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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF STAVEBNÁ SPOLOČNOSŤ TATRY POPRAD S.R.O.
v. SLOVAKIA
(Application
no. 7261/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 May 2011
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Stavebná
spoločnosť TATRY Poprad, s.r.o. v. Slovakia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Josep Casadevall,
President,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Alvina
Gyulumyan,
Ján Šikuta,
Luis López
Guerra,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Mihai Poalelungi,
judges,
and Santiago Quesada,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 5 April 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 7261/06) against the Slovak
Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by Stavebná spoločnosť TATRY
Poprad s.r.o. (“the applicant company”), on 9 February
2006. The authorised signatories to the application were MM. I.
Moravčík, L. Šípka and J. ČíZik.
- The
applicant company was represented by Mr F. Kočka, a lawyer
practising in Košice. The Government of the Slovak Republic
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs
M. Pirošíková.
- On
1 February 2010 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same
time (former Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant is a company with limited liability, with its registered
office in Poprad.
- On
6 July 1997 the applicant company’s predecessor sued a private
limited company for a sum due for construction works carried out by
the former.
- Courts
at two levels granted the claim in part, but the Supreme Court, in
proceedings on the defendant’s appeal on points of law, quashed
the lower courts’ judgments on 27 September 2001.
- In
subsequent proceedings, in December 2001, the plaintiff argued that
the relevant part of the contract was void, as it had been signed by
Mr K., who did not have the authority to act on behalf of the
defendant company, on 22 April 1996.
- On
5 February 2002 the Prešov Regional Court
dismissed the action. It established that the parties had
concluded a contract for the reconstruction of a spa house on 22
April 1996. The contract included a provision under which the
plaintiff was liable to pay a penalty in case of delay. That penalty
amounted to 0.5% of the contractual price for each day of delay, the
maximum amount being 20%. The court established that the work under
the contract had been completed on 13 December 1996 instead of
21 October 1996 as agreed in the contract. The defendant
had therefore rightly deducted the sum in issue from the payment of
the price.
- As
to the above argument concerning the validity of the relevant part of
the contract, the Regional Court held that Mr K. had been elected to
the company’s board of directors at an extraordinary general
meeting held on 12 April 1996. He had therefore been authorised to
sign the contract on the defendant’s behalf. The fact that he
had been entered in that capacity in the companies’ register on
28 May 1996 could not affect the position, as such an entry was of a
declaratory nature only.
- On
27 March 2002 the applicant company appealed. Its representative
argued that the first-instance court had disregarded the relevant
evidence when concluding that Mr K. had been authorised to sign the
contract for the defendant company. In particular, the applicant
company relied on the minutes of a meeting of that company’s
supervisory board held on 26 April 1996. Point 4 on the agenda was
entitled “Election of the Board of Directors” and the
minutes indicate that “the supervisory board approved Mr K. as
a new member of the company’s board of directors”. The
applicant further argued that there was nothing to prove that K. had
been effectively appointed to that post at the general meeting held
on 12 April 1996, contrary to what was stated in the Regional Court’s
judgment.
- On
12 June 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court judgment of
5 February 2002. As regards the standing of Mr K. to sign the
contract in particular, it held that the Regional Court had correctly
established that that person had been elected as a member of the
company’s board of directors at the general meeting held on 12
April 1996. He had therefore been entitled to sign the contract on 22
April 1996. According to one of the documents from the court’s
file, on 24 May 1996 the defendant company had requested that the
responsible court register Mr K. as a member of the company’s
board of directors with effect from 12 April 1996. The
judgment became final on 2 September 2003.
- On
23 September 2003 the applicant company appealed on points of law
against the judgment of 12 June 2003. It maintained that the appeal
court had not examined its arguments concerning the evidence in the
case and the standing of Mr K. to sign the contract in issue on the
defendant company’s behalf. The applicant company further
complained that at the end of the hearing before the appeal court its
representative had not been allowed to sum up the arguments or to
submit final comments on the case. The applicant company had thus
been prevented from acting before the court, which was a reason
justifying the admissibility of an appeal on points of law within the
meaning of Article 237(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- On
31 October 2003 the applicant company lodged a complaint under
Article 127 of the Constitution. It argued that its right under
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a fair hearing had been
breached by the conduct of the Supreme Court and its decision of 12
June 2003. In particular, the Supreme Court had disregarded the
applicant company’s arguments concerning the standing of Mr K.
to act on the defendant company’s behalf.
