In the case of R.Sz. v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human
Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi, President,
Danutė Jočienė,
Peer Lorenzen,
András Sajó,
Işıl Karakaş,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Helen Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 11 June 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
41838/11) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr R.Sz. (“the
applicant”), on 5 July 2011. The President of the Section acceded to the
applicant’s request not to have his name disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of
Court).
The applicant was represented by Mr A. Grád, a
lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and
Justice.
The applicant complained under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 - read alone and in conjunction with Article 13 of the
Convention - that the imposition of a 98% tax on part of his severance pay constituted
an unjustified deprivation of property, with no remedy available. He also
invoked Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.
On 21 February 2012 the application was
communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility
and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Budapest.
The applicant had been employed by a State-owned
limited company for about eleven years. On 1 July 2010 his employment was
terminated by mutual agreement, with effect from 5 October 2010.
According to his labour contract, the applicant became
entitled, amongst other benefits, to severance pay in the amount of four months’
salary - which was in excess by one month’s salary of that provided by the
Labour Code - and to salary for the three months of his notice period. The benefits
were reduced by taxes payable at that time
and paid to the applicant on 2 July 2010.
The applicant’s benefits were subsequently taxed at 98% in
their part exceeding 3,500,000 Hungarian forints (HUF).
The exceeding part was HUF 8,130,939,
the tax thus amounting to HUF 7,968,320.
The amount payable was HUF 4,054,085,
regard being had to the fact that the benefits had already been taxed HUF
3,914,235
on payment, on 2 July 2010.
The tax, whose due date was apparently 10 May 2011, was paid on
23 February 2011, that is, according to the rules of the second version
(of 30 December 2010 - see paragraph 12) of the legislation outlined
below; however, the third version (of 14 May 2011 - see paragraphs 16-17) did
not change the applicant’s situation.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
On 22 July 2010 Parliament adopted Act no. XC of
2010 on the Adoption and Modification of Certain Economic and Financial Laws
(“the Act”). The Act, which was published in the Official Gazette on 13 August
2010, introduced inter alia a new tax on certain payments for employees
of the public sector - including those of State-owned enterprises such as the applicant’s
employer - whose employment was terminated. Consequently, severance pay and
other payments related to the termination of employment (such as salary for the
notice period) exceeding HUF 2 million became subject to a 98% tax. However,
income tax and social security contributions already paid could be deducted
from the tax. Notwithstanding the limit of HUF 2 million, the statutory provisions
on the sum of severance pay were not modified. The bill preceding the Act
justified the tax with reference to public morals and the unfavourable
budgetary situation of the country.
The Act entered into force on 1 October 2010;
however, the tax was to be applied to the relevant revenues as from 1 January
2010. Simultaneously, the Constitution was also amended establishing
retroactive tax liability in respect of the given tax year concerning “any
remuneration against good morals” paid in the public sector.
The Act was challenged before the Constitutional Court within the framework of an abstract ex post facto control. This
court found the relevant provisions unconstitutional in decision
no. 184/2010. (X.28.) AB on 26 October 2010.
According to the Constitutional Court, revenues earned solely
on the basis of relevant statutory provisions (that is, the overwhelming
majority of the revenues concerned by the disputed legislation) could not be
regarded as being against good morals, and therefore not even the
constitutional amendment justified a retroactive 98% tax. The Constitutional Court pointed out that it reviewed the rate or amount of taxes only
exceptionally; however, it held that a pecuniary burden was unconstitutional if
it was of a confiscatory nature or its extent was clearly exaggerated, i.e. was
disproportionate and unjustified. Considering also the “fifty-percent rule” (Halbteilungsgrundsatz)
set out by the German Federal Constitutional Court - according to which the
overall tax load on assets must be limited to 50-60% of the yield on those
assets - the court found that the 98% tax was excessive and punitive, yet it
equally applied to severance pay earned in a fully untainted manner. The tax
was levied on or deducted from the revenues concerned even if their morally
doubtful origin could not be established. The Constitutional Court annulled the
relevant provisions retroactively, that is, from the day of the Act’s entry
into force. It relied on the above arguments, rather than on considerations
about the protection of property, to which its scrutiny did not extend in the
case.
The Constitutional Court’s decision contained in
particular the following considerations:
“5.2. ... [The Act] applies to ... payments originating in
unconditional statutory entitlements and defined by objective criteria, that
is, to those ... received from any source specified in the Act and exceeding
the [relevant] amount .... The Act does not apply only to budgetary
institutions but to other, State-owned employers as well. The use of private
resources depends on the citizens’ relatively free choices and autonomous
decisions. However, decisions concerning public funds are different. [The
impugned legislation] relates to public funds, and determines - at least
indirectly - the use of public resources.
5.3. ... Depending on the circumstances, [the] 98% tax may
apply to payments which derive from the obligatory application of cogent legal
provisions. ... In these cases, the special tax does not function as a
regulatory instrument, given its inescapable factual basis. Nor does it aim to
prevent abusive payments; its purpose is rather to levy almost the entire
income [in question] for the central budget. ...
The volume of public duties is considered unconstitutional if
they have a confiscatory nature or amount to an evidently excessive rate of the
kind which can be regarded as disproportionate and unjustified. ...
The material case concerns a substantial punitive tax which
also applies to payments which are received, by virtue of law and within the
limits of the proper exercise of rights, upon the termination of employment in
the public sector. The Act would be applied also in cases where no infringement
of law can be established in connection with the payments concerning the
termination of a legal relation. It would deprive the taxable persons of
incomes originating in unconditional statutory entitlements. ...
To increase budgetary revenues and secure a general and
proportionate distribution of public burden is only the secondary and eventual
purpose of the legislator when introducing such a tax. The direct purpose of
the legislator in this case is to set a certain barrier on incomes by using the
means of tax law. However, imposing a tax or other similar duty is no
constitutional means to achieve such purpose. Several constitutional
instruments are at the disposal of the legislator to accomplish its objective.
It may reduce or even abolish some State allowances falling under the scope of
the Act for the future, or transform the allocation system so that in the
future it should not be possible to acquire further entitlements to allowances
above a certain limit. Nonetheless, the discretion of the legislator only
prevails in the framework of international and European community law.”
