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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority & Ors [2000] EWCA Civ 45 (17 February 2000) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/45.html Cite as: [2000] ICR 612, [2000] EWCA Civ 45, [2000] IRLR 257

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Case No: EATRF 98/1340/A1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Thursday, 17th February 2000

"If the terms of a contract under which a woman is employed - do not include - an equality clause they should be deemed to include one."

Section 1(2) provides

"An Equality Clause is a provision which relates to terms (whether concerned with pay or not) of a contract under which a woman is employed (the "Woman's Contract"), and has the effect that -
(c) where a women is employed on work which, not being work in relation to which paragraph (a) or (b) above applies, is, in terms of the demands made on her (for instance under such headings as effort skill and decision), of equal value to that of a man in the same employment
(i) if (apart from the Equality Clause) any term of the woman's contract is or becomes less favourable to the woman than a term of a similar kind in the contract under which that man is employed, that term of the woman's contract should be treated as so modified as not to be less favourable and
(ii) if (apart from the equality clause) at any time the woman's contract does not include a term corresponding to a term benefiting the man included in the contract under which he is employed, the woman's contract shall be treated as including such a term ".

The submissions for the Appellants start with the proposition that there was no evidence before the Tribunal of any discretionary element to the annual increments to salary. Both the contract of Mrs Evesham and the contract of Dr Mollon contained a condition that they were to receive an annual increment to their salary, in Mrs Evesham's case for each of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th years of her employment, the increment being £528 each year, and in Dr Mollon's contract for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th year at varying amounts set out above, all of which were more than £528. The actual salary to be received in any year was to be determined by the number of years of employment, and by that alone. It followed that the provisions of the Act could only be complied with if Mrs Evesham was paid a salary representing the salary Dr Mollon would have had in 1987 had he been in post for five years and not for less than a year. The equality clause deemed to be included in the contract under Section 1 of the 1970 Act:
"Did not require or permit the woman to be moved to a different incremental point on the salary scale of the comparator, simply because the comparator had a different length of service from the applicant. There was no inequality between the contracts in relation to the applicability of an incremental scale; only in relation to the amounts payable under the incremental scale."
The Appellants' counsel argues that the decision of the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal to disapply the length of service increment in Mrs Evesham's case when arriving at the salary she should have received in 1987 has caused inequality where none had previously existed. The only inequality of treatment is the assessment of her salary as though Mrs Evesham's length of service was merely one year and not, as it actually was in 1987 five years. This approach, it is submitted, wrongly results in Mrs Evesham being treated as if she were the comparator with all his personal features material to pay, including length of service. This approach deprives Mrs Evesham of the true benefit of the term in her contract which entitles her to annual salary increments.

The Appellants' Counsel goes on to point out that had Mrs Evesham had fewer years in post than Dr Mollon, Mrs Evesham would have received "a pay windfall". The interpretation of the Act and its application as contended for by the Appellant avoids this anomaly. Another anomaly avoided by the Appellants' construction, in the submission of the Appellants' Counsel, is the fact that in this case Mrs Evesham's claim for two years arrears of salary has been conceded, and the Respondents have also conceded that Mrs Evesham should receive the salary of a clinical psychologist on the lowest rung of the pay scale for clinical psychologists, thus notionally treating Mrs Evesham as though she had worked for three years without the benefit of annual salary increment. This anomaly will be all the greater if, subsequently, it should prove that Mrs Evesham is entitled to six years' arrears of pay.
Once it was established that Mrs Evesham did work of equal value to that of Dr Mollon in 1987, the equality clause in her contract required the term in her contract relating to salary to be amended to provide that she should be remunerated on pay scale Code SD61. With that amendment, Mrs Evesham having been in post for 6 years was entitled to a salary of £26,624 for the year 1987.
