In the case of Gorovoy v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as
a Chamber composed of:
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque,
Ksenija Turković,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 4 June 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
54655/07) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Sergey Nikolayevich Gorovoy (“the
applicant”), on 15 October 2007.
The applicant, who had been granted legal aid,
was represented by Ms O. Druzhkova, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative
of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
The applicant complained, in particular, of the
length of his detention without sufficient reason and in appalling conditions.
On 27 May 2010 the application was communicated to
the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of
the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1970 and is serving a
prison sentence in Kemerovo Region.
A. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
On 5 December 2004 Ch. complained that a group of
men had tried to extort 7,000,000 Russian roubles from him. On the same date
the prosecutor’s office opened an investigation in respect of S. and four other
unidentified persons.
Following the applicant’s failure to appear for
questioning, on 14 January 2005 the prosecutor put his name on the wanted
persons’ list.
On 29 January 2005 the applicant was arrested on a
train going to Moscow. He was, inter alia, suspected of having
participated in the attempt of extortion.
On 31 January 2005 the Naberezhniye Chelny Town
Court remanded the applicant in custody pending investigation. In particular,
the court noted as follows:
“[The applicant] is suspected of having committed a crime which
entails a custodial sentence exceeding two years, and the court considers that
there are sufficient grounds to believe that, if released, he may abscond,
given that he is not domiciled in Naberezhniye Chelny, that he was apprehended
after his name had been put on the wanted persons’ list, that he may threaten
the witnesses and other parties to the criminal proceedings, and that he may
destroy evidence or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice.
[He] might continue his criminal activities, since the crime he is suspected of
was committed before the period of the suspended sentence imposed on him
earlier had expired. This fact is confirmation that [the applicant] persistently
engages in unlawful behaviour.”
On 11 February 2005 the Supreme Court of the
Republic of Tatarstan upheld the decision of 31 January 2005 on appeal.
On 25 March 2005 the Town Court extended the
applicant’s detention until 29 April 2005. The court noted as follows:
“According to the court order of 31 January 3005, [the
applicant], if released, may abscond (he was apprehended after his name had
been put on the wanted persons’ list), threaten witnesses, destroy evidence or
continue criminal activities.
To date the above circumstances have not changed. [The
applicant] is charged with a particularly serious criminal offence.
Under such circumstances ... [the applicant’s] detention should
be extended ...”
On 15 April 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the
decision of 25 March 2005 on appeal.
On 26 April 2005 the District Court extended the
applicant’s detention until 29 July 2005. The court noted, in particular, as
follows:
“... [the applicant] is charged with a particularly serious
criminal offence which entails a custodial sentence exceeding two years. This
case is of extreme complexity. The circumstances underlying the court’s
decision to remand the applicant in custody still remain ... [The applicant]
may abscond or commit new crimes.”
On 10 June 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the
decision of 26 April 2005 on appeal.
On 22 June 2005 the applicant was formally
charged with participation in the attempt of extortion, membership of a
criminal gang and illegal possession of firearms.
On 13 July and 19 October 2005 the Town Court
extended the applicant’s detention until 30 October 2005 and 29 January 2006
respectively. In both decisions the court noted as follows:
“... [the applicant] is charged with particularly serious
criminal offences which are a danger to public order and entail a custodial
sentence exceeding two years. The present criminal case is of high complexity.
The circumstances underlying the [applicant’s] remand in custody still remain. A
number of investigative activities involving [the applicant] are pending. [The
applicant] might abscond, commit new criminal offences and interfere with
administration of justice ... ”
On 27 January 2006 the Town Court extended the
applicant’s pre-trial detention until 29 April 2006. The court noted as
follows:
“[The applicant] is charged with grievous and particularly
grievous criminal offences. He might abscond and continue criminal activities.
In view of the above, the defence’s request to replace remand
in custody with an alternative measure of restraint is dismissed.”
On 12 April 2006 the Town Court extended the
applicant’s detention until 30 June 2006. The court noted as follows:
“[The prosecutor’s request to extend the applicant’s detention]
should be granted. [The applicant] is charged with particularly grievous
criminal offences. The arguments of the defendant and his counsel that the
investigative authorities have been inactive for a long time cannot justify the
dismissal of the [prosecutor’s] request.”
On 1 June 2006 the investigator established that
the applicant was not involved in extortion and discontinued the criminal
proceedings in that respect.
On 14 June 2006 the prosecutor’s office
completed the criminal investigation. The applicant remained in custody.
