covered the period from 22 April 1904 to
25 September 1987.
- On
30 October 1992 the applicant was registered in the land register as
a member of the community of joint owners.
- In
two letters, of 8 September and 17 December 1992, the heirs of the S.
brothers sought the restitution of the remaining two thirds of the
land in accordance with section 1(6) of the law on the resolution of
outstanding property issues – the Property Act (Gesetz über
die Regelung offener Vermögensfragen - Vermögensgesetz)
of 23 September 1990 (see relevant domestic law and practice,
paragraph 30 below).
- In
a notarially-registered agreement of 15 March 1993 the heirs of the
S. brothers sold one third of the disputed land for DM 3,700,000 to
Mrs T. The same agreement contained a clause indicating that the
heirs of the S. brothers were also selling the remaining two thirds
of the land for DM 6,800,000 under the condition precedent that
they obtained its restitution (the procedure was pending before the
domestic authorities and courts – see paragraphs 23 et seq.
below).
- On
31 January 1997 the applicant acquired a second share in joint
ownership from M. P., which was also registered in the land register
on 4 May 1998. The Government pointed out that the applicant had
not provided evidence that he had paid for that acquisition, whereas
the applicant indicated that the value of that second share had also
amounted to DM 90,000 as stipulated in the initial agreement of
11 April 1992, and that he had acquired that share from M. P. in
exchange for debts owed to him by the latter.
- On
17 June 1997, the applicant entered into a notarially-registered
sales agreement for his two shares for a total sum of DM 600,000 to
the company Global Pacific Investment Trust, having its registered
office in Vaduz (Liechtenstein). This agreement indicated that the
parties had released the notary from his obligation to inspect the
land register, in spite of his warning that the existence of
third-party rights could not entirely be ruled out.
- The
applicant alleged that, on account of the restitution of the disputed
property, he had been unable to fulfil his undertakings under that
agreement.
C. Procedures before domestic authorities and courts
- In
a decision of 8 November 1995 the Office for the Resolution of
Outstanding Property Issues (Amt für die Regelung offener
Vermögensfragen) of the town of Erfurt initially rejected
the request by the heirs of the S. brothers, on the ground that the
friendly settlement reached on 18 October 1948 had ruled out any
request for restitution. The heirs of the S. brothers challenged that
decision.
- In a decision of 13 October 1997 the Office for the
Resolution of Outstanding Property Issues for the Land of
Thuringia (“Office for the Land of Thuringia”)
upheld their request and ordered the restitution of the remaining two
thirds of the land. The Office took the view that there was a
presumption that the disputed land had been sold under duress in
1938, because the sale price had not been appropriate and it had not
been established that the sale would have taken place without the
National Socialist Party’s “rule”. Moreover,
restitution could not be ruled out, whether because of the friendly
settlement reached in the former GDR under the pressure of
forthcoming expropriations without the agreement of those concerned,
or for any of the other reasons given in section 4 of the Property
Act, namely an acquisition in good faith at the time of the former
GDR (see relevant domestic law and practice, paragraph 30 below).
Under section 7a(2) of the Property Act, the applicant was entitled
to the payment of consideration (Gegenleistung) for a sum
equivalent to the sale price of his shares in 1938 at the conversion
rate of DM 1 for RM 20, thus DM 1,250.
- The
applicant then took the matter to the Gera administrative court,
complaining that the current purchasers were not responsible for the
situation under the National-Socialist regime, that the friendly
settlement had been valid and that the Office’s decision
infringed his right to the enjoyment of his possessions under Article
1 of Protocol No. 1.
