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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Secretary Of State For Trade Industry v Grant & Ors [2001] EWCA Civ 1373 (15 August 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1373.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1373

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
(Dismissal List)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Wednesday, 15th August 2001

Wednesday, 15th August 2001

1. MASTER VENNE: I should perhaps begin by saying that Mr Atkins has written to the court a letter dated 13th August in which he seeks an adjournment of today's hearing. He describes how his father died some five weeks ago and that his mother has since been taken ill. I decline that application for an adjournment given the delay to which this matter has already been subjected but, in the light of the conclusion which I have reached, Mr Atkins will not in the event be prejudiced by that refusal.
2. Mr Atkins has before the court an application to reinstate his appeal. The matter comes to me in effect as a summons for directions and arises in this way. The applicant was the eighth defendant in proceedings brought by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry under the Financial Services Act 1986. On 15th September of last year Neuberger J made an order restraining the first and second defendants in those proceedings from carrying on any investment business without authorisation under the Act, whether under the name of Business Incentive Gains International or BIG International or under any similar derivative name. The judge also made orders under sections 6(4) and sections 61(4) of the Act, enabling receivers to recover some £46,500 from the appellant, Mr Atkins. The judge also made an order for costs against him to be assessed if not agreed. Finally, Neuberger J granted permission to appeal to all the parties, including, of course, the present appellant, in the following terms:

"1.There be permission to appeal and/or cross-appeal to all parties limited to points of law arising from the judgment.

2. Permission to appeal and/or cross-appeal on factual findings refused."

3. The judge then added on the relevant permission to appeal form:

"The law on the Financial Services Act 1986 is to my mind plainly appropriate to the Court of Appeal. My findings of fact, I think, are not."

4. On 27th September Mr Atkins filed an appeal notice. I should add that in this court, as in the court below, he has been unrepresented by solicitors and counsel and therefore acts in person. In section 7 of that appeal notice, which is headed "Grounds of Appeal", Mr Atkins has included a paragraph which describes in some detail how Neuberger J's judgment was handed down and how, so the applicant at least contends, he was given but very short notice of a further hearing. However, it contains no grounds of appeal which can be said to relate in any way to points of law under the Financial Services Act 1986. It is true that on another part of his form Mr Atkins writes:

"I am awaiting advice from solicitors."

5. And it indeed it is clear from the correspondence which he has had with this court that he has made unsuccessful attempts to secure representation at public expense under the legal aid scheme. Nevertheless, the appellant's appeal notice at this stage remains defective, and indeed, I would say it remains ineffective.
6. The appellant's notice was duly acknowledged by the court on 3rd October when the appellant was also reminded of his obligation to provide bundles in support of his appeal. Unhappily, he failed, in the event, to lodge those bundles, notwithstanding that he was granted a considerable number of extensions of time for that purpose. In consequence, on 20th December of last year this matter came before Deputy Master Joseph in the dismissal list who then made an order the effect of which was that, unless the appellant filed satisfactory bundles and a transcript of the judgment by 31st January this year, his appeal would stand dismissed without further order. Unfortunately for the appellant, by 31st January he had still failed to file his bundles and consequently the Deputy Master's order took effect.
7. Thereafter two events occurred; first, Mr Atkins on 22nd March of this year lodged an application to reinstate his appeal; and, second - very sensibly if I may say so - he sought the assistance of the Citizens Advice Bureau in this building. They then arranged for an honourary legal adviser to assist him in the preparation of proper bundles and, it would seem, to help him formalise his grounds in support of the application for reinstatement. Those bundles have now been filed.
8. The position today is therefore that the appeal still stands dismissed under the terms of Deputy Master Joseph's unless order. There is before the court an application to reinstate the appeal. There are effective bundles, but, unhappily, there are no effective grounds of appeal to reflect the terms of the grant of permission to appeal by Neuberger J. I am told that enquiries have now been made of the Citizens Advice Bureau to see if any further help can be provided to the appellant to assist him in the formulation of proper grounds of appeal. Accordingly, I will adjourn this matter and strongly advise the appellant to visit the Citizens Advice Bureau and to see its senior legal adviser Mr Makouris.
9. To ensure that this matter reaches a final conclusion. I will, however, direct that it stands adjourned and that, if necessary, it be relisted before me in approximately four weeks time. Meanwhile, I will direct that the transcript of my judgment today be transcribed and a copy provided at public expense to Mr Atkins, to the Citizens Advice Bureau and also to the respondent's solicitors as soon as practicable.
10. Finally, I will remind Mr Atkins that if his grounds are not made effective, his application to reinstate may well fail, if it does not fail in any event. But, even if his application were to be successful, his appeal will in all probability be dismissed for want of effective grounds.
Order: As above.