However, no detention order covering the period from 1 July to 27 October 2006
was submitted.
On 17 July 2006 the applicant and fourteen other
defendants started reading the case file, which consisted of thirty-nine volumes.
By 19 January 2007 the applicant had read eighteen volumes.
On 27 October 2006 the Town Court extended the
applicant’s detention until 30 January 2007. The court noted as follows:
“[The court] discerns no grounds to release [the applicant].
[The applicant] is charged with extremely serious criminal offences which attract
a custodial sentence of more than two years.
[The applicant] may abscond, continue criminal activities,
interfere with administration of justice.”
On 19 January 2007 the Town Court set the
end-date for the applicant’s study of the case file for 10 February 2007.
The applicant appealed, alleging that the Town Court had failed to specify the
exact number of working days allocated for his study of the case file. On
6 February 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 19 January 2007
on appeal.
On 25 January 2007 the Town Court extended the
applicant’s detention until 30 April 2007. The court noted as follows:
“The [prosecutor’s] request should be granted. [The applicant]
is charged with extremely serious criminal offences. He might abscond or
interfere with the administration of justice. [The court] discerns no
circumstances justifying the [applicant’s] release.”
On 24 March 2008 the Town Court extended the
detention of all the defendants, including the applicant. The court noted as
follows:
“The defendants are charged with extremely serious criminal
offences ... To date the circumstances underlying their remand in custody still
remain. They might abscond, continue with their criminal activities, or interfere
with the administration of justice. Accordingly, the defendants cannot be
released.”
According to the applicant, he appealed against
all the orders remanding him in custody. The Supreme Court upheld all of them
on appeal.
On 15 September 2008 the Town Court found the
applicant guilty of membership of a criminal gang and illegal possession of firearms
and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. On 12 November 2009 the
Supreme Court of Russia upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal.
B. Conditions of the applicant’s detention in the
temporary detention centre in Naberezhniye Chelny
1. The period of the applicant’s detention in, the
temporary detention centre in Naberezhniye Chelny, and the levels of occupation
there
The Government submitted the following
information as regards the applicant’s detention in the temporary detention
centre in Naberezhniye Chelny:
The Government provided data on cell numbers and
measurements. The applicant did not contest the accuracy of the information
submitted by the Government. He too reported on the cell population in respect
of the cells where he had been detained. The parties’ submissions on the issue
can be summarised as follows:
|
Cell
no.
|
Cell
surface area (sq. m) (as indicated by the Government and not contested by
the applicant)
|
Number
of sleeping places (as indicated by the Government and not contested by the
applicant)
|
Number
of inmates (as indicated by the applicant)
|
|
7
|
|
-17
|
|
4
|
|
-10
|
|
0
|
|
-10
|
|
81
|
|
According to the applicant, he was
not detained in those cells.
|
|
7
|
|
|
3
|
|
|
9
|
|
|
8
|
|
|
3
|
|
|
7
|
|
|
7
|
|
|
9
|
|
-15
|
|
5
|
|
-10
|
|
3
|
|
-17
|
|
1
|
|
-10
|
|
6
|
|
-17
|
|
3
|
|
According to the applicant, he was
not detained in those cells.
|
|
5
|
|
|
9
|
|
|
9
|
|
|
7
|
|
|
2
|
|
-17
|
The Government were unable to
submit the information concerning the individual cell population in view of the
lack of the relevant records. Nor could they provide any data in respect of the
period prior to 25 October 2005 in view of the destruction of the relevant
records due to the expiration of the statutory time-limit prescribed for their
storage. As regards the overall temporary detention centre population from 2
November 2005 to 2 October 2007, they provided the following data, which was
not contested by the applicant:
According to the applicant, the cells in the
detention centre were overcrowded at all times and the inmates had to take
turns to sleep. The applicant did not have an individual sleeping place. On
some days inmates suffering from tuberculosis, hepatitis, Aids, and scabies
were placed in the same cell with him. Some of the inmates had lice.
2. General conditions of detention
(a) The Government’s submissions
The Government submitted a report of 15 July
2010 prepared by the Ministry of the Interior of the Tatarstan Republic on the inspection of the temporary detention centre in Naberezhniye Chelny, where the
applicant had been detained. The report contained the following description of
the temporary detention centre:
“[The temporary detention centre] was commissioned in 1977. It
is located in a two-storey brick building ... Prior to refurbishment it had twenty-two
cells on the second floor, with a maximum capacity of 110 inmates ...
