European Court of Human Rights

 

FIRST SECTION

CASES OF UZELAC AND ĐEKIĆ v. CROATIA

(Applications nos. 6161/13 and 57863/14.)

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

4 June 2020

 

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Uzelac v. Croatia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

          Armen Harutyunyan, President,
          Pere Pastor Vilanova,
          Pauliine Koskelo, judges,
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 28 April 2020,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in two applications (nos. 6161/13 and 57863/14) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Ms Branka Uzelac (“the first applicant”) and Ms Nada Đekić (“the second applicant”), on 10 December 2012 and 8 August 2014 respectively. The first applicant is a Croatian national, whereas the second applicant is a Croatian and Serbian national.

2.  The first applicant was represented by Mr M. Ličina, a lawyer practising in Zagreb, and the second applicant was represented by Mr J. Borić, a lawyer practising in Belgrade. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik

3.  The Government were given notice of the complaints concerning the right of property on 8 October 2015 (application no. 6161/13) and 7 September 2017 (application no. 57863/14), and the remainder of the applications was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

4.  The Government of Serbia, having been informed of their right to intervene (application no. 57863/14) in accordance with Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 1 (a) of the Rules of Court, did not avail themselves of this right.

5.  The Government objected to the examination of the applications by a Committee. Having considered the Government’s objection, the Court rejects it.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6.  The first applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Zagreb. The second applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Belgrade.

A.  Proceedings in the first applicant’s case

1.     Administrative proceedings

7 .  On 14 October 1997 the first applicant asked the Regional Office of the Croatian Pension Fund in Gospić (Hrvatski zavod za mirovinsko osiguranje, Područna služba u Gospiću, hereinafter “the Gospić Office”) to grant her an old-age pension. At the time of submitting her request, the first applicant had her registered domicile in Gospić, Croatia. In order to demonstrate that she met the statutory requirement concerning years of service (see section 21(1) of the Basic Pension and Disability Insurance Act quoted in paragraph 53 below), she relied exclusively on the period between 1 December 1965 and 2 September 1991, during which she had worked in Croatia. In that regard, she submitted a copy of her employment booklet (radna knjižica) indicating that she had been in continuous employment during that period for twenty-five years and nine months. She did not fill in the section of the relevant application form provided by the Croatian Pension Fund where applicants were required to provide information concerning their employment abroad.

8.   On 16 February 1998 the Gospić Office issued an interim decision whereby it

-  established that the first applicant had the right to a pension because on 1 November 1997 she had met the statutory requirements for an old-age pension (see section 21(1) of the Basic Pension and Disability Insurance Act quoted in paragraph 53 below); and

-  granted her advance payment of her pension (akontacija mirovine) until subordinate legislation for the implementation of the Validation Act was adopted (see paragraph 55 below) and the exact amount of her pension was calculated.

9 .  On the basis of that decision, the first applicant received advance payment of her pension until 31 December 2000.

10 .  On 4 February 1999, relying on the Validation Act (see paragraph 55 below), the first applicant asked the Gospić Office to recognise that in the period between 9 October 1991 and 4 August 1995 she had been working in a part of Croatia which had, in that period, been outside the Croatian authorities’ control, and to take that period into account for the purposes of her pension, namely, when calculating her years of service. By a decision of 14 November 2008 the Gospić Office established that the available evidence suggested that the first applicant had only worked during a part of that period, specifically, between 11 August 1992 and 18 March 1993, and it recognised only that part as counting towards her years of service.

11.   Meanwhile, on 31 January 2001, the Gospić Office had invited the first applicant to submit evidence on whether she had been employed in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after 1991, instructing her to request such evidence from the relevant authorities in Belgrade. The first applicant did not reply. The Gospić Office then requested that information of its own motion.

12.  On 7 March 2001 the Serbian Fund for Pension and Disability Insurance in Belgrade (Republički fond za penzijsko i invalidsko osiguranje zaposlenih Beograd) informed the Gospić Office of the Croatian Pension Fund that from 28 April 1993 until 30 April 1994 the first applicant had been employed in Serbia ( which was a federal unit of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in that period).

13.  On 26 March 2001 the Central Office of the Croatian Pension Fund (Hrvatski zavod za mirovinsko osiguranje, Središnja služba, hereinafter “the Central Office”) re-examined the first applicant’s case of its own motion in the context of supervision proceedings (see section 126 of the Pension Insurance Act quoted in paragraph 54 below, and section 63 of the Administrative Procedure Act quoted in paragraph 56 below). It established that the Gospić Office did not have jurisdiction to decide the first applicant’s case, given that her most recent employment had not been in Croatia (see section 75(4) of the Basic Pension and Disability Insurance Act quoted in paragraph 53 below). Thus, relying on section 263(1) sub‑paragraph 1 of the Administrative Procedure Act (see paragraph 56 below), it set aside the first-instance decision of the Gospić Office of 16 February 1998 (see paragraph 8 above) and remitted the case for reconsideration.

14.  In fresh proceedings, on 4 May 2001, the Gospić Office dismissed the first applicant’s request for a pension on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction. It considered that, in accordance with domestic law (see section 75(4) of the Basic Pension and Disability Insurance Act quoted in paragraph 53 below), the relevant authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had jurisdiction in the matter, since the first applicant’s most recent employment had been in Serbia (see paragraph 12 above). The first applicant did not appeal and that decision became final.

