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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Ahmed v Secretary of State for Work & Pensions [2005] EWCA Civ 535 (19 April 2005)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/535.html
Cite as: [2005] EWCA Civ 535

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Neutral Citation Number: [2005] EWCA Civ 535
C3/2004/2303

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONERS

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2
19th April 2005

B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE MAY
LORD JUSTICE RIX
LORD JUSTICE JACOB

____________________

ALI AHMED Claimant/Respondent
-v-
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WORK AND PENSIONS Defendant/Appellant

____________________

(Computer-Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
Smith Bernal Wordwave Limited
190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

____________________

MISS J ANDERSON (instructed by OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, DEPARTMENT OF WORK AND PENSIONS) appeared on behalf of the Appellant
MR R DE MELLO (instructed by COVENTRY LAW CENTRE) appeared on behalf of the Respondent

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    Tuesday, 19th April 2005

  1. LORD JUSTICE RIX: This is an appeal about the circumstances in which dependent relatives abroad can obtain entry to this country and indefinite leave to remain here.
  2. The critical rule of the Immigration Rules involved is Rule 317 which it is necessary to set out substantially in full, together with Rules 318/319:
  3. "317. The requirements to be met by a person seeking indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom as the parent, grandparent or other dependent relative of a person present and settled in the United Kingdom are that the person:
    (i) is related to a person present and settled in the United Kingdom in one of the following ways:
    ...
    (f) the son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle or aunt over the age of 18 if living alone outside the United Kingdom in the most exceptional compassionate circumstances and mainly dependent financially on relatives settled in the United Kingdom;
    and
    (ii) is joining or accompanying a person who is present and settled in the United Kingdom...
    and
    (iii) is financially wholly or mainly dependent on the relative present and settled in the United Kingdom; and
    (iv) can, and will, be accommodated adequately, together with any dependants, without recourse to public funds, in accommodation which the sponsor owns or occupies exclusively; and
    (iva) can, and will, be maintained adequately, together with any dependants, without recourse to public funds; and
    (v) has no other close relatives in his own country to whom he could turn for financial support; and
    (vi) if seeking leave to enter, holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity.
    "318. Indefinite leave to enter the United Kingdom as the parent, grandparent or other dependent relative of a person present and settled in the United Kingdom may be granted provided a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity is produced to the Immigration Officer on arrival. Indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom as the parent, grandparent, or other dependent relative of a person present and settled in the United Kingdom may be granted provided the Secretary of State is satisfied that each of the requirements of paragraph 317(i)-(v) is met.
    "319. Indefinite leave to enter the United Kingdom as the parent, grandparent or other dependent relative of a person settled in the United Kingdom is to be refused if a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity is not produced to the Immigration Officer on arrival. Indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom as the parent, grandparent or other dependent relative of a person present and settled in the United Kingdom is to be refused if the Secretary of State is not satisfied that each of the requirements of paragraph 317 (i)-(v) is met."
  4. Rule 35 is also relevant. That provides as follows:
  5. "A sponsor of a person seeking leave to enter or variation of leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom may be asked to give an undertaking in writing to be responsible for that person's maintenance and accommodation for the period of any leave granted, including any further variation. Under the Social Security Administration Act 1992... the Department of [Work and Pensions]... may seek to recover from the person giving such an undertaking any income support paid to meet the needs of the person in respect of whom the undertaking has been given."
  6. The consequences of a sponsor giving such an undertaking are dealt with in other statutory provisions. For instance, section 105(1) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 provides that a person who persistently refuses or neglects to maintain a person whom he is "liable to maintain" shall, if, as a consequence of that refusal or neglect, income support is paid to such a person whom he is "liable to maintain", be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment to a term not exceeding 3 months or to a fine.