Upon a new bill introduced on the same day as
the date of the Constitutional Court’s decision, on 16 November 2010 Parliament
re-enacted the 98% tax with certain modifications, according to which this tax
applied from 1 January 2005; however, for the majority of those affected
(excluding some senior officials) it only applied to revenues above HUF 3.5 million.
The new legislation was published in the Official Gazette of 16 November
and entered into force on 30 December 2010.
At the same time, Parliament again amended the
Constitution, allowing retroactive taxation going back five years. Furthermore,
the Constitutional Court’s powers were limited: the amended articles of the
Constitution contained a restriction on the Constitutional Court’s right to
review legislation on budgetary and tax issues. This restriction - which has
also been maintained in the new Basic Law in force from 1 January 2012 - allows
for constitutional review only in respect of violations of the right to life
and human dignity, the protection of personal data, freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, and the rights related to Hungarian citizenship.
Upon a petition for an abstract ex post facto
control, on 6 May 2011 the Constitutional Court annulled - notwithstanding its
limited powers - the five-year retroactive application of the 98% tax in
decision
no. 37/2011 (V.10.) AB, relying on the right to human dignity. However,
the reasoning of the decision underlined that only the taxation of revenues
gathered before the 2010 tax year constituted a violation of the right to human
dignity. The Constitutional Court did not find unconstitutional as such the Act’s
presumption that the relevant revenues infringed good morals; however, it ruled
that this presumption should be susceptible to a legal challenge. In view of
its limited jurisdiction, it did not consider the substantive aspects of the
tax.
The Constitutional Court’s decision contained in
particular the following considerations:
“1. ... The Constitutional Court has held that the retroactive
effect of the Act does not only apply to incomes earned contra bonos mores,
but also to incomes originating in unconditional statutory entitlements.
Payments of statutory amounts [which have not been abolished] cannot be
regarded as being contra bonos mores.
As regards the prospective provisions of the Act, the Constitutional Court has pointed out that the tax in issue is also applicable to payments
received legally and within the limits of proper exercise of rights upon
termination of employment in the public sector, and that it deprives the
persons concerned of incomes originating in unconditional statutory
entitlements. However, in this case the legislator interpreted the “special
rate” as an entire withdrawal of the income, by which it overstepped its
constitutional mandate and breached the amended constitutional rule of
distributing public burden.
2. In pursuit of decision [no. 184/2010 (X.28.)AB], Parliament
amended the rules on the Constitutional Court’s competence as well as the
provision of the Basic Law determining the distribution of public burden, and
re-enacted the special tax. ...
2.2. ... [The new legislation] contains no reference to the
notion “contra bonos mores”, and allows for retroactive law-making with
regard to the fifth tax year in arrears as well as for [any] imposition falling
short of [the total] deprivation of income. ...
3. ... The legal relations falling under the scope of the
special tax are typically regulated by the so-called “legal status” Acts [i.e.
the Acts concerning the legal status of civil servants]. [In this context, the]
salary is specified by the so-called “pay scale”, which is independent from the
parties and obligatory for them.
[Moreover,] the personal scope of the special tax also includes
employers and employees, mainly those who belong under the Labour Code, who can
significantly influence the amount of the allowance received upon the
termination of employment. ...
In this respect, the special tax is a tax whose purpose is not
to generate [State] revenue. It is, in this connection, a regulatory
instrument. ... Certain taxes may serve not only the purpose of increasing
State revenue, but also function as regulatory instruments. Secondarily, but
not insignificantly, [this] taxation can be also seen as part of the State’s
economic policy. In this regard the legislature is afforded an exceptionally
broad constitutional margin of discretion. ...
4.1.4. ... The special tax is not a general income tax
applicable to all types of income, but rather a particular tax levied on
non-repetitive, non-regular payments which relate to certain factual
circumstances (i.e. the termination of a legal relation) and which exceed a
certain limit. ...
Such a tax with ex nunc effect cannot be considered to
violate the right to protection of human dignity or to constitute an improper
interference by the State with individual autonomy. Taking into account its
base, the incomes not belonging in that base and their amounts, the special tax
cannot be considered as completely dispossessing the tax subjects. ...
The individual’s acquisition of the income subject to the
special tax is restricted by a public-law limitation originating in that tax
...
4.2.4. ... In case of misuse of public resources, the
limitation on payments might even have retroactive effect, [under] section 70/I
(2) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has already emphasised in its
decision [no. 184/2010 (X.28.)AB] that a retroactive special tax may be imposed
on unfairly high payments, on certain types of severance pay or on compensation
for significant periods of unused vacation time accumulated over years; the Act
aiming at preventing abuses and endorsing society’s sense of justice is not
unconstitutional in itself, but must remain within the framework of the amended
Constitution.
4.2.5. However, to impose tax on incomes [lawfully] acquired
during the tax year ... cannot be considered as the implementation of the new
paragraph (2) of section 70/I of the Constitution, but rather interference by a
public authority with individual autonomy going to such lengths that cannot
have constitutional justification, and therefore violates the taxpayers’ human
dignity. ...
The special tax does not provide for a fair and just assessment
of individual circumstances; its retroactive rules apply to everyone [with two
exceptions mentioned above] without differentiation. Nor does it take into
account objective circumstances concerning a wide range of taxpayers, such as
the economic crisis or emergency situations, which may disadvantageously
influence the individuals’ circumstances. ...”
On 9 May 2011 Parliament again re-enacted the
retroactive application of the 98% tax. The amendment to Act no. XC of 2010 was
published in the Official Gazette on 13 May and entered into force on 14 May
2011. It provided that only relevant revenues earned after 1 January 2010
should be subject to the tax. The amended legislation did not contain any
remedy available to those affected.