- The
Constitutional Court (First Chamber) dismissed that complaint on 25
February 2004. It held, with reference to Article 238 § 3(b) of
the Code of Civil Procedure, that an appeal on points of law was
available against the appeal court decision and that the applicant
company was required to use that remedy first. The relevant part of
its complaint was therefore premature.
- On
26 May 2005 the Supreme Court (chamber dealing with appeals on points
of law) dismissed the applicant company’s appeal on points of
law (see paragraph 12 above) as inadmissible. According to the
decision, “the applicant company was aware of the fact that the
admissibility criteria for an appeal on points of law under Articles
238 and 239 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not been met, as it
alleged a breach of its right of access to court, which is a ground
for an appeal on points of law listed in Article 237(f) of the Code
of Civil Procedure”.
- The
Supreme Court further held that the arguments concerning the
assessment of evidence and determination of the point in issue did
not permit the conclusion that the applicant company had been
prevented from acting before the appeal court within the meaning of
Article 237(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such arguments could
be raised only in cases where an appeal on points of law was
admissible on one of the grounds enumerated in Articles 238 or 239 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
- As
to the other argument, that the representative of the applicant
company had been prevented from making final submissions at the
hearing before the appeal court, the Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff had had ample opportunity to present its arguments in the
course of the hearing. No new evidence requiring comments from the
parties had been taken. The applicant company’s procedural
rights had therefore not been infringed in the proceedings leading to
the appellate court’s judgment of 12 June 2003. An appeal on
points of law under Article 237f of the Code of Civil Procedure was
therefore not available in that context.
- On
9 August 2005 the applicant company lodged a fresh constitutional
complaint. It complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
that its right to a fair hearing had been breached by the judgment of
the Prešov Regional Court of 5
February 2002, the Supreme Court’s (appellate chamber) judgment
of 12 June 2003 and the decision of the Supreme Court (chamber
dealing with appeals on points of law) of 26 May 2005. The
applicant company relied on the arguments which it had submitted in
the proceedings before the ordinary courts. In particular, it alleged
that the courts at the first and second levels of jurisdiction had
disregarded the position in the case and the plaintiff’s
arguments that the contract was void. The applicant further
complained that its representative had been unable to make final
submissions to the appeal court and that it had obtained no redress
in that respect in the proceedings on the appeal on points of law.
- The
Constitutional Court (Fourth Chamber) rejected the complaint on 27
September 2005. It held that the complaint about the Regional Court
and Supreme Court judgments of 5 February 2002 and 12 June 2003 had
been lodged after the expiry of the statutory time-limit of two
months. It declared manifestly ill-founded the complaint about the
Supreme Court decision of 26 May 2005. It held, in particular, that
the Supreme Court had considered the applicant company’s
arguments appropriately and had given sufficient and relevant reasons
for its decision on the applicant company’s appeal on points of
law.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The Constitution and the Constitutional Court Act 1993
- Article
127 of the Constitution provides:
“1. The Constitutional Court shall decide on
complaints lodged by natural or legal persons alleging a violation of
their fundamental rights or freedoms or of human rights and
fundamental freedoms enshrined in international treaties ratified by
the Slovak Republic ... unless the protection of such rights and
freedoms falls within the jurisdiction of a different court.
2. When the Constitutional Court finds that a complaint
is justified, it shall deliver a decision stating that a
person’s rights or freedoms set out in paragraph 1 were
violated as a result of a final decision, by a particular measure or
by means of other interference. It shall quash such a decision,
measure or other interference. When the violation found is the result
of a failure to act, the Constitutional Court may order [the
authority] which violated the rights or freedoms in question to take
the necessary action. At the same time the Constitutional Court may
return the case to the authority concerned for further proceedings,
order the authority concerned to abstain from violating fundamental
rights and freedoms ... or, where appropriate, order those who
violated the rights or freedoms set out in paragraph 1 to restore the
situation existing prior to the violation.
3. In its decision on a complaint the Constitutional
Court may grant adequate financial satisfaction to the person whose
rights under paragraph 1 were violated.” ...
- Under
section 53(1) of the Constitutional Court Act 1993, a complaint
to the Constitutional Court is admissible only where the applicant
has used effective remedies provided for by the law to protect his or
her fundamental rights. Paragraph 3 of the same section provides that
a complaint to the Constitutional Court can be lodged within two
months of a decision finally taking effect or from the date of a
contested measure or notification of another interference with a
person’s rights.