The respondent's case is that Mrs Evesham, having established that her work in 1987 was of equal value to that of Dr Mollon in 1987, was entitled to have her conditions as to her pay amended so that she received for 1987 a level of pay equal to that received by Dr Mollon in that year and thereafter the same entitlement to annual increments. If an applicant succeeds in establishing that her work is of equal value to that of her chosen comparator, she is entitled to equal terms. There was an existing term for remuneration in Mrs Evesham's contract which, under s. 1(2)(c)(i) had to be treated as being so modified as not to be less favourable than the term dealing with remuneration in Dr Mollon's contract. The Act does not require that the term in Mrs Evesham's contract relating to remuneration should be treated as being modified so as to be more favourable than the term in Dr Mollon's contract. The purpose of the 1970 Act is not to introduce fair wages but to avoid discrimination against female employees by an employer. If Dr Mollon for the work he did in 1987 was remunerated in the sum of £22,667 then amending Mrs Evesham's contract so that she received the same sum by way of salary would be either modifying her contract so that it was not less favourable or, and Mr Lynch, counsel for the respondents, preferred this analysis, it would be including a term in Mrs Evesham's contract corresponding to the term benefiting Dr Mollon included in the contract under which he was employed.
Mr Lynch also made the point that examination of the decision of the industrial tribunal on the 9th September 1997 that the applicant had been engaged on work of equal value with that of her male comparator and the report of the independant expert, Mrs Keogh, assessing whether the applicant and the comparator were doing work of equal value in 1987 showed that the fact that the applicant was a highly qualified speech therapist who had been in post for 5 years and that she had chosen as a comparator a clinical psychologist who was highly qualified as a clinical psychologist but lacking experience because he was the first clinical psychologist to be appointed by the first respondents and was in his first year, must have affected and did affect the conclusion that the work done by each was of equal value. Mrs Keogh in her conclusion observed:
"Neither the applicant nor the comparator can be said to be typical of the generic titles speech therapist/clinical psychologist."
Mrs Keogh was careful to limit her conclusion to the time of the originating application. The point that Mr Lynch makes is that to remunerate Mrs Evesham as though she were doing work of equivalent value to the work that Dr Mollon would be doing in 1992 in his 5th year in post would go far beyond the equal treatment envisaged by Parliament in the 1970 Equal Pay Act.
Miss Cox, QC for the appellants sought to counter that last submission by saying that in deciding whether a woman is to be regarded as doing work rated as equivalent with that of any man, the value of the woman's work and the value of the man's work is looked at in terms of the demand made on the worker under various headings for example effort, skill, decision, see s.1(5) of the Act. The demands made on the employee are not affected by the employee's length of service. An employee's length of service or experience will play little part in an assessment of the value of that employee's work. On this aspect of the case, Mr Lynch in his submissions gave the example of a young solicitor whose work after 5 or 6 years of experience would be of greater value than it had been in his first year, because he would be able to work more accurately and more quickly in the field of law in which he was employed to practice. It would be unrealistic for anyone to maintain that the work he had done in his first year had been of equal value to the work he was doing in his fifth or sixth years.
The decision of the Industrial Tribunal was to this effect:
"The Tribunal looked at the terms of the legislation, in particular to s. 1(2)(c) of the Equal Pay Act and asked itself what was the term of the male comparator's contract which was more favourable. The Tribunal found that it was that the comparator was paid on the clinical psychologist scale at a particular point on that scale. It also found that a further more favourable term was that the comparator had the right to progress up that scale. The Tribunal was therefore satisfied that the terms to be modified in the appellants' contracts were that they should be paid on the appropriate scale of their comparators at the point on those scales that their comparators had reached and that thereafter they progress up those scales at the same rate as their comparators."
The Tribunal went on to record that the parties had agreed, with regard to arrears, that the appellants should recover two years' back pay and that the question of any further back pay should be adjourned to await the determination of a reference to the European Court of Justice.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal started the reasoning by which they came to a conclusion favourable to the respondents by observing:
"These jobs are not routine nor straight-jacketed. Matters of professional development and development of the post held are matters for the individual. Equality, breadth and extent of work done by individuals within their grade in respective fields varies enormously. Mrs Evesham was able to establish that, at the date of her originating application, and after many years of distinguished service in the field of speech therapy including some five or six years of development in and of, her post, her work was of exactly equal value of that of Dr Mollon. Dr Mollon was in fact a man with many years less experience in his field, but with the high level of training commensurate with it.
Accordingly, the respondents submitted that the Equal Pay Act focuses on the job done by the applicant and by the chosen comparator at the relevant date of equal value (the Originating Application). For Mrs Evesham to establish equal value with one District Clinical Psychologist did not demonstrate that she had (or would be able to) establish equal value with all District Clinical Psychologists. The analysis undertaken is one to one.