The Act, as in force as of 14 May 2011, provides
(in sections 8-12/B) that the special tax rules are applicable to incomes
received on 1 January 2010 or after. Incomes shall be subject to a 98%
special tax where the private individual has worked at an economic operator or
an organisation operating from public money, the payment is effected on account
of the termination of the private individual’s work relationship, and the
amount of the income exceeds HUF 3,5 (in certain cases 2) million. Incomes
received between 1 January 2010 and 29 December 2010 were declared by private
individuals by means of self-assessment, in tax returns submitted until
25 February or 10 May 2011 (depending on the taxpayer group). The tax was
payable by the same dates.
Members of Parliament, vice mayors and Members of the European
Parliament declared their income earned in 2010 and subject to the special tax
in a different manner, in a separate tax return submitted by 31 July 2011. They
paid the special tax by the same date. Those who retired immediately on
dismissal were exempted from the tax. Persons subjected to the payment of the special
tax declared their taxable incomes earned between 1 January 2011 and 13
May 2011 by way of tax returns submitted by 25 February or 20 May 2012
(depending on the taxpayer group), and paid the tax by the same dates. In all
other cases, the special tax is deducted by the payment issuer as withholding
tax, and the deduction is indicated in the private individual’s tax return for
the given revenue year.
Any charges paid by or deducted from the private individual
including, in particular, personal income tax or individual contributions shall
be regarded as tax advances paid on the special tax.
III. RELEVANT LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union provides as follows:
Article 34 - Social security and social assistance
“1. The Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social
security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as
maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the
case of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community
law and national laws and practices.”
The European Court of Justice held in Case C-499/08 Andersen
v Region Syddanmark, [2010] ECR I-09343 as follows:
“29. The aim pursued by the severance allowance of
protecting workers with many years of service in an undertaking and helping
them to find new employment falls within the category of legitimate employment
policy and labour market objectives provided for in Article 6(1) of Directive
2000/78.”
European Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on
remuneration policies in the financial services sector (2009/384/EC) provides
as follows:
“1. Excessive risk-taking in the financial services
industry and in particular in banks and investment firms has contributed to the
failure of financial undertakings and to systemic problems in the Member States
and globally....
5. Creating appropriate incentives within the
remuneration system itself should reduce the burden on risk management and
increase the likelihood that these systems become effective. Therefore, there
is a need to establish principles on sound remuneration policies.”
In the case Michel Bourgès-Maunoury, Marie-Louise Heintz v
Direction des services fiscaux d’Eure-et-Loir concerning the compatibility
with European Union primary law of a national provision on the procedure for
calculating a wealth tax, Advocate General Cruz Villalón reiterated that the
principle that rules governing tax law and the exercise of fiscal power must
not have confiscatory effects is a “well-known and widely-recognised idea”
(Case C-558/10, Michel Bourgès-Maunoury, Marie-Louise Heintz v Direction
des services fiscaux d’Eure-et-Loir 12 Dec 2011, OJ C-46, 12, Opinion of AG
Villalón).
IV. COMPARATIVE LAW
Germany - Federal Constitutional Court
In a judgment of 22 June 1995, the Federal
Constitutional Court held that, according to Article 14 of the Basic Law, the
use of property served the purpose of private gain and the public good. In that
sense, property tax, combined with other taxes, might take no
more than 50% of the income from property (Halbteilungsgrundsatz). The
overall tax burden should moreover not run counter to the principle of equality
demanding the division of burden depending on the contributing capacity (BVerfG,
2 BvL 37/91, 22.6.1995).
In its subsequent decision of 18 January 2006 (BVerfG, 2 BvR 2194/99, 18.01.2006), the Federal
Constitutional Court found that even though tax load fell within the ambit of
Article 14 of the Basic Law, that is, the protection of property, the overall
burden through business and personal income tax, in the particular
circumstances, did not infringe the complainant’s right to property. In the
instant case the overall tax burden in business and personal income tax
combined amounted to 57.58%. The Federal Constitutional Court noted in this
regard that it was permissible to charge high income with higher tax burden, as
long as the taxable person, after deduction of the relevant tax, disposed of a
remaining income representing his private performance.
France - Conseil constitutionnel
In decision no. 2007-555 DC (16 August 2007; Act
pertaining to work, employment and purchasing power), the Conseil constitutionnel
held as follows:
“24o The requirement deriving from Article 13 of the
declaration of 1789 would not be complied with if taxation were to be of a
confiscatory nature or subjected a certain category of taxpayers to an
excessive burden in comparison with their ability to pay taxes. The principle
of the capping of the proportion of a tax household’s income allocated to
paying direct taxes, far from infringing the principle of equality before
public burden sharing, is intended to avoid a patent infringement of this same
principle;”
Switzerland - Federal Supreme Court
The Federal Supreme Court held that a taxation
scheme that is confiscatory in its effects and not limited in time would
infringe the essence of the right to property (Decisions of the Federal Supreme
Court, BGE 106 Ia 342, 349; BGE 128 II 112, 126). To date, the Federal Supreme
Court has not found that any taxation scheme was confiscatory.
Decision no. BGE 128 II 112, 126 contains the following
passage:
“10 bb) ... In taxation matters, however, it [the guarantee of
property, as set out in Article 26 of the Federal Constitution] does not go
beyond the prohibition of confiscatory taxation. Therefore, a tax to be levied
may not damage the very essence of private property. It is the task of the
legislative branch to preserve the substance of the taxpayer’s assets and to
allow him the chance to create new ones. In fact, a tax rate expressed in
percentages is not the only decisive criterion in order to determine whether a
taxation scheme has a confiscatory effect. It is necessary to examine the
burden of the imposition for a rather long period and by not taking into
account extraordinary circumstances. In order to accomplish this, all specific
facts must be taken into consideration: the length and the gravity of the
interference as well as the accumulation with other taxes or charges and the
possibility to shift the tax to another person ...”.
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court no. 2P.139/2004 contains
the following passage:
“4.2 The Federal Supreme Court has held that it is not
compatible with Article 26 of the Federal Constitution if an annuity for life,
inherited by bequest, of initially CHF 2200 per month is - regardless of
the ability to pay other taxes of the person in receipt of the pension -taxed
at 55 % in total, in terms of inheritance and income taxes as well as other
expenses, which (taking into account of the tax sum due for over CHF 200,000)
were necessary for their financing (Decision P.1704/1984, published in: ASA 56
p. 439 et seq.). In that specific case the specific circumstances were relevant
because the heir could not secure her own existence after paying the taxes for
the annuity for life.”
