European Court of Human Rights

 

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF KLOPCOVS v. LATVIA

(Application no. 26902/13)

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

STRASBOURG

13 February 2020

 

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Klopcovs v. Latvia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

          Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, President,
          Síofra O’Leary,
          Lado Chanturia, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 21 January 2020,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 26902/13) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Latvian national, Mr Boriss Klopcovs (“the applicant”), on 11 April 2013.

2.  The Latvian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Līce.

3.  On 18 December 2013 the Government were given notice of the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

4.  Written observations were received from the Government and a just satisfaction claim was received from the applicant.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Riga.

6.  In 2005 the applicant was detained in the Riga Central Prison pending trial. Throughout the months of June, July and August 2005 the Riga Central Prison administration controlled and stopped the applicant’s correspondence addressed to private persons and institutions.

7.  On 14 and 25 September 2005 the applicant complained to the Prisons Administration about the actions of the Riga Central Prison administration, controlling and stopping his correspondence, and the reasons for these actions.

8.  On 11 October and 24 October 2005 the Prisons Administration rejected the applicant’s complaints. On 4 October and 16 December 2005 the Ministry of Justice found the actions of the Riga Central Prison administration, and the answers given by the Prisons Administration, lawful.

9.  On 22 September 2006 the applicant brought proceedings against the Ministry of Justice before the administrative courts. Subsequently the Prisons Administration joined the proceedings.

10.  On 21 October 2008 the Administrative District Court found the actions of the Riga Central Prison administration unlawful. However, it rejected the applicant’s claim for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages of 5,406 Latvian lats (LVL) (approximately 7,692 euros (EUR)).

11.  On 3 December 2009 the Administrative Regional Court quashed the first-instance court’s decision and remitted the case to the first-instance court.

12.  On 27 April 2010 the first-instance court again found that the Riga Central Prison administration’s actions had been unlawful and rejected the applicant’s claim for damages. The applicant appealed against that judgment as regarded the claim for damages; however, the court did not accept his appeal as it was lodged after the expiry of the time-limit. Nevertheless, the opposing parties’ appeals were accepted and appellate proceedings were initiated.

13.  On 15 February 2012 the Administrative Regional Court found that the Riga Central Prison administration’s actions had been unlawful in so far as the applicant had not been informed about the reasons for stopping his letters and also that one of the letters had been stopped unlawfully. The remainder of the applicant’s claims were dismissed.

14.  On 26 October 2012, in a final decision, the Senate of the Supreme Court, upheld the judgment of the Administrative Regional Court and dismissed the cassation complaints of the Prisons Administration and the applicant who disagreed with the conclusions of the appellate court

15.  According to the case materials, none of the ten hearings were postponed due to the applicant’s unjustified absence. Nevertheless, it appears that after the hearing of 22 February 2008 the applicant did not return 77 pages of case documents to the file. On 23 May 2008 the applicant explained to the Administrative District Court that he considered that the documents were given for his personal use and was not aware that they had to be returned. The Administrative District Court was able to reobtain them from another case-file in September 2008. Apparently at least one hearing was adjourned due to this. The applicant also initiated several ancillary proceedings challenging various procedural decisions adopted by the first-instance and appellate courts.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

16.  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by ... tribunal ...”

17.  The Government contested that argument.

A.    Admissibility

1.    Incompatibility ratione materiae

18.  The Government argued that Article 6 was not applicable to the present case under its civil head as the applicant’s claim before the domestic courts was not “pecuniary” in nature. It primarily and substantially concerned the de facto action of the Riga Central Prison administration and, therefore, was undoubtedly in the sphere of public law. Furthermore, the applicant’s claims for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages were only accessory. As he failed to appeal against the judgment of 27 April 2010 in due time (see paragraph 12 above), he did not continue to maintain his claim for damages.

19.  The applicant did not respond to the Government’s objections.

20.  With regard to procedures instituted in the prison context, the Court has held that some restrictions on prisoners’ rights fall within the sphere of “civil rights”. For example, the Court has found Article 6 to be applicable to a prisoner’s family visits, correspondence or relationships with non-family members and restriction on private meetings with a lawyer (see De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, §§ 147-55, 23 February 2017, and Altay v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 11236/09, § 68, 9 April 2019).

21.  In the present case, the Court considers that the above line of case‑law can be validly transposed to the circumstances of the present case. The right to respect for the applicant’s correspondence clearly fell within the sphere of personal rights and were civil in nature (compare De Tommaso, cited above, § 154). Accordingly the Court rejects the Government’s objection and finds that Article 6 § 1 is applicable under its civil limb in the instant case.

