Edukacja, Nauka, Kultura v REA (Interim relief - Research and technological development - Grant agreement entered into as part of the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation - Order) [2024] EUECJ T-479/24_CO (25 November 2024)


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Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions) >> Edukacja, Nauka, Kultura v REA (Interim relief - Research and technological development - Grant agreement entered into as part of the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation - Order) [2024] EUECJ T-479/24_CO (25 November 2024)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2024/T47924_CO.html
Cite as: [2024] EUECJ T-479/24_CO

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ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

25 November 2024 (*)

(Interim relief - Research and technological development - Grant agreement entered into as part of the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) - Request for reimbursement of ineligible costs - Application for suspension of operation of a measure - Failure to comply with procedural requirements - Inadmissibility )

In Case T‑479/24 R,

Stowarzyszenie Edukacja, Nauka, Kultura, established in Szczecin (Poland), represented by R. Jakubowski, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Research Executive Agency (REA), represented by S. Payan-Lagrou and V. Canetti, acting as Agents, and by M. Le Berre, lawyer,

defendant,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

makes the following

Order

1        By its application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, Stowarzyszenie Edukacja, Nauka, Kultura, seeks suspension of the operation of debit note No 3242409862 of 16 July 2024, issued by the European Research Executive Agency (REA) for a sum of EUR 135 000 (‘the contested debit note’).

 Background to the dispute and forms of order sought

2        The applicant is a non-profit association established under Polish law active in the field of education, science and culture.

3        The applicant acceded to Grant Agreement 734602 and thus became a party to the project ‘Technologies of Imaging in Communication, Art and Social Sciences’ (TICASS).

4        On 25 April 2024, on the basis of the conclusions of an audit report, the REA sent the applicant a letter informing it of its intention to recover a sum of EUR 135 000 and invited it to submit its observations.

5        On 24 May 2024, the applicant sent a letter to the REA in response to the disclosure letter of 25 April 2024.

6        On 16 July 2024, the REA sent a letter to the applicant whereby it maintained its previous position and requested payment of the sum of EUR 135 000 by means of the contested debit note. That debit note stated that the sum was to be repaid by 30 August 2024 at the latest.

7        By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 16 September 2024, the applicant brought an action under Articles 263 and 272 TFEU.

8        By a separate document, lodged at the Registry of the General Court on the same date, the applicant brought the present application for interim measures, in which it claims that the President of the General Court should:

–        order the suspension of operation of the contested debit note until the final conclusion of the main proceedings;

–        order the REA to pay the costs.

9        On 30 September 2024, the European Commission sent a letter of formal notice to the applicant requesting payment of the claim and default interest.

10      In its observations on the application for interim measures, lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 1 October 2024, the REA contends that the President of the General Court should:

–        dismiss the application for interim measures;

–        reserve the costs or, in the alternative, order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

11      In accordance with Articles 278 and 279 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 256(1) TFEU, the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that operation of a measure challenged before the Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures, having regard to the rules of admissibility laid down in Article 156 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

12      The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measures applied for’.

13      The judge hearing an application for interim measures may order suspension of operation of an act and other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law, and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, and consequently an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim measures is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

14      Furthermore, under Article 156(5) and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, an application for interim measures must, in particular, be made by a separate document, indicate the subject matter of the proceedings and contain a summary of the pleas in law and arguments relied on.

15      It follows from a combined reading of Article 156(4) and (5) and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure that an application for interim measures must be sufficient in itself to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the judge hearing the application to rule on it, where necessary, without other supporting information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the proper administration of justice, it is necessary, if such an application is to be admissible, that the essential elements of fact and law on which it is founded be set out coherently and comprehensibly in the application for interim measures itself. While the application may be supported and supplemented on specific points by references to particular passages in documents which are annexed to it, a general reference to other written documentation, even if annexed to the application for interim measures, cannot make up for the absence of essential elements in that application (see order of 4 December 2015, E-Control v ACER, T‑671/15 R, not published, EU:T:2015:975, paragraph 8 and the case-law cited).

16      Moreover, point 284 of the Practice Rules for the Implementation of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court then applicable expressly states that the application for interim measures must be intelligible in itself, without necessitating reference to the application lodged in the main proceedings, including the annexes thereto.

17      Since failure to comply with the Rules of Procedure constitutes an absolute bar to proceedings, it is for the judge hearing the application for interim measures to examine, if necessary of his or her own motion, whether the applicable provisions of those rules have been complied with (see order of 14 February 2020, Vizzone v Commission, T‑658/19 R, not published, EU:T:2020:71, paragraph 11 and the case-law cited).

18      In the present case, although an application for interim measures against a debit note is in principle admissible if, where the Commission has chosen to allocate the grants at issue to the beneficiaries by means of a contract, the main action is based on Article 272 TFEU (see, to that effect, order of 6 April 2016, GABO:mi v Commission, T‑10/16 R, not published, EU:T:2016:197, paragraphs 24 to 32), it must nevertheless be noted that, in the application for interim measures, the applicant makes no argument in respect of the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case or the weighing of the competing interests.

19      As regards, in particular, the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case, the applicant has confined itself, in the application for interim measures, to setting out only the pleas relied on in support of the main action.

20      Such an absence of arguments does not enable the judge hearing the application for interim measures to make a legal assessment of whether the pleas relied on in the application in the main action are prima facie well founded.

21      It follows that the application for interim measures is not intelligible in itself without referring to the application in the main proceedings.

22      Such an absence of sufficient explanation, in the application for interim measures, of the constituent elements of a possible prima facie case cannot be compensated for by a reference to the application in the main proceedings.

23      In that regard, it is sufficient to note that it is not for the judge hearing the application for interim measures to seek, in place of the party concerned, those matters contained in the annexes or in the main application which would support the application for interim measures. For such an obligation to be imposed on the judge hearing the application for interim measures would, moreover, render ineffective the provision of the Rules of Procedure which requires the application for interim measures to be made by a separate document (see order of 27 March 2023, Cogebi and Cogebi v Council, T‑782/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:162, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

24      It follows that, as regards the condition relating to the existence of a prima facie case, but also that relating to the weighing of the competing interests, the present application for interim measures does not comply with the requirements of Article 156(4) and (5) and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure and that, as a result, it must be dismissed as inadmissible.

25      Pursuant to Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs must be reserved.

On those grounds,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

hereby orders:

1.      The application for interim measures is dismissed.

2.      The costs are reserved.

Luxembourg, 25 November 2024.

V. Di Bucci

 

M. van der Woude

Registrar

 

President


*      Language of the case: English.

© European Union
The source of this judgment is the Europa web site. The information on this site is subject to a information found here: Important legal notice. This electronic version is not authentic and is subject to amendment.


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