15.  On 17 April 2001 the first applicant found employment in Croatia and was employed until 18 June 2001.

16.  On 27 June 2001 she submitted a new pension request.

17.  On 24 October 2001 the Zagreb Office of the Croatian Pension Fund (Hrvatski zavod za mirovinsko osiguranje, Područna služba u Zagrebu, hereinafter “the Zagreb Office”) issued an interim decision whereby it

-  established that the first applicant had the right to a pension because she met the statutory requirements for an old-age pension (see section 178 of the Pension Insurance Act quoted in paragraph 54 below); and

-  granted her advance payment of her pension until the entry into force of the bilateral Social Insurance Agreement between Croatia and Serbia (see paragraph 58 below), which would enable it to obtain all the relevant information from the Serbian authorities about her employment there that was needed for the exact calculation of the amount of her pension.

18.  Following the entry into force of that bilateral agreement on 1 May 2003 (see paragraph 58 below), on 7 May 2008 the Zagreb Office issued a definitive decision granting the first applicant the right to a pension with effect from 1 January 2001. Since the first applicant did not appeal, the decision became final shortly afterwards.

2.     Civil proceedings

(a)    Principal proceedings

19.   In a letter of 24 July 2002 the Central Office proposed that the first applicant pay back in instalments the pension payments which she had received before 31 December 2000 (see paragraphs 8-9 above).

20 .  On 14 July 2005 the Central Office reminded the first applicant that she had to pay back those pension payments, and cautioned her that civil proceedings would be instituted against her if she failed to do so.

21 .  By a letter of 15 September 2005 the first applicant informed the Central Office that she refused to pay back the amounts sought (see paragraph 19 above).

22.  On 3 November 2005 the Croatian Pension Fund brought a civil action against the first applicant, seeking reimbursement of the pension paid to her before 30 December 2000, in total, 51,208.38 Croatian kunas (HRK), together with statutory default interest. That amount corresponded to approximately 6,900 euros (EUR) at the material time.

23.  In a judgment of 18 November 2011, relying on section 164 of the Pension Insurance Act and section 214 of the Obligations Act (see paragraphs 54 and 57 below), the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu) allowed the plaintiff’s claim and ordered the first applicant to pay the amount sought back to the Croatian Pension Fund, together with statutory default interest accrued from 3 November 2005 (the date when the action had been brought against the first applicant, see paragraph 22 above). The court held that the first applicant had received the disputed payments in good faith, and that therefore statutory default interest could not have started to accrue from an earlier date.

24.  On 12 June 2012 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) dismissed an appeal by the first applicant and upheld the first‑instance judgment, which thereby became final and enforceable.

25.  The first applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). She relied on Article 14 and Article 29 of the Constitution, which guarantee the right of equality before the law and the right to a fair hearing respectively. She also complained that it was evident from the case file that she had fulfilled all statutory requirements to be granted a pension, and that she had been deprived of her right to a pension only because the domestic authorities had subsequently established that they lacked jurisdiction to decide her request.

26.  By a decision of 8 November 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the first applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible, finding that the case did not raise any constitutional issue.

(b)    Enforcement proceedings

27.  On 23 August 2013 the Croatian Pension Fund instituted enforcement proceedings against the first applicant before the Požega Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Požegi), applying for enforcement of the above-mentioned judgment of 18 November 2011 (see paragraph 23 above).

28 .  On 25 March 2014 the Požega Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Požegi) issued a writ of execution (rješenje o ovrsi) for garnishment of part of the first applicant’s pension.

29 .  By 29 February 2016 HRK 25,126.14 (approximately EUR 3,300 at the material time) had been collected from the first applicant’s pension (see paragraph 18 above).

30 .  It appears that the enforcement proceedings are still pending.

B.     Proceedings in the second applicant’s case

1.    Administrative proceedings

31.   On 6 May 1998 the second applicant asked the Gospić Office to grant her an old-age pension. In order to demonstrate that she met the statutory requirement concerning years of service (see section 21(1) of the Basic Pension and Disability Insurance Act quoted in paragraph 53 below), she submitted a copy of her employment booklet indicating that she had spent thirty-five years in continuous employment. According to the booklet, she had most recently been employed from 1 September 1992 to 31 January 1993 in Futog, Serbia. In the section of the relevant application form provided by the Croatian Pension Fund where applicants were required indicate whether they had already been granted a right arising from pension insurance, the second applicant stated that she had not.

32.  On 10 August 1998 the Gospić Office issued an interim decision whereby it

-  established that the second applicant had the right to a pension because on 1 May 1998 she had met the statutory requirements for an old-age pension (see section 21(1) of the Basic Pension and Disability Insurance Act quoted in paragraph 53 below); and

-  granted her advance payment of her pension until the subordinate legislation for the implementation of the Validation Act was adopted (see paragraph 55 below) and the exact amount of her pension was calculated.

33 .  On the basis of that decision, the second applicant received advance payment of her pension until 30 April 2002.

34 .  On 30 November 1998, relying on the Validation Act (see paragraph 55 below), the second applicant asked the Gospić Office to recognise that in the period between 9 October 1991 and 31 August 1992 she had been working in a part of Croatia which had, in that period, been outside the Croatian authorities’ control, and to take that into account for pension purposes, namely when calculating her years of service. By a decision of 30 November 1998 the Gospić Office established that the second applicant had indeed been working during that period, and recognised that this counted towards her years of service.

35.  On 12 March 2002 the Gospić Office requested information from the relevant Serbian authorities on whether they had granted the second applicant a pension and whether she had been employed in Serbia after 8 October 1991.

36.  On 29 March 2002 the Serbian Fund for Pension and Disability Insurance in Novi Sad (Republički fond za penzijsko i invalidsko osiguranje zaposlenih Novi Sad) informed the Gospić Office of the Croatian Pension Fund that the second applicant had been employed in Serbia from 1 September 1992 until 31 January 1993, and she had been granted a pension in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the basis of which she had received a pension from 1 February 1993 until 30 April 1998.

