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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Barry Urquhart Associates (A Firm) v East Surrey Health Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 1465 (8 October 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1465.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1465

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
CIVIL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE EPSOM COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Hull QC)

		The Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London Monday 8 October 2001

Monday 8 October 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: This is an application for permission to appeal in a case concerning unpaid architects' fees in which His Honour Judge Hull QC gave judgment on 4 May 2001. The claimants were the architects, who were instructed by the defendants' predecessors in title for the redevelopment of the Oxted and Limpsfield Hospital.
2. Discussions between the parties took place on 25 April 1990 and the result of those discussions was encapsulated in a letter of 26 April 1990 from the defendants' predecessors to the claimants. In that letter Mr Fox, the Director of Planning, on their behalf indicated that they were instructing the claimants to take the project involved at that time to stage C of the RIBA guidance on the basis that £10,000 would be paid if the claimants were appointed as project architects but that, if other architects were appointed for the final scheme, they would be reimbursed on the basis of 15 per cent of 5.5 per cent of the agreed budget costs for the building and engineering content of the scheme.
3. The claimants undoubtedly carried out work pursuant to those discussions. Indeed the scheme then developed further because it became apparent that the scheme was not one which could be financed out of the defendants' predecessors' own budget, so a further scheme was developed for the purpose of seeing ways in which the land which surrounded the hospital could itself be developed and utilised in order to produce funding. Unhappily, the scheme came to nothing as far as the claimants were concerned. Another firm of architects ultimately did the final plans which, to take the matter to its conclusion, were not acceptable to the planning authority.
4. It was the defendants' argument that the letter of 26 April 1990 encapsulated the whole of the agreement between the claimants and the defendants' predecessors, and the result was that, since the claimants were not the project architects, they were not entitled to £10,000. The claimants were not entitled either to the percentage figure because no final scheme was produced in the sense that it proceeded to completion, no planning permission having been granted. In other words, they were not entitled, pursuant to that oral agreement evidenced by the letter of 26 April 1990, to any sums at all. The judge concluded that that argument was correct.
5. The claimants' argument, on the other hand, had always been that the letter of 26 April was either an incomplete statement of the contractual arrangement between the parties, or that it was in any event overtaken by a letter of 27 April 1990. The effect of the claimants' argument was that the RIBA terms of engagement were in fact part of the contract and that those terms entitled the claimants to the sums which were set out in their statement of claim, because they had completed all that was required under the RIBA terms of engagement.
6. There is no doubt that the letter of 27 April 1990 had appended to it the RIBA terms relating to architects' appointments, and there was no response from the defendants' predecessors to suggest that they were not prepared to accept those terms or that in any other way the letter of 26 April 1990 was to stand as the basis, and sole basis, of the claimants' entitlement to fees.
7. It seems to me that there is a real prospect of the claimants succeeding in persuading the court that the letter of 27 April 1990, and the absence of any evidence to suggest that it was in any way dissented from thereafter, is either evidence that the terms of the architects' appointments were indeed included (either expressly or by implication) in the discussions of 25 April and the letter of the 26th; or alternatively, that the contract was in fact concluded by virtue of the defendants' predecessors' acceptance of the letter of 27 April as being the counter offer upon which the claimants would be entitled to their fees for the work which they undoubtedly carried out.
8. It is for those reasons that I am prepared to give permission to appeal in relation to the main thrust of the grounds of appeal. There are subsidiary arguments which are also raised in the grounds of appeal, and it seems to me to be appropriate that I should give permission for those to be argued as well in order that the whole matter can be properly considered by this court. I accordingly grant permission to appeal.
ORDER: Application allowed. Case to be listed for one day on the short warned list. Costs in the appeal. (Order not part of approved judgment)