If equal value is established, the applicant is entitled to obtain what her chosen comparator enjoys as his contractual rights at the relevant date. Thus, Mrs Evesham should receive the salary received by her chosen comparator and thereafter the rights on the comparator's contractual increment scale.
If, however, Mrs Evesham were to enter, at the relevant date, the pay scale enjoyed by her comparator but at an incremental level higher than her comparator, the effect would be that from that date she received pay at a level in excess of that received by her comparator with whom she had established equal value, and commensurate with the pay scale of somebody with whom she had not established equal value.
That, it was submitted, does not achieve the purpose of the Act. Furthermore, by starting at an incremental point of, say, six years, Mrs Evesham would get a second, or double, benefit from those six years which had contributed to her achieving the level of professional development already taken into account in establishing equal value.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondents' concession of the appellant's claim to two years arrears of pay amounted to a binding concession that the appellant's work was of equal value to that of her comparator for the two years before the relevant date, at which equal value was in fact assessed. That was not conceded by the respondents whose position was that the decision to agree to two years of arrears was a pragmatic one taken at the end of very long litigation.
It is, as we understand, the appellant's case that, having entered the comparator's pay scale at the incremental level appropriate to her actual years in post, she should be paid arrears on the incremental level appropriate for the two previous years.
Had Dr Mollon been of equivalent service in post, the contention would have caused no difficulty. The difficulty only arises if Mrs Evesham is to enter the scale at her comparator's incremental level and because that was, in fact, at the lowest level. That creates a practical difficulty in achieving what the Industrial Tribunal put in these terms:
"The applicant mirrors the comparator over the two years prior to the presentation of the originating application, or where the comparator would have been, had he been in post at the time"
To obtain true mirror effect, Mrs Evesham's arrears of pay should reflect the pay in fact enjoyed by her comparator in the two previous years (even if on a lower scale). But the mirror effect cannot, in this instance, be achieved. Mrs Evesham does better by receiving arrears at the level in fact achieved by her comparator at the relevant date, than by truly mirroring his pay over the two previous years.
We have reached the conclusion, and we hold, that Mrs Evesham's entitlement under s. 1(2) of the 1970 Act is to have the relevant term of her contract modified so as to be not less favourable than that of her comparator. She has established equal value with him and not with all, or any other, District Clinical Psychologist of his grade. Accordingly, we agree with the Industrial Tribunal that Mrs Evesham mirrors the comparator on the incremental scale, at the relevant date she joins it where her comparator whose work is of equal value stands and enjoys the same contractual entitlement to incremental progression as the comparator enjoys."
One difficulty under which this court laboured was the absence of a copy of Mrs Evesham's contract of employment and Dr Mollon's contract of employment. The absence of those documents may not have been surprising in view of the 12½ years which have elapsed between the operative date and the present time. Since the hearing of argument copies of the contracts havebeen found and, with the agreement of both counsel supplied to the court. The contract of Mrs Evesham provided the salary scale would be "Chief I" which was scale ST41, Mrs Evesham's "commencing salary" and the "incremental date" the 26th November. That contract was dated the 5th November 1976. A letter written by Mrs Evesham to the Health Authority's District Personnel Officer on the 4th May 1983, establishes that on the 1st April 1982 Mrs Evesham was regraded to District Senior Chief from Chief I Speech Therapist. It follows that on that date her salary scale would have become ST46. Dr Mollon's contract provided: "Your current basic pay is £22,667 per annum ..... and will be paid at monthly intervals in accordance with the Authority's conditions of pay, and your increment date is 1st October."
It is clear from the Industrial Tribunal's decision that the Industrial Tribunal was satisfied that there were two terms in Mrs Evesham's contract that had to be modified. The first related to the salary scale and the second related to the rate at which she should progress up the salary scale. The Employment Appeal Tribunal analysed the matter in the same way considering that there were two terms in Dr Mollon's contract which had to be reflected in Mrs Evesham's contract either by being incorporated into it or by the terms in her contract relevant to such matters being modified. Miss Cox in the course of her reply sought to argue that the term in Mrs Evesham's contract dealing with increments to her salary was not a term of her contract which was less favourable than the term in Dr Mollon's contract. In my judgment that submission was clearly wrong. The term in Dr Mollon's contract was much more favourable in that it provided for four increments and not merely three and each of those increments was substantially larger than the increments contained in Mrs Evesham's contract. That term, therefore, called for amendment and had to be amended as at the operative date.
