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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF
JUHAS ĐURIĆ v. SERBIA
(Application
no. 48155/06)
JUDGMENT
(Revision)
STRASBOURG
10 April
2012
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Juhas Đurić v. Serbia (request for
revision of the judgment of 7 June 2011),
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise Tulkens,
President,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Dragoljub
Popović,
Işıl Karakaş,
Guido
Raimondi,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen
Keller, judges,
and Stanley
Naismith, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 20 March 2012,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 48155/06) against Serbia
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Serbian national, Mr Viktor Juhas Đurić
(“the applicant”), on 20 November 2006.
- In
a judgment delivered on 7 June 2011, the Court, inter alia,
found that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention as regards the applicant’s access to a court in the
determination of his civil rights and obligations.
- On
8 August 2011 the applicant, himself a licensed attorney, requested
revision of the judgment in question within the meaning of Rule 80
of the Rules of Court.
- On
11 October 2011 the Court considered this request and decided to give
the Government until 23 November 2011 to submit any written
observations. Those observations were received on 21 November 2011.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1966. He is a practising lawyer and lives in
Subotica, Serbia.
- The
facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as
follows.
A. The applicant’s request regarding D.G.
- On
19 May 2004 the Police Department in Subotica appointed the applicant
to represent D.G., a suspect in a preliminary criminal investigation,
during his questioning by the police. The applicant provided no legal
assistance to the suspect beyond this hearing.
- On
the same day the applicant filed a request with the police, seeking
payment of his fees in accordance with the Tariff issued by the Bar
Association.
- Having
received no response, on 13 September 2004 the applicant lodged a
civil claim with the Municipal Court in Subotica, requesting that his
fees be covered (7,800 Serbian Dinars, “RSD”,
approximately 105 Euros, “EUR”, at the time, according to
the exchange rate of the National Bank of Serbia).
- On
21 April 2005, the Municipal Court rendered a judgment in default
(presuda zbog izostanka) in favour of the applicant. It
thereby ordered the Police Department to pay him a total of RSD
18,800 (approximately EUR 230 at the time), on account of his fees
and litigation costs, plus statutory interest.
- On
15 August 2005 the District Court in Subotica quashed this judgment
on appeal.
- On
23 January 2006 the Municipal Court declared itself as lacking
jurisdiction ratione materiae to consider the applicant’s
claim on its merit (oglasio se stvarno nenadleZnim za postupanje)
and ordered the applicant to pay RSD 10,500 for litigation costs
(approximately EUR 120 at the time).
- On
29 September 2006 the District Court confirmed this decision on
appeal and it thus became final.
- Both
the Municipal Court and the District Court reasoned, inter alia,
that the fees in question were related to a preliminary criminal
investigation, which was a specific kind of administrative
proceedings, not a formal criminal procedure, and concluded that his
claim was therefore not for the civil courts to determine. The police
themselves, however, had had an obligation to decide upon the
applicant’s request.
- On
13 November 2006 the applicant paid the litigation costs imposed
against him.
- On
23 January 2008, on the grounds that he had misdirected his payment
of 13 November 2006, the applicant was ordered once again to pay the
litigation costs at issue plus statutory interest. By March 2009 the
applicant therefore paid another RSD 18,068 (approximately EUR 190 at
the time).
B. The applicant’s request regarding G.I., D.Č.,
V.Đ., B.Đ. and D.Đ.
- On
31 July 2006 the Police Department in Subotica appointed the
applicant to represent G.I., D.Č.,
V.Đ., B.Đ. and D.Đ., all suspects in a preliminary
criminal investigation, during their questioning by the police.
- On
the same day the applicant filed a request with the police, seeking
payment of his fees in accordance with the Tariff issued by the Bar
Association (in total RSD 12,960, approximately EUR 155 at the time).
C. The applicant’s request regarding S.S., B.B.,
A.S., and D.J.
- On
6 August 2008, 24 April 2009, 19 May 2009 and 1 June 2009 the Police
Department in Subotica appointed the applicant to represent S.S.,
B.B., A.S., and D.J., all suspects in a preliminary criminal
investigation, during their questioning by the police.
- On
11 August 2008, 11 May 2009, 21 May 2009 respectively the applicant
filed a request with the police, seeking payment of his fees in
accordance with the Tariff issued by the Bar Association (in total
RSD 48,000, approximately EUR 500 at the time).