37.   On 16 May 2002 the Central Office of the Croatian Pension Fund re‑examined the second applicant’s case of its own motion in supervision proceedings (see section 126 of the Pension Insurance Act quoted in paragraph 54 below, and section 63 of the Administrative Procedure Act quoted in paragraph 56 below ). Relying on section 263(1) sub-paragraph 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act (see paragraph 56 below), it set aside the first-instance decision of the Gospić Office of 10 August 1998 (see paragraph 32 above) and remitted the case for reconsideration, because the second applicant had failed to disclose that she had been granted a pension in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

38.  In fresh proceedings, by a decision of 17 June 2002, the Gospić Office declared the second applicant’s request for a pension inadmissible, on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction. It found that, in accordance with domestic law (see section 75(4) of the Basic Pension and Disability Insurance Act quoted in paragraph 53 below), the relevant authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had jurisdiction in the matter, since the second applicant’s most recent employment had been in Serbia.

39.  On 29 January 2003 the Central Office dismissed an appeal by the second applicant and upheld the first-instance decision, endorsing the reasons given therein. It also advised the second applicant that she could submit a new pension request following the entry into force of the bilateral Social Insurance Agreement between Croatia and Serbia (see paragraph 58 below). Since the second applicant did not challenge that decision before the Administrative Court, it became final.

40.  On 27 May 2003 the second applicant submitted a new pension request, relying on that bilateral agreement, which had come into force on 1 May 2003 (see paragraph 58 below).

41.  On 30 September 2003 the Central Office of the Croatian Pension Fund issued an interim decision whereby it

-  established that the second applicant had the right to a pension because she met the statutory requirements for an old-age pension (see section 178 of the Pension Insurance Act quoted in paragraph 54 below); and

-  granted her advance payment of her pension until it obtained all the relevant information from the Serbian authorities that was needed for the exact calculation of the amount of her pension.

42.  On 27 January 2006 the Central Office issued a definitive decision granting the second applicant the right to a pension with effect from 1 May 2003. The second applicant lodged an appeal, an action for judicial review, and a constitutional complaint against that decision, but those proceedings were eventually dismissed. The decision became final on 23 November 2011.

2.    Civil proceedings

(a)    Principal proceedings

43.  On 9 October 2002 and 3 March 2003 the Central Office asked the second applicant to pay back the pension payments which she had received before 30 April 2002 (see paragraphs 32-33 above). On 14 July 2003 the second applicant told the Croatian Pension Fund that she refused to repay the amounts sought.

44.   On 29 August 2003 the Gospić Office instituted enforcement proceedings against the second applicant before the Gračac Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Gračacu), seeking reimbursement of the pension paid to her before 30 April 2002 - HRK 56,866.10 (approximately EUR 7,300 at the material time) in total - together with statutory default interest.

45.  On 4 September 2003 the Gračac Municipal Court issued a writ of execution as requested by the Gospić Office. However, since the second applicant challenged the writ by objecting to it, the court set it aside. As a consequence, pursuant to the relevant civil procedure legislation, the enforcement proceedings were transformed into regular civil proceedings, and were resumed as such. It appears that the case was then transferred to the Gospi ć Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Gospi ću).

46 .  In a judgment of 8 November 2012, relying on section 164 of the Pension Insurance Act (see paragraph 54 below), the Gospi ć Municipal Court ordered the second applicant to pay back to the Croatian Pension Fund the amount sought, together with statutory default interest accrued from 14 July 2003 (the date on which the second applicant had refused to pay back the amount sought, see paragraph 43 above) .

47 .  The second applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance judgment. In the appeal, inter alia, she reiterated the two following arguments which had been raised during the first-instance proceedings:

-  the administrative authority’s decision of 17 June 2002 (see paragraph 38 above) declaring her pension request inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction did not (automatically) imply that she had to pay back the pension payments which she had received;

-  receiving those payments had not constituted unjust enrichment, because it was evident that she had been entitled to a pension, as she had met the relevant statutory requirements concerning age and years of service.

48 .  On 10 September 2013 the Karlovac County Court (Županijski sud u Karlovcu) dismissed the second applicant’s appeal and upheld the first‑instance judgment, which therefore became final and enforceable.

49.  The second applicant then lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court in which she raised the same argument that she had raised in her appeal against the first-instance judgment (see paragraph 47 above). In doing so, she relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

50.  By a decision of 29 January 2014 the Constitutional Court declared her constitutional complaint inadmissible, finding that the case did not raise any constitutional issue. The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the second applicant on 14 February 2014.

(b)    Enforcement proceedings

51.  On 4 October 2013 the Central Office of the Croatian Pension Fund applied to the Gospi ć Municipal Court for that court’s judgment of 8 November 2012 (see paragraph 46 above) to be enforced against the second applicant.

52 .  It appears that shortly afterwards the case was transferred to the Zadar Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zadru), which on 20 January 2014 issued a writ of execution for garnishment of part of the second applicant’s pension (see paragraph 42 above). The writ became final on 18 July 2014.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

A.    Croatian pension legislation

53.  The relevant provisions of the Act on Principal Rights Arising From Pension and Disability Insurance (Zakon o osnovnim pravima iz mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja , Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no. 23/82 with subsequent amendments, and Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 53/91, hereinafter “the Basic Pension and Disability Insurance Act”), which was in force between 1 July 1983 and 31 December 1998, read as follows:

Section 21(1)

“Workers ... shall acquire the right to an old-age pension when they reach the age of 60 (men) or 55 (women) and have completed 20 years of service .”

Section 75

“(1) Rights arising from pension and disability insurance shall be exercised in [respect of] the [pension insurance fund] of the republic or province in which the insured person was most recently insured.

(2)  ...

(3)  As an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 and 2 of this section, the insured person or beneficiary of the right [to a pension] may, at his or her request, exercise the right to a pension in [respect of] the [pension insurance fund] in which he or she has completed the majority of his or her years of service .