- In
a judgment of 17 April 2003 the Gera Administrative Court upheld the
decision of the Office of the Land of Thuringia, in all its
aspects, relying on sections 2(1) and 3(1) taken together with 1(6)
of the Property Act (see relevant domestic law and practice, §
30 below). It explained that the Property Act had to be regarded as a
law controlling the use of property within the meaning of the second
paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, having the legitimate aim
of ensuring reparation for the injustice committed against Jewish
citizens. Even supposing that the applicant had a possession within
the meaning of that Article, the relevant provisions of the Property
Act had validly defined the scope of his property right (zulässige
Inhaltsbestimmung des Eigentumsrechts). He therefore had only a
restricted right (eingeschränkte Rechtsposition). The
Administrative Court concluded that restitution was not ruled out
under section 4(2) of the Property Act, because the applicant had not
acquired title to its pecuniary value (kein Eigentum an dem
Vermögenswert) and had acquired his share after the entry
into force of the Property Act. Nor had he been able to dispose of
(verfügen) his property, and for that reason was simply
registered in the land register as a member of the community of joint
owners of the inherited estate.
The
Administrative Court did not give the applicant leave to appeal
against that judgment or to lodge an application for review with the
Federal Administrative Court.
- In
a decision of 29 January 2004, the Federal Administrative Court
dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Administrative
Court’s decision not to give him leave to lodge an application
for review.
- In
a decision of 31 March 2004 the Federal Constitutional Court, ruling
in a committee of three, rejected the applicant’s
constitutional appeal.
- On
26 July 2004 the applicant filed a request for compensation under the
Law of 27 September 1994 on compensation in accordance with the
Property Act – the Compensation Act (Gesetz über die
Entschädigung nach dem Vermögensgesetz –
Entschädigungsgesetz – see relevant domestic law
and practice, paragraph 31 below) and that procedure is still
pending.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
Law on the resolution of outstanding property issues – the
Property Act
- On
29 September 1990 the Property Act of 23 September 1990, which was
also to be part of the Unification Treaty (Einigungsvertrag),
came into force. Under the Treaty the Property Act would remain in
force in Germany after the reunification of the two German States on
3 October 1990. The Act’s purpose was, in particular, to settle
any conflicts relating to property on the territory of the GDR in a
manner that was socially acceptable, in order to ensure long-term
legal security in Germany.
Section
1(1) of the Property Act provides that it is applicable to rights in
respect of property that was expropriated at the time of the GDR and
section 1(6) provides that it also applicable to persons against
whom proceedings were brought in Germany between 30 January 1933
and 8 May 1945 on racist, political, religious or ideological grounds
(weltanschauliche Gründe) and who had consequently
lost their property “by forced sale, expropriation or other
means”. Sections 2 and 3 of the Act complement section 1.
Section
3(1) of the Property Act provides that any property that became
“people’s property” will be returned on request
unless excluded by the law. Section 3(2) provides that if a number of
parties make a request for restitution concerning the same property,
it is the party that was “first” injured which is thus
entitled. That means that, as in the present case, when property was
sold under duress during the National-Socialist period, then
subsequently expropriated in the former GDR, the heirs of the
original Jewish owners have a priority right to restitution.
Restitution
is ruled out if it proves impossible in practice (section 4 (1) of
the Act) or if the purchasers acquired the property in good faith
between 8 May 1945 and 18 October 1989 (section 4 (2) of the
Act). However, it is not excluded if, as in the present case, the
acquisition took place after that date.
Section
30a(1), first sentence, of the Property Act provides that
applications for restitution had to be lodged no later than 31
December 1992.
- In the event of the property’s restitution,
section 7a(2) of the Property Act provides that consideration
equivalent to the original sale price must be paid to the new
purchasers. The conversion rate is DM 1 for RM 20. In this
connection, no distinction is made between the heirs of the initial
purchaser in the National-Socialist era and a new purchaser, who, as
in the present case, has more recently acquired joint-ownership
shares from the community of heirs of the initial purchaser.
Section
7a(3b) provides that the heirs of the initial purchaser or the new
purchaser may also opt for the payment of compensation in accordance
with the Compensation Act of 27 September 1994 if the original sale
price had been paid in reichsmarks (RM) in the National-Socialist
era. The objective of this provision was to alleviate the effect of
the devaluations resulting from two changes of currency since that
time. Only those persons who had acted in a manner contrary to the
principles of humanity or who had abused their position in the
National-Socialist era were to be excluded from the possibility of
obtaining such compensation.
THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1
32. The applicant argued that the
decisions of the domestic courts based on the relevant provisions of
the Property Act had infringed his right to the enjoyment of his
possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which
reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
33. The Government disputed that
allegation.
A. The parties’ submissions
- The
applicant maintained that he was a victim of a deprivation of
property without compensation, as in the case of Jahn and Others
(see Jahn and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99,
72203/01 and 72552/01, ECHR 2005 VI).
He
did not dispute the restitution as such, nor the legitimate purpose
pursued by the German legislature and its margin of appreciation in
such matters. The applicant took the view, however, that he was
entitled to fair compensation and that the payment of DM 1,250 by way
of consideration, as provided for in the Property Act, placed a
disproportionate burden on him. He submitted that he had acquired his
property lawfully and in good faith, after German reunification, from
the legitimate heirs of the initial purchaser in the
National-Socialist era. In his submission, if the FRG, as successor
State, sought to provide redress for the injustices committed by the
National-Socialist State, it was incumbent on the FRG to assume the
consequences and it could not do so to the detriment of an ordinary
purchaser who had nothing to do with the events of that era. Contrary
to what the Government had argued, the State’s objective had
precisely not been to strike a fair balance between the interests at
stake, but to avoid paying damages on the basis of legal arguments.
- As
to the Government, they accepted that the applicant had a
“possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1, even though they noted that he had only a share of an
inherited estate (Miterbenanteil) and not title to the
disputed land, which was held by the community of heirs as a whole
(Gesamthandseigentum). They added that even supposing there
had been a deprivation of possessions in the present case, that
deprivation was based on the relevant provisions of the Property Act
and was therefore “provided for by law”. It was also in
the “public interest”, given that its objective was to
return property to the heirs of the former Jewish owners who had been
the victims of persecution under the National-Socialist regime.
The
Government further argued that the interference was justified and
that it struck a fair balance between the interests at stake, in the
light of the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in the
context of German reunification and taking into account the need to
provide redress for the injustices committed under the
National-Socialist regime. In the absence of any general regulations
to that end in the GDR, the FRG had sought to make up for that
shortcoming after German reunification.
In
addition, the applicant had acquired his shares after the entry into
force of the 1990 Property Act for a minimal sum and had been
apprised of the history of the property in question. He had thus
knowingly taken the risk of acquiring property against which a
restitution application might be lodged by the heirs of the original
Jewish owners. In accordance with the objectives of the Property Act,
the applicant was entitled to the payment of consideration based on
the sale price in the National-Socialist era; he also had the
possibility of requesting payment of compensation under the
Compensation Act, which – according to the Government –
amounted to DM 15,000. They alleged that, in reality, the applicant
had hoped to earn money through a property deal and had perhaps
suffered a loss as he was unable to fulfil his undertakings in
respect of the subsequent sale of his share. His hope of doing a
“good deal”, however, was not part of the rights
protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
B. The Court’s assessment
1. The existence of interference with the peaceful
enjoyment of a “possession”
- According
to the Court’s case-law, the notion of “possessions”
in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not
limited to the ownership of physical goods: certain other rights and
interests constituting assets can also be regarded as “property
rights”, and thus as “possessions”, for the
purposes of this provision (see, among other authorities, Gasus
Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands,
23 February 1995, § 53, Series A no. 306 B, and Wittek
v. Germany, no. 37290/97, § 42, ECHR 2002 X).
37. The Court notes in the present case
that the applicant, under notarially registered agreements of 11
April 1992 and 31 January 1997, acquired in
joint ownership two shares belonging to the community of heirs of the
initial purchaser for the total sum of DM
180,000 and was registered in the land register as a member of the
community of joint owners of the inherited estate. Even though he did
not acquire title to the land in question, he nevertheless acquired
shares in the estate under joint ownership. He thus had a
“possession”, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1, and this has not in fact been disputed by the Government.
