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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Mackin, R v [2007] EWCA Crim 1844 (29 June 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/1844.html Cite as: [2007] EWCA Crim 1844 |
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CRIMINAL DIVISION
Strand London, WC2 |
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B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE STANLEY BURNTON
MR JUSTICE WILKIE
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R E G I N A | ||
-v- | ||
PAUL JAMES MACKIN |
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Smith Bernal Wordwave Limited
190 Fleet Street London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
MR R BROWN appeared on behalf of the CROWN
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Crown Copyright ©
The evidence at trial
The CCRC's involvement
Alan Simpson
Donna Jones
Clare Bird
Amanda Henderson.
Jason Atherton
"(1) For the purposes of an appeal under this Part of this Act the Court of Appeal may, if they think it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice-
...
(c) receive any evidence which was not adduced in the proceedings from which the appeal lies.
(2) The Court of Appeal shall, in considering whether to receive any evidence, have regard in particular to -
(a) whether the evidence appears to the Court to be capable of belief;
(b) whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any ground for allowing the appeal;
(c) whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and
(d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in those proceedings."
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" ... It is obvious from the reasons given in Rowland (supra) [1994] 7 KB 460, which I need not repeat, that in the ordinary course of events this court will be very careful before it will admit a confession of guilt by one of two people who have been convicted by a jury of a joint offence. It would be so easy for criminals to seek to share out the responsibility so as to get one of them off. On the other hand, there is nothing in the decided cases which in any way affects this court in receiving such evidence in a proper case."
More recently, in R v Horner [2004] EWCA Crim. 560, this court has said at paragraph 18:
"As a general proposition if a friend or relative comes forward after a trial and conviction of the offence and claims to have committed the offence having stood by and allowed the trial to go ahead without imparting that information previously, the appellant in such a case would have a very high hurdle to surmount in persuading the Court that the new witness is giving evidence that is credible."
Finally, we must mention the decision of the Privy Council in Dial v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 WLR 1660. In that case, Lord Brown of Heaton-under-Heywood in a speech giving with which the of the majority agreed said, at paragraph 31:
"In the board's view the law is now clearly established and can be simply stated as follows. Where fresh evidence is adduced on a criminal appeal it is for the Court of Appeal, assuming always that it accepts it, to evaluate its importance in the context of the remainder of the evidence in the case. If the court concludes that the fresh evidence raises no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused it will dismiss the appeal. The primary question is for the court itself and is not what effect the fresh evidence would have had on the mind of the jury. That said, if the court regards the case as a difficult one, it may find it helpful to test its view 'by asking whether the evidence, if given at the trial, might reasonably have affected the decision of the trial jury to convict': R v Pendleton [2002] 1 All ER 524 at [19]. The guiding principle nevertheless remains that stated by Viscount Dilhorne in Stafford v DPP [1973] 3 All ER 762, [1974] AC 878 at 906, and affirmed by the House in R v Pendleton:
'While the Court of Appeal and this House may find it a convenient approach to consider what a jury might have done if they had heard the fresh evidence, the ultimate responsibility rests with them and them alone for deciding the question [whether or not the verdict is unsafe].'
32. That is the principle correctly and consistently applied nowadays by the criminal division of the Court of Appeal in England - see, for example, R v Hakala [2002] EWCA Crim 730 R v Ishtiaq Ahmed [2002] EWCA Crim 2781 It was neatly expressed by Judge LJ in R v Hakala, at [11] thus:
'However the safety of the appellant's conviction is examined, the essential question, and ultimately the only question for this court, is whether, in the light of the fresh evidence, the convictions are unsafe'."
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"In that statement I will say that I believe I mistakenly identified you as my attacker and now believe that it was Barry Chadwick and also that I must have mistaken your friendship with Simmy as a partnership and my dealings was always done with Simmy and none actually done with you. Is that okay?"
It is significant that not only is Atherton now seeking to exculpate the appellant from being one of his attackers, but also to exculpate him from drug dealing. That evidence is quite inconsistent with his witness statement in which he described paying Simpson and Mackin for drugs and seeing them once or twice a week "when I would get gear". He also described how Mackin in a telephone conversation accused him of stealing some of his gear. This is quite inconsistent with Atherton's evidence to us that he assumed Mackin was Simpson's partner in the drug dealing. It is also an assertion which is inconsistent with evidence that Simpson gave that Mackin was involved with him in drug dealing, albeit they had their own customers.
"There were two reasons:
Firstly, Paul and I had rowed and were no longer together by the time his trial came up. Secondly, and more importantly, I knew that even though I was telling the truth, I would not be believed because I was Paul's girlfriend and people would say that I was giving a false account because of that. I believed that I would be given a hard time in the witness box and I was scared of that. I didn't want to go."
She said in evidence that she did not know the date of the trial. She did not inform the appellant that she was going to Spain, nor his solicitors, nor did she inform them where she was. However, when she arrived in Spain she telephoned her mother. She had given her mother's address to the police when she made her witness statement.