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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Saif, R. v [2001] EWCA Crim 541 (8 March 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2001/541.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Crim 541

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London WC2
		Thursday 8th March 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: John Saif was born in January 1983. He was cautioned a year or two before the incident which we are about to narrate for pinching a yo-yo, but he is a young man of good character without previous convictions and, as Mr Bidder QC pointed out in his skeleton argument to us, effectively there was no evidence to suggest that it was of a violent disposition.
2. On 18th July 2000 in the Crown Court at Cardiff, before Curtis J, he pleaded not guilty to murder. The case proceeded as a trial until the conclusion of the prosecution case. At that stage he pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The basis of the plea then tendered was in effect no intent, or no sufficient evidence of intent. The plea was not accepted. The trial continued. On 24th July he was acquitted of murder and convicted of manslaughter. On the following day he was sentenced to nine years' detention under section 53(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.
3. He appeals against sentence with the leave of the single judge.
4. This is a very sad case. The appellant at the relevant time in November 1999 was 16 years old, nearly 17. The victim of the homicide was another young man, Shane Martinson, also 16 years old. They lived in Barry in Glamorgan. They went to the same school, and during the autumn of 1999 they started socialising with the same group of friends, visiting each other's houses and so on in the way that teenagers do. Although they were in the same group, they did not appear to get on very well and could not be described as friends. They were just part of the same circle.
5. On 20th November 1999 they went to a party. The appellant drank a fair amount of alcohol. The deceased apparently did not. They then went on to the home of another friend for a pre-arranged party. Eventually most of those at that party left at about quarter past 1 in the morning. That left the young man in whose home it was taking place, a man called Adrian Lewis, the appellant, the deceased and a girl of much the same age. The situation then became rather tense. There was some argument and an exchange of personal insults. The appellant was heard to call the deceased "green teeth". The deceased apparently responded with words like "smelly Arab". All very unpleasant, but it did not need to result in the disaster which then occurred. The appellant had been drinking a great deal and was getting progressively drunker.
6. We cannot say why the jury reached the conclusion that it did and we do not propose, nor could we, to go behind that conclusion. But we have little doubt that the jury was addressed on the basis that one of the factors they had to take into account was whether the alcohol which this young man had consumed meant that he did not have the necessary intention for murder.
7. There was a challenge by the deceased to the appellant to "come outside". The appellant declined that invitation. There was then some evidence, which the jury may well have accepted, that the appellant was egged on to fight, and accused of being frightened of having a fight. Eventually, in view of what the appellant was to say, it looks as though that may have had its impact on him.
8. Shortly afterwards the young woman in the house saw the appellant holding a kitchen knife. Very sensibly she told him not to be stupid. They left the kitchen. The appellant put the knife in the belt of his trousers and sat down. The deceased then went upstairs to the lavatory. The appellant suddenly jumped up and made his way upstairs saying, "If you want me to fight him, I'll fight him." That was no dispute that that was said. That confirms the evidence that someone at any rate may have been egging him on to fight.
9. When the deceased came out of the lavatory, the appellant lunged at him with the knife in his right hand, saying words to this effect ,"If you want to fight, I'll fight you." A struggle then followed. The two young men went to the ground. The others tried to part them. Both stood up. A punch was thrown. By now the deceased was holding his chest. He asked for an ambulance to be called. He was assisted downstairs and placed on a sofa. It was clear that he was bleeding heavily. In fact he suffered five stab wounds, one in effect through the heart, and although the ambulance arrived and the deceased was taken to hospital, he had received fatal injuries. His life could not be saved.
10. So far as the appellant was concerned, he sat, waited for the ambulance to be called, was apparently crying and heard to keep repeating, "I'm going to jail. I'm going to get done for murder", or words to that effect. After the ambulance had been summoned, he left and went home and told his own parents what had happened. After the deceased had been taken to hospital his parents drove him back to the premises. The appellant was seen to be crying hysterical and repeating, "I didn't mean to stab him." He was arrested.
11. He was interviewed on a number of occasions. He admitted that he was responsible for the stabbing. He blamed the alcohol. He implied that he had been egged on. He said he could not recall how he came into possession of the knife.
12. The sentencing judge regarded this as a very serious case of manslaughter. He said to the appellant in his sentencing remarks that the jury had convicted him on the basis that the prosecution had not proved the requisite intent for murder. He said that he would faithfully reflect that finding in favour of the appellant and that the appellant had indicated for a long time that he would be willing to admit manslaughter.
13. The judge went on to record, as we do, that no sentence that he could pass would bring the young man who had died back to life. He described that as a tragedy both for him and his family, and indeed for the young man at whose hands he had met his death.
14. He said that he regarded this as a particularly bad case. He set out the relevant facts. He ended his sentencing remarks by describing this as a:

"... determined, wicked and senseless act, and is close to a murder case ..."

adding:

"... by the verdict of the jury [it] did not amount to murder."

15. These observations were made by a very senior and experienced judge at the end of a trial over which he had presided. We attach great weight to them. We note in particular how the judge considered that this case came, as he put it, "close to murder". No doubt he was reflecting, in particular, the fact that an aggravating feature in a case of manslaughter was that the appellant had deliberately armed himself and had gone upstairs.
16. But the reality was that strong as the case may have appeared, and powerful as it appears to us on paper, the jury took the view that the right verdict was manslaughter. As the judge said, and we must, the sentence had to be passed on that basis.
17. We have here a homicide committed by a young man who was still only 16 at the time, apparently under some pressure from others in the house to fight, who deliberately took the knife upstairs and used it in the course of a fight. All that said, he pleaded guilty.
18. This is notoriously a difficult decision for any sentencing judge. Mr Bidder kindly drew our attention in a very careful analysis to a whole series of sentencing decisions of this Court in cases of this kind. We considered them and in addition took account of our own experience as sentencing judges and judges sitting in this Court about the appropriate level of sentencing in cases of this kind.
19. We have concluded that in this case a sentence of nine years on this young man on a plea was somewhat excessive, certainly sufficiently excessive for us to feel it right to interfere. There are cases where much lower sentences are imposed in other situations. In this case, to reflect the aggravating features of the case of manslaughter, and in particular the deliberate self-arming, notwithstanding that the appellant was a young man of 16 at the time when he became involved, we think that the appropriate level of sentence is one of seven years in custody. To that extent this appeal will be allowed.