- Section
56(3) of the Constitutional Court Act 1993 provides that, when a
violation of fundamental rights or freedoms is found, the
Constitutional Court may order the authority liable for that
violation to proceed in accordance with the relevant rules. It may
also return the case to the authority concerned for further
proceedings, prohibit the continuation of the violation or, as the
case may be, order the restoration of the situation existing prior to
the violation.
B. Code of Civil Procedure
- Article
118 § 3 provides that parties can sum up their proposals and
comment on the evidence and the merits of a case at the end of a
court hearing.
- The
relevant provisions concerning appeals on points of law provide:
“Article 237
An appeal on points of law against any decision of the
appeal court is admissible where ...
f) a party has been prevented, by the appeal
court’s conduct, from acting before the court ...
Article 238
...3. An appeal on points of law is also
admissible against an appeal court judgment confirming the
first-instance judgment where the appeal court ...
b) upheld a judgment deciding on the matter
in a different manner than an earlier delivered judgment because the
first-instance court was bound by the legal view of the court which
had quashed the earlier judgment...”
C. The Supreme Court’s practice relating to appeals on
points of law
- In
its decision no. 1 Cdo 11/02 of 24 September 2002 the Supreme Court
found that availability of an appeal on points of law under Article
238 § 3 (b) did not extend to situations where an appeal court
upheld a fresh first-instance judgment deciding on the matter in a
different manner than in a judgment delivered earlier as a result of
the fact that the first-instance court was bound by the legal view
expressed by the court which had quashed such an earlier judgment in
the context of proceedings on appeal on points of law. Otherwise, the
last-mentioned court would be called upon to review, contrary to the
purpose of proceedings on an appeal on points of law, its own legal
view expressed when it quashed the original first-instance judgment
in the case. This decision was included in the collected Supreme
Court judgments and decisions under number 3/2004 with effect from
24 September 2004.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §
1 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant company cited Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and
complained that the domestic courts had disregarded the principle of
equality of arms and had decided arbitrarily. In particular, they had
based their decision concerning the validity of the contract on
evidence which had not been included in the file, had disregarded the
applicant company’s arguments and had failed to give relevant
reasons for their conclusion. It also complained that prior to the
delivery of the Supreme Court judgment of 12 June 2003 its
representative had not been allowed to sum up the applicant’s
submissions and, in particular, to orally request that the Supreme
Court should allow an appeal on points of law against its judgment.
- The
applicant company further complained that the Supreme Court had
dismissed its appeal on points of law and that in its two decisions
the Constitutional Court had refused to examine its complaint against
the judgment of the Regional Court of 5 February 2002 and the Supreme
Court judgment of 12 June 2003. It relied on Article 13 of the
Convention.
- Given
that the Court is free, in the performance of its task, to attribute
to the facts of the case a characterisation in law different from
that given by the applicant (see Camenzind
v. Switzerland,
judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions,
1997-VIII, § 50), it considered it appropriate, when
communicating the case to the Government, to examine this complaint
also from the viewpoint of the applicant company’s right of
access to court as guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
- The Government contested those
arguments and maintained that the application was manifestly
ill-founded.
- Article
6 § 1,
in its relevant part,
provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...
by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
- The Court considers, in the light of the
parties’ submissions, that the application raises serious
issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of
which requires an examination of the merits. The Court notes that the
application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is
not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
1. Alleged breach of the applicant company’s right of access
to court
(a) Arguments of the parties
- The
applicant maintained that the Constitutional Court had rejected its
first complaint as premature and then, after the appeal on points of
law had been declared inadmissible by the Supreme Court, it had
rejected the relevant part of its second complaint as out of time. As
a result, the Constitutional Court had failed to examine a part of
the complaint made by the applicant company. It had therefore been
prevented from seeking redress in respect of the alleged breach of
its right to a fair trial before the Constitutional Court.
- The
Government argued that the Constitutional Court, in its first
decision, had refused to deal with the applicant company’s
complaint because the applicant company had not made use of the
available remedy, namely an appeal on points of law, which was at its
disposal. This decision was adopted in line with the Constitutional
Court’s established practice. After the applicant company had
lodged an appeal on points of law, the Supreme Court examined the
applicant’s arguments in detail and found that appeal
inadmissible. As to the second constitutional complaint, the
Government maintained that the Constitutional Court had examined the
applicant company’s complaint on the merits, as it had dealt in
detail with the decision of the Supreme Court on the appeal on points
of law. It had thoroughly considered that decision, its reasoning and
the conclusion that the applicant company had not been prevented from
acting before the appeal court within the meaning of Article 237(f)
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- As
to the part of the constitutional complaint which had been rejected
as out of time, the Government noted that the Constitutional Court
had adopted a formal decision on all points of the summary of the
constitutional complaint. The applicant company’s argument as
to the unfairness of the proceedings had been examined on the merits
by courts at all levels of jurisdiction. The Government therefore
expressed the view that the manner in which the Constitutional Court
had dealt with the present two constitutional complaints had been
compatible with the applicant company’s right of access to
court.
