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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF ROÏDAKIS v. GREECE (No. 3)
(Application
no. 38998/09)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
6 March
2012
This
judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Roïdakis v. Greece (No. 3),
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a
Committee composed of:
Anatoly
Kovler,
President,
Linos-Alexandre
Sicilianos,
Erik
Møse,
judges,
and André Wampach,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 14 February 2012,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an
application (no. 38998/09) against the
Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Greek national, Mr Nikolaos Roïdakis (“the applicant”),
on 25 June 2009.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr A. Kaloutsakis, a lawyer practising
in Athens. The Greek Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent’s delegates,
Mr I. Bakopoulos and Ms G. Kotta, Legal Assistants at the State Legal
Council.
- On
10 December 2010 the
President of the First Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. In accordance
with Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of
three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Athens.
- On
21 August 1997 he lodged an
opposition (ανακοπή)
with the Athens First Instance Civil Court challenging his arrest as
compulsory enforcement measure regarding a decision of the Athens
First Instance Civil Court issued against him for unpaid debt to an
individual (decision no. 951/1995).
- On
30 October 1998 the opposition was rejected (judgment no. 8769/1998).
- On
30 November 1998 the applicant filed an appeal before the Athens
Civil Court of Appeal challenging the court’s findings and its
evaluation of the evidence.
- By
judgment dated 21 June 1999, the court accepted the applicant’s
appeal and the case was remitted to the Athens First Instance Civil
Court in order to be retried (judgment no. 5619/1999).
- On
6 March 2001 a preliminary decision was issued partially rejecting
the applicant’s opposition and asking him to submit
supplementary evidence regarding the remainder of his allegations
(judgment no. 1923/2001).
10. On
17 June 2002 the applicant filed an application asking
for a hearing date to be set as soon as possible.
- On
15 March 2004, after a subsequent re-hearing was held, the Athens
First Instance Civil Court rejected the applicant’s opposition
(judgment no. 1299/2004).
- On
2 February 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal challenging the First
Instance Court’s decisions nos. 1923/2001
and 1299/2004.
- By
judgment dated 6 March 2009, the Athens Civil Court of Appeal
accepted the applicant’s appeal after quashing the ruling of
the first instance court. Subsequently, after examining the
applicant’s opposition de novo, the court held that it
was well founded (judgment no.
1236/2009).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 21
August 1997, when the applicant lodged the opposition before the
Athens First Instance Civil Court, and
ended on 6 March 2009, when judgment no.
1236/2009 of the Athens Court of Appeal was published. It thus
lasted more than eleven years and six months
for two levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court reiterates that for Article 6 § 1 to be applicable under
its “civil” head, there must be a “dispute”
over a “right” which can be said, at least on arguable
grounds, to be recognised under domestic law (see,
among other authorities, James and Others v. the United
Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 81, Series A no. 98,
and Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, 21
February 1990, § 36, Series A no. 172).
- In
the present case the Court observes that Article 6 is applicable to
the proceedings in question as the opposition
that the applicant lodged challenging his arrest
as compulsory enforcement measure, was related to
a decision of the Athens First Instance Civil Court issued
against him for unpaid debt to an individual (no. 951/1995).
Therefore, the subject matter of the claim was founded on the alleged
infringement of rights of a pecuniary nature (see Enea v.
Italy [GC], no. 74912/01, §§ 97 and 103-107, ECHR
2009 ....). Moreover, the Court notes that the proceedings
concerned in substance the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty
and that, the right to liberty, which was thus at stake, is a civil
right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see
Laidin v. France (no. 2), no. 39282/98, §§
74-77, 7 January 2003).
- In
view of the above the Court notes that the application is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a)
of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on
any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France
[GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
- The
Court considers at the outset that the overall length of the
proceedings in the present case, which was approximately eleven years
and six months for two levels of jurisdiction, appears to be
excessive. It is true that the applicant was responsible for some
delays over the entire course of the proceedings. In particular, the
Court observes a delay regarding the lodging of an application asking
for a hearing date to be set after preliminary decision no.
1923/2001 of the Athens First Instance Civil
Court was issued and the lodging of an appeal with the Athens Civil
Court of Appeal challenging the First Instance Court’s
decisions nos. 1923/2001
and 1299/2004. These delays correspond
approximately to four years of the total length of the proceedings.
Nevertheless, the Court does not find that it was the applicant’s
conduct alone which contributed to the prolonged length of the
proceedings. On the contrary, the Court is of the opinion that the
actual length of the proceedings, which was more than seven years, -
without taking into account the applicant’s delays - remains
excessive. In particular, it is noted that the
actual duration of the proceedings when the case was pending the
second time before the Athens First Instance Civil Court
- which lasted approximately three years and six months - was
attributable to the national courts. Their handling of the
case did not facilitate its timely completion. In the Court’s
opinion, the length of the proceedings can be explained by the
failure of the domestic courts to deal with the case diligently (see
Gümüÿten v. Turkey,
no. 47116/99, §§ 24-26, 30 November
2004).
- Thus,
in the light of the criteria laid down in its case-law and having
regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that
the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the
“reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant further complained of the fact that in Greece there was no
court to which application could be made to complain of the excessive
length of proceedings. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention
which provides as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in the Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before
a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above
and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
- The
Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy
before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement
under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156,
ECHR 2000-XI). It notes that the objections and arguments put forward
by the Government have been rejected in earlier cases (see
Konti-Arvaniti v. Greece, no. 53401/99, §§ 29-30, 10
April 2003 and Tsoukalas v. Greece, no. 12286/08, §§
37-43, 22 July 2010) and sees no reason to reach a different
conclusion in the present case.
- Accordingly,
the Court considers that in the present case there has been a
violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of a
remedy under domestic law whereby the applicant could have obtained a
ruling upholding his right to have his case heard within a reasonable
time, as set forth in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 300,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non pecuniary
damage.
- The
Government considered the amount claimed exorbitant and submitted
that the finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just
satisfaction. They submitted, however, that if the Court considers
that an award should be made, an amount of EUR 3,000 would be
adequate and reasonable.
- The
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non pecuniary
damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 6,000 under
that head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant claimed EUR 1,647.10 for costs and expenses incurred both
before the domestic courts and the Court. He produced four separate
bills of costs; three for the sum of EUR 1,047.10 for the costs
incurred before the domestic courts and one for the sum of EUR 600
regarding those incurred before the Court.
- In
so far as the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts
are concerned, the Government observed that those were not causally
linked with the protracted length of the proceedings and that this
claim should be dismissed. As regards the costs and expenses incurred
before the Court, the Government did not express an opinion on
the matter.
- According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum (see Iatridis
v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC],
no. 31107/96, § 54, ECHR 2000 XI).
- Regarding
the applicant’s claim in respect of the costs incurred before
the domestic courts, the Court has already ruled that the length of a
procedure could result in increased costs for the applicant before
the domestic courts and should therefore be taken into account (see
Capuano v. Italy,
25 June 1987, § 37, Series A no. 119). The Court notes, however,
that the costs in this case were not caused by the length of
proceedings but were costs normally incurred in the context of the
proceedings. Thus, the Court does not discern any causal link between
the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore
rejects this claim.
- In
respect of the claim for costs incurred before the Court, regard
being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the
Court considers it reasonable that the sum claimed, namely EUR 600
should be awarded in full, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the
applicant.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should
be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application
admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months, the following amounts:
(i) EUR
6,000 (six thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii)
EUR 600 (six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to
the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 March 2012, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Anatoly Kovler
Deputy
Registrar President