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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Kasoar, R. v [2002] EWCA Crim 12 (16 January 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2002/12.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Crim 12

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London WC2
		Wednesday 16th January 2002

Wednesday 16th January 2002

1. JUDGE FAWCUS: On 17th November 2001 at the Inner London Crown Court this appellant appeared before Judge Issard-Davies, having that same day changed his plea to guilty of a breach of a restraining order imposed under section 5 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. He was then and there sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment. He appeals to this Court against that sentence by leave of the single judge.
2. Mr Anders, in an admirably succinct and clear submission to us, has made it clear that he does not criticise the imposition of a custodial sentence in the circumstances of this case but merely its length.
3. Turning to the circumstances, his victim was a young woman called Sonita Pantoni who had been his former girlfriend. They had known each other since 1994 and began to go out the following year, but the relationship broke down in a comparatively short time, after about a year and a half. After the breakdown the appellant used to park his car outside her place of work. She ignored him at that stage. In 1996 (so that is five years ago) she got married, but the appellant constantly followed her from work to her home, and that had the consequence of causing disruption to the relationship with her husband and they, indeed, separated.
4. In January 2000 there was a period of harassment and assault, which resulted in this appellant being convicted of assault in March 2000, and made the subject of a community service order. The learned judge in his sentencing remarks referred to that incident and said he had been placed on probation. That was clearly an error. But the importance of it is that it was an appearance before the court and a community penalty, which was a first shot across his bows.
5. He was subsequently arrested and appeared before the court again in July 2000, when he was given a sentence of imprisonment and the restraining order to which he had pleaded guilty to the breach of in this case was imposed.
6. Judge Issard-Davies said in his sentencing remarks in relation to the earlier offence:

"The day after [that is, the imposition of a community service order] you started telephoning her. You had harassed her with telephone calls for a period of months. You were imprisoned and made the subject of a restraint order and now you have broken that restraining order."

7. So he had a second warning as to what would happen if he continued to pester this young lady. On this occasion, as we have said, he received a prison sentence, although the length of it was reduced on appeal.
8. On the occasion which led to his appearance at the Inner London Crown Court, he had been in a motorcar in the vicinity of where his victim was being accompanied home by her current boyfriend. She noticed him as she approached her home. This was on 17th June 2001; and, as Mr Anders pointed out, there was therefore a period of nearly twelve months where he had complied with the restraining order. What she had to say was that she turned round and saw him sitting in the driver's seat of a car parked nearby and he was shouting in his own language "you fucking bitch". Not surprisingly, she was shocked and stunned after this length of time to find him yet again waiting for her and abusing her. She went inside her house. The appellant continued to shout for a short time and then drove off at high speed. She said in her statement that she was left feeling upset and angry that he had come back to interfere in her life again.
9. The appellant, by his plea, admitted his presence there and that he was in breach of the order. He had sought to say in interview that what he had said in her own language was "Is that your new lover?" - perhaps not quite as aggressive as what she recorded him as saying, but nonetheless an impertinent remark, uncalled for and in breach of the order. In our view it does not make a great deal of difference precisely what it was that was said to her.
10. His previous convictions all relate to his pestering of this lady. He has no other convictions.
11. There was a pre-sentence report in which, as noted during the course of argument, the probation officer referred to the appellant having been advised to go to trial by his solicitor, notwithstanding he had admitted that he was in breach in the course of his interview. Mr Anders is unable to explain precisely how it came to be that he only pleaded guilty on his appearance in front of the Crown Court, but it is evident from the sentencing remarks of Judge Issard-Davies that he was giving him credit for his guilty plea and he did not seek to suggest that that credit should be reduced by reason of it being a late plea.
12. Perhaps more important, but not of great help to this appellant, is the comment made by the probation officer in the last paragraph of section 2 of the report when he had this to say:

"At interview, Mr Kasoar maintained that he did not think there was anything wrong in his behaviour and did not feel that he had caused any harm to the victim. He significantly minimises the level of premeditation, as evidence would suggest that Mr Kasoar was parked and waiting for her to return, and he denies any abusive language."

13. Under "Offender Assessment" on the following page he said:

"Furthermore, Mr Kasoar remains unable to recognise that his behaviour constitutes harassment, informing me at interview that he does not wish to engage with the Probation Service to address this continuing domestic violence."

14. No doubt that passage led the learned judge, even if he was not there already, to arrive at a custodial sentence.
15. Under the passage dealing with "Assessment" he said:

"Whilst Mr Kasoar continues to hold these distorted beliefs and attitudes with regards to the victim and their relationship, I assess there is a high risk that he will reoffend in a similar manner."

16. It is in those circumstances that the learned judge had to approach what the length of sentence was to be.
17. Mr Anders, as we have already observed, accepts that he cannot argue against a custodial sentence but suggests that a sentence of twelve months was too high, notwithstanding the fact that he received an earlier custodial sentence. He referred to the guidelines contained in the case of Liddle and Hayes [2000] 1 Cr App R (S) 131 setting out of the considerations that sentencers should have in mind when approaching sentence in this type of case. It is not necessary for us to go through in detail all of those factors that the court must take into account. In our judgment they are, when looked at, all common sense factors for this sort of case. It is clear that this offence was aggravated in relation to a number of those factors, apart from the final one, where there was a guilty plea, but, as we have remarked, accompanied by the attitude which he displayed towards the probation officer in interview.
18. Judge Issard-Davies, having referred to the background, continued by saying "You have put this young woman through hell because she had been foolish enough or unlucky enough to have a relationship with you some time ago", went on to say - which, in our judgment, was important:

"That woman's confidence in the law to protect her would be completely eroded by any sentence other than a sentence of immediate custody."

19. To that we add: particularly in the light of the fact that he had already received custody before.
20. Mr Anders, perhaps with a slip of the tongue, opened his submissions to us by suggesting that this sentence was a little too long, but corrected that by saying that one has to look, in the context of sentences as short as twelve months, at reductions of perhaps months. Whilst accepting that this was a severe sentence, we are of the view that it was wholly justified in the context of the history of this case and the learned judge is not to be criticised at all for his imposition of that sentence. Accordingly this appeal fails.