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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF
C. v. IRELAND
(Application
no. 24643/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
1 March
2012
This
judgment is final. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of C. v. Ireland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a
Committee composed of:
Mark Villiger, President,
Dean
Spielmann,
André Potocki, judges,
and
Stephen Phillips,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 7 February 2012,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an
application (no. 24643/08) against Ireland
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an
Irish national, Mr C. (“the applicant”), on 24 April
2008. The President of the Section
acceded to the applicant’s request not to have his name
disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).
- The
applicant was represented by Mr B. Flanagan, a solicitor practising
in Co. Galway. The Irish Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Co-Agent, Mr P. White,
of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
- On
14 December 2010 the
President of the Third Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Dublin.
He was a teacher at a school in Dublin in the 1980s.
- In
July 1998 the applicant was charged with sexual offences in 1982 as
regards A, B, C, D and E (minors and students in the school).
- On
5 October 1998 he was returned for trial. The trial was due to
commence in February 1999 but it was adjourned (the applicant’s
request) due to publicity surrounding the trial. The trial was
re-listed for 15 November 1999: on that date the indictment was
severed (the applicant’s request) so that separate consecutive
trials would take place as regards each complainant.
1. Proceedings concerning A, B, C and D
- On
15 November 1999 the trial proceeded on the charges raised by A. The
applicant was acquitted nine days later.
- On 24 January 2000 the trial on charges concerning B
began. The jury was dismissed and the trial was reset for 22 May
2000.
- On 22 March 2000 the applicant was tried and convicted
of 2 counts of sexual assault of C and sentenced to four years’
imprisonment.
- On 22 May 2000 the trial concerning B recommenced. He
was acquitted of a charge of rape but convicted on five counts of
sexual assault. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment
(one year of which was suspended), which sentence was to run
concurrently with the sentence in respect of C. During the trial the
applicant had unsuccessfully applied to stay the indictment on
grounds of delay; on 22 May 2000 he was accorded leave to appeal the
refusal of the stay; on 27 January 2003 the Court of Criminal Appeal
(“CCA”) dismissed his appeal; in March 2003 the CCA
granted the applicant leave to appeal on a point of law of
exceptional public importance to the Supreme Court (section 24 of the
Courts of Justice Act 1924); on 15 June 2006 the Supreme Court heard
the appeal; and on 27 July 2006 judgment, dismissing the appeal, was
delivered.
- On 26 June 2001 the trial on the charges concerning D
began. The indictment was quashed on grounds of delay (the
applicant’s application).
2. Proceedings concerning E
- E
was 12 years of age at the time of the alleged offences in 1982. She
complained to the police in June 1998. On 15 July 1998 the applicant
was charged with indecent assault contrary to the Criminal Law (Rape)
Act 1981. As noted above, on 5 October 1998 he was returned for trial
on all charges (students A-E) and the trial was adjourned to 15
November 1999, on which date the indictments were severed.
- The
trial concerning E was listed for 10 June 2002. However, since no
judge was available, it was re-listed for 12 January 2004.
- On 6 May 2003 the applicant was released
from prison (sentence following conviction on offences against C).
- On 7 July 2003 the applicant applied on an ex parte
basis to the High Court for, and was granted, leave to apply by way
of judicial review to prohibit the proceedings on grounds of delay
since the alleged offence as well as for a stay on those proceedings
pending the prohibition action. On 10 February 2004 a statement of
opposition was delivered.
- On 11 March 2005 the High Court ruled (detailed
judgment) that the delay in pursuing the charges was such that his
applicant’s ability to defend the charges had probably been
prejudiced so that there was a risk of an unfair trial and it
prohibited the applicant’s prosecution.
- In April 2005 the prosecution appealed to the Supreme
Court. The appeal was adjourned on a number of occasions, although
the dates and reasons are not clear. On 20 December 2007 the Supreme
Court heard the appeal. On 4 March 2008 judgment was delivered
allowing the appeal (the court not being satisfied that there was a
real or serious risk of an unfair trial) so that the prosecution
could proceed.
- On 20 October 2008 the applicant pleaded guilty to the
offence of indecent assault of E. On 9 February 2009 he was sentenced
to 3 years’ imprisonment. He appealed against sentence arguing
that that sentence amounted to a consecutive sentence whereas
concurrent sentences were the practice where offences were committed
against several victims. On 5 November 2009 the CCA rejected his
argument, but suspended the last 12 months of his sentence subject to
probation and therapy.
- The applicant was released from prison in July 2010.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION (LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS)
- The
applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings against him concerning E was incompatible with the
“reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any
criminal charge against him everyone is entitled to a ... hearing
within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 15 July 1998 and ended
on 5 November 1999. It thus lasted 11 years and 4 months for two
levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among
many other authorities, Pélissier and
Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, §
67, ECHR 1999-II). The Court has frequently found
violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising
issues similar to the one in the present case (for example, McFarlane
v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, 10 September 2010).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
- There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
(FAIRNESS OF PROCEEDINGS)
- The
applicant further complained that it would be unfair to continue the
proceedings concerning E because he would not receive a fair trial
given the above-noted delay. However, the applicant pleaded guilty
and did not suggest that that plea was anything other than voluntary
and informed: he cannot therefore claim to be a victim of any alleged
procedural unfairness.
- It
follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione personae
with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article
35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §
4.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicant submitted observations which he referred to as just
satisfaction claims but which contained observations on the merits
only. The applicant has not therefore made any just satisfaction
submissions to the Court. Having regard to Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court and the Practice Direction of 28 March 2007 on Just
Satisfaction Claims, the Court makes no award under this heading.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings concerning E admissible and the remainder
of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Dismisses the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 1 March 2012, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen
Phillips Mark Villiger Deputy Registrar President