In my judgment the issue in this appeal is to be resolved by examining first if the finding that the work done in 1987 by Mrs Evesham was of equal value to the work done in that year by Dr Mollon was dependant upon the length of service and experience of Mrs Evesham and the length of service and experience of her chosen comparator. The appellants maintain, correctly, that the annual salary increment does not depend on the employee's performance. It depends solely upon length of service and is, in effect, a reward for loyal service. Nevertheless, if the finding that the work that Mrs Evesham did in 1987 was the equivalent of the work Dr Mollon did in that year depended upon the fact that Mrs Evesham with her five years of experience was in her sixth year contributing work of greater value than she would have contributed in the first year of her employment with the first respondents, and if her chosen comparator in his sixth year would have been contributing work of greater value than the work he actually contributed in his first year, then to allow Mrs Evesham to receive in respect of 1987 not merely the salary that Dr Mollon received in that year, but Dr Mollon's salary plus four annual increments, would be to allow Mrs Evesham to double count her experience. Such an approach would also disregard additional value to work done by her chosen comparator which the extra years of experience in post would bring to that comparator's work.
A reading of Mrs Keogh's report and the decision of the Industrial Tribunal of the 9th September 1997 make it clear that these factors did play a significant part in Mrs Evesham establishing that she was doing work of equal value to that of Dr Mollon in 1987. Further, I would respectfully adopt the reason which found favour with the Employment Appeal Tribunal for reaching the conclusions they did namely that were Mrs Evesham to enter, at the relevant date, the pay scale enjoyed by her comparator but at an incremental level higher than her comparator, the effect would be that from that date she received pay at a level in excess of that received by her comparator with whom she had established equal value, and commensurate with the pay scale of somebody with whom she had not established equal value.
It is the treatment of the chosen comparator by the employer that has to be equalled. That equal treatment is to be achieved in Mrs Evesham's case by one of the two mechanisms in s. 1(2)(c) . Equal treatment is achieved by examining the applicant's contract of employment and the comparator's contract of employment term by term. If there is a term in the applicant's contract of employment which is less favourable than a term of a similar kind in the comparator's contract of employment then the term in the applicant's contact of employment must be modified so as not to be less favourable. If there is a term in the comparator's term of contract of employment which is beneficial and which has no equal term in the applicant's contract of employment, then the applicant's contract of employment is altered so as to include that term. If the applicant has terms in her contract which are more favourable than equivalent terms in the comparator's contract the applicant keeps the benefit of those terms and in addition is entitled to have any less favourable term in her contract modified so as to be not less favourable than the equivalent term in the comparator's contract or, if the comparator has in his contract a beneficial term which does not appear in the applicant's contract, to have such a term included in her contract. That is the way in which the Act requires equality of treatment to be achieved. It is not open to the employer to say "I have not modified that clause in the applicant's contract because although it is less favourable than the similar clause in the comparator's contract, looked at overall the applicant's contract is as favourable to her as the comparator's contract is favourable to him", see Hayward -v- Cammell Laird [1988] ICR 464 HL.
However, neither the obligation to modify terms in the applicant's contract or the obligation to include a term found in the comparator's contract in the applicant's contract requires the employer to modify a term or to include a term so that the term in the applicant's contract becomes more favourable than the term in the comparator's contract. What is to be achieved is equality of treatment by the employer of the applicant and the comparator whom the applicant has chosen. The title to the Act is "Equal Pay Act". The conclusion reached by the Industrial Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal achieves the result that Mrs Evesham will be paid for doing work of equal value to that done by Dr Mollon the same annual salary as Dr Mollon for 1987 and the same annual salaries as he received for the succeeding years.
The term relating to salary in Mrs Evesham's contract was to be replaced by the terms in Dr Mollon's contract, namely; "Your current basic pay is £22,667 per annum ..... and will be paid at monthly intervals in accordance with the Authority's conditions of pay, and your increment date is 1st October."