(4)  The request for a pension shall be submitted to the [pension insurance fund] in which the insured person was most recently insured.”

54 .  The relevant provisions of the Pension Insurance Act (Zakon o mirovinskom osiguranju, Official Gazette no. 102/98 with subsequent amendments), which was in force between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2013, therefore at the material time, read as follows:

Section 30

“The right to an old-age pension belongs to insured persons who have reached the age of 65 (men) or 60 (women) and have completed 15 years of service.”

Section 105

“(1)  Rights related to pension insurance shall be decided:

1.  at first instance - by the organisational unit of the [Croatian Pension] Fund in whose territory the person exercising the right was most recently insured,

2.  at second instance - by the [Croatian Pension] Fund’s central organisational unit.”

Section 126

“(1)  A final decision of the [Croatian Pension] Fund may be quashed, declared null and void or set aside in the context of supervision [proceedings], and under the conditions set out in the Administrative Procedure Act.

(3)  ... a decision rendered in the course of the supervision [proceedings] referred to in paragraph 1 shall be definitive [konačno] in [terms of] administrative proceedings, but judicial-review proceedings [upravni spor] may be instituted against it, unless otherwise provided for by this Act.”

Section 164

“(1)  A person who has received [a] payment arising from pension insurance to which he or she was not entitled shall be bound to pay it back to the [Croatian Pension] Fund.

(2)  The repayment obligation shall arise:

1.  when the right arising from pension insurance has been obtained contrary to this Act.”

Section 178

“As an exception to the provisions of section 30 of this Act, insured persons shall acquire the right to an old-age pension:

-  in 1999, when they reach the age of 60 years and six months (men) or 55 years and six months (women) and have completed 19 [and a half] years of service;

-  in 2000, when they reach the age of 61 years (men) or 56 years (women) and have completed 19 years of service;

-  in 2001, when they reach the age of 61 years and six months (men) or 56 years and six months (women) and have completed 18 and [a half] years of service;

-  in 2002, when they reach the age of 62 years (men) or 57 years (women) and have completed 18 years of service.

-  in 2003, when they reach the age of 62 years and six months (men) or 57 years and six months (women) and have completed 17 [and a half] years of service.

...”

55 .  The Validation Act (Zakon o konvalidaciji, Official Gazette no. 104/97), which entered into force on 8 October 1997, allowed for the recognition of documents and decisions issued by the occupying authorities in areas not controlled by the Croatian authorities during the Croatian War of Independence. For pension purposes, it also allowed for the recognition of years of service completed in such areas. The following pieces of relevant subordinate legislation implementing the Validation Act in relation to pension insurance entered into force on 10 April 1998 and 9 May 2008 respectively:

-  the Government’s Decree for the implementation of the Validation Act for the administrative areas of labour, employment, pension and disability insurance, child benefits, social welfare and the protection of military and civilian war invalids (Uredba za provođenje Zakona o konvalidaciji za upravno područje rada, zapošljavanja, mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja, doplatka za djecu, socijalne skrbi i zaštite vojnih i civilnih invalida rata , Official Gazette no. 51/98 with further amendments)

-  the relevant ministry’s rules on the procedure for the validation of decisions and individual acts in the field of pension insurance (Pravilnik o postupku konvalidiranja odluka i pojedinačnih akata iz područja mirovinskog osiguranja, Official Gazette no. 53/08).

B.     The Administrative Procedure Act

56 .  The relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (Zakon o op ćem upravnom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 53/91 with subsequent amendments), which was in force between 1 July 1978 and 1 January 2010, read as follows:

Section 11

“A party has the right to appeal against a first-instance decision.”

Section 263

“The relevant authority shall, in the context of supervision [proceedings], set aside a definitive decision rendered in administrative proceedings:

(1)  if the decision was rendered in matters which fall outside the administrative authorities’ jurisdiction ...

(2)  if the decision was rendered by an authority that did not have territorial jurisdiction;

...

(5)  if the decision was rendered as a consequence of coercion, extortion, blackmail, pressure or another unlawful act.”

Section 264

(5)  An appeal is not allowed against a decision rendered under section 263 of this Act, but judicial review proceedings may be instituted against it.”

C.    The Obligations Act

57 .  The text of sections 210 and 214 of the 1978 Obligations Act (Zakon o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette no. 53/91 with subsequent amendments), which was in force between and 1 October 1978 and 31 December 2005, is reproduced in the case of Čular v. Croatia (dec.), no. 55213/07 , 22 April 2010.

D.    The Social Insurance Agreement

58.   The relevant provisions of the Social Insurance Agreement between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Zakon o potvrđivanju Ugovora između Republike Hrvatske i Savezne Republike Jugoslavije o socijalnom osiguranju, Official Gazette - International treaties no. 14/01), signed on 15 September 1997 (which came into force on 1 May 2003), provide:

Article 2
Legislative scope

“(1)  This Agreement concerns:

the Croatian legislation that governs:

...

2.  pension and disability insurance ...

(2)  This Agreement concerns all legislation that integrates, amends or supplements the legislation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 3
Personal scope of application

“(1)  This Agreement applies to:

(a)  persons who are or were subject to the legislation of one or both of the Contracting States”

Article 16
Totalisation of years of service

“Years of service completed under the legislation of both Contracting States shall, if necessary, be totalised for the purposes of acquiring [a person’s] entitlement to a benefit and for establishing the duration of that benefit, provided that [these periods] do not overlap.”

Article 32
Submission of a request

“(1)  Requests ... submitted to the ... competent authority of one Contracting State ... shall be deemed to have been submitted to the ... competent authority of the other Contracting State.

...

(4)  In the circumstances referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3 of this Article, the relevant authorities shall immediately forward requests, statements or [requests for] legal remedies to the relevant authorities of the other Contracting State, directly or through the liaison authority.”