Each cell had a toilet located in the corner at least 1.5 m
away from the dining table and the nearest sleeping place. They were separated by
a 120-cm brick screen, ensuring partial privacy ... Each cell had a dining
table ... All the windows were covered with two layers of metal bars ... The
cells were lit with a 100-watt bulb ...
A full refurbishment of the temporary
detention centre in Naberezhniye Chelny was started in mid-June 2008 ...
Some inmates received bedding and bed sheets from their
relatives because of the shortage of it in the centre. The inmates could have a
shower at least once a week. Bed linen was changed whenever possible ...
Given that the regulations governing the operation of the
temporary detention centres do not require daily registration of the number of inmates
in each cell, it is impossible to specify the exact number of inmates detained
with the applicant in each cell of the temporary detention centre, or to
indicate the cell numbers where the applicant was detained ...
The average daily population of the temporary detention centre
during the periods of the [applicant’s] detention was 137, that is 1.2 times
its maximum capacity. This overcrowding was due to extensive criminal
investigations of the activities of organised criminal gangs, which were thirty
to forty strong ...
Inmates of temporary detention centres are provided with three
meals a day. They may also receive food from their relatives in accordance with
the statutory norms ... The temporary detention centre did not refuse to accept
food parcels for the inmates.”
There are three exercise areas measuring 2.5-3.5 square metres
located within the territory of the temporary detention centre. The exercise
areas are surrounded by metal screens ... While the applicant was an inmate in the
temporary detention centre the inmates were allowed daily outdoor exercise for
at least an hour ...
10. All inmates received medical assistance from a
paramedic. If necessary, they received medical care at other medical
institutions ... During the period of his detention in the temporary detention
centre, [the applicant] consulted [the paramedic] on twelve occasions ... ”
(b) The applicant’s submissions
According to the applicant, the cells in the
temporary detention centre were not ventilated. Because of the metal bars on
the windows there was no access to daylight in the cells. They were lit with a
60-watt bulb. Because of the lack of sufficient lighting in the cells, it was
impossible to read or work there.
The distance between the toilet and the closest
sleeping place was 0.5 metres. In some cells there was no toilet, but only a
hole in the floor. The brick wall separating the toilet from the living area of
the cell did not ensure sufficient privacy, and the person using it could be
seen by other inmates.
The cells were infested with bedbugs,
cockroaches, flies and mice. The administration of the centre took no measures
to exterminate them. The food was of poor quality.
The applicant was confined to the cell
twenty-four hours a day with no opportunity for outdoor exercise. He received
no newspapers or magazines. He was allowed one shower a week. During the summer
only cold showers were available.
On 24 November 2006 the prosecutor’s office
informed the applicant of the results of the inquiry conducted in response to
his complaint about the conditions of detention in the temporary detention
centre. In part, they acknowledged the problems raised by the applicant in his
complaint. In particular, they noted that the number of inmates detained in the
centre exceeded its designed capacity. They further admitted that the centre building
required extensive repairs in order to bring it into compliance with applicable
standards. They confirmed that the inmates received only one meal a day, and
that it was impossible to arrange outdoor exercise for the inmates because they
were so numerous. Nevertheless, the prosecutor did not discern any reasons to
take action against the management of the temporary detention centre.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The Federal Law on
Detention of Suspects and Defendants charged with Criminal Offences, in effect,
as amended, since 21 June 1995, provides that suspects and defendants detained
pending investigation and trial are held in remand prisons (Article 8). They
may be transferred to temporary detention facilities if so required for the
purposes of investigation or trial and if transportation between a remand
prison and a police station or court-house is not feasible because of the
distance between them. Such detention in a temporary detention facility may not
exceed ten days a month (Article 13). Temporary detention facilities in police
stations are designated for the detention of persons arrested on suspicion of a
criminal offence (Article 9).
According to the
Internal Regulations for Temporary Detention Facilities, approved by Order No.
41 of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation on 26 January
1996, as amended (in force at the time of the applicant’s detention), the
living space per detainee should be four square metres (paragraph 3.3 of the
Regulations). It also made provision for cells in temporary detention facilities
to be equipped with a table, toilet, water tap, shelf for toiletries, drinking
water tank, radio and rubbish bin (paragraph 3.2 of the Regulations).
Furthermore, the Regulations made provision for detainees to have outdoor
exercise for at least one hour a day in a designated exercise area (paragraphs
6.1, 6.40, and 6.43 of the Regulations).
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS
The
relevant extract from the 2nd General Report of the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)
(CPT/Inf (92) 3) reads as follows:
“42. Custody by the police is
in principle of relatively short duration ... However, certain elementary
material requirements should be met.