  7. Similarly, section 106 of the same Act provides that if income support is claimed by, or paid to, a person whom another person is "liable to maintain", the Secretary of State can seek from the Magistrates' Court an order requiring the person "liable to maintain" to make payments by way of recoupment to the Secretary of State. Thus, by section 106(2):
  8. "On the hearing of a complaint under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances and, in particular, to the income of the liable person, and may order him to pay such sum, weekly or otherwise, as it may consider appropriate..."
  9. It is made clear by other provisions of the 1992 Act, such as section 78(6)(c) and section 105(3) that:
  10. "a person shall be liable to maintain another person throughout any period in respect of which the... first-mentioned person has... given an undertaking in writing in pursuance of immigration rules within the meaning of the... Immigration Act 1971 to be responsible for the maintenance and accommodation of the other person."
  11. It is also necessary to refer to section 115 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 which provides in effect that if that section applies to a person then that person is excluded from various welfare payments such as an income based jobseeker's allowance, and of particular relevance to this appeal, income support (see section 115(1)(e)).
  12. Section 115(3) states that:
  13. "This section applies to a person subject to immigration control unless he falls within such category or description, or satisfies such conditions, as may be prescribed."
  14. Section 115(9) provides as follows:
  15. "'A person subject to immigration control' means a person who is not a national of an EEA State and who -
    ...
    (c) has leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom given as a result of a maintenance undertaking..."
  16. "Maintenance undertaking" is defined in subsection (10) as follows:
  17. "'Maintenance undertaking', in relation to any person, means a written undertaking given by another person in pursuance of the immigration rules to be responsible for that person's maintenance and accommodation."
  18. It is clear, therefore, from these statutory provisions to which I have referred, that there is a link between the terms upon which dependent relatives may be admitted to this country, in circumstances where their relatives here provide a written undertaking to be responsible for them, and provisions of the social security administration regime.
  19. In essence it may be noted that although a written undertaking to be responsible for a dependent relative may be requested, there is no mandatory obligation upon a settled relative in this country who is seeking to assist a dependent relative to gain clearance entry to provide a maintenance undertaking.
  20. So far as the requirements which have to be met for the entry of a dependent relative set out in Rule 317 of the Immigration Rules are concerned, there is no requirement in that Rule at all for the provision, even by way of a non-mandatory request, of a maintenance undertaking.
  21. It is true that under Rules 317 to 319 read together, a dependent relative, within the meaning of that term, can only obtain leave to enter or remain if the requirements of Rule 317 are met and cannot obtain entry if they are not met. Or rather, the question is whether the Secretary of State is or is not satisfied that each of the requirements of Rule 317(i) to (v) are met.
  22. Nevertheless, it is essentially a matter for the Secretary of State to decide how and by what evidence he is to be satisfied of those requirements, which admittedly do, so far as requirements (iv) and (iva) are concerned, extend into the future. So the Secretary of State needs to be satisfied that the dependent relative will be accommodated and maintained adequately without recourse to public funds after his or her arrival in this country.
  23. I should also add that although a written maintenance undertaking for the purposes of these statutory provisions is quite likely to be given for an indefinite time, thus matching the indefinite leave to remain which is being sought on behalf of the dependent relative, nevertheless, by Regulation 2 of the Social Security Consequential Amendments Regulation 2000, the exclusion from welfare payments, effected by section 115 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, ceases to apply if either the person giving the undertaking has died or the person with leave to enter or remain has been resident in the United Kingdom for a period of at least 5 years.