THE LAW

I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

59.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

II.   ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION

60.  The applicants complained that the domestic courts’ judgments ordering them to repay the pension payments which they had received before 2001 (the first applicant) and 2002 (the second applicant) had violated their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. The first applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, whereas the second applicant relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

61.  The Government contested that argument.

62.  The Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, and having regard to its case-law (see Čakarević v. Croatia, no. 48921/13, §§ 44-91, 26 April 2018), considers that the applicants’ complaints fall to be examined only under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

A.    Admissibility

1.    The parties’ arguments

(a)    The Government

63.  The Government contended that the core issue in the present case was whether the applicants’ property rights had been infringed by the administrative authorities’ decisions divesting them of their pension rights (see paragraphs 13 and 37 above). In the Government’s view, the civil courts had been obliged to order that the received pension payments be repaid because they had been bound by the administrative authorities’ decisions and therefore not entitled to examine their lawfulness. Thus, the applicants’ entitlement to those payments could not have been effectively challenged in the civil proceedings (see paragraphs 22-26 and 44-50 above). For that reason, the Government pointed out that the applicants’ complaints should be examined exclusively in relation to the administrative proceedings (see paragraphs 7-18 and 31-42 above).

64 .  In this regard, the Government firstly argued that the first and the second applicants had failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies, in that they had failed to challenge the administrative authorities’ decisions of 4 May 2001 and 29 January 2003 (see paragraphs 14 and 39 above).

65 .  In this connection, the Government also argued that the first and the second applicants had failed to comply with the six-month time-limit for lodging an application, because that period had started to run after the expiry of the statutory time-limit for challenging the relevant decisions.

66 .  The Government further submitted that since it had been established in the administrative proceedings that the first applicant had not been entitled to a pension in the period between 1 November 1997 and 31 December 2000, the pension payments which she had received during that period did not constitute “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

67 .  In addition, the Government submitted that the first applicant had not properly exhausted domestic remedies, because in her constitutional complaint she had not relied on the relevant provision of the Constitution guaranteeing the right of ownership (see paragraph 25 above).

68 .  Lastly, the Government pointed out that the second applicant had failed to raise the relevant arguments concerning the alleged violation of her right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions in the civil proceedings (see paragraph 47 above); namely, in those proceedings, she had failed to argue that the State had corrected its own error at her expense (see paragraph 84 below), that she had been forced to bear an excessive individual burden, and that the interference with her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions had been disproportionate.

(b)    The first and the second applicant

69.   The first applicant submitted that she had exhausted all available domestic remedies in the civil proceedings complained of (see paragraphs 22-26 above).

70 .  The second applicant submitted that no decision concerning the repayment of the received pension payments had been rendered in the administrative proceedings (see paragraphs 31-42 above). Such a decision had been adopted in the subsequent civil proceedings (see paragraphs 44-50 above), since the issue of unjust enrichment fell under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Thus, in her view, her complaint should be examined with regard to the civil proceedings in which all available domestic remedies had been exhausted.

2.    The Court’s assessment

(a)    Scope of the case

71.  The Court considers it appropriate to point out at the outset that the applicants’ complaints do not concern the administrative proceedings in which the Croatian Pension Fund firstly rendered decisions granting their requests for pensions, then quashed those decisions, and eventually, for lack of jurisdiction, dismissed the first applicant’s request and declared the second applicant’s request inadmissible (see paragraphs 7-18 and 31-42 above). Instead, these complaints refer to the civil proceedings for unjust enrichment in which the civil courts ordered the applicants to pay back to the Croatian Pension Fund the pension payments which they had received, together with accrued interest (see paragraphs 22-26 and 44-50 above, and, mutatis mutandis, Čakarević, cited above, § 46).

72.  Therefore, like in Čakarević, what is at issue in the present case is not the discontinuation of the relevant social security benefit (the payment of the applicants’ pensions), but the obligation imposed on them to repay benefits which they had already received in reliance on an administrative decision (see, mutatis mutandis, Čakarević, cited above, § 80). The Court will therefore not examine the Government’s inadmissibility objections which exclusively concern the administrative proceedings (see paragraphs 64-65 above).

73.  It is true that the administrative and civil proceedings were, to a certain extent, interrelated. The Court will therefore take into account the domestic authorities’ findings in those administrative proceedings when assessing whether the applicants’ obligation to repay the pension payments which they had received satisfied the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Čakarević, cited above, §§ 47-48). However, the Court emphasises that it is one thing to terminate a person’s entitlement to a pension, and quite another to also order that person to repay the pension payments which he or she has received. The Court therefore cannot accept the Government’s argument that that the core issue in the present case was whether the applicants’ property rights had been infringed by the administrative authorities’ decisions divesting them of their pension rights (see paragraph 63 above).

(b)    Applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

74 .  The Court notes that the Croatian Pension Fund’s decisions adopted in the respective administrative proceedings (see paragraphs 7-18 and 31-42 above) indicate

-  that the applicants qualified for old-age pensions, as they met the statutory requirements concerning age and years of service (see paragraphs 8, 17, 32 and 41 above); and

-  that after initially being granted, their pension requests were later denied, not because of a different assessment of the relevant statutory requirements, but purely because the Croatian Pension Fund established that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the applicants’ cases (see paragraphs 13‑14 and 38 above).

75.  That being so, and having regard to its case-law in similar cases (see Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no. 53080/13, § 94, 13 December 2016, and, a fortiori, Čakarević, cited above, §§ 54-58 and 61-65), the Court holds that the received pension payments constituted the applicants’ “possessions” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

(c)     Exhaustion of domestic remedies

(i) The first applicant

76.  The Court notes that it is evident that the first applicant, in her constitutional complaint, did not rely on either the relevant provision of the Constitution guaranteeing the right of ownership or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see paragraph 25 above). However, she did complain that she had qualified for a pension and that she should not have been ordered to pay back the pension payments which she had received purely because the Croatian Pension Fund had subsequently established that it lacked jurisdiction to decide her pension request (see paragraph 25 above).