All police cells should be of a
reasonable size for the number of persons they are used to accommodate, and
have adequate lighting (i.e. sufficient to read by, sleeping periods excluded)
and ventilation; preferably, cells should enjoy natural light. Further, cells
should be equipped with a means of rest (e.g. a fixed chair or bench), and
persons obliged to stay overnight in custody should be provided with a clean
mattress and blankets.
Persons in custody should be allowed to
comply with the needs of nature when necessary, in clean and decent conditions,
and be offered adequate washing facilities. They should be given food at
appropriate times, including at least one full meal (i.e. something more
substantial than a sandwich) every day.
43. The issue of what
is a reasonable size for a police cell (or any other type of detainee/prisoner
accommodation) is a difficult question. Many factors have to be taken into
account when making such an assessment. However, CPT delegations felt the need
for a rough guideline in this area. The following criterion (seen as a
desirable level rather than a minimum standard) is currently being used when
assessing police cells intended for single occupancy for stays in excess of a
few hours: in the order of 7 square metres, 2 metres or more between
walls, 2.5 metres between floor and ceiling.”
The CPT reiterated the above conclusions
in its 12th General Report (CPT/Inf (2002) 15, § 47).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that he had been
detained in appalling conditions in the temporary detention centre in
Naberezhniye Chelny in contravention of Article 3 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”
The Government contested that argument. They
considered that the conditions of the applicant’s detention had been compatible
with the requirements set forth in the Convention. They conceded that the cells
where the applicant had been detained were overcrowded, that the applicant had
received only one meal a day, and that he had not had an opportunity for outdoor
exercise.
The applicant maintained his complaint. He
asserted that he had been detained in appalling conditions falling short of
international and domestic standards.
A. Admissibility
. The
Court observes that the applicant was detained in the temporary detention
centre in Naberezhniye Chelny during multiple periods between 31 January
2005 and 1 October 2007. At the end of each period the applicant was
transferred to another detention facility pending the criminal proceedings
against him. Those regular interruptions in the applicant’s detention in the
temporary detention centre do not prevent the Court from treating such
detention as a “continuing situation”. In the Court’s opinion, it would be excessively
formalistic, in the circumstances of the case, to insist that the applicant lodge
a new complaint after the end of each of the multiple periods of his detention
at the same remand prison (see, mutatis mutandis, Ananyev and Others
v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08,
§ 78, 10 January 2012).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that, by
introducing the complaint on 15 October 2007, the applicant complied with
the six-month criterion. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
. Article
3 of the Convention, as the Court has observed on many occasions, enshrines one
of the fundamental values of a democratic society. The Convention prohibits in
absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
irrespective of the circumstances or the victim’s behaviour (see Balogh v. Hungary, no.
47940/99, § 44, 20 July 2004, and Labita v.
Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV). The Court has consistently stressed that the suffering and
humiliation involved must, for a violation to be found, go beyond that
inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of
legitimate treatment or punishment. Measures depriving a person of his liberty
may often involve such an element. In accordance with Article 3 of the
Convention, the State must ensure that a person is detained under conditions
which are compatible with respect for his human dignity and that the manner and
method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or
hardship exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention
(see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 92-94, ECHR 2000-XI).
. Turning
to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the parties
disagreed as to certain aspects of the conditions of the applicant’s detention.
However, there is no need for the Court to establish the veracity of each and
every allegation, because it can find a violation of Article 3 on the basis of
the facts presented to it by the applicant which the respondent Government did
not refute.
. In
this connection the Court takes into account the Government’s admissions that
during the period under consideration the temporary detention centre in
Naberezhniye Chelny had been overcrowded. The number of the detainees had
exceeded its maximum capacity. According to the information provided by the
Government, on the average the personal space allocated per one inmate did not
exceed 2.28 square metres (see paragraph 30 above).
. As
a result of such overcrowding, the applicant’s detention did not meet the
minimum requirement as laid down in the Court’s case-law (see, among many other
authorities, Trepashkin v. Russia (no. 2), no. 14248/05, § 113, 16 December 2010; Kozhokar v. Russia, no. 33099/08,
§ 96, 16 December 2010; and Svetlana
Kazmina v. Russia, no. 8609/04, § 70, 2 December
2010). The inmates had to take turns to sleep, given the absence of individual
sleeping places. The Court notes that the applicant was held at the temporary
detention centre for 300 days. Admittedly, he was not confined to his cell on
the days of the court hearings. Nevertheless, for over 200 days the applicant was
held in an overcrowded cell for practically twenty-four hours a day, without an
opportunity to take outdoor exercise.