  24. Above all, for these purposes, one needs to have in mind that an undertaking such as is referred to in Rule 35 is something which may (but need not) be requested of a sponsor of a person seeking leave to enter, and is described there as "an undertaking in writing to be responsible for that person's maintenance and accommodation for the period of any leave granted", and that the same rule makes reference across to the 1992 Act under which the person giving such an undertaking may be liable to effect recoupment for income support paid to the entrant.
  25. It is also necessary to bear in mind the definition of "maintenance undertaking" given in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, section 115(10), as cited above, as being a "written undertaking given by another person in pursuance of the immigration rules to be responsible for that person's maintenance and accommodation."
  26. So the language of Rule 35 of the Immigration Rules and the language of section 115(10) of the 1999 Act link together.
  27. In this case the claimant is an elderly man, Mr Ali Ahmed, who came to this country in 1999 and was given leave to enter for an indefinite period to join his nephew here. In sponsoring his uncle's entry, for the purposes of the Immigration Rules to which I have referred, the nephew made a statutory declaration, dated 9th March 1998, in the following terms:
  28. "DECLARATION TO SPONSOR A DEPENDENT RELATIVE
    I ...
    SINCERELY AND SOLEMNLY DECLARE as follows:
    1. I make this declaration in support of the application of the following for settlement to the United Kingdom..."
  29. He then gives details about his uncle. The declaration continues:
  30. "2. I am able and willing to maintain and accommodate the applicant without recourse to public funds and in suitable accommodation."
  31. In the succeeding three numbered paragraphs of the declaration the nephew gives details of his employment as a machine operator, states his average gross earnings, encloses pay slips, and gives further information about a deposit that he has in a building society (in respect of which he encloses statements). He gives details of the premises where he lives, for the purposes of showing that it contains ample accommodation for the uncle. The address of those premises is given, and the declaration states that the property is owned by his mother and that the only people who live in the property in question are the nephew's parents and the nephew's brother.
  32. In essence the question which came before Coventry United Appeal Tribunal, on 31st July 2002, and then on appeal to the Social Security Commissioner (CIS 426/2003), was whether Mr Ahmed was entitled to income support for a period within the first five years of his entry here. He has now been in this country for more than five years and so, on any view, is no longer a person excluded from income support by the provisions of section 115 of the 1999 Act, but he maintains a claim for back-payment of income support within the first five years and that is what this litigation is about.
  33. The decision of the appeal tribunal, a decision signed by its chairman, MR WPC Barry, was in favour of Mr Ahmed, as was the decision of the Social Security Commissioner, a decision signed by Mr Charles Turnbull, dated 24th June 2004.
  34. In essence the central single question which the tribunals below had to consider was whether Mr Ahmed had indeed gained entry on the basis of a maintenance undertaking given by his nephew as his sponsor. If there was such an undertaking in place then Mr Ahmed was a person excluded from income support for the purposes of section 115, but if such an undertaking had not been given then he was not excluded from income support and was entitled to the back payment in question. So that was the issue.
  35. The issue depended upon what attitude should be taken to the critical second paragraph of the nephew's declaration, albeit in the overall context of that declaration and in the overall context of the statutory provisions to which I have referred. For convenience I will repeat that second paragraph:
  36. "I am able and willing to maintain and accommodate the applicant without recourse to public funds and in suitable accommodation."
  37. It is the submission by Miss Anderson, on behalf of the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the appellant in this court, that that is an undertaking for the purposes of the legislation. It is the submission of Mr De Mello, on behalf of Mr Ahmed, the respondent to this appeal, that the decisions below were right in their conclusions and that this did not amount to an undertaking.
  38. It is, I think, common ground here, indeed Miss Anderson has said nothing in opposition to this proposition, that for an undertaking to be found in the relevant circumstances there must be something in the nature of a promise or agreement, prima facie contractual in form, albeit this arises in a public law context, which obliges a sponsor to maintain and accommodate the dependent relative. It is also common ground that there is no prescribed form for such an undertaking (although the Home Office has brought certain forms into existence in the past, to which I shall refer below). Indeed, there is a decision of this court in Shah v Secretary of State for Social Security [2002] EWCA Civ 285 (20th February 2002, unreported) to that effect (see, for instance, paragraph 19 in the judgment of Hale LJ, and paragraph 43 in the judgment of Mummery LJ), namely that there is no prescribed form.