77.  The manner in which the first applicant expressed her grievances before the Constitutional Court clearly indicates that the same complaint was subsequently submitted to the Court (see paragraph 60 above). Therefore, given that she raised the same issue in substance at domestic level, having regard to its case-law (see Lelas v. Croatia, no. 55555/08, §§ 49-52, 20 May 2010, and, mutatis mutandis, Žaja v. Croatia, no. 37462/09, §§ 68‑72, 4 October 2016), the Court considers that the first applicant provided the national authorities with the opportunity which is in principle intended to be afforded to Contracting States by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, namely the opportunity to put right the violations alleged against them.

78.  Furthermore, it cannot but be noted that the second applicant, unlike the first applicant, did rely on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in her constitutional complaint (see paragraphs 47 and 49 above), and that the Constitutional Court nevertheless declared that complaint inadmissible, finding that the case did not raise any constitutional issue (see paragraph 50 above). This means that relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in her constitutional complaint would not have increased the first applicant’s prospects of success (see, mutatis mutandis, Laska and Lika v. Albania, nos. 12315/04 and 17605/04, §§ 46-48, 20 April 2010).

(ii) The second applicant

79.  Lastly, the Court dismisses the Government’s argument that the second applicant failed to raise the relevant arguments concerning the violation of her property rights in the civil proceedings (see paragraph 68 above). The Court notes that the second applicant stated in both her appeal and her constitutional complaint that the subsequent finding of a lack of jurisdiction could not be the only grounds for ordering her to pay back the pension payments at issue (see paragraphs 47 and 49 above). As the second applicant made those arguments and relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in her constitutional complaint (see paragraph 49 above), the Court considers that the manner in which she expressed her grievances also clearly indicates that she subsequently submitted the same complaint to the Court (see paragraph 60 above). By so doing, like the first applicant, she provided the national authorities with sufficient opportunity to remedy the alleged violation of her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions before lodging her application with the Court.

(iii) Conclusion

80.  It follows that the Government’s objections as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies must be rejected.

(d)    Conclusion as to admissibility

81.  The Court further notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B.     Merits

1.    The parties’ submissions

(a)    The applicants’ submissions

82.  The first and the second applicants submitted that the repayment of the pension payments which they had received, as ordered by the civil courts, had been purely based on the Croatian Pension Fund’s subsequent finding that it lacked jurisdiction to decide their pension requests (see paragraphs 13-14 and 38 above). They also pointed out that when they had resubmitted their pension requests later on, the Croatian Pension Fund had not declined jurisdiction and had recognised their right to a pension (see paragraphs 16-17 and 40-41 above).

83.  The first applicant also explained that she had submitted her pension request to the Croatian authorities because she had spent almost her entire working life in Croatia, whereas she had worked in Serbia for only a year (see paragraphs 7, 10 and 12 above).

84.  The second applicant emphasised that, together with her pension request, she had submitted her employment booklet, from which it had been evident that her most recent employment had been in Serbia (see paragraph 31 above). Thus, the Croatian Pension Fund had had all the relevant information for examining her case. She further argued that by ordering her to pay back the pension payments in question, the domestic authorities had remedied their own error at her expense.

(b)    The Government’s submissions

85.  The Government submitted that the civil courts’ judgments ordering the applicants to pay back the pension payments which they had received in error had been lawful, because they had been based on section 164 of the Pension Insurance Act (see paragraphs 23, 46 and 54 above). Those judgments had also pursued a legitimate aim in the public interest, namely, the protection of the property of the Croatian Pension Fund, which was disbursed for pensions constituting the main source of income for almost 1.2 million Croatian pensioners and was thus the main pillar of the country’s social security system. The aim of taking back part of that property from those who had received it in error had been to use it to pay pensions to those who were entitled to it, which was in the public interest.

86.  As regards proportionality, the Government submitted that both the first and the second applicants had deliberately omitted to disclose information relevant for the examination of their pension requests. In particular, the first applicant had failed to report her employment in Serbia (see paragraphs 7 and 12-13 above), while the second applicant had failed to inform the Croatian Pension Fund that she had already been granted a pension in another country (see paragraphs 31 and 36-37 above). For this reason, referring to the case of Komšo v. Croatia ((dec.), no. 38462/14, § 39, 4 April 2017), the Government considered that the applicants should bear the consequences of their omissions.

2.    The Court’s assessment

(a)    Whether there was an interference

87.  In this connection, the Court firstly refers to its above finding (see paragraphs 74-75) that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to the present case because each applicant satisfied the statutory requirements for being granted a pension.

88.  That being so, and having regard to its case-law on the matter (see, a fortiori, Čakarević, cited above, §§ 54-65 and 71), the Court considers that the civil courts’ judgments ordering the applicants to pay back the pension payments which they had received, together with accrued interest (see paragraphs 23 and 46 above), undoubtedly constituted an interference with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

89.  As regards the issue of which of the three rules contained in that Article applies in the instant case, the Court considers that the applicants’ complaints should be examined under the general rule enunciated in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Čakarević, cited above, § 72)

90.  The Court must further examine whether the interference with the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions was justified, that is, whether it was provided for by law, in the public or general interest, and proportional.

(b)    Whether the interference was provided for by law

91.  The Court notes that the civil courts’ judgments in the applicants’ cases had a legal basis in domestic law, as they were based on the relevant provisions of the Pension Insurance Act and the Obligations Act (see paragraphs 23, 46, 54 and 57 above). The Court also considers that the legislation in question met the qualitative requirements of accessibility and foreseeability.