United States - Supreme Court
In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315
(1946) the Supreme Court dealt with the following problem: According to the
provisions of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, after 15 November 1943
no salary or compensation was to be paid to certain individuals, who were then
government employees, out of any moneys then or thereafter appropriated, except
for services as jurors or members of armed forces unless they were prior to
that date again appointed to jobs by the President with advice and consent of
the Senate. In the background of the statute challenged lay the House of
Representatives’ feeling that in the late 1930s many ‘subversives’ were
occupying influential positions in the Government and elsewhere and that their
influence must not remained unchallenged. In 1943 the respondents, Lovett,
Watson and Dodd, were and had been for several years working for the
Government. The Government agencies which had lawfully employed them were fully
satisfied with the quality of their work and wished to keep them employed in
their jobs. The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the provision challenged
was not merely to cut off the plaintiffs’ compensation through regular
disbursing channels, but permanently to bar them from government service and it
was designed to force the employing agencies to discharge respondents and to
bar their being hired by any other governmental agency. The Supreme Court
reiterated that the Constitution barred such legislative acts by providing that
“no Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”. It found
that the relevant provision was designed to apply to particular individuals and
operated as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion from a chosen vocation.
It ruled that this permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the
Government was punishment of those individuals without a judicial trial and
thus carried the usual characteristics of bills of attainder. The Supreme Court
found that “legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way
as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial, are ‘bills of
attainder’ prohibited by the Constitution”.
The subject matter of the case Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) was as follows: The plaintiffs (Armstrong and al.)
furnished various materials to Rice for use in construction of boats. Upon Rice’s
default, the Government exercised its option as to ten of the boat hulls still
under construction and removed these
properties to out-of-state naval shipyards for use in the completion of the
boats. When the transfer occurred, the plaintiffs had not been paid for their
materials and they were not paid afterwards, either. Petitioners therefore
contended that they had liens. The Supreme
Court held “that there was a taking of these liens
for which just compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment. It is true that
not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been
held to be a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense. This case and many others
reveal the difficulty of trying to draw the line between what destructions of
property by lawful governmental actions are compensable ‘takings’ and what
destructions are ‘consequential’ and therefore not compensable... The Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use
without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole. A fair interpretation of this constitutional
protection entitles these lienholders to just compensation here.”
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498
(1998) the Supreme Court held that the Coal Industry
Retiree Health Benefit Act 1992 amounted to an unconstitutional regulatory
taking of property. It held that the economic impact of the Act was substantial
as to Petitioner, in that it required Eastern Enterprises to contribute large
sums of money to a pension fund for employees employed in the 1950s and 1960s
solely because those payments could not be allocated to other coal companies
that were currently operating in the coal industry. The retroactive effect of
the Act imposed a substantial economic injury on Eastern Enterprises that could
not have been anticipated. Moreover, the challenged statute interfered with
Eastern Enterprises’ expectations in that in 1987 the company sold off its
remaining holdings in coal operations and completely quit this industry. The
statute’s requirement for Eastern Enterprises to undertake the obligation at
issue clearly interfered with the expectations of Eastern when it sold off its
interest in coal operations. Lastly, the nature of the government action was
unusual because it retroactively applied a substantial economic burden on
Eastern Enterprises. For the Supreme Court, the character of the government
action was substantial and invasive. The balance of the factors resulted in the
finding of an unconstitutional taking requiring just compensation.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No.
1 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the levying of tax
at a rate of 98% on part of his severance pay had amounted to a deprivation of
property which was unjustified. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which
provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law
and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the
use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
a. The Government
The Government did not dispute that the
contested deprivation of revenue had amounted to an interference with the
applicant’s right to property. However, in their view, this interference was
prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aims of satisfying society’s sense
of justice and of protecting the public purse. These aims of general interest
were also recognised by the European Union which had initiated legislative
steps (see paragraph 18 above) against excessive severance payments, as their
amount often per se violated society’s sense of justice and the
remuneration policy applied in the financial sector to executive officers had
contributed to the international financial crisis of the past years.
The Government were further of the opinion that,
in order to achieve the above aims of general interest, taxation can, in a
democratic society, be regarded as the most suitable regulatory means. In so
far as the impugned tax could be seen as modifying the contents of the
applicant’s existing employment contract, they submitted that respect for
contracts already concluded required that their modification or cancellation
take place according to the laws, even if they contained seemingly lawful
commitments at the expense of the State budget violating the society’s sense of
justice.
The Government pointed out that by introducing
the special tax the lawmaker had intended to strike a fair balance between the
aim pursued and the limitation on the individual’s rights - by paying, at the
same time, due attention to the circumstance that, in the midst of a deep
world-wide economic crisis, additional burdens should be borne not only by the
State but also by other market participants including senior civil servants and
senior managers of State-owned enterprises, capable of influencing their own
benefits. In the Government’s view, a wide margin of appreciation should be
left to the national authorities in this respect. Significantly high tax rates
were not unknown under the various tax regimes.
The Government also emphasised that severance not exceeding
HUF 3.5 million did not fall under the impugned Act (in this part, it
was subject to the general personal income tax rate of 16%); therefore the
sharing of burdens should be regarded as fair and just. In this connection the
Government submitted that this sum was approximately equivalent to sixteen
months’ average salary in Hungary in 2010.
The deprivation of revenue had not imposed an
excessive individual burden on the applicant, either. He had not been deprived
of an existing possession or income, therefore the payment of the tax had not
entailed unbearable hardships for him. The rate of the tax had not been
excessive and - having regard to average Hungarian revenues, the social and
economic situation and the amount of benefits received by the applicant - had
not imposed a disproportionate burden on the applicant or endangered his
subsistence.
b. The applicant
The applicant submitted that he had received the
severance pay lawfully - under the work agreement with his employer - but had
had to pay back virtually the entire amount half a year later, retroactively, pursuant
to the newly enacted Act. In his view, society itself had no “sense of social
justice”; therefore such an aim could not be justified as one of public
interest. Nor could the economic crisis serve as a basis for deprivation of
private property in a democracy. The purpose of the impugned tax was
furthermore questionable bearing in mind that a more favourable deadline was
applicable for Members of Parliament and others. A 98% tax burden was so disproportionate
that it should be considered as a disguised deprivation of property in
violation of the Convention. Consequently, the intervention could not be
considered either as “prescribed by the law” or “pursuing a general interest”.