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Criminal Procedure Code (Zakonik o krivičnom
postupku; published in the Official Gazette of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia – OG FRY – nos. 70/01 and 68/02, as well as
the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia – OG RS –
nos. 58/04, 85/05 and 115/05)
- Article
193 § 1 provides, inter alia, that “criminal
procedure costs” (troškovi krivičnog postupka)
shall include all expenses incurred in connection with criminal
proceedings, “from their commencement until their conclusion”.
- Article
193 § 6 provides that the costs incurred in the course of a
preliminary criminal investigation (pretkrivični postupak),
which concern fees to be paid to a police-appointed lawyer, shall be
covered by the police themselves.
- Article
196 provides, inter alia, that a defendant who has been
convicted shall bear the costs of the criminal proceedings.
- Article
197 § 1 provides, inter alia, that should criminal
proceedings (krivični
postupak) against a defendant be discontinued, the indictment be
rejected, or the defendant be acquitted, the defence lawyer’s
fees shall be covered from the court’s budget.
- Article
197 § 6 provides, inter alia, that should the criminal
court reject a claim for costs made under Article 197 § 1, or
fail to rule thereupon within a period of three months, the defendant
and his or her lawyer shall have the right to file a separate claim
before the civil courts.
- Article
225, inter alia, sets out the general duties of the police
during a preliminary criminal investigation.
- Article
226 §§ 7-9, inter alia, regulates the questioning by
the police of persons suspected of having committed a crime, whose
statements may, under certain conditions, be used as evidence in the
subsequent criminal proceedings.
- Article
243 provides, inter alia, that a formal judicial investigation
shall commence upon the adoption of a specific judicial decision to
this effect.
B. The relevant commentary as regards Articles 193, 225
and 226 of the Criminal Procedure Code
- Costs
covered by the police in connection with Article 225 of the Criminal
Procedure Code cannot be considered as criminal procedure costs
within the meaning of Article 193 thereof (see Komentar Zakonika o
krivičnom postupku, Prof. dr Tihomir Vasiljević and
Prof. dr Momčilo Grubač, IDP Justinijan, Belgrade, 2005, p.
338, paragraph 2).
- General
duties of the police during a preliminary criminal investigation are
not formally regulated by the Criminal Procedure Code, the exception
to this rule being those activities referred to in Article 226 §§
7-9 (ibid., p. 397, paragraph 8).
C. The decision issued by the investigating judge of
the District Court in Subotica (Ki 25/04 of February 2005)
- The
investigating judge held, inter alia, that the defendant
against whom the charges had been dropped was not entitled to the
full recovery of his lawyer’s fees from the budget of the
District Court in Subotica. Specifically, he noted that since a part
of these fees concerned legal services rendered during a preliminary
criminal investigation it was up to the police themselves to cover
any such costs (the defendant’s lawyer in the domestic
proceedings being the applicant in the present case before the
Court).
D. The Civil Procedure Act 2004 (Zakon o parničnom
postupku; published in OG RS no. 125/04)
- Article
1 provides, inter alia, that the Civil Procedure Act shall be
applied to all property-related/pecuniary matters (imovinskopravni
sporovi), except those where the law specifically provides for
another procedure.
- Article
16 provides, inter alia, that should a court establish its
lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae it shall, ex officio,
reject the claim in question regardless of the stage of the
proceedings.
E. The Courts’ Act 1991 (Zakon o sudovima;
published in OG RS 46/91, 60/91, 18/92 and 71/92)
- Article
12 § 2 (a) provides that Municipal Courts shall have
jurisdiction to rule in respect of all property-related/pecuniary
claims (imovinskopravnim zahtevima) unless they fall within
the competence of the Commercial Courts.
- Article
17 § 1 (z) provides that the Supreme Court shall be competent to
assess the lawfulness of all final administrative decisions adopted
by the State, unless specifically provided otherwise by law.
- Article
17 § 2 (v) provides that the Supreme Court shall resolve any
conflicts of jurisdiction (rešava sukobe nadleZnosti)
between the lower courts.
F. The Organisation of Courts Act 2001 (Zakon o
uređenju sudova; published in OG RS
nos. 63/01, 42/02, 27/03, 29/04, 101/05 and 46/06)
- Article
4 provides that a court of law cannot refuse to consider a claim in
respect of which its jurisdiction has been established by law or the
Constitution.