  39. It is also common ground that there is no question that the statutory declaration made by the nephew is plainly intended to be a formal and important document, but the question remains, and in my judgment it is a question of substance and not mere form, as to whether that declaration, formal and solemn as it may be, contains something in the nature of an undertaking, promise or agreement, or falls short of that.
  40. The Commissioner's view was that the declaration fell short of an undertaking. From paragraph 29 and following of his decision he gave a number of reasons why he came to that conclusion in agreement with the appeal tribunal below. But the essence of his reasons was that an assertion or declaration that someone is able and willing to act in a particular way falls short of a promise or undertaking that he would or will act in a certain way. In his view an undertaking is a promise as to future conduct, whereas the declaration that the nephew had made was only a statement, solemn and declaratory as it may be, as to present ability and intention.
  41. The Commissioner went on to explain that words of promise or agreement or undertaking are very familiar concepts; that the word "sponsor" in the title to the declaration ("Declaration to Sponsor a Dependent Relative") could refer to support for the application of entry of a dependent relative as well as to a promise of future support in the way of maintenance and accommodation; that entry could lawfully be granted by the authorities without the extraction of an undertaking; and thus that there was nothing in the surrounding circumstances that compelled the declaration to be construed as an undertaking.
  42. The Commissioner also stressed the seriousness of an undertaking by reference to the potential liability of an undertaking sponsor to pay back income support obtained by the dependent relative, or even to be found criminally liable for an offence for failure to maintain when he had an obligation to do so.
  43. Finally, the Commissioner considered a previous decision in CIS/47/02 by Commissioner Fellner who, on very similar declaratory language, had found an undertaking to have been made out. But in the opinion of Commissioner Turnbull that decision was wrong.
  44. The court has been taken to the decision of Commissioner Fellner and some other decisions, to the case of Shah in this court, and also to a decision in the Administrative Court, R (on the application of) Begum v Social Security Commissioner [2003] EWHC 3380 Admin (6th November 2003 unreported). In all the authorities or decisions of the Commissioners to which we have been taken (other than CIS/47/02), however, it has been quite plain that in one form or another the express language of an undertaking has been used. Therefore those cases do not assist me in the decision which has to be made on this appeal.
  45. I said above that the Home Office had brought into existence certain forms for use in this context, albeit these are in no way forms prescribed by the legislation. One such form is known as RON 112. The pro forma of it, which I have before me contains a date of April 2002 at its foot. It is headed "Immigration Act 1971" and is called "Undertaking given in pursuance of Immigration Rules." It provides for the details of a sponsor to be entered, if resident in the United Kingdom, and the meat of it is contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 which read as follows:
  46. "2. I hereby undertake that if [name of sponsored person]... is granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom I shall be responsible for his/her maintenance and accommodation in the United Kingdom, throughout the period of that leave and any variation of it.
    "3. I understand that this undertaking shall be made available to the Department of Health and Social Security in the United Kingdom who may take appropriate steps to recover from me the cost of any Income Support paid to or in respect of the person who is the subject of this undertaking."
  47. A later form which the Home Office has brought into existence is known as Form SET(F). I have before me a version of that form dated August 2003. It is a composite form providing for an application for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom as a dependent relative. It begins with quite a number of pages which is for the applicant himself or herself to fill out, but when you get to page 9 out of 17 you reach something which is called a "Sponsorship Undertaking". The head of the form, consistently with my understanding of the Immigration Rules to which I have referred above, begins:
  48. "It is not compulsory to complete this undertaking. But if it is completed, it will help us with the application. This form should only be completed if the sponsor is resident in the United Kingdom."