Moreover, the applicant argued that he had
received the severance pay significantly earlier than the end of his
employment. By the time his employment had terminated he had already spent most
of the money, unaware that he would have to retroactively pay back 98% thereof.
Therefore the measure in question constituted a disproportionate and excessive burden
for him.
2. The Court’s assessment
a. Whether
there was an interference with the applicant’s “possessions” within the meaning
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
In its judgment of 23 September 1982 in the case
of Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, the Court analysed Article 1 as
comprising “three distinct rules”: the first rule, set out in the first
sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the
principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property; the second rule, contained in
the second sentence of the first paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions
and subjects it to certain conditions; the third rule, stated in the second
paragraph, recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other
things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest
(Series A no. 52, § 61). The Court further observed that, before inquiring
whether the first general rule has been complied with, it must determine
whether the last two are applicable (ibid.). The three rules are not, however,
“distinct” in the sense of being unconnected. The second and third rules are
concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful
enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the
general principle enunciated in the first rule (see, among many other
authorities, James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, §
37, Series A no. 98).
Moreover, an interference, including one
resulting from a measure to secure payment of taxes, must strike a “fair
balance” between the demands of the general interest of the community and the
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. The
concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 as a
whole, including the second paragraph: there must be a reasonable relationship
of proportionality between the means employed and the aims pursued. The
question to be answered is whether, in the applicant’s specific circumstances,
the application of the tax law imposed an unreasonable burden on him or
fundamentally undermined his financial situation - and thereby failed to strike
a fair balance between the various interests involved (see M.A. and
34 Others v. Finland (dec.), no. 27793/95, 10 June 2003; Imbert de
Trémiolles v. France (dec.), nos. 25834/05 and 27815/05 (joined), 4 January
2008; Spampinato v. Italy (dec.), no. 69872/01, 29 March 2007; and Wasa
Liv Ömsesidigt, Försäkringsbolaget Valands Pensionsstiftelse
v. Sweden, no. 13013/87, Commission decision of 14 December 1988,
Decisions and Reports 58, p. 186).
The Court recalls that in certain circumstances
loss of ownership of property resulting from a legislative measure or from an
order of a court will not be equated with a “deprivation” of possessions: in
the cases of AGOSI v. the United Kingdom (24 October 1986, Series A no.
108) and Air Canada v. the United Kingdom (5 May 1995, Series A no.
316-A), the forfeiture or other loss of ownership was treated as a “control of
use” of property within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 Protocol No.
1. In Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands
(23 February 1995, Series A no. 306-B), impoundment was considered as a measure
securing the payment of taxes within the meaning of the second paragraph of
Article 1 in fine, while in Beyeler v. Italy ([GC],
no. 33202/96, ECHR 2000-I), the interference with the applicant’s
property rights was examined under the first sentence of that Article.
The Court does not consider it necessary to rule on whether the
second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 applies in this case. The
complexity of the factual and legal position prevents the impugned measure from
being classified in a precise category. The Court recalls that the situation
envisaged in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 is only a
particular instance of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of
property as guaranteed by the general rule set forth in the first sentence
(see, for example, Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 8 July
1986, § 106, Series A no. 102). The Court therefore considers that it should
examine the situation complained of in the light of that general rule (cf. Beyeler,
cited above, § 106).
In the Court’s view, the classification of a
general measure taken in furtherance of a social policy of redistribution as a
“control of use” of property rather than a “deprivation” of possessions is not
decisive in so far as the principles governing the question of justification
are substantially the same, requiring both a legitimate aim and the
preservation of a fair balance between the aim served and the individual
property rights in question.
Furthermore, a legislative amendment which removes a legitimate
expectation may amount in its own right to an interference with “possessions”
(see, mutatis mutandis, Maurice v. France [GC],
no. 11810/03, §§ 67-71 and 79, ECHR 2005-IX; Draon v. France [GC],
no. 1513/03, §§ 70-72, 6 October 2005; and Hasani v. Croatia
(dec.), no. 20844/09, 30 September 2010).
In the present case, the Court notes that the
parties agree that the impugned taxation represents an interference with the
applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
The Court will examine the issue under the first paragraph of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, subject to the specific rule
concerning the payment of taxes contained in Article 1 in fine.
b. Lawfulness
of the interference
i. General
principles
The Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 requires that any interference by a public authority with the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions should be lawful: indeed, the second sentence of the
first paragraph of that Article authorises the deprivation of possessions
“subject to the conditions provided for by law”. Moreover, the rule of law, one
of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is a notion inherent in
all the Articles of the Convention (see Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece
[GC] (merits), no. 25701/94, § 79, ECHR 2000-XII, and Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 147, ECHR 2004-V).
However, the existence of a legal basis in
domestic law does not suffice, in itself, to satisfy the principle of
lawfulness. In addition, the legal basis must have a certain quality, namely it
must be compatible with the rule of law and must provide guarantees against
arbitrariness.
It follows that, in addition to being in accordance
with the domestic law of the Contracting State, including its Constitution, the
legal norms upon which the deprivation of property is based should be
sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application (see Guiso-Gallisay
v. Italy, no. 58858/00, §§ 82-83, 8 December 2005). The Court would add
that similar considerations apply to interferences with the peaceful enjoyment
of possessions.
As to the notion of “foreseeability”, its scope depends to a
considerable degree on the content of the instrument in issue, the field it is
designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed
(see, mutatis mutandis, Sud Fondi S.r.l. and Others v. Italy,
no. 75909/01, § 109, 20 January 2009). In particular, a rule is “foreseeable”
when it affords a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by the
public authorities (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l.
and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 143, ECHR-2012). Similarly, the applicable law
must provide minimum procedural safeguards commensurate with the importance of
the principle at stake (see, mutatis mutandis, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V.
v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 38224/03, § 88, 14 September 2010; Vistiņš and
Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], no. 71243/01, §§ 96-98, 25 October
2012).