G. The General Administrative Proceedings Act (Zakon o
opštem upravnom postupku; published in OG FRY nos. 33/97 and
31/01)
- Article
208 § 1 provides, inter alia, that in simple matters an
administrative body shall be obliged to issue a decision within one
month as of when the claimant had lodged his or her request. In all
other cases, the administrative body shall render a decision within
two months thereof.
- Article
208 § 2 enables the claimant whose request has not been decided
within the periods established in the previous paragraph to lodge an
appeal as if his or her request has been denied. Where an appeal is
not allowed, the claimant shall have the right to directly initiate
an administrative dispute before the competent court of law.
H. The Administrative Disputes Act (Zakon o upravnim
sporovima; published in OG FRY no. 46/96)
- Article
6 provides that an administrative dispute may only be instituted
against an “administrative act”, which is, inter alia,
an act/decision adopted by a State body in the determination of one’s
rights and obligations concerning “an administrative matter”.
- Article
9 § 1 (1) provides that an administrative dispute may not be
instituted against an “act”/decision rendered in matters
where judicial redress has been secured outside of the administrative
disputes procedure.
- Articles
8 and 24 provide, inter alia, that a claimant who lodged a
request with an administrative body shall have the right to institute
an administrative dispute before a court in the following situations:
(i) Should
an appellate body fail to issue a decision upon his or her appeal
within sixty days the claimant may repeat the request, and if the
appellate body declines to rule within an additional period of seven
days the claimant may institute an administrative dispute.
(ii) In
accordance with the conditions set out under (i) above, should a
first instance administrative body fail to issue a decision and there
is no right to an appeal, the claimant may directly institute an
administrative dispute.
(iii) Should
a first instance administrative body fail to issue a decision upon
the claimant’s request within sixty days, in matters where an
appeal has not been excluded, the claimant shall have the right to
lodge the said request with the appellate administrative body. Should
that body render a decision, the claimant shall have the right to
institute an administrative dispute against it, and should it fail to
rule the claimant shall be entitled to institute an administrative
dispute in accordance with the conditions set out under (i) above.
- Article
41 § 5 provides that where an administrative dispute has been
brought under Article 24 the court shall, should it rule in favour of
the claimant, order the administrative body in question to decide
upon the claimant’s original request.
- Articles
63 provides, inter alia, that should the said administrative
body fail to comply with this instruction within a period of thirty
days, the claimant shall be entitled to request the enforcement of
the court’s decision. Should the administrative body fail to
respond to this request within a period of seven days, the claimant
may petition the court to decide his case on the merits, i.e. to
adopt the necessary decision in the administrative body’s
stead. The court shall then request information from the
administrative body as to the reasons for its failure to comply with
the court’s order. Should the administrative body fail to
respond within a period of seven days or should its explanation fail
to satisfy the court, the court itself shall decide on the claimant’s
original request.
- Articles
41 §§ 1-4, 61 and 62 provide details as regards other
situations in which a claimant’s request may be decided on its
merits.
I. The relevant commentary as regards Article 24 of the
Administrative Disputes Act
- There
is no deadline for the institution of an administrative dispute in
accordance with Article 24 of the Administrative Disputes Act (see
Komentar Zakona o opštem upravnom postupku i Zakona o
upravnim sporovima, Svetislav Vuković, Poslovni biro,
Belgrade, 2006, p. 219).
J. The relevant domestic case-law provided by the
Government
- In
six judgments rendered between 8 December 1999 and 9 April 2009 the
Supreme Military Court and the Supreme Court of Serbia, respectively,
ruled on the merits of administrative disputes concerning pension
entitlements, the right to stand for elections, property-related
municipal decisions, disability benefits and the proposed change in
the registration of persons authorised to represent political parties
(see Up. br. 2530/03, UZ. 133/92, UZ. 11/08, U.br. 1739/08, U.br.
48/08 and U.br. 1093/02).
