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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF BODOR v. HUNGARY
(Application
no. 31181/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14 June
2011
This
judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Bodor v. Hungary,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a
Committee composed of:
Dragoljub Popović,
President,
András Sajó,
Paulo Pinto
de Albuquerque, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos,
Deputy Section Registrar.
Having
deliberated in private on 24 May 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 31181/07) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Hungarian national, Mr Jenő Bodor (“the applicant”),
on 12 July 2007.
- The
applicant was represented by Ms M. Regász, a lawyer practising
in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by Mr L.
Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
- On
5 May 2010 the
President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol No. 14,
the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Érd.
- The
applicant was arrested on 5 October 2000 on suspicion of having
committed several counts of fraud and forgery of private documents.
- The
Budapest X/XVII District Prosecutor's Office preferred a bill of
indictment in respect of the applicant and forty-two other defendants
on 19 June 2003.
- After
issuing numerous arrest warrants, the Pest Central District Court
held several hearings. On 19 February 2009 it delivered a judgment in
respect of sixteen defendants. The public prosecutor submitted an
appeal in case of two defendants, where the District Court stated in
the reasoning of its judgment that the length of the criminal
proceedings was taken into account among the mitigating
circumstances.
- The
first-instance judgment in respect of the applicant was delivered on
15 April 2010. The applicant was found guilty, inter alia, of
aggravated fraud and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment whose
enforcement was suspended for two years and exempted in advance from
the effects of criminal conviction. The applicant did not appeal
against this judgment and therefore received only a short version of
the judgment, based on section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which did not contain a detailed reasoning.
THE LAW
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
Government argued in particular that the applicant could not be
considered as victim, as his sentence had been mitigated due to the
protraction of the proceedings, therefore providing him sufficient
redress. Even though the shortened judgment did not expressly contain
the reasons for mitigation, the Government highlighted that the
protraction of criminal proceedings is generally taken into
consideration by the trial courts as a mitigating factor. Considering
that the sentence for the offence for which the applicant was
convicted would in theory be imprisonment from two to eight years,
the applicant's lenient sentence resulted from the mitigation due to
the length of proceedings. Moreover, the Government referred to the
detailed judgment delivered in the same proceedings in respect of two
other defendants, where the District Court had expressly acknowledged
the protraction of the proceedings. Finally, the Government
considered that the applicant waived his right to appeal against the
judgment and therefore also waived his right to an explicit
acknowledgment of the protraction of the criminal proceedings against
him.
- The
applicant contested these arguments.
- The Court recalls that the mitigation of a sentence on
the ground of the excessive length of proceedings does not in
principle deprive the individual concerned of his status as a victim
within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. However,
this general rule is subject to an exception when the national
authorities have acknowledged in a sufficiently clear way the failure
to observe the reasonable time requirement and have afforded redress
by reducing the sentence in an express and measurable manner (see
Eckle v. Germany, of 15 July 1982, Series A no. 51, § 66
and Beck v. Norway, no. 26390/95, 26 June 2001).
However, in the present case, the reasons for mitigation cannot be
established with certainty because the District Court delivered a
shortened judgment.
- As
regards the absence of appeal against the judgment, the Court is
unable to share the Government's view on this matter. It cannot be
imputed to the applicant that he did not lodge an appeal against the
judgment, further contributing to the protraction of the proceedings.
The Government's objection must therefore be rejected.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 5 October 2000 and
ended on 15 April 2010. It thus lasted nine years and six months for
one level of jurisdiction. In view of such lengthy proceedings –
and in the absence of any other reason for inadmissibility –
the application must be declared admissible.
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
application (see Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC],
no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject,
the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
- Relying
on Article 41 of the Convention, the applicant claimed 12,000 euros
(EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The Government contested
the claim, submitting that the finding of a violation by the Court
should in itself be regarded as constituting just satisfaction for
the applicant, having regard to the mitigation of his sentence.
Moreover, they pointed out that it would be unjust to give double
redress to those who had waived their right to a reasoned judgment in
criminal proceedings as opposed to those who had not waived that
right.
- The
Court is of the opinion that in the absence of a detailed reasoning
listing the reasons of mitigation, the grounds for the applicant's
light sentence cannot be established with absolute certainty.
Therefore the mitigation cannot constitute just satisfaction for the
protracted length of the proceedings. It considers that the applicant
must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage and awards him EUR
10,000 under this head.
- The
applicant has not submitted a costs claim.
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months,
EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable,
in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Hungarian
forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement,
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 June 2011, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-Passos Dragoljub Popović
Deputy
Registrar President
