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European Court of Human Rights |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> ARMSTRONG v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 65282/09 - HECOM [2012] ECHR 1676 (10 July 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2012/1676.html Cite as: [2012] ECHR 1676 |
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FOURTH SECTION
Application no. 65282/09
Peter Charles ARMSTRONG
against the United Kingdom
lodged on 27 November 2009
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicant, Mr Peter Charles Armstrong, is a British national, who was born in 1955 and is currently detained at HM Prison Dovegate, Staffordshire.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 3 August 2007, the applicant stabbed a man at his home in Liverpool. The man died of his injuries. When the police arrived at the house, they found the applicant sitting in a chair, and he told them, “He’s my best friend and I’ve stabbed him.” The applicant was arrested and taken to the police station. When interviewed, he claimed that the victim had entered the house and attacked him, and that he was acting in self-defence.
The applicant was charged with murder and his trial began in the Crown Court before a jury. The applicant’s defence to the charge was one of self-defence.
A member of the jury informed the court that he was a retired police officer. He had been retired for many years and had not served in any of the units involved in the case. He did not recognise the names of any of the police officers in the case. The judge brought the matter to the attention of counsel, but neither prosecution nor defence suggested that the juror be discharged.
On the second day of the trial, another member of the jury informed the court that he was a serving police officer and that he recognised a man sitting at the back of the court. The man in question was the officer in charge of the case, but the prosecution did not intend to call him as a witness. The man had already informed the prosecution that he recognised the juror and that they had worked together some four years earlier at St Helen’s police station.
Prosecuting counsel submitted that it would be sufficient if the man were to remain outside, as the rest of the jury did not know who he was. Defence counsel said that he would like to know how much the juror knew about the man and about other officers involved in the case. The judge directed that the juror be questioned.
When questioned, the juror confirmed that he knew the man when they had both been based at St Helen’s police station. He said that he had not seen the man since the latter left St Helen’s some four years earlier. He said that the man had been his inspector for a few months but that he had never seen him socially or out of hours. He explained that he was still based at St Helen’s and did not know the other police officers involved in the case. The officers in the case were all based in Liverpool.
The judge was satisfied that the juror was not aware that the man was the officer in charge of the case. He ruled that it was satisfactory for the juror to continue to serve and defence counsel agreed to that course.
On 15 January 2008 the applicant was convicted of murder. On 24 January 2008 he was sentenced to life imprisonment with a tariff of thirteen years. He sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal on the ground that the presence of the serving police officer on his jury created a real possibility of actual or apparent bias which rendered his conviction unsafe.
On 28 November 2008 permission to appeal was refused on the papers. The judge considered that no fair-minded and informed observer with full knowledge of the relevant facts as disclosed in the discussions between counsel and the trial judge would conclude that there was a real possibility that the jury were biased. He further observed that the police evidence was not in dispute and that the applicant’s trial counsel, who was pre-eminently placed to assess the situation, had made no objection to either juror sitting on the jury after full inquiry had been concluded.
The applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal before the full court. He argued that bias in his case arose from the following factors: that police witnesses and other witnesses closely connected to the police were cross-examined; that the juror was an officer in the same police force as the police witnesses and the officer in charge of the case, although was not based at the same police station; and that the juror had served under the officer in charge of the case some four years earlier.
On 8 June 2009 the Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal. It noted the factors relied on by the applicant as suggesting bias, but considered that, against those factors, were the fact that the juror had no particular knowledge of the facts of the case; that he knew none of the police witnesses who were due to be called; and that he had had no contact with the officer in charge of the case for some four years. The court rejected the suggestion that the juror had worked out that the man at the back of the court was the officer in charge of the case, or indeed that he had any connection with the case. It concluded:
“1.20 It is apparent that the mere fact that a juror is a serving policeman is not sufficient to give rise to a real risk of bias. There must be some other factor connecting him to the case in order to give rise to that risk. This was not a case in which the police evidence was in any sense hotly contested, despite the fact that some of the witnesses were cross-examined. In the circumstances, in our view, the suggestion that there was some additional connection between this juror and the office in charge of the case could be little more than speculation.”
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
In brief, pursuant to section 1 of the Juries Act 1974 as amended, all persons aged eighteen to seventy who are registered as parliamentary or local electors and have been ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom for a period of at least five years since the age of thirteen are eligible for jury service and are therefore under a duty to attend court if summoned. Formerly, those involved in the administration of justice were automatically disqualified from serving on a jury. This disqualification was removed by section 321 and schedule 33 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which entered into force in 2004.
In R v. Abdroikof and Others [2007] UKHL 37, the House of Lords held that no argument about the general undesirability of police officers serving on juries could succeed in light of the change in the law. However, it considered that where there was a crucial dispute regarding police evidence, and the police witness and police juror shared the same local service background, an issue might arise as to the objective impartiality of the tribunal.
C. Approach in other relevant jurisdictions
For a summary of the approach in other jurisdictions, see the Court’s judgment in Hanif and Khan, cited above, §§ 93-125.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains about his trial and conviction for murder, and in particular about the presence of a retired police officer and a serving police officer on his jury.
He further complains that he was attacked and beaten at the police station by uniformed officers.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