The Court would, moreover, reiterate the finding
in its settled case-law that the national authorities are in principle better
placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions. In
matters of general social and economic policy, on which opinions within a
democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the domestic policy-maker
should be afforded a particularly broad margin of appreciation (see, for
example, Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 65731/01,
§ 52, ECHR 2006-VI).
In so far as the tax sphere is concerned, the
Court’s well-established position is that States may be afforded some degree of
additional deference and latitude in the exercise of their fiscal functions
under the lawfulness test (see National & Provincial Building Society,
Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United
Kingdom, 23 October 1997, §§ 75 to 83, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1997-VII; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, no. 14902/04, § 559,
20 September 2011).
Moreover, since in the present case the
interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions was
incarnated by a tax measure, it is convenient to point out that retroactive
taxation can be applicable essentially to remedy technical deficiencies of the
law, in particular where the measure is ultimately justified by public-interest
considerations. There is in fact an obvious and compelling public interest to
ensure that private entities do not enjoy the benefit of a windfall in a
changeover to a new tax-payment regime (see National etc., cited above,
§§ 80 to 83).
However, no such deficiency of the law has been demonstrated in
the circumstances of the present case. Therefore, the Court considers that
particular caution is called for when assessing whether or not the impugned
measure was “lawful” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
ii. Application
of the above-mentioned principles to the present case
The Court notes that the taxation of the
severance pay in question was due after the enactment of the final version of
the impugned legislation. In the applicant’s particular case, the tax was actually
paid prior to that date, under the intermediary rules (see paragraph 7 above). In
any case, the taxation complained of can be argued to have certain retroactive
features. In particular, the taxed benefits themselves were generated on the
applicant’s dismissal on 1 July 2010 and were paid on 2 July 2010 (see
paragraphs 6 and 7 above) - which preceded the entry into force of the final
amendment of the Act on 14 May 2011 (see paragraph 16 above).
The Court cannot overlook the legislative
process leading to the enactment of the law affecting the applicant. It
observes that the Constitutional Court found, in its first decision (see
paragraph 11 above), the measure unconstitutional for being confiscatory (especially
in regard to statutorily provided severance pay to civil servants who could not
be considered to have received it in violation of good morals or otherwise
illegally).
In its second decision (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above) the
Constitutional Court held that for the current tax year (that is, for 2010),
the tax was not unconstitutional in regard to severance payments which were
made before the entry into force of the Act, since it did not violate human
dignity - which was the only basis for constitutional evaluation of a tax law
after the reduction of the competences of the Constitutional Court. This did
not, however, change the finding of substantive unconstitutionality of
essentially identical provisions of the original Tax Act - only that the
Constitutional Court could not review the slightly amended provisions of the
Amendment.
The modified Tax Act was enacted on 9 May 2011, published on 13 May 2011
and entered into force the next day, 14 May 2011, being applicable to severance
and related payments earned after 1 January 2010 (see paragraph 16 above). However,
the applicant had received the severance payment in question more than ten
months earlier.
The Court also notes that the rules under which
the applicant paid the tax in question were subsequently annulled by the
Constitutional Court and the missing legislation was substituted for only on 14
May 2011 (see paragraphs 14 and 16 above), which in the Court’s eyes
raises some doubts as to the presence of a proper legal basis. Moreover, the
Court considers that the decisions of the Constitutional Court as such raise
certain issues as to the constitutionality - and therefore the legality - of
the impugned Act.
The Court nevertheless finds that the final amendment of the
Act can be accepted as providing a legal basis for the measure in question,
taking into account the degree of additional deference and latitude afforded in
this field (see paragraph 39 above). It considers that it is not necessary to
take a position on the legality of the impugned tax measures, which concerned
the applicant’s employment and severance pay, both having occurred long before
the entry force of the Act, since this issue is taken into consideration under
the proportionality test (see paragraphs 54 to 62 below).
c. Public
interest
The applicant challenged the legitimacy of the
aim pursued by the impugned measure. In this connection, the Court reiterates
that, because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the
national authorities are in principle better placed than the international
judge to appreciate what is “in the public interest”. Under the system of
protection established by the Convention, it is thus for the national
authorities to make the initial assessment as to the existence of a problem of
public concern warranting measures of deprivation of property or interfering
with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. Here, as in other fields to which
the safeguards of the Convention extend, the national authorities accordingly
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. Furthermore, the notion of “public
interest” is necessarily extensive (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins,
cited above, § 106).
The Court further reiterates that the levying of
taxes constitutes in principle an interference with the right guaranteed by the
first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that such interference may
be justified under the second paragraph of that Article, which expressly
provides for an exception in respect of the payment of taxes or other
contributions. However, this issue is nonetheless within the Court’s control
(see paragraphs 31 and 34 above).
Moreover, it is naturally in the first place for
the national authorities to decide what kind of taxes or contributions are to
be collected. The decisions in this area will commonly involve the appreciation
of political, economic and social questions which the Convention leaves within
the competence of the States parties, the domestic authorities being better
placed than the Court in this connection. The power of appreciation of the
States parties in such matters is therefore a wide one (see Gasus Dosier-
und Fördertechnik GmbH, cited above, § 60, and National etc., cited
above, §§ 80-82).
However, as regards the Government’s implied
reference to European Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC (see paragraphs 18
and 25 above), the Court finds that this consideration is immaterial in regard
to the applicant. The measures envisioned in the Recommendation, which will be
applicable in the future to restrict excessive payments in the financial
sector, were conceived because “excessive risk-taking in the financial services
industry and in particular in banks and investment firms has contributed to the
failure of financial undertakings and to systemic problems in the Member States
and globally.” The Recommendation suggests national regulation that provides for
performance-based components of remuneration based on longer-term performance
and contains no reference to social justice expectations. For the Court,
excessive risk-taking in the financial sector is irrelevant in the applicant’s
particular case.