2.    Incompatibility ratione personae and non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies

22.  Invoking both incompatibility ratione personae and non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies, the Government argued that the applicant could have lodged a claim with the courts of general jurisdiction on the basis of Article 92 of the Constitution seeking compensation for the alleged violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this remedy the Government submitted a judgment of 11 April 2013 of the Riga Regional Court concerning a civil claim about the length of criminal proceedings (domestic case no. C27200511). In that case the plaintiff was awarded LVL 500 (approximately EUR 711), as following six years of criminal trial the first-instance court had not delivered a judgment.

23.  The applicant contested the Government’s objections regarding non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies.

24.  In the case of Veiss v. Latvia (no. 15152/12, § 71, 28 January 2014) the Court dismissed a similar argument on the grounds that the Government had failed to submit relevant case-law examples establishing the effectiveness of this remedy under Article 92 of the Constitution for the particular type of claim. The Court notes that the case-law example provided by the Government in the present case was adopted by the appellate court on 11 April 2013 ‑ almost five months after the adoption of the final judgment in the present case. Hence, it cannot be invoked to conclude that the existence of this particular domestic remedy had been sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice at the time the relevant proceedings were concluded (compare mutatis mutandis Melnītis v. Latvia, no. 30779/05, §§ 50-53, 28 February 2012).

25.  Therefore, the Court rejects the Government’s objection concerning the non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies without further assessing the effectiveness of the domestic remedy invoked.

3.    Conclusion

26.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.     Merits

27.  The Government argued that there were no periods of inactivity before the domestic courts and the applicant himself had significantly contributed to the length of proceedings. In particular, he initiated several ancillary proceedings and failed to return some documents to the case file after the hearing of 22 February 2008 (see paragraph 15 above).

28.  In the instant case the Court considers that the period to be taken into consideration began on 14 September 2005, when the applicant challenged the actions of the Riga Central Prison administration (see paragraph 7 above). The application to the Prisons Administration and the Ministry of Justice was a prerequisite for bringing the proceedings to the court (see mutatis mutandis König v. Germany, 28 June 1978, § 98, Series A no. 27, and Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, §§ 65‑66, ECHR 2007‑II). It ended on 26 October 2012, when the Supreme Court adopted its final decision (see paragraph 14 above). The proceedings before the Prisons Administration, the Ministry of Justice and three levels of jurisdiction, including one remittal of the Administrative District Court’s judgment, lasted 7 years, 1 month and 13 days.

29.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

30.  The Court observes that the applicant’s case was not particularly complex. While it did not belong to a category that by its own nature would call for a special expedition (see Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], no. 75529/01, § 133, ECHR 2006‑VII), what was at stake to the applicant still required a reasonably expeditious decision given that he was in detention.

31.  As to the conduct of the applicant, the Court considers that after the mandatory administrative procedure it was up to him to bring the proceedings before the domestic courts in a timely manner. Thus, the period from 16 December 2005 to 22 September 2006 cannot be attributed to the State. As regards the delays caused by the applicant’s alleged failure to return some documents to the case file after the hearing of 22 February 2008 (see paragraph 15 above), the documents submitted before this Court do not allow it to conclude that these delays were wholly imputable to the applicant. It appears that this situation emerged from a miscommunication between the applicant and the Administrative District Court and was followed by some obstacles encountered by the Administrative District Court to reobtain those documents. Finally, whilst some ancillary proceedings initiated by the applicant might have slightly prolonged the proceedings, the applicant cannot be blamed for making use of the remedies available to him under domestic law (see Gürkan v. Turkey, no. 1154/04, § 28, 29 March 2011).

32.  The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above). Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. The applicant’s failure to act expeditiously and any delay imputable to him as a result of the above miscommunication as regards the documents from the file cannot justify the overall duration of proceedings which related to a relatively simple issue and was mainly due to delays in the examination of the case by the State authorities. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that, in the instant case, the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

33.  Accordingly there has been a breach of Article 6 § 1.

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

34.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.    Damage

35.  The applicant submitted a claim for just satisfaction but left the question of the award to the Court’s discretion.

36.  The Government contested the applicant had sustained any damage.

37.  The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Taking into consideration the particular circumstances of the case and the applicant’s contribution to the delay and ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 1,000 under that head.

B.     Costs and expenses

38.  The applicant also claimed EUR 900 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 769.39 for those incurred before the Court. The applicant has not added any documents justifying these costs and expenses.

39.  The Government contested these claims.

40.  In view of the lack of documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses.

C.    Default interest

41.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.      Declares the complaint concerning the length of proceedings admissible;

2.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3.      Holds

(a)   that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4.      Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 February 2020, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

    Milan Blaško                                                      Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer
Deputy Registrar                                                                  President