    There are then provisions for the sponsored person's details and for the details of the sponsor to be given. The undertakings in question are set out in the following form:

    "I hereby undertake that if the sponsored person named above is granted leave to enter or remain in the UK on a permanent basis, I shall be responsible for his/her maintenance and accommodation in the UK throughout the period of leave and any variation of it.
    "I understand that this undertaking shall be made available to the Department of Social Security in the UK who will take appropriate steps to recover from me the cost of any income support paid to or in respect of the sponsored person named above. I also understand that the Home Office may take appropriate action to recover from me amounts attributable to any support provided under Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (support for asylum seekers) to the sponsored person named above. I further understand that I may be committing a criminal offence and liable to prosecution if, after I have given this undertaking, I do not support the sponsored person named above and income support (under social security legislation) and/or support for asylum seekers (under immigration legislation) is provided to or in respect of the sponsored person named above."

    It may be noted that these forms are expressly in the language of undertaking and emphasise the significance of such undertakings.

  49. On this appeal Miss Anderson submits that the Commissioner got it wrong. She has advanced her submissions, not so much by reference to the reasons given by the Commissioner for construing the declaration in question in the way in which I have indicated above he did construe it, but essentially by reference to the overall context which she submitted the Commissioner had paid insufficient regard to.
  50. She submitted, in effect, that if something which looked sufficiently formal had been accepted by an entry clearance officer as an undertaking in the overall context of clearance for a dependent relative, then essentially it would be an error to allow the matter to be reopened on the basis that the entrance clearance officer had misunderstood the document before him as being an undertaking when it might not be so.
  51. Miss Anderson submitted that the relevant legislation would be set at nought if it were possible to fool an entry clearance officer into thinking that the Rules had been complied with when they had not. She submitted that someone who said that they were ready and willing to do something were entering into an obligation to do so. Thus she submitted that someone who said that he was a ready and willing purchaser of a house at a certain price was entering into a contract or undertaking to buy the house at that price.
  52. She relied again, as she had done before the Commissioner, upon the reference to the status of "sponsor" in the heading of the declaration ("Declaration to Sponsor"), and she relied upon the authorities to which I have referred as being consistently in her favour in stating that no form was prescribed and that an undertaking in one form or another was sufficient. In particular those authorities emphasised that it was not necessary for the forms RON 15 or SET(F) to be used or for their exact language to be reduplicated.
  53. In essence, however, it seems to me that Miss Anderson has, at every stage of her argument, tended to assume that any formal document put before the immigration authorities for the purpose of Immigration Rule 317, is, prima facie, to be construed as an undertaking. It seems to me that this is not so.
  54. The first matter to emphasise, again, is that Rule 317, as Miss Anderson accepted at an early stage, does not require an undertaking. Even Rule 35 does not require it. An officer can be satisfied of what the Secretary of State needs to be satisfied for the purpose of Rule 317, without the extraction of an undertaking. That is the context in which the word "sponsor" is found in Rule 317(iv). Therefore the word "sponsor", as the Commissioner found, need only connote support and need not connote the promise of support.
  55. Secondly, I would emphasise that for the purposes of the requirements about which the Secretary of State does have to be satisfied for the purposes of Rule 317, it is perfectly understandable that a relative settled in this country wishing to support the entry of a dependent relative abroad would wish to put before the authorities evidence about his means and ability to support and accommodate a dependent relative so as to satisfy the Secretary of State of the statutory requirements.
  56. Indeed, inasmuch as it is also a requirement of Rule 317 that the dependent relative has lived alone outside the United Kingdom, essentially dependent financially on relatives settled in the United Kingdom, and that there are no other close relatives in his own country to whom he could return, although that is material which the applicant himself or herself could no doubt provide to the authorities, it is also material which the supporting relatives in this country could quite properly provide evidence about.
  57. All such matters, both as to the applicant's dependency in the past and as to intentions and ability for the future, are matters which a sponsor could quite properly wish to put before the authorities in the strongest form of which they were capable in order to satisfy the Secretary of State of the matters within Rule 317 of which he needs to be satisfied. Hence, the use of the statutory declaration is in no way surprising. One always comes back, however, to the question of substance and not of form, and that is whether an undertaking which is not a statutory requirement, but may be requested, is contained in the declaration in question.
  58. Miss Anderson, at one point, submitted that it would be unfortunate if, at a later stage, relatives who had provided undertakings could get out of their undertakings by relying upon a comma, present or absent, in the wrong place. There again she was addressing the question of form rather than the question of substance. One cannot assume an undertaking has been given. The question is: is there an undertaking in this declaration?
  59. For my part I am satisfied, in agreement with both tribunals below, that there is not language sufficient to create an undertaking in this case. It seems to me that an undertaking has to be something in the nature of a promise or agreement and the language that "I am able and willing to maintain and accommodate" is language which has reference, essentially, to current ability and intention and does not amount to a promise for the future. The essence of an undertaking is a promise as to the future, as typically found in the language "I will."