(b) The Court’s assessment
(i) Recapitulation of the relevant principles
-
The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 does not guarantee
a right of appeal as such. However, where several levels of
jurisdiction do exist, each instance must comply with the guarantees
of Article 6, including the right of effective access to court (see,
mutatis mutandis, Brualla Gómez de la Torre v.
Spain, judgment of 19 December 1997, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, p. 2956, § 37). Moreover,
parties to proceedings must be able to exercise usefully the rights
of appeal or other remedy available to them (see Hadjianastassiou
v. Greece, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 252, p. 16,
§ 33, and Marpa Zeeland B.V. and Metal Welding B.V. v. the
Netherlands, no. 46300/99, § 48, ECHR 2004 X).
- The
“right to court”, of which the right of access is one
aspect, is not absolute; it is subject to limitations permitted by
implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility of
an appeal are concerned, since by its very nature it calls for
regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of
appreciation in this regard (see García Manibardo v. Spain,
no. 38695/97, § 36, ECHR 2000-II, and Mortier v. France,
no. 42195/98, § 33, 31 July 2001). Nonetheless, the
limitations applied must not restrict or reduce the individual’s
access in such a way or to such an extent as to impair the very
essence of the right. Furthermore, limitations will only be
compatible with Article 6 § 1 if they pursue a legitimate aim
and there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim pursued (see Guérin
v. France, judgment of 29 July 1998, Reports 1998-V,
p. 1867, § 37).
(ii) Application of the relevant principles to the
present case
- The
Court notes that in Slovakia Article 127 of the Constitution entitles
the Constitutional Court to examine complaints in which natural or
legal persons allege a breach of their fundamental rights and
freedoms and to provide redress, for example by quashing final
decisions given by other authorities including ordinary courts and to
return the case to such authorities for further proceedings. The
Court has required applicants in similar circumstances to exhaust
that remedy for the purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention. It sees no reason why the guarantees of a fair trial
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention should not extend also to
proceedings before the Constitutional Court (see also Süßmann
v. Germany, 16 September 1996, §§ 41-46,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 IV, and, a
contrario, Slovenské telekomunikácie, š.p.,
Herold Tele Media, s.r.o. and František Eke v. Slovakia
(dec.), no. 47097/99, 23 March 2004).
-
In the present case, the applicant company, in its first
constitutional complaint, alleged a breach of its right under Article
6 of the Convention to a fair trial in the proceedings leading to the
Supreme Court’s judgment of 12 June 2003. It argued, among
other issues, that the Supreme Court had disregarded its arguments
which concerned the validity of the relevant contract. In parallel,
it sought protection of its rights by means of an appeal on points of
law relying on Article 237(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- On
25 February 2004 the Constitutional Court rejected the above
complaint. Relying on section 53(1) of the Constitutional Court Act
1993, it held that the applicant company was obliged first to use the
other remedy available, namely an appeal on points of law. The
Constitutional Court expressly referred to Article 238 § 3(b) of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Subsequently,
a different chamber of the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant
company’s appeal on points of law holding that no relevant
ground rendering such a remedy admissible had been established. That
decision was in compliance with its earlier practice concluding that
Article 238 § 3(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure did not extend
to similar situations. The Supreme Court then dealt in more detail
with the argument concerning the denial of the right to sum up the
arguments and make final submissions prior to the conclusion of the
hearing before the appeal court. It held that the applicant company
had not thereby been prevented from acting before the appeal court
within the meaning of Article 237(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- The
applicant company then lodged a fresh constitutional complaint, in
which it again alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in the proceedings before ordinary courts at all three
levels. In its decision of 27 September 2005 the Constitutional
Court noted that the proceedings on the merits ended by the decision
of the appeal court which had become final on 2 September 2003. It
concluded that the applicant company’s complaint in respect of
the proceedings leading to that decision had been introduced outside
the time-limit of two months laid down in section 53(3) of the
Constitutional Court Act 1993.
- The
Constitutional Court further held that the Supreme Court gave
relevant and sufficient reasons for its conclusion, in the decision
on the appeal on points of law, that the applicant company’s
right to act before the appeal court had not been breached. There was
no appearance of a breach of Article 6 § 1 in the proceedings
concerning the appeal on points of law.