- As a result, the restitution of the land to the heirs
of the original owners, in accordance with the relevant provisions of
the Property Act and subject to the payment to the applicant of
consideration amounting to DM 1,250, a sum equivalent to the
sale price of those shares in 1938, or of compensation under the
Compensation Act, constituted interference with his right to the
enjoyment of his possessions.
- Having
regard to its case-law in such matters, the Court takes the view that
interference with the applicant’s right to the enjoyment of his
possession must be regarded as a “deprivation” of
possessions, within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1. It must therefore ascertain whether the
interference complained of is justified under that provision.
2. Justification for the interference
(a) “Provided for by law”
- The Court notes that the impugned measure was based on
sections 2(1) and 3(1), taken together with section 1(6) of the
Property Act of 23 September 1990. Section 1(6) indicates that the
Property Act, which contains very clear provisions on the conditions
of restitution of land expropriated at the time of the former GDR, is
also applicable to the pecuniary rights of persons against whom
proceedings were brought in the National-Socialist period. Section
7a(2) of that Act provides for payment to the new purchasers of
consideration equivalent to the original sale price and section
7a(3b) provides for payment of compensation under the Compensation
Act.
- The deprivation of possessions was thus provided for
by law, in compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
(b) “In the public interest”
- The
Court reiterates that because of their direct knowledge of their
society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle
better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is “in
the public interest”. Under the system of protection
established by the Convention, it is thus for the national
authorities to make the initial assessment of the existence of a
problem of public concern warranting measures of deprivation of
property. Here, as in other fields to which the safeguards of the
Convention extend, the national authorities accordingly enjoy a
certain margin of appreciation.
Furthermore,
the notion of “public interest” is necessarily extensive.
In particular, the decision to enact laws expropriating property will
commonly involve consideration of political, economic and social
issues. The Court finds it natural that the margin of appreciation
available to the legislature in implementing social and economic
policies should be a wide one and will respect the legislature’s
judgment as to what is “in the public interest” unless
that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation (see James
and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 46,
Series A no. 98; Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece
[GC], no. 25701/94, § 87, ECHR 2000 XII; and Zvolský
and Zvolská v. the Czech Republic, no. 46129/99, §
67 in fine, ECHR 2002 IX).
- In
the present case the Court has no doubt – and this has not in
fact been disputed by the applicant – that the aim pursued by
the German legislature to return the property to the heirs of the
original Jewish owners, who were victims of persecution under the
National-Socialist regime, was “in the public interest”.
(c) Proportionality of the interference
- The
Court reiterates that interference with the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions must strike a “fair balance” between the
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements
of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights (see,
among many other authorities, Sporrong and Lönnroth v.
Sweden, 23 September 1982, § 69, Series A no. 52). The
concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a whole, including therefore the
second sentence, which is to be read in the light of the general
principle enunciated in the first sentence. In particular, there must
be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realised by any measure depriving a
person of his possessions
(see Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium,
20 November 1995, § 38, Series A no. 332).
In
determining whether this requirement is met, the Court recognises
that the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard both
to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the
consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest for
the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question (see
Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95
and 28443/95, § 75, ECHR 1999 III). Nevertheless, the Court
cannot fail to exercise its power of review which requires it to
determine whether the requisite balance was maintained in a manner
consonant with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions, within the meaning of the first sentence of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Zvolský and Zvolská,
cited above, § 69)
- Compensation
terms under the domestic legislation are material to the assessment
as to whether the contested measure respects the requisite “fair
balance” and, in particular, whether it imposes a
disproportionate burden on the applicant. In this connection, the
Court has already found that the taking of property without payment
of an amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute
a disproportionate interference and a total lack of compensation can
be considered justifiable under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in
exceptional circumstances (see Jahn and Others, cited above, §
94).