  60. I accept that the use of any particular language is not a condition precedent. The absence of an express reference to "I undertake", such as is found in the Home Office's forms, or to "I promise" or "I agree", will not necessarily be critical if it is still clear that the substance of what is said is a promise for the future. However, it seems to me that the natural meaning of the wording in this case does not amount to a promise to the future. There is no express reference to any promise or undertaking. The declaration relates entirely to the context of the nephew's present circumstances. It is important to remember, moreover, as Rule 35 itself makes plain, that an undertaking is something to which the authorities will look, if necessary, for the purposes of gaining recoupment of any income support paid out to the entrant. It may also involve the sanctions of the criminal law. In those circumstances it seems to me that one should not be too ready to assume that an undertaking has been given in the absence of reasonably plain language expressive of a promise.
  61. The only decision to the contrary is the decision of Commissioner Fellner in CIS/47/02. But when one looks at her reasoning at paragraph 27 and following of her decision, it consists, essentially, in the thought, expressed at the beginning of paragraph 27, that she finds elusive the concept of a document in solemn form which is made solely for the purpose of securing entry clearance and can then be discarded.
  62. That, it seems to me, is looking to the form rather than to the substance. It also assumes that an undertaking is a necessary condition of Rule 317, when it is not. It is only by the time one gets to paragraph 30 of the decision, which is after the essential decision has been given and when merely additional reasons are being supplied, that Commissioner Fellner states her acceptance that what has to be shown is a promise as to the future.
  63. It seems to me that in the essential paragraphs of her reasoning Commissioner Fellner did not clearly ask herself the question whether the language found in that case, which I accept is essentially the same as the language found in this case, amounted to a promise for the future rather than a statement of present ability and intention.
  64. It seems to me, on the contrary, that the reasons given by both tribunals below are more compelling. Against the statutory background to which I have referred, and in the light of the essential paragraph 2 of the declaration in this case, I am in agreement that this declaration falls short of an undertaking which could be given contractual effect. In my judgment, I would dismiss this appeal.
  65. LORD JUSTICE JACOB: I agree. An enforceable undertaking to be responsible for a dependent relative for an indefinite period is clearly one which is onerous. But equally clearly it is not difficult to put into words one way or another. The sole question is whether this document does that job. In my judgment it does not. I do not know from the language used whether or not, when Mr Ahmed signed it, he thought he was undertaking such an obligation.
  66. It is worth bearing in mind that the document is used for two purposes. One is to obtain entry for the dependent relative, and the other is to impose an enforceable obligation. One cannot tell whether, when Mr Ahmed signed this document, he thought he was doing both things or only one of them. The language itself does not achieve the promise which is necessary for this appeal to succeed. It therefore fails.
  67. LORD JUSTICE MAY: I agree that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Rix LJ. The critical short question is whether the sincere and solemn declaration, which the respondent's nephew signed in the presence of a notary public on 9th March 1998, is a maintenance agreement within section 115(10) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Such an undertaking means a written undertaking, in pursuance of the Immigration Rules, to be responsible for that person's maintenance and accommodation.
  68. The relevant Immigration Rule for this purpose is Rule 35. It is not, as might superficially be supposed, Rule 317, since that Rule does not speak of an undertaking and it is accepted that its conditions can be achieved without an undertaking.
  69. One purpose on the ground for such an undertaking, if there is one, may be for an entry clearance officer to be satisfied that Rule 317 is fulfilled. But the statutory purpose of the undertaking relates rather to questions of social security as Rule 35 indicates. This makes clear that the Department of Social Security may seek to recover from the person giving such an undertaking any income support paid to meet the needs of the person in respect of whom the undertaking has been given. There may also be criminal sanctions.
  70. For this reason the court should not, I think, conclude that a declaration is, in substance, an undertaking unless it clearly is an undertaking. An undertaking is an enforceable promise or agreement for the future. I grant that in some circumstances the word "sponsor" may connote a promise to support, but it may also simply connote "support". A sincere and solemn declaration is clearly more numinous than a mere declaration, but sincerity and solemnity do not by themselves change the nature of the declaration.
  71. Miss Anderson accepts that Rule 317 can be satisfied without an undertaking, but her submissions from time to time appeared to me to proceed on the footing that this is an undertaking simply because its purpose was to fulfil the requirements of Rule 317. I was at first unsure whether this declaration should be seen as an undertaking or not. Its purpose was, in the first place, to persuade an entry clearance officer that the uncle could and would be maintained and accommodated without recourse to public funds. It is perhaps a small step from a statement to that effect to a promise to achieve what is stated, but I am persuaded that it is not possible to read the words, "I am able and willing to maintain and accommodate the applicant without recourse to public funds..." as importing a promise to that effect.
  72. I note, although it does not contribute to my construction of the declaration, that there is no reference there to the risk of the Department recovering income support from the giver of the undertaking such as appears in Home Office forms RON 112 and SET(F), but this goes to emphasise that an undertaking in the present circumstances would give rise to serious consequences.
  73. "I am able and willing" is not clearly a promise for the future but a statement of present fact. So to hold is not to hold out the opportunity for sponsors to evade their obligations. Not only would this beg the question of what their obligations are, but the remedy lies with the Home Office and their entry clearance officers in making sure that if they require an undertaking it should be in their form drafted for that purpose, or in a form which is clearly a promise for the future and not in a different form tendered for the purpose of Rule 317 not amounting to an undertaking.
  74. As I said, I agree that this appeal should be dismissed.
  75. ORDER: appeal dismissed; public funding assessment of respondent's costs; respondent to have costs of appeal; permission to appeal refused.


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