. Regard
being had to the above, the Court finds that the applicant was subjected to
inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention on
account of the conditions of his detention in the temporary detention centre in
Naberezhniye Chelny during the period between 31 January 2005 and 1 October
2007.
. In
view of the above, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine the
remainder of the parties’ submissions concerning other aspects of the
conditions of the applicant’s detention during the period in question.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that
the length of his pre-trial detention had not been justified by relevant or
sufficient reasons. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be
conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
The Government asserted that the length of the
applicant’s pre-trial detention had been justified in view of the complexity of
the case. They further considered that the applicant had deliberately
procrastinated in his study of the case file, having contributed to the length
of his pre-trial detention. Lastly, they noted that the whole period of the
applicant’s pre-trial detention had been offset against the prison
sentence imposed on him.
The applicant maintained his complaint. He
considered that the domestic courts, when extending his pre-trial detention,
had failed to take into account the particular circumstances of his case. They
had kept extending his pre-trial detention on the basis of a standard formula,
without providing any evidence to justify their findings that if released he
could abscond or interfere with administration of justice. At no time had the
courts considered the possibility of using alternative measures of restraint to
ensure the applicant’s presence at the trial. Lastly, he argued that the
national authorities had failed to demonstrate “special diligence” when
bringing his case to trial. In particular, there had been significant periods
of inaction on the part of the investigating authorities. The trial had lasted
from 11 September 2007 to 15 September 2008. During that period, the trial
court had held fifty-eight hearings, thirty-three of which had not lasted more
than two hours a day and the remainder had lasted four hours a day.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) General principles
. The
Court reiterates that the question whether a period of time spent in pre-trial
detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract. Whether it is
reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed on the facts
of each case and according to its specific features. Continued detention can be
justified in a given case only if there are actual indications of a genuine
requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of
innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty laid down in
Article 5 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Kudła, cited above, §§ 110 et seq.).
. The
existence and persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person arrested
has committed an offence is a sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention. However, after
a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must
establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued
to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are “relevant” and
“sufficient”, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national
authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings
(see Labita,
cited above, §§ 152 and 153). Justification for any period of detention, no
matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities (see Shishkov
v. Bulgaria, no. 38822/97, § 66, ECHR 2003-I (extracts) When deciding whether a person should be released or detained,
the authorities are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his
appearance at trial (see Jablonski v. Poland, no. 33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000).
. The
responsibility falls in the first place on the national judicial authorities to
ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused person does
not exceed a reasonable length. To this end they must, paying due regard to the
principle of the presumption of innocence, examine all the arguments for or
against the existence of a public interest which justifies a departure from the
rule in Article 5, and must set them out in their decisions on applications for
release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions
and of the established facts stated by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to
decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 (see, for
example, McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, § 43,
ECHR 2006-X).
(b) Application of these
principles to the present case
. The
applicant was remanded in custody on 29 January 2005. He was convicted by
the trial court on 15 September 2008. Thus, the
period to be taken into consideration lasted three years and seven and a half
months.
. The
Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant committed the
offences he had been charged with, being based on cogent evidence, persisted
throughout the trial leading to his conviction. It remains to be
ascertained whether the judicial authorities gave “relevant” and “sufficient”
grounds to justify the applicant’s placement in detention and whether they
displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings.
. The
inordinate length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention - three years and
seven and a half months - is a matter of serious concern for the Court. It
considers that the Russian authorities were required to put forward very
weighty reasons for keeping the applicant in pre-trial detention for such a
long time.
. When
extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the domestic authorities
referred to the gravity of the charges against him. In this respect they noted
that he might interfere with the administration of justice, put pressure on the
witnesses or other parties to the proceedings, or destroy evidence. They also cited
the risk that he would abscond or continue with criminal activities, in view of
his prior criminal record.
. In
this connection the Court reiterates that, although the severity of the
sentence faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of an
accused absconding or reoffending, the need to continue the deprivation of
liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into
consideration only the seriousness of the offence. Nor can continuation of the
detention be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see Letellier v. France,
26 June 1991, § 51, Series A no. 207; Panchenko
v. Russia, no. 45100/98, § 102, 8
February 2005; Goral v. Poland, no. 38654/97, § 68, 30 October 2003; and Ilijkov
v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, § 81, 26 July 2001).