THE LAW
I. THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
- In
its judgment of 7 June 2011, inter alia, the Court held as
follows:
“65. ... [I]t is noted that the
applicant’s fees-related claims clearly fall within the scope
of Article 6 § 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Editions
Périscope v. France, 26 March 1992, § 40, Series A
no. 234 B). Further, while it is not this Court’s task to
decide which domestic court, civil or administrative, had
jurisdiction to determine these claims on their merits (see Beneficio
Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, no. 40786/98, § 29, ECHR
2004 VIII (extracts)), it is noted that: (i) the domestic civil
courts had considered the fees issue as an administrative matter and
had offered some reasoning in this respect (see paragraph 14 above);
(ii) the applicant could therefore have made use of the
administrative avenue and, if needed, brought his case to the Supreme
Court, apparently without a deadline for so doing (see paragraphs
38-46 above); and (iii) the Supreme Court could, ultimately, either
have ruled on the merits or indicated which other court had
jurisdiction to proceed (see paragraphs 44, 35 and 36 above, in that
order; compare also to Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino,
cited above, where both the civil and the administrative courts had
declined jurisdiction). Finally, the applicant has failed to provide
domestic case-law to the effect that in any other case such as his
own the civil courts had declared themselves competent ratione
materiae, whilst the respondent State has, for its part, produced
jurisprudence indicating that the domestic judiciary has been willing
to consider very diverse claims within an administrative disputes’
context, as well as to grant redress on the merits where appropriate
(see paragraph 47 above).”
- In
such circumstances, the Court concluded, unanimously, that the
applicant had not been denied access to a court in the determination
of his civil rights and obligations. Accordingly, there had been no
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. THE REQUEST FOR REVISION
- Rule
80 of the Rules of Court provides, in so far as relevant:
“A party may, in the event of the discovery of a
fact which might by its nature have a decisive influence and which,
when a judgment was delivered, was unknown to the Court and could not
reasonably have been known to that party, request the Court ... to
revise that judgment.
...”
- On
8 August 2011 the applicant filed a request for revision of the
Court’s judgment of 7 June 2011, disagreeing with its
conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention as regards his access to a court.
- The
applicant explained that on 20 June 2011 a major Serbian daily
newspaper, Politika, had published an article wherein it
reported that the Belgrade Court of First Instance (Prvi osnovni
sud u Beogradu), as confirmed by its spokesperson, had in the
last couple of years been dealing with an increasing number of
fees-related claims such as his own, and that many had been resolved
by means of the respondent State’s acceptance thereof within
the civil proceedings.
- Having
read the article on 25 June 2011, on 28 June 2011 the applicant filed
a request with the said court, seeking copies of the relevant
judgments.
- On
5 July 2011 the Belgrade Court of First Instance provided the
applicant with the copies sought. The four civil judgments in
question, of which three were based on the respondent State’s
explicit acceptance of the plaintiffs’ claims, had been adopted
between 28 March 2011 and 2 June 2011, and had all become final by 24
June 2011.
- The
applicant maintained that the Government must have been aware of the
said jurisprudence, yet had omitted to provide the Court with this
information, which would have been decisive for the outcome of the
present case – particularly given the Court’s holding in
paragraph 65 of the original judgment that “the applicant ha[d]
failed to provide domestic case-law to the effect that in any other
case such as his own the civil courts had declared themselves
competent ratione materiae ...” (see paragraph 48
above).
- The
Government endorsed the Court’s conclusion in its original
judgment, as well as its reasoning, and maintained that the domestic
court decisions provided by the applicant in support of his request
for revision could not be deemed “decisive” as required
under Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
- Additionally,
the applicant had failed to make use of the administrative avenue
although he had been instructed to do so by the first and second
instance civil courts in Subotica (see paragraphs 38-46 above).
- Lastly,
being a licensed lawyer himself, the applicant should have been aware
of the relevant domestic case-law and could have informed the Court
thereof, it being noted that all but one of the “new”
court decisions submitted by the applicant had become final before
the adoption of the Court’s original judgment (see paragraph 54
above).
- In
view of the above, the Court considers that, quite apart from the
other requirements contained in Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, the
jurisprudence discovered by the applicant would not, “by its
nature”, have been “decisive” within the meaning of
this provision.
- In
particular, the relevant civil judgments in the applicant’s
case had been adopted in 2006 while the judgments provided in support
of his request for revision were all rendered in 2011, some five
years later (see paragraphs 12, 13 and 54 above). It follows that
there is no new evidence that at the relevant time, i.e. in 2006, any
domestic civil courts had been willing to declare themselves
competent ratione materiae in a case such as the applicant’s.
Moreover, the applicant could have made use of the administrative
avenue and, if needed, brought his case to the Supreme Court, which,
ultimately, could either have ruled on the merits or indicated which
other court had jurisdiction to proceed (see paragraph 48 above).
- The
request for revision should therefore be refused.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Decides
to reject the applicant’s request for revision.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 April 2012, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Françoise Tulkens
Registrar President