For those reasons I would dismiss these appeals.
LORD JUSTICE WARD:
By its decision of 7 September 1997, against which there has been no challenge, the Industrial Tribunal held that Mrs Evesham was engaged on work of equal value to that of Dr Philip Mollon and adjourned the case for a remedies hearing. By its decision sent out to the parties on 29 October 1997, the Industrial Tribunal "asked itself what was the term of the male comparator's contract which was more favourable", and concluded as follows:-
"The Tribunal found that the comparator was paid on the clinical psychologist scale at a particular point on that scale. It also found that a further more favourable term was that the comparator had the right to progress up that scale. The Tribunal was therefore satisfied that the terms to be modified in the Applicants' contracts were that they should be paid on the appropriate scale of their comparators at the point on those scales that their comparators had reached and that thereafter they progress up those scales at the same rate as their comparators."
Mrs Evesham appealed unsuccessfully to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and now appeals to us.
Her claim is brought under the Equal Pay Act 1970. This is, as it says, "An Act to prevent discrimination, as regards terms and conditions of employment between men and women." The Act must be purposively construed to give effect to Article 141 (formerly Article 119) of the Treaty of Rome which provides:-
"1. Each member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied."
Thus section 1 of the Act provides as follows:-
"(1) If the terms of a contract under which a woman is employed at an establishment in Great Britain do not include (directly or by reference to a collective agreement or otherwise) an equality clause they shall be deemed to include one.
(2) An equality clause is a provision which relates to terms (whether concerned with pay or not) of a contract under which a woman is employed (the "woman's contract"), and has the effect that -
(a) where the woman is employed on like work with a man in the same employment ...
(b) where the woman is employed on work rated as equivalent with that of a man in the same employment ...
(c) where a woman is employed on work which, not being work in relation to which paragraph (a) or (b) above applies, is, in terms of the demands made on her (for instance under such headings as effort, skill and decision), of equal value to that of a man in the same employment -
(i) if (apart from the equality clause) any term of the woman's contract is or becomes less favourable to the woman than a term of a similar kind in the contract under which that man is employed, that term of the woman's contract shall be treated as so modified as not to be less favourable, and
(ii) if (apart from the equality clause) at any time the woman's contract does not include a term corresponding to a term benefiting that man included in the contract under which he is employed, the woman's contract shall be treated as including such a term."
We have to approach this appeal on the basis that the Tribunal has concluded that the appellant is employed on work which, in terms of the demands made on her, is of equal value to that of the comparable man. The task is then as follows:-
(1) under s. 1(2)(c)(i), to ascertain firstly whether there is any term in her contract which is of a similar kind to a term in the comparator's contract, if so, secondly whether it is less favourable to the woman, and,
(2) under s. 1(2)(c)(ii), to ascertain from a comparison of their contracts whether hers does not contain a term corresponding to a term in his which benefits him.
Now that we have the actual contracts, this comparative exercise is relatively straightforward. Mrs Evesham's contract of 5 November 1976 contains these terms:-
"Your terms and conditions of service are in accordance with the Professional & Technical `A' Whitley Council and General Whitley Council Agreements ...
SALARY SCALE £4872 - £6033 plus £141 outer London weighting
Chief I
COMMENCING SALARY £5334 (third point in scale)
INCREMENTAL DATE 26 November"
There is no dispute that with effect from 1 April 1982 she was re-graded to District Senior Chief which put her on pay scale code ST46 which began at £13,008 and moved up in three steps to the top level of £14,592.
Dr Mollon has these terms in his contract:-
"4. Your current basic pay is £22,667 per anum ... and your incremental date is 1 October.
...
6. Your employment is governed by the current terms and conditions laid down by the Professional & Technical `A' Staffs Whitley Council and the General Whitley Councils and NHS Superannuation Regulations and any future nationally agreed changes to these."
It is common ground that he was on pay scale code SD61 starting as the contract indicated at £22,667 and moving up four steps to a ceiling of £26,624.
