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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Sangha, R (on the application of) v Stratford Magistrates Court [2009] EWCA Civ 1099 (24 September 2009) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/1099.html Cite as: [2009] EWCA Civ 1099, [2010] RVR 194

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
(MR ROBERT JAY QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		24th September 2009

Lord Justice Maurice Kay:

1. On 15 October 2008 Mr Robert Jay QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge in the Administrative Court, heard an application for judicial review of a decision of a District Judge sitting at Stratford Magistrates' Court. The District Judge had declined to set aside a liability order which had been made on 26 May 2004. The hearing in the Magistrates' Court was on 31 May 2006. The background to the case is fully set out in the judgment of the deputy High Court judge. Its origin is a demand for national non-domestic rates in the sum of £5,853.19, covering the period 1 July 1997 to 1 April 2001.
2. The application for judicial review seeks to challenge the refusal of the District Judge to set aside the liability order that was made consequential upon the demand for national non-domestic rates. In a very careful judgment, the Deputy High Court Judge observed that the applicant, Mr Sangha, was in a peculiarly difficult position in seeking to challenge the District Judge's decision, in that there was no transcript or agreed version of the ruling of the District Judge or the proceedings that had taken place before him on 31 May 2006. That is a difficulty which continues to exist.
3. Be that as it may, the Deputy High Court judge eventually dismissed the application for judicial review. He did so for two reasons. The first was that he concluded in paragraph 30:

"…the issue in these judicial review proceedings is whether the District Judge, having taken cognisance of Maria Ellick's witness statement of 16^th May 2006, could have reached the conclusion that he clearly did, that B26 and B27 must have been received by the claimant in January and February 2004. In these judicial review proceedings I am not in a position, on the material I have, to conclude that the District Judge's finding was one which was not open to him."

Essentially, the Deputy High Court Judge was referring to the absence of any formal record or agreed note of the proceedings and the ruling in Stratford Magistrates' Court. As the Deputy High Court Judge said in paragraph 32, the absence of material about that hearing in the form of a transcript or an agreed not was:

"…something which must count against the claimant rather than the defendant or the interested party."

That was undoubtedly correct. It was Mr Sangha who was seeking to overturn the decision of the District Judge, and it was incumbent upon him to have the necessary material before the Administrative Court. The Deputy High Court Judge concluded:

"I cannot infer that the District Judge made Wednesbury unreasonable conclusions, or based his evidence on no evidence. There was evidence which could have justified, putting it at its lowest, the conclusions which were reached."

That, it seems to me, is an unassailable approach to that aspect of the case.

4. The second reason for refusing to overturn the liability order derived from the requirement of promptness, which requirement is well-established on the authorities; in particular R (Brighton and Hove Council) v Brighton and Hove Justices [2004] EWHC 1800 (Admin), a decision of Stanley Burnton J, part of which was based on an earlier decision of mine in the Administrative Court in Liverpool City Council v Pleroma Distribution Ltd [2002] EWHC 2467 (Admin). That there is a requirement of promptness is beyond dispute.
5. The Deputy High Court Judge concluded that Mr Sangha had not acted promptly in seeking to challenge the liability order. He came to that conclusion because, whatever may have been the factual position before 3 September 2004, the documents establish that from that date at the latest, Mr Sangha was aware of the liability order. Indeed, in paragraph 23 of his judgment, the Deputy High Court Judge said:

"What is clear is that from 3rd September 2004 Mr Sangha came to know about the liability order, at least that is conceded in paragraph 5 of the letter of 20 October 2004."

6. In view of the fact that there was an unassailable finding that Mr Sangha had that knowledge from early September 2004 and the fact that the proceedings in the Magistrates' Court were not commenced until January 2006, it seems to me that the finding of a lack of promptness was inevitable. The Deputy High Court Judge dealt with this in paragraphs 37 and 38 of his judgment. I detect no arguable error in those passages.
7. Accordingly, like Moses LJ, who refused permission to appeal following a consideration of the papers, I conclude that Mr Sangha does not have a real prospect of success, nor is there any other compelling reason to grant permission to appeal.
8. I ought to record the fact that there is a document before me making clear that Mr Sangha is now retired, and lives in India. Today, he is not in court. He has authorised Rani Kaur to represent him today. She is a friend and neighbour who has been involved in this litigation throughout. That is quite clear from the documents I have seen relating to earlier hearings and from the judgment of the Deputy High Court Judge. Although she has no right of audience in this court, I have permitted her to address me and I have read her documents, including the latest one headed "Summary", which she handed in this morning. On any view Miss Kaur has a detailed grasp of the history of this matter and the documents to which it has given rise. She has made submissions, but in my judgment she has not established the basis for an appeal.
9. Accordingly, permission to appeal is refused.

Order: Application refused.