Nevertheless, given the above margin of
appreciation regarding the determination of what is “in the public interest”,
granted to general measures interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions, the Court accepts that the “sense of social justice of the
population”, in combination with the interest to protect the public purse and
to distribute the public burden satisfies the Convention requirement of a
legitimate aim, notwithstanding its broadness. The Court has no convincing
evidence on which to conclude that the reasons referred to by the Government
were manifestly devoid of any reasonable basis (compare and contrast Tkachevy v.
Russia, no. 35430/05, § 50, 14 February 2012).
However, serious doubts remain as to the relevance of these
considerations in regard to the applicant who only received a contractually
stipulated compensation and could not have been made responsible for the fiscal
problems which the State intended to remedy. While the Court recognises that
the impugned measure was intended to protect the public purse against excessive
severance payments, it is not convinced that this goal was primarily served by
taxation. As the Constitutional Court noticed, there was a possibility to
change severance rules and reduce the amounts which were contrary to public
interest, but the authorities did not opt for this course of action. However,
it is not necessary for the Court to decide at this juncture on the adequacy of
a measure that formally serves a social goal, since this measure is in any event
subject to the proportionality test.
d. Proportionality
i. General
principles
Even if it has taken place subject to the
conditions provided for by law - implying the absence of arbitrariness - and in
the public interest, an interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment
of possessions must always strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the
individual’s fundamental rights. In particular, there must be a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought
to be realised by the impugned measure (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1)
[GC], no. 36813/97, § 93, ECHR 2006-V, and also paragraph 31 above).
In determining whether this requirement is met,
the Court reiterates that the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with
regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether
the consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest for the
purpose of achieving the object of the law in question (see Chassagnou and Others
v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 75, ECHR 1999-III,
and Herrmann v. Germany [GC], no. 9300/07, § 74, 26 June
2012). Nevertheless, the Court cannot abdicate its power of review and must
therefore determine whether the requisite balance was maintained in a manner
consonant with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions,
within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Jahn
and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01, § 93,
ECHR 2005-VI). In the determination of the proportionality of the
measure, the Court did in the past also consider the personal situation of the
applicants, including their good faith (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins,
cited above, § 120).
In order to assess the conformity of the State’s
conduct with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must
conduct an overall examination of the various interests at issue, having regard
to the fact that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are
“practical and effective”, not theoretical or illusory. It must go beneath
appearances and look into the reality of the situation at issue, taking account
of all the relevant circumstances, including the conduct of the parties to the
proceedings, the means employed by the State and the implementation of those
means. Where an issue in the general interest is at stake, it is incumbent on
the public authorities to act in good time, and in an appropriate and
consistent manner (see Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfı v. Turkey,
no. 34478/97, § 46, 9 January 2007, and Bistrović v. Croatia,
no. 25774/05, § 35, 31 May 2007).
In the context of tax collection, the Court
considers that the suitability of methods is a consideration in the
establishment of proportionality of a measure of interference (see, in the
context of exercise of the State’s right of pre-emption, Hentrich v. France,
22 September 1994, § 48, Series A no. 296 A).
Although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 contains no
explicit procedural requirements, in order to assess the proportionality of the
interference the Court looks at the degree of protection from arbitrariness
that is afforded by the proceedings in the case (see Hentrich, cited
above, § 46). In particular, the Court examines whether the proceedings
concerning the interference with an applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment
of possessions were attended by basic procedural safeguards. It has already
held that an interference cannot be legitimate in the absence of adversarial
proceedings that comply with the principle of equality of arms, enabling
argument to be presented on the issues relevant for the outcome of a case (see Hentrich,
cited above, § 42; and Jokela v. Finland, no. 28856/95, § 45, ECHR 2002-IV).
A comprehensive view must be taken of the applicable procedures (see AGOSI,
cited above, § 55; Hentrich, cited above, § 49; and Jokela, cited
above, § 45).
ii. Application
of the above-mentioned principles in the present case
As it transpires from its case-law, in the area
of social and economic legislation including in the area of taxation as a means
of such policies States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation, which in the
interests of social justice and economic well-being may legitimately lead them,
in the Court’s view, to adjust, cap or even reduce the amount of severance
normally payable to the qualifying population. However, any such measures must
be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner and comply with the requirements
of proportionality.
In particular, as regards the existence of a “reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought
to be realised”, the Court notes at the outset that the Constitutional Court’s
first decision can be understood to characterise the tax in question as
amounting to a confiscatory measure. Moreover, tax rates exceeding 50% have
been found unconstitutional in Germany, a Member State of the Council of Europe
(see paragraph 19 above). However, in several European countries - such as
Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy - personal income tax
rates reached about 75% in the past - although those rates were usually
applicable only to the highest income brackets, related to revenues clearly
exceeding the amount that is contemplated in the context of the present case.
It is also to be noted that the OECD average of top combined statutory personal
income tax rates was 65.7% in 1981, 50.6% in 1990, 46.5% in 2000 and 41.7% in
2010.
The applicable threshold in the present case was
HUF 3.5 million, the amounts of severance pay falling below this
limit being subject to the general personal income tax rates (a maximum of 32%
in the period, see paragraph 7 above). By contrast, a tax rate of 98% was applied
to that part of severance pay which exceeded the threshold.
In the instant case, the Court takes into
consideration in the proportionality analysis that the tax rate applied exceeds
considerably the rate applicable to all other revenues, without determining in
abstracto whether or not the tax burden was, quantitatively speaking, confiscatory
in nature. For the Court, given the margin of appreciation granted to States in
matters of taxation, the applicable tax rate cannot be decisive in itself,
especially in circumstances like those of the present case.
The Court observes that the applicant, who was
entitled to severance pay according to his labour contract and whose acting in
good faith has never been called into question, was subjected to the impugned
measure notwithstanding the fact that the severance pay served the specific and
recognised social goal of labour reintegration.