(c)     Whether the interference was in the public or general interest

92.   The Court reiterates that it is in the public interest that property received on a basis which does not exist or which has ceased to exist should be returned to the State (see Čakarević, cited above, § 76). The Court has held that, bearing in mind the importance of social justice, public authorities should not be prevented from correcting their mistakes, even those resulting from their own negligence. Holding otherwise would be contrary to the doctrine of unjust enrichment. It would also be unfair to other individuals contributing to the social security fund, and it would amount to sanctioning an inappropriate allocation of scarce public resources, which in itself would be contrary to the public interest (see Čakarević, cited above, § 79).

93.  The Court therefore considers that the interference in the present case was in the public or general interest.

(d)    Whether the interference was proportionate

94.   The Court must further examine whether the interference struck the requisite fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the public and the requirements of the protection of the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, and whether it imposed a disproportionate and excessive burden on the applicants (see, among other authorities, Béláné Nagy, cited above § 115).

95.  According to the Court’s case-law, the assessment of the proportionality of an interference may involve the conduct of the parties, including the means employed by the State and their implementation (see Čakarević, cited above, § 81). In that context, it should be stressed that uncertainty - be it legislative, administrative or arising from practices applied by the authorities - is a factor to be taken into account in assessing the State’s conduct (ibid.). In particular, when dealing with matters of vital importance to individuals, such as welfare benefits and other property rights, it is incumbent on the authorities to act in good time, in an appropriate and consistent manner (ibid., and Moskal v. Poland, no. 10373/05, §§ 51 and 72, 15 September 2009).

(i) The applicants’ conduct

(α)    The first applicant

96.  With regard to the first applicant’s conduct, the Government argued that by failing to report her (most recent) employment in Serbia from 28 April 1993 to 30 April 1994 and by submitting her request to the Croatian authorities although her most recent employment had been in another country, she had contributed to the erroneous decision granting her advance payment of her pension (see paragraph 7, 12-13 and 86 above).

97.  The Court is of the view that the first applicant acted in good faith when submitting her pension request to the Croatian authorities, as she had been working in Croatia for almost her entire working life (see paragraph 7 above). Looking at the first applicant’s situation from a practical point of view, it was not unreasonable on her part to submit the request in Croatia, that is to say, in the country where she was residing at the material time (see paragraph 7 above). Lastly, it is to be noted that the first applicant requested her pension from the Croatian authorities at a time when the Social Insurance Agreement with Serbia had not yet entered into force (see paragraphs 7 and 58 above). In those circumstances, she could have reasonably believed that, as she was seeking her pension from the Croatian Pension Fund, her employment in Serbia was irrelevant and thus did not have to be mentioned.

98.  It is the Court’s view that it therefore cannot be said that the first applicant omitted to report her employment in Serbia with the intention of misleading the Croatian authorities. On the contrary, the failure to mention her most recent employment, that is, the fact that she had been employed and therefore insured for one more year in Serbia, was actually to her detriment, it being understood that the amount of a pension is determined by taking into account years of service, among other criteria. Moreover, the Court notes that the domestic courts themselves established that the first applicant had received the pension payments in good faith. It was precisely because of her good faith that she was ordered to pay statutory default interest only from the date when the civil proceedings had been instituted, rather than from any earlier date (see paragraph 23 above).

(β)    The second applicant

99.  In relation to the Government’s arguments regarding the second applicant’s failure to inform the Croatian Pension Fund that she had been granted a pension in Serbia (see paragraphs 31, 36-37 and 86 above), the Court notes that the Serbian authorities stopped paying her pension after she had submitted her pension request in Croatia (see paragraph 32 above). Moreover, the refusal to grant her a pension for the period between 1 May 1998 and 30 April 2002 was ultimately based on the Croatian Pension Fund’s lack of jurisdiction rather than her omission to declare the pension which she had been granted abroad (see paragraphs 32 and 38 above).

100.  In addition, the Court notes that the second applicant submitted a copy of her employment booklet together with her pension request (see paragraph 31 above). The most recent employment recorded in her employment book was in Futog, Serbia (see paragraph 31 above). It thus follows that from the very beginning the domestic authorities had at their disposal all relevant information for determining whether they had jurisdiction in relation to the matter. Therefore, in the second applicant’s case, the domestic authorities accepted jurisdiction as a result of their own error.

(γ)    Conclusion as to the applicants’ conduct

101 .  In the light of the above considerations (see paragraphs 96-100), the Court considers that, contrary to the Government’s argument (see paragraph 86 above), the present case cannot be compared to Komšo (cited above, § 39), where the Court held that ordering the applicant to pay back the social welfare benefit which she had received in error was justified by her deliberate omission to disclose the relevant fact.

(ii) The conduct of the authorities

102.  As to the conduct of the authorities, the Court finds that in both the first and the second applicants’ cases they failed in their duty to act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner (see Moskal, cited above, § 72).

103.  In the first applicant’s case, the Croatian Pension Fund initiated the supervision proceedings three years after it had recognised her right to a pension, and she had regularly received pension payments during this three‑year period (see paragraphs 8-9 and 11-13 above). The civil court’s judgment ordering the first applicant to repay the pension payments at issue became final only in 2012, that is, eleven years after the administrative authorities had deprived her of her right to a pension (see paragraphs 11-13 and 23-24 above).

