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European Court of Human Rights |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> Andras LENGYEL v Hungary - 39202/09 [2012] ECHR 687 (20 March 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2012/687.html Cite as: [2012] ECHR 687 |
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SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no.
39202/09
András LENGYEL
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 20 March 2012 as a Committee composed of:
Dragoljub
Popović,
President,
András
Sajó,
Paulo
Pinto de Albuquerque,
judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 21 July 2009,
Having regard to the declaration submitted by the respondent Government on 8 November 2011 requesting the Court to strike the application out of the list of cases and the applicant’s reply to that declaration,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr András Lengyel, is a Hungarian national who was born in 1932 and lives in Budapest. He was represented before the Court by Ms T. Lengyel. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
On 25 March 1998 a limited liability company brought an action in compensation against the applicant before the Pest Central District Court based on a management agreement concluded between the parties.
On 1 November 1999 the case was transferred to the Budapest District Labour Court as the agreement was classified as employment contract.
Following unsuccessful out-of-court negotiations, the Labour Court found for the plaintiff on 13 October 2004.
On 21 September 2005 this judgment was quashed by the Budapest Regional Court and remitted to the first-instance court.
On 22
June 2006 the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s action,
which was modified on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on
2
May 2007.
On 11 March 2009 the Supreme Court partly upheld in part the Regional Court’s judgment but quashed the remainder of the judgment and found for the plaintiff.
The applicant was represented at the first stage of the proceedings by her wife and a lawyer of his choice, and through a State-appointed lawyer since 2006. The courts relied on documentary evidence and testimonies of a witness and the parties.
As a consequence of the outcome of the domestic proceedings, enforcement proceedings were initiated against the applicant.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained about the length, outcome and alleged unfairness of civil proceedings to which he was a party, and the alleged violation of his private and family life. He relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. As to the complaint about the length of proceedings
The applicant complained about the length of civil proceedings concerning a compensation dispute. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations..., everyone is entitled to a... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
After communication and unsuccessful friendly settlement negotiations, by a letter dated 8 November 2011 the Government informed the Court that they proposed to make a unilateral declaration with a view to resolving the issue raised by the application. They further requested the Court to strike out the application in accordance with Article 37 of the Convention.
The declaration provided as follows:
“The Government note that the efforts with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the case have been unsuccessful.
In this situation the Government hereby wish to express by way of unilateral declaration its acknowledgement of the reasonable length of the domestic proceedings in which the applicant was involved.
Consequently, the Government are prepared to pay to Mr
András Lengyel
8,000 (eight thousand) euros.
This sum, which is to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as well as costs and expenses (inclusive of value-added taxes paid on lawyer’s fees), will be converted into the national currency at the rate applicable on the date of payment, and will be free of any further taxes that may be applicable. It will be payable within three months from the date of notification of the decision taken by the Court pursuant to Article 37 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the event of failure to pay this sum within the said three-month period, the Government undertake to pay simple interest on it, from the expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. The payment will constitute the final resolution of the case.
The Government therefore invite the Court to strike the present case out of the list of cases. They suggest that the present declaration might be accepted by the Court as «any other reason» justifying the striking out of the case of the Court’s list of cases, as referred to in Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention.”
In a letter of 7 December 2011 the applicant expressed the view that the sum mentioned in the Government’s declaration was unacceptably low.
The Court recalls that Article 37 of the Convention provides that it may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to one of the conclusions specified, under (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 1 of that Article. Article 37 § 1 (c) enables the Court in particular to strike a case out of its list if:
“for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application”.
It also recalls that in certain circumstances, it may strike out an application under Article 37 § 1(c) on the basis of a unilateral declaration by a respondent Government even if the applicant wishes the examination of the case to be continued.
To
this end, the Court will examine carefully the declaration in the
light of the principles emerging from its case-law, in particular the
Tahsin Acar judgment (Tahsin Acar v. Turkey,
[GC], no. 26307/95, §§ 75-77,
ECHR 2003-VI); WAZA
Spółka z o.o. v. Poland (dec.) no. 11602/02,
26 June 2007; and Sulwińska v. Poland (dec.)
no. 28953/03).
The
Court has established in a number of cases, including those brought
against Hungary, its practice concerning complaints about the
violation of one’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time
(see, for example,
Váraljai v. Hungary, no.
31172/07, § 8, 15 June 2010; Frydlender v. France
[GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII; Cocchiarella
v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 69-98,
ECHR 2006 V.; Majewski v. Poland, no. 52690/99,
11 October 2005; and Wende and Kukówka v. Poland,
no. 56026/00, 10 May 2007).
Having regard to the nature of the admissions contained in the Government’s declaration, as well as the amount of compensation proposed – which is consistent with the amounts awarded in similar cases – the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of this part of the application (Article 37 § 1(c)).
Moreover, in light of the above considerations, and in particular given the clear and extensive case-law on the subejct, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of this part of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine).
In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike the case out of the list in so far as it concerns the complaint about the length of proceedings.
2. As to the alleged unfairness of the proceedings
Moreover, the applicant complained, relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, about the alleged unfairness of the proceedings. In particular, he claimed that due to his state of health, he had not been able to be present in person at the hearings and that State-appointed lawyer had only been provided for him in 2006. The Court observes, however, that he was duly represented before the domestic courts by his wife until the case was taken over by a State-appointed lawyer, who both made submissions on his behalf.
Accordingly, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the fairness of the proceedings. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
3. As to the complaint about the outcome of the proceedings
The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 about the outcome of the proceedings. In so far as this complaint may be understood to concern the assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999 I). In the present case, the Court is satisfied that the applicant’s submissions do not disclose any appearance that the courts lacked impartiality, or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
4. As to the Article 8 complaint
Lastly, relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that as a result of the domestic proceedings, their real estate had been subjected to enforcement proceedings and they will lose their home.
The Court observes that the enforcement proceedings are the result of final court judgment. The interference served the legitimate aim of protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as provided under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. In the absence of any sign of arbitrariness in the proceedings, this complaint is likewise manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Takes note of the terms of the respondent Government’s declaration under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and of the modalities for ensuring compliance with the undertakings referred to therein;
Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention, in so far as it concerns the complaint about the length of proceedings;
Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.
Françoise Elens-Passos Dragoljub
Popović
Deputy Registrar President