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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Stone v Humberside Police & Anor [2015] EWCA Civ 903 (07 July 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/903.html Cite as: [2015] EWCA Civ 903

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
KINGSTON-UPON-HULL COMBINED COURT CENTRE
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE RICHARDSON QC)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		7 July 2015

1. LADY JUSTICE SHARP: There are before me three applications for permission to appeal made by Mr Harvey Stone, who is acting in person and who has presented his case today with courtesy and care.
2. The applications relate individually to three linked claims made by Mr Stone, which were struck out by HHJ Jeremy Richardson QC, sitting as a judge of the High Court in Kingston-upon-Hull District Registry in November 2014. The defendants to the claims are the Humberside Police, the CPS and the Metropolitan Police. The High Court references to the cases are A00KH/682/683 and 684.
3. The genesis of these matters relate to certain events which took place when Mr Stone went to Kingston-upon-Hull job centre to sign on in December 2012. It is not necessary to set out the detail. Mr Stone's view of the matter was that the security were heavy-handed and that he was threatened with violence.
4. In short, as a result of what then occurred, Mr Stone was banned from the job centre in circumstances arising from that dispute. He was banned on a number of occasions, and he made a series of complaints about what had happened, including against the deputy manager of the job centre, a Ms Bidwell and others. Eventually, Mr Stone had to sign on by post.
5. In due course in 2013, he was upset by something that he heard the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, say on the radio and sent an email on 30 September 2013.
6. I do not have a copy of the email before me and Mr Stone tells me he does not accept the description of it, which is given in a later judgment of HHJ Richardson of 26 March 2015.
7. It is sufficient to say that Mr Stone's own description of it is that it contained some Anglo-Saxon English words which, quite rightly, he has not expressed in exact terms today; and that it said (according to his witness statement which he has put in for the purposes of this application) that he wished that George Osborne was dead. He makes the point this is not the same thing as saying you are going to kill them.
8. Mr Stone also says that he did not intend to alarm or upset Ms Bidwell or other employees of the Department for Work and Pensions to whom he copied the email. He also tells me it was sent copied to George Osborne, David Cameron and other Government employees.
9. However, he was subsequently arrested in relation to that email and prosecuted for an offence under the Malicious Communications Act 1988. It is this arrest and his detention for a period of time, some 9 and a half hours after his arrest and his subsequent prosecution, that led to the three actions which the judge struck out.
10. On 23 June 2014, Mr Stone was acquitted of the charge under the Malicious Communication Act 1988 by Wimbledon magistrates but he was convicted of harassment in relation to Ms Bidwell and made the subject of a conditional discharge which he tells me has now come to an end.
11. There have been a large number of claims made by Mr Stone as a result of all these events. Details of them are set out in the judgment of HHJ Richardson of 26 March 2015, which the judge has invited the Court of Appeal to read by way of background to this renewed application.
12. In view of the details set out in that judgment which sets out the various actions which have been started by Mr Stone, including some which post-date the actions with which I am concerned (and those actions are called in his judgment the third tranche of actions), it is not necessary for me to add much more to what I have already said on the facts and the history, except to say that Mr Stone was made the subject of a limited civil restraint order on 1 April 2014 and a general civil restraint order on 10 July 2014.
13. It is quite clear from what Mr Stone has said to me this morning that he feels very passionately that he has been the subject of a grievous miscarriage of justice in a number of respects. He tells me that he is disillusioned and upset, that his respect for the police has been shattered, that the actions that were taken against him were disproportionate and wrong. He has also lost faith, he tells me, in the judiciary and in particular in HHJ Richardson QC.
14. Coming to the issue that I have to determine, the complaints which are made about the decision and order of HHJ Richardson QC which he seeks to appeal can be put into two categories: in essence, the first complaint is that Mr Stone was unfairly treated by the judge. He says he was in league with the Government and was biased and should, therefore, have recused himself from dealing with Mr Stone's claims. Mr Stone refers, for example, to what Mr Stone himself said about the judge during the course of remarks which were broadcast on the radio. The judge dealt with the application that he should recuse himself in a judgment dated 12 September 2014.
15. The second category of complaint is that his claims have merit and he ought to be allowed to pursue them. Looking at the first complaint, as I said to Mr Stone during the course of this morning, it is inevitably the case that when a judge makes a ruling in a case where there are two sides to be heard that one side, normally the side that loses, will be upset by whatever it is the judge finds against him or her.
16. I have looked carefully at the ruling that was made by the judge on 12 September 2014, and indeed the subsequent judgments made by HHJ Richardson QC.
17. I understand Mr Stone's feelings about the matter. However, I cannot see any evidence from any of the material that is before me that Mr Stone was treated unfairly, or that the judge was actually biased against him, or that there was any perceived basis for concluding that he was. The transcripts of the rulings made by the judge show to the contrary.
18. As for the merits, the essence of the problem with the third tranche of actions is a legal one which was correctly identified by the judge at paragraphs 25 to 27 of his ruling.
19. First, this was re-litigation. Indeed, this was the third iteration of earlier cases covering the same ground that the judge had struck out. For reasons which have been decided over many years the courts simply cannot allow parties to carry on litigating points which have been decided against them. There has, at some point, to be finality.
20. Secondly, the judge said that it did not follow from the fact that Mr Stone had been acquitted of the charge under the Malicious Communications Act 1988, that he had a proper claim that his arrest and detention and prosecution were unlawful.
21. I can see no basis for disturbing the judge's conclusions on the matter. In order for Mr Stone to be given permission to appeal, he has to demonstrate that there are grounds with arguable merit for concluding that the judge was wrong. In my view, he has not succeeded in surmounting that hurdle.
22. The matter was dealt with by Vos LJ in refusing permission to appeal on the papers and I agree with the observations that he made as to the merits.
23. As I say, I understand entirely why Mr Stone feels a sense of grievance about the way he has been dealt with. However, in my judgment, there are no grounds for his pursuing an appeal against the order that was made and accordingly this renewed application must be refused.