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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Akram v Switchgear & Instrumental Ltd & Anor [2001] EWCA Civ 728 (15 May 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/728.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 728

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
(MR RECORDER UNDERHILL QC)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday, 15th May 2001

Tuesday, 15th May 2001

JUDGMENT
1. LORD JUSTICE MUMMERY: This is an application for permission to appeal. The application was lodged by Mr Mohammed Akram acting in person. He wishes to have permission to appeal against the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal given on 24th January 2001. The judgment of the Appeal Tribunal was given by Mr Recorder Underhill QC, dismissing Mr Akram's appeal against the decision of the Employment Tribunal. In extended reasons sent to the parties on 23rd May 2000, the Employment Tribunal, after a hearing in Leeds between the 8th and 11th May 2000, dismissed Mr Akram's claim about a number of matters, including unfair dismissal.
2. At the hearing in the Employment Tribunal, Mr Akram acted in person. In the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Mr Akram did not attend. The matter was dealt with by way of a preliminary hearing and the decision of the Appeal Tribunal was given in his absence. As Mr Recorder Underhill QC mentioned in his judgment, Mr Akram had written to the tribunal by fax letter of 23rd January 2001 asking to be excused from attending the hearing on various grounds. He did not ask for an adjournment, but asked the tribunal to treat his letter as written submissions.
3. The Appeal Tribunal proceeded on the basis of the various matters raised by Mr Akram in a number of letters that he had written to the tribunal. The Appeal Tribunal dealt with the various points raised in the correspondence. It concluded that there was no arguable error of law in the decision of the Employment Tribunal and no other error of law in the various points which he raised. There was therefore no point in the matter proceeding to a full hearing. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
4. The application for permission was called on this morning at 10.30 am when it was listed as the first application in the list. Mr Akram was not present. The matter was called on again at 11.45. Mr Akram was still not present. There is no record of any letter or other communication having been received by the Civil Appeals Office from Mr Akram either saying that he does or does not intend to appear or seeking an adjournment. In those circumstances I propose to deal with his application on the basis of the papers which he has submitted, including his notice of appeal.
5. The background to the case can be briefly summarised. Mr Akram was employed as an electrical fitter by the first respondent, Switchgear and Instrumental Limited, a subsidiary of another company, N G Bailey & Co Limited. He began his employment on 18th August 1991. He was suspended and later dismissed. His appeal against the decision to dismiss him was also dismissed.
6. In those circumstances he presented to the Employment Tribunal an application on 24th September 1999. He complained of a whole list of matters starting with equal pay and also including discrimination, unfair dismissal, union member, closed shop, harassment, kidnap, equal opportunities, race relations, health and safety activities, statutory rights not to work extra hours and denial of other statutory rights. Further details of all those complaints are set out in box 11 of the IT1 form.
7. As I mentioned, the matter was heard by the Employment Tribunal in May 2000, but earlier in the year some of the allegations in the IT1 had been struck out by the Employment Tribunal as falling outside their jurisdiction. At a hearing before the chairman below on 25th January 2000, at which both sides were represented, the regional chairman directed that Mr Akram's allegations of unequal pay, harassment, kidnap, equal opportunity and statutory rights be struck out as it was outside the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal. It was mentioned that in respect of equal pay that he had failed to name a female comparator.
8. It was noted for the avoidance of doubt that the allegations of harassment and kidnap remained part of the matrix of the other complaints. It was also pointed out that the complaint of race discrimination concerned the failure of the respondent company to enable him to apply for posts within the undertaking of team leader, charge hand, night supervisor, personnel manager and production manager. He claimed that he was excluded from consideration for promotions to those posts on racial grounds. The other matters which were dealt with in that decision were union membership and health and safety activities.
9. Directions were then given for preparation for a five-day hearing starting on 8th May. After the hearing, the Employment Tribunal delivered extended reasons which were sent to the parties on 23rd May 2000. The tribunal unanimously decided that the originating application failed on all grounds and was accordingly dismissed. The extended reasons set out the findings of fact. In particular, they found that the reason for Mr Akram's dismissal was sexual harassment in the form of a letter to a Mrs Sagar and her reaction to it, which could not be ignored by the employers. The employers set up the disciplinary hearing, which resulted in Mr Akram's dismissal.
10. The tribunal found it was a straightforward dismissal by an employer of an employee who committed a serious act of sexual harassment. That was the sole reason for the dismissal. It was not influenced by any racial considerations or any other considerations that Mr Akram had been complaining about, such as health and safety matters. The tribunal said in clear terms it was a fair dismissal unrelated to race, health or safety matters. The tribunal, on the findings of fact which it made, rejected Mr Akram's suggestion that he had been treated detrimentally or dismissed for memberships of a trade union.
11. Mr Akram could only appeal against that decision if he could demonstrate to the Appeal Tribunal that there had been an error of law. For the reasons given by Mr Recorder Underhill in his judgment on behalf of the Appeal Tribunal, Mr Akram was unable to demonstrate that.
12. I agree with the comments of Mr Recorder Underhill on the criticisms that Mr Akram had made of the decision of the Employment Tribunal. He also dealt with a number of other matters which had not been raised before. I agree with the comment that if Mr Akram wished to pursue those, subject to questions of time limit, it was a matter for him to do so in fresh proceedings.
13. In his notice of appeal Mr Akram repeats the points which he had made earlier saying that his statutory rights had been struck out and he should have had his appeal heard by a full Appeal Tribunal. He raised more personal matters, such as his ill health and disability. He submitted that the case should have been allowed to proceed. He had not been given a fair chance to present his case. In particular he was aggrieved by the order of 25th January 2000, for which he was out of time in appealing, when the chairman struck out certain of the allegations as outside the jurisdiction.
14. I have considered the grounds of appeal which Mr Akram sets out in detail in his notice received on 20th February 2001. I am unable to find there any point which identifies an error of law on the part of the Employment Tribunal in dismissing his claim in May 2000. In my judgment this appeal has no real prospect of success because no error of law can be identified in the decision or procedure in the Employment Tribunal. Accordingly, I dismiss the application.
(Further comments on application)
15. About an hour ago I gave a judgment in the case of Mr Akram, who was seeking permission to appeal. I mentioned the fact that his case had been called on at 10.30 and again at 11.45; he had not responded. I therefore dealt with his application in his absence.
16. Since then I have been handed a fax, which was received in the Civil Appeals Office at about 10.40, from Mr Akram headed "Private and Confidential" and "Most Urgent" and addressed to The Registrar and the Judges of the Court of Appeal. What he says in the letter is this:

"As I am still sick, I have not been able to attend personally. I request a postponement on the grounds of health. Also I have no access to a Barrister until the law changes. Unlawful acts were committed against me, while I was employed. Your honours, I have not been allowed the justice any person should/and has under the current UK, EEC law and Human Rights laws."

17. He then sets out the reasons why he says he did not have a proper hearing in the tribunals below. He requests a rehearing and reinstatement on the grounds of the health and safety and union activities which I have referred to. He says that he has been "framed by very rich and powerful people because of his race/disability/sex and for reporting health and safety issues and criminal acts".
18. There is nothing in that letter from Mr Akram which has not been mentioned before by him in the papers submitted to the Employment Tribunal, the Appeal Tribunal and in support of the application for permission. I have explained in my judgment why I am unable to find in any of these allegations an error of law on the part of the Employment Tribunal or its procedure, which would entitle him to succeed on an appeal to this Court. I have given my reasons for saying that there is no real prospect of success. I do not, therefore, in the light of Mr Akram's fax seek to change any of the conclusions in my judgment.
19. Finally, I should mention that, if Mr Akram wishes to pursue the matter, he must apply to have his application for permission reinstated on the basis that he will actually attend or, if he does not attend, that he will be represented by someone who is able to make oral submissions.
(Application for permission to appeal refused)