- The
Court notes that, as a result, the Constitutional Court excluded from
its review a part of the arguments which the applicant company made
in both complaints to it and which concerned the evidence put before
the ordinary courts at first and second levels of jurisdiction, the
reasoning in respect of the validity of the contract and, in
particular, the standing of Mr K. to act on behalf of the
defendant company.
- In
its first decision, the Constitutional Court held that such issues
could be reviewed in proceedings on an appeal on points of law, and
referred to Article 238 § 3(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
After the Supreme Court had refused to examine such complaints,
concluding that the above provision did not allow for an appeal on
points of law in similar cases, the Constitutional Court, in its
second decision, held that the statutory time-limit of two months
prevented it from dealing with the alleged shortcomings in the
proceedings leading to appeal court’s judgment of 12 June
2003.
- The
Court considers that the manner in which the Constitutional Court
dealt with the two complaints of the applicant company (see
paragraphs 43 and 44 above) prevented it from asserting its rights
and effectively using the remedy available under Article 127 of the
Constitution in respect of a substantial part of the case and that,
accordingly, the very essence of the applicant company’s “right
to court” was impaired (see paragraph 36 above and also,
mutatis mutandis, Vodárenská akciová
společnost, a. s. v. the Czech Republic, no. 73577/01, 24
February 2004, §§ 32 and 34; Zvolský and
Zvolská v. the Czech Republic, no. 46129/99, §§ 54
and 55, ECHR 2002 IX, and Běleš and Others v. the
Czech Republic, no. 47273/99, § 69, ECHR 2002 IX).
- There
has therefore been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
2. Other alleged breaches of Article 6 § 1
- The
applicant company complained that the courts had based their decision
concerning the validity of the contract on evidence which had not
been included in the file, had disregarded its arguments and had
failed to give relevant reasons for their conclusions. It also
complained that its representative had not been allowed to sum up the
submissions or to orally request that the Supreme Court should allow
an appeal on points of law against its judgment.
- The
Government stated that the courts had based their conclusion on the
basis of the documents in the file, noting that courts had been free
to take evidence not proposed by the parties. They concluded that the
applicant company had not been prevented from submitting other
evidence or raising other arguments, and that the guarantees in
Article 6 § 1 had been respected.
- Having
regard to its conclusion, above, that there was a violation of the
applicant company’s right of access to court within the meaning
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and considering that it has
only limited powers to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly
committed by national authorities, the Court does not find it
necessary to examine separately the applicant company’s
remaining complaints raised under that provision (see also Čanády
v. Slovakia (no. 2), no. 18268/03, 20 October 2009, with further
references).
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
- Under
Article 13 of the Convention the applicant complained that the
Supreme Court had dismissed its appeal on points of law and that in
its two decisions the Constitutional Court had refused to hear its
complaint against the Regional Court judgment of 5 February 2002 and
the Supreme Court’s judgment of 12 June 2003.
- The
Government maintained that the applicant company had at its disposal
effective domestic remedies, namely an appeal on points of law to the
Supreme Court and the complaint procedure under Article 127 of the
Constitution. The present complaint was thus manifestly ill-founded.
- The
Court considers that this complaint is closely linked to the
above-mentioned applicant company’s complaint under Article 6 §
1. It must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
- In
view of the finding of a breach of the applicant company’s
right under Article 6 § 1 of access to court (see paragraph 47
above), the Court further considers that it is not necessary to
examine whether in this case there has been a violation of Article
13.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- In
a letter of 8 June 2010 the Court invited the applicant company to
submit its just satisfaction claims by 20 July 2010. The attention of
its representative was drawn to Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. The
applicant company’s lawyer submitted such claims in a letter
sent by fax on 22 July 2010, explaining that the
above-mentioned time-limit had not been respected due to a holiday
period at the applicant company.
- Noting that no just satisfaction claims were submitted
within the given time-limit and no extension of time had been
requested before the expiry of that period, the Court makes no award
under Article 41 of the Convention (see also, A.R., spol. s r.o.
v. Slovakia, no. 13960/06, §§ 63-65, 9 February 2010,
with further references, or Ryabykh v. Russia,
no. 52854/99, §§ 66-68, ECHR 2003 IX).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the applicant company’s
right of access to a court;
- Holds that there is no need to examine
separately the other complaints raised under Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention;
- Holds that there is no need to examine the
complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 May 2011, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Josep Casadevall
Registrar President
