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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Barnes v Peter Godfrey-Evans [2002] EWCA Civ 1564 (22 October 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1564.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 1564

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE PUMFREY AND MR JUSTICE RIMER)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Tuesday, 22nd October 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS: It is now 12.00 o'clock. This case was listed for half past 11. I have received two communications from Mr Barnes. First, an application for an adjournment which I have refused. The ground of his seeking an adjournment is that he wishes to have a copy of the bench memorandum. That I refuse in accordance with the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice in Her Majesty's Attorney-General v Andrew Covey, delivered on 19th February 2001.
2. I have since received a communication from Mr Barnes that he is having traffic problems. However, in my view there is no excuse. This case was not listed for early in the morning and he has had ample time to come.
3. I therefore propose to give judgment having read the papers and the submissions made by Mr Barnes on this matter.
4. This is an application by Mr Barnes for permission to appeal in respect of two orders. First, an order of Rimer J dated 16th May 2002 which dismissed Mr Barnes' application to vacate the hearing of his appeals from the order of Mr Registrar James which were listed to float from 17th May. Second, an order of Pumfrey J dated 17th May 2002 which, amongst other things, dismissed Mr Barnes' appeal from the order of Mr Registrar James dated 12th September 2001, and also refused Mr Barnes an application for an adjournment.
5. The applicant Mr Barnes is a bankrupt. On 14th August 2001 he made an application to the court under section 303 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The section 303 application was for an order that his trustee in bankruptcy should be ordered to pursue, or alternatively to permit Mr Barnes to pursue, a claim against Norwich Union and Law Direct. That claim was in respect of alleged damage to a BMW motor car whilst it was the subject of a distress levied by the Uttlesford District Council in 1995.
6. Mr Barnes did not attend on 12th September 2001. On that day Mr Registrar James made an order that unless Mr Barnes did by 28th September 2001 file and serve written answers to certain questions contained in the request for further information, Mr Barnes' application should stand dismissed with costs and without further order. The documents forming the subject of the request relate to the motor car itself, the title to the motor car, the alleged damage, the policy of insurance and any evidence as to the need for a replacement vehicle.
7. Mr Barnes filed a notice of appeal dated 26th September 2001 requesting a direction to his trustee under section 303 to take the proceedings in question. In the alternative that the trustee be removed. The substantive criticism Mr Barnes made of Mr Registrar James' order was that he did not have and would not have the documents necessary for answering the questions. Those documents Mr Barnes contended would be in a court file.
8. No application was made for an extension of time in order to comply with the order of Mr Registrar James. There followed an application to vacate the hearing which was then due to be heard floating for 7th May 2002. That was heard by Rimer J on 16th May. Rimer J refused Mr Barnes' application to stand the matter out of the list for an indefinite period. Rimer J doubted that Mr Barnes needed a copy of the court's file in order to progress his appeal, and in any event he considered that it would be fundamentally wrong to take the case out of the list. He went on to say:

"It will be open, of course, to Mr Barnes to renew his application to the judge hearing the appeal or appeals and applications when they are called on, but whether or not that judge will think it appropriate to accede to his application will be a matter for that judge. The judge will at least be in a better position than I am to assess the merits of the application, since he will have the benefit of the papers in the case which will inform him of what it is all about, as to which I know virtually nothing. I therefore refuse Mr Barnes' application."

It was in those circumstances that the appeal came before Pumfrey J on 17th May. He reviewed the factual background and then came to the substance of the appeal in paragraph 11 of his judgment. He said this:

"However, that brings me to the substance of the appeal. The exercise of the Registrar's discretion in making the unless order in question is criticised on the basis that it was clear that Mr Barnes either did not have, or would not have, the necessary documents in order to answer the questions. Mr Barnes tells me that he ought to have an adjournment of this case so that he can obtain the necessary documents from the court files."

The judge went on to consider the submissions of Mr Barnes, and concluded in paragraphs 16 and 17 as follows:

"However, I am satisfied the order made by Registrar James was a correct order. No proper explanation for non-compliance between Mr Registrar James's order and now has been advanced to me. I should add finally that I am satisfied that Mr Barnes knew of the making of Mr Registrar James' order and of the contents thereof, largely by reason of his statement on the notice of appeal that he was unable to comply by the stated date.

17. In those circumstances, it seems to me that there is no ground advanced for me to interfere with the exercise of discretion by Mr Registrar James, and, having regard to the long period which has now elapsed without any evidence whatsoever of any attempt to comply, I see no reason why the order should be set aside. This application is dismissed accordingly."

9. The notice of appeal contain a number of grounds which have been conflated. Mr Barnes contends that he was double-booked on 17th May. Rimer J acted in breach of natural justice having regard to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He was biased. The judge did not consider his obligations under the White Book and generally came to a wrong conclusion. He also asserts against both appeals that he should have been granted an adjournment.
10. The application for permission to appeal against Rimer J's decision to refuse an adjournment is covered by CPR 52.3(6). Permission to appeal will only be given if there is a real prospect of success or some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard. In my view there is no such real prospect of success, nor is there another compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. The decision was within the judge's discretion. Further, the judge made it clear that the application for an adjournment could be renewed at the hearing, as it was.
11. The appeal against Pumfrey J's judgment is an application for permission in respect of a second-tier appeal. It is therefore covered by section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and CPR Part 52.13. It follows that permission to appeal will not be granted unless there is an important point of principle or practice or there is some other compelling reason for this court to hear the appeal.
12. I have no doubt that there is no important point of practice or principle involved in this case. Further, there is no other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard. The Registrar had to consider the effect of an event that happened in 1995. The judge was entitled to conclude that the Registrar was right to decide as he did. In any case, there is no important point of principle or practice.
13. For those reasons, I conclude that permission to appeal should be refused in both applications.

ORDER: Applications for permission to appeal refused.

(Order not part of approved judgment)