46. The Court first notes that the
Property Act, which governs disputes concerning property situated in
the former GDR, affords a priority right of restitution to the heirs
of the original Jewish owners, who were the first injured parties
prior to the heirs of owners whose land was expropriated in the
former GDR, who were thus the second injured parties, as was the case
for the community of heirs from whom the applicant in the present
case acquired his shares after German reunification. These second
injured parties are entitled either to the payment of consideration
equivalent to the original sale price or to compensation under the
Compensation Act (see relevant domestic law and practice, paragraphs
30-31 above). This also applies to the applicant, who was registered
in the land register as a member of the community of joint owners of
the inherited estate.
- In
that connection the Court further reiterates that the State has a
wide margin of appreciation in the enactment of laws in the unique
context of German reunification, having regard to the immense task
facing the legislature to deal with all the questions that
necessarily arose as a result of the changeover from a Communist
regime to that of a democratic market economy (see, in particular,
Maltzan and Others v. Germany (dec.) [GC], nos.
71916/01, 71917/01 and 10260/02, §§ 74, 77 and 110, ECHR
2005 V; Jahn and Others, cited above, § 113;
and lastly, mutatis mutandis, Vistiņš and
Perepjolkins v. Latvia, no. 71243/01, §
85, 8 March 2011).
- In the present case, the Court notes that the
applicant acquired the first share from the community of heirs on 11
April 1992, after the entry into force on 29 September 1990 of the
Property Act of 23 September 1990 and before the expiry of the
time-limit for restitution applications, fixed at 31 December
1992. In addition, the applicant had been duly informed by the notary
of the property’s history since the beginning of the century.
- The Court thus accepts the Government’s
reasoning to the effect that the applicant knowingly took the risk of
acquiring property against which a restitution claim could be made.
This is particularly the case for the acquisition of his second share
on 31 January 1997, over five years after the lodging of the
restitution applications on 8 September and 17 December 1992 by the
heirs of the original owners, and a few months after the decision of
13 October 1997 by the Office of the Land of Thuringia to
grant their request.
- However, the applicant did not complain of the
restitution as such but of the minimal amount of consideration
provided for by section 7a(2) of the Property Act, based on the
original sale price of the shares in the National-Socialist era. In
this connection, the Court notes that section 7a(3b) of the
Property Act also affords the applicant the possibility of seeking
payment of compensation under the Compensation Act, as he did on 26
July 2004. The procedure in this connection is still pending and the
Government assessed the amount of the compensation to which the
applicant would be entitled at DM 15,000.
- In
the present case, what appears crucial in the Court’s view is
first the aim of the Property Act, which was to afford a priority
right of restitution to the heirs of the original Jewish owners who
had been despoiled at the time of the National-Socialist regime, and
second the fact that the applicant acquired his shares after the
entry into force of the Property Act with full knowledge of the risk
that an application for restitution of the land might be lodged by
the heirs of the original owners. As regards the amount of the
consideration or compensation to which the applicant would be
entitled under the Property Act or the Compensation Act, the Court
observes that he cannot assert any rights going beyond those provided
for by those two Acts (see Maltzan and Others, cited
above, §§ 112-113, and Leuschner v. Germany
(dec.), no. 58623/00, 15 May 2007). The fact that the applicant
was entitled to claim compensation also distinguishes the present
case from the case of Jahn and Others, cited above,
where the second law amending the property legislation did not
provide for the payment of any compensation to the applicants (§
110).
- In
view of the foregoing, and in particular the exceptional
circumstances related to German reunification, the Court finds that
the respondent State has not overstepped its margin of appreciation
and that it has not failed, having regard to the legitimate aim
pursued, to strike a “fair balance” between the interests
of the applicant and the general interest of German society.
There
has therefore been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Holds that there has been no violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
Done in French and in English, and notified in writing on 8 December
2011, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Dean Spielmann
Registrar President