Moreover, to the extent that the Government may
be understood to argue that certain senior managers of State-owned enterprises
were capable of influencing their own benefits, which phenomenon could only be
countered by targeted taxation (see paragraph 27 above), the Court is satisfied
that - although the benefits in question were stipulated in the labour contract
between the applicant and his employer - there is nothing in the case file to
corroborate such an assumption of abuse in the case of the applicant, who in
any event was not an executive of that enterprise. In particular, the Court
notes that the applicant, having been in the service of the employer for about
eleven years, was statutorily entitled to three months’ severance pay under the
Labour Code (see paragraph 7 above), and acquired only one additional month’s
amount under the labour contract.
As regards the personal burden which the
applicant sustained on account of the impugned measure, the Court notes that he
had to suffer a substantial deprivation of income in a period of presumable considerable
personal difficulty, namely subsequent to the loss of employment. The Court
would observe in this context that Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (see paragraph 18 above) endorses benefits
providing protection in the case of loss of employment, and that according to
the European Court of Justice, the aim pursued by severance pay - that is,
helping dismissed employees find new employment - belongs within legitimate
employment policy goals (see paragraph 18 above).
Moreover, the Court cannot overlook the fact that the applicant
received the benefits in question, reduced by the then applicable taxes,
several months before the change in the revenue rules, and might have disposed
of it already, unaware that subsequently he would have to surrender this money,
almost in its entirety, in the levying of an additional tax. For the Court,
this element - that is, the absence of a transitional period within which to
adjust himself to the new scheme - is likely to have exposed the applicant to
substantial personal hardships. In this connection the Court recalls that
taxation at a considerably higher tax rate than that in force when the revenue
in question was generated could arguably be regarded as an unreasonable
interference with expectations protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(see M.A. and 34 Others, cited above). The tax complained of was
not intended to remedy technical deficiencies of the pre-existing law, nor had
the applicant enjoyed the benefit of a windfall in a changeover to a new
tax-payment regime (compare and contrast, National etc., cited above,
§§ 75 to 83).
Against this background, the Court finds that
the measure complained of entailed an excessive and individual burden on the
applicant’s side. This is all the more evident when considering the fact that
the measure targeted only a certain group of individuals, who were apparently
singled out as having been paid, directly or indirectly, out of the public
purse. Assuming that the impugned measure served the interest of the State
budget at a time of economic hardship, the Court notes that the majority of
citizens were not obliged to contribute, to a comparable extent, to the public
burden.
The Court concludes that the specific measure in
question, as applied to the applicant, even if meant to serve social justice,
cannot be justified by the legitimate public interest relied on by the
Government. It affected the applicant being in good-faith standing and deprived
him of the larger part of an acquired right (statutorily guaranteed to a large
extent), serving the special social interest of labour-market reintegration. In
the Court’s opinion, those who act in good faith on the basis of law or
contracts should not be frustrated in their expectations without specific and
compelling reasons. Therefore the measure cannot be held to be reasonably
proportionate to the aim sought to be realised.
The foregoing considerations are sufficient to
enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE
CONVENTION READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
The applicant also complained that he did not
have any effective remedy at his disposal in respect of the alleged violation
of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He relied on Article 13 of the
Convention.
The Government contested that argument in
general terms.
The Court notes that this complaint is linked to
the one examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
Having regard to the finding relating to Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 62 above), the Court considers that it is
not necessary to examine separately whether, in this case, there has been a
violation of Article 13.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE
CONVENTION READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
The applicant further complained that those
retiring immediately on dismissal were exempted from the tax in question and,
moreover, that certain categories of tax subjects (including the applicant) had
to declare and pay the tax earlier than ex-Members of Parliament and others. Moreover,
he also complained about the differentiation between taxing amounts of severance
pay over HUF 3.5 million and taxing others under that threshold, asserting that
this was discriminatory for those with long and/or senior employments giving
rise to substantial severance pay.
He relied on Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Article 14 reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the]
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as ...
property ... or other status.”
The Government contested these arguments in
general terms.
The Court reiterates that Article 14 has no independent
existence, but plays an important role by complementing the other provisions of
the Convention and the Protocols, since it protects individuals placed in
similar situations from any discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights set
forth in those other provisions. Where a substantive Article of the Convention
has been invoked both on its own and together with Article 14 and a separate
breach has been found of the substantive Article, it is not generally necessary
for the Court to consider the case under Article 14 also, though the position
is otherwise if a clear inequality of treatment in the enjoyment of the right
in question is a fundamental aspect of the case (see, for example, Chassagnou
and Others, cited above, § 89).
In the circumstances of the present case, the
Court is of the view that the inequality of treatment of which the applicant
claimed to be a victim has been sufficiently taken into account in the above
assessment that has led to the finding of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 taken separately (see paragraph 62 above). Accordingly, it finds that -
while this complaint is also admissible - there is no cause for a separate
examination of the same facts from the standpoint of Article 14 of the Convention
(see, mutatis mutandis, Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia,
no. 18147/02, § 101, 5 April 2007).
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has
been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed altogether 27,100 euros
(EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage (that is, the tax amount complained of plus
accrued interests) and non-pecuniary damage combined.
The Government found these claims excessive.
Having regard to the fact that, in the absence
of the 98% tax rate, the applicant’s severance would have been in all
likelihood subject to the general personal income taxation, the Court awards
the applicant EUR 25,000 in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage
combined. The Court notes in this respect that there is no element in the case
file or the parties’ submissions substantiating that the applicant had actually
been in a position to influence his benefits due on dismissal (see paragraph 7
above).
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed 1,000,000
Hungarian forints (HUF) for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court,
billable by his lawyer.
The Government did not express a view on the
matter.
According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant
is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has
been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the
documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the full sum of claimed, that is, EUR 3,400.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine
separately the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 read in
conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention;
4. Holds that there is no need to examine
separately the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 read in
conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention;
5. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the
applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes
final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the
following amounts, to be converted into the currency
of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement:
(i) EUR 25,000 (twenty-five thousand euros), plus
any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damage;
(ii) EUR 3,400 (three thousand four hundred euros),
plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and
expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 July 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Guido
Raimondi
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and
Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges Raimondi, Jočienė
and Lorenzen is annexed to this judgment.
G.R.A.
S.H.N.