. The
Court accepts that in cases concerning organised crime and involving numerous accused, the risk that a detainee
if released might put pressure on
witnesses or might otherwise obstruct the proceedings is often particularly
high. All these factors can justify a relatively long period of detention.
However, they do not give the authorities unlimited power to extend this
preventive measure (see Osuch v. Poland, no. 31246/02, § 26, 14 November 2006, and Celejewski v. Poland, no.
17584/04, §§ 37-38, 4 May 2006). The fact that a person is charged
with acting in a criminal conspiracy is not in itself sufficient to justify
long periods of detention; his personal circumstances and behaviour must always
be taken into account. There is no indication in the present case that the
domestic courts had in any way checked whether the applicant had indeed made
any attempts to intimidate witnesses or to obstruct the course of the
proceedings in any other way. In such circumstances the Court has difficulty
accepting the argument that there was a risk of interference with the
administration of justice. Furthermore, such a risk was bound to decrease
gradually as the trial proceeded and the witnesses were interviewed (compare Miszkurka v. Poland,
no. 39437/03, § 51, 4 May 2006) The Court is not therefore persuaded that,
throughout the entire period of the applicant’s detention, compelling reasons
existed for a fear that he would interfere with witnesses or otherwise hamper
the examination of the case, and certainly not such as to outweigh the
applicant’s right to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial.
Another ground for the applicant’s detention was
the risk that he would abscond. Admittedly, given the applicant’s history, the
authorities’ finding that there was a risk that he would abscond was not
unjustified. Nevertheless, at no point during the three years and seven and a
half months that the applicant was awaiting determination of the criminal
charges against him did the courts’ reasoning evolve to the point where it
sought to check whether that risk still persisted or whether it could be
avoided by bail or other alternatives.
Similarly, the Court is not convinced that the
domestic authorities’ findings that he might interfere with justice, put
pressure on witnesses or other parties to the proceedings, or destroy the
evidence, were sufficiently established. The Court observes that the domestic
authorities failed to provide any clarification as to which of the acts the
applicant was likely to commit amounted to interference with justice. When reasoning
that he should be detained pending trial to minimise that risk, the courts did
not refer to any matters which had allowed them to draw such an inference.
There is nothing in the materials in the Court’s possession to indicate that
the applicant had ever tried, in particular, to put any pressure on witnesses
during either the pre-trial investigation or the trial. In any event, it
appears that the domestic authorities had sufficient time to take statements
from witnesses in a manner which could have excluded any doubt as to their
veracity and would have eliminated the necessity to continue the applicant’s
deprivation of liberty on that ground (see, for similar reasoning, Solovyev
v. Russia, no. 2708/02, § 115, 24 May 2007). The Court
therefore considers that the national authorities were not entitled to regard
the circumstances of the case as justification for using the risk of putting
pressure on witnesses as a further ground for the applicant’s detention.
Lastly, the Court observes that all the court
orders extending the applicant’s detention issued within the period under
consideration were stereotypically worded in the same summary form.
Having regard to the above, the Court considers
that by relying essentially on the gravity of the charges and by failing to
substantiate their finding by pertinent specific facts or to consider
alternative “preventive measures”, the authorities extended the applicant’s
detention on grounds which, although “relevant”, cannot be regarded as
sufficient to justify its duration of three years and seven and a half months.
In these circumstances it would not be necessary for the Court to examine
whether the domestic authorities acted with “special diligence”.
There has accordingly been a violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 5
§ 1 (c) of the Convention that his pre-trial detention had been unlawful and
under Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention that the domestic courts had set
a time-limit for his study of the case file.
Having regard to all the
material in its possession and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence,
the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that
this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded,
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the
Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant
claimed 115,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government considered
the applicant’s claim to be excessive and in contradiction with the Court’s
case-law.
The Court observes that the applicant was
detained in appalling conditions for almost a year in contravention of
Articles 3 of the Convention. The length of his pre-trial detention, which
lasted three years and seven and a half months, was not justified. The Court
considers that the applicant’s suffering and frustration cannot be compensated
for by the mere finding of a violation. However, the Court accepts the
Government’s argument that the specific amount claimed appears excessive.
Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards the
applicant EUR 5,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant did not submit any claims for
costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court makes no award under this head.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaints concerning the
conditions of the applicant’s detention in the temporary detention centre in
Naberezhniye Chelny and the length of his pre-trial detention admissible and
the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand
euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage,
to be converted into the currency of the respondent
State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 June 2013, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Isabelle
Berro-Lefèvre
Registrar President