104 .  The Court further notes that the first applicant worked in Croatia for twenty-five years and nine months (see paragraph 7 above). She was retroactively deprived of her right to a pension only because her most recent employment, lasting one year, had been in Serbia (see paragraphs 12-13 above). However, the fact that she was then employed again in Croatia for just two months was sufficient for the Croatian authorities to accept jurisdiction in relation to the same matter (see paragraphs 15-17 above). Yet, the consequence of her lodging her first pension request with the Croatian authorities rather than the Serbian authorities was that she had to pay back the entire amount which she had received during those three years, together with statutory default interest (see paragraphs 8-9, 11-13, 23, 29 and 103 above ). She also had to bear the consequences of delays on the part of the domestic authorities, a factor which increased her debt, since the statutory default interest that she eventually had to pay ran from the date when the civil proceedings were instituted (see paragraphs 22-23 above). Those proceedings lasted seven years at two levels of jurisdiction, and only then did the decision become final (see paragraphs 22-24 above).

105 .  In the second applicant’s case, even though the fact that she had been paid the pension payments in question was entirely the result of an error made by the State authorities (see paragraph 100 above), she was nevertheless ordered to pay back those amounts in full, together with statutory default interest (see paragraph 44 above). The State thereby avoided any consequences of its own negligence, and the whole burden was placed on the second applicant alone (see, mutatis mutandis, Čakarević, cited above, § 86). The domestic authorities thereby remedied their own error at her expense.

106 .  In the second applicant’s case, the civil court’s judgment ordering her to repay the pension payments at issue became final only in 2013, that is, eleven years after the administrative authorities had deprived her of her right to a pension (see paragraphs 37-38 and 48 above). She also had to bear the consequences of delays on the part of the domestic authorities which increased her debt, since the statutory default interest that she eventually had to pay ran from the date when she refused to pay back the pension payments in question (see paragraphs 43 and 46 above). The civil proceedings instituted approximately a month and a half after that refusal lasted more than ten years over two levels of jurisdiction, and only then did the decision become final (see paragraphs 44-48 above).

107 .  Lastly, it cannot but be noted that even though paragraph 4 of section 75 of the Basic Pension and Disability Insurance Act required the applicants to submit their pension requests to the pension insurance fund located in the area where they had most recently been insured, paragraph 3 of the same section allowed the insured persons to exercise their right to a pension in relation to the fund in the area in which they had completed the majority of their years of service (see paragraph 53 above). In these circumstances, setting aside the decisions granting the applicants their right to a pension, for lack of jurisdiction, and subsequently ordering them to pay back the pension payments which they had received, could be seen as excessively formalistic.

(iii) Conclusion as to the proportionality of the interference

108 .  In view of the above considerations, and having regard to its case‑law (see Moskal, cited above, §§ 67-76, and Čakarević, cited above, § § 82-91) , the Court finds that in the given circumstances, ordering the applicants to pay back the pension payments which they had received imposed an excessive individual burden on them.

109 .  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

110.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.    Damage

1.    The parties’ submissions

111.  The first applicant claimed EUR 3,300 euros in respect of pecuniary damage, together with statutory default interest running from 1 May 2014. That amount corresponded to the amount which had been collected from her in the enforcement proceedings (see paragraph 29 above). She also claimed EUR 6,600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, together with statutory default interest running from 11 December 2012.

112.  The second applicant claimed just satisfaction without specifying the relevant amount and without making a separate claim under each head.

113.  The Government contested those claims.

2.    The Court’s assessment

114.  The Court reiterates that a judgment in which it finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its consequences. If national law does not allow - or allows only partial - reparation to be made, Article 41 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, §§ 32-33, ECHR 2000-XI).

(a)    Pecuniary damage

115.  As regards the first applicant’s claim in respect of pecuniary damage (see paragraph 111 above), the Court has found that ordering her to pay back the pension payments which she had received was in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraphs 108-109 above). The Court further notes that the Government did not contest that the amount sought had indeed been collected from her in the enforcement proceedings (see paragraph 29 above). It therefore accepts the first applicant’s claim in respect of pecuniary damage and awards her EUR 3,300 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount. As regards the statutory default interest, the Court notes that the first applicant did not specify the amount claimed, the relevant rate, or the method by which such interest should be calculated. It therefore does not award her any sum on that account.

116.  As regards the second applicant, the Court reiterates that pursuant to Rule 60 § 1 of the Rules of Court, an applicant who wishes to obtain an award of just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention in the event of a finding of a violation of his or her Convention rights must make a specific claim to that effect. Since the second applicant failed to specify her claim for just satisfaction (see paragraph 112 above), the Court does not award her any sum on account of pecuniary damage.

(b)    Non-pecuniary damage

117.  As regards non-pecuniary damage, having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicants have suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards each applicant EUR 2,600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.

B.     Costs and expenses

1.    The first applicant

118.  The first applicant also claimed EUR 1,020 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts, and EUR 820 for those incurred before the Court.

119.  The Government contested these claims.

120.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum.

121.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the first applicant the sums sought.

2.    The second applicant

122.  Given that the second applicant did not make a specific claim for just satisfaction (see paragraph 112 above), the Court does not award her any sum in respect of costs and expenses.

C.    Default interest

123.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.      Decides to join the applications;

2.      Declares the applications admissible;

3.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;

4.      Holds,

(a)   that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into Croatian kunas at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 3,300 (three thousand three hundred euros) to the first applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 2,600 (two thousand six hundred euros) to each applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(iii) EUR 1,840 (one thousand eight hundred and forty euros) to the first applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable to her, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6.      Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 June 2020, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Renata Degener                                                                Armen Harutyunyan
Deputy Registrar                                                                       President

 

No.	Application no.	Case name	Lodged on	Applicant Place of Residence Nationality	Represented by
1	6161/13	Uzelac v. Croatia	10/12/2012	Branka UZELAC Zagreb Croatian	Milan LIČINA
2	57863/14	Đekić v. Croatia	08/08/2014	Nada ĐEKIĆ Beograd Croatian, Serbian	Jovo BORIĆ

APPENDIX