The main thrust of the appellant's case is that since both the appellant's contract and the comparator's contained a term whereby they were to be employed on an incremental scale geared to the length of service irrespective of personal skills or performance, the criterion is gender-neutral and thus there was no inequality between the sexes. So Miss Cox Q.C. submits the incremental scale did not in itself infringe the 1970 Act or required to be varied. The only inequality, she submits, related to the rate payable under the incremental scale having regard to Mrs Evesham's position at the highest point on her scale as against the lowest position Dr Mollon had on his. She argues for equality of treatment which may not always be met by equality of wages. Although I recognise its attractions, I cannot accept that submission for the following principal reasons, in addition to those given by Roch L.J. with which I also agree.
1. I agree that the Act deals with more than equality of pay, even though equality of pay is the expressed aim of the Treaty. The attainment of equality of treatment is brought within the Act by the definition of an equality clause in s. 1(2) as "a provision which relates to terms (whether concerned with pay or not)", the emphasis being added by me.
2. Equality of treatment and equality of pay under the Act is achieved and is only achieved by treating the woman's contract as so modified as to be not less favourable than his or to include a beneficial term as his pursuant to s. 1(2)(c)(i) and (ii).
3. The fact that both contracts have an incremental pay scale based on length of service establishes the first limb of the s. 1(2)(c)(i) enquiry, namely that the contracts have terms of a similar kind. The terms may be similar but, ex hypothesi, may not be the same because one set is less favourable than the other.
4. The relevant terms of a similar kind in this case are:-
(a) an identified commencing salary
(b) a salary scale, hers identified at the time of the contract but both having incorporated into them the scales covered by the Whitley Council Agreements.
(c) an incremental date.
5. The next analysis is whether her terms are less favourable than his. This is a process of contractual analysis comparing the effect her contractual terms have on her pay and treatment with the effect his have on him. On 3 February 2000 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said in Marshall and others -v- Glasgow City Council and others:-
"The scheme of the Act is that a rebuttable presumption of sex discrimination arises once the gender-base comparison shows that a woman, doing like work or work rated as equivalent or work of equal value to that of a man, is being paid or treated less favourably than the man. The variation between her contract and the man's contract is presumed to be due to the difference of sex."
Because of that presumption, Miss Cox's analysis of the incremental scale being gender-neutral is beside the point. What is material now is how the terms operate.
6. As to salary, under her contract she received at the time the comparison had to be made, namely at the time of her application, only £14,592 whereas he received £22,667. Her terms were less favourable to that extent.
7. As to the scale, her scale was less favourable than his in that:-
(a) the stage payments were less in amount than his,
(b) she was only entitled to three increases, he to four,
(c) she would enjoy no more increases because she was at the top of her scale whereas he would have all of his to follow.
8. As to incremental date, she was less favourably treated because her increase would be paid a month later than his.
9. It follows that the modifications to her contract to make it no less favourable than his are:-
(a) that her salary be increased to equal his,
(b) that she enjoy the same future increments as his pay scale will give him, and
(c) her increments start as soon as his.
10. There are no other terms more beneficial to his which fall to be included in her contract by operation of s. 1(2)(c)(ii).
To the complaint that this conclusion gives no credit to Mrs Evesham for her years of service in post, there are in my judgment these main answers:-
1. The work evaluation was, as Roch L.J. has shown, an individual evaluation, not a general one. The value of her work, as she was performing it at the date of the application was being compared with the work her chosen comparator was doing at the same time. It was not a comparison between what speech therapists did as against what clinical psychologists were doing. If this individualised comparison produces anomalies, and it may well do so, it is an unfortunate result of the operation of the Act which requires an identified comparator, not a hypothetical one.
2. The modifications to the contractual terms take effect only from the date of comparison. Thereafter male and female move in step together.
3. Mrs Evesham cannot claim retrospective effect for the modification for the simple reason that like would not then have been compared with like. She has to accept her comparator as he was including the fact that he was, as the Industrial Tribunal put it "at a particular point on (his) scale." It would be Dr Mollon making the complaint of unequal treatment if for the work of like value she was suddenly paid £4,000 more than he was.
Attractively as Miss Cox, now as always, puts her case, this time I am against her. I too would dismiss the appeal.
MR JUSTICE GAGE: I agree with the judgments of My Lords.
Order: Appeal dismissed with costs. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords refused. Order does not form part of approved judgment.