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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Iqbal v R. [2009] EWCA Crim 1627 (30 July 2009) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2009/1627.html Cite as: [2009] EWCA Crim 1627 |
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COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM Crown Court sitting at Birmingham
The Recorder of Birmingham, HHJ Saunders QC
20037868
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE LLOYD JONES
and
MR JUSTICE CRANSTON
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Shamus Iqbal |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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The Queen |
Respondent |
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Mr Rex Tedd QC and Mr Timothy Harrington (instructed by CPS Birmingham) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 4, 5 and 6 February 2009, 6 March 2009 and 24 July 2009
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Crown Copyright ©
LORD JUSTICE HOOPER:
The data was held by T-mobile on their Oscar database, and in order to extract any data a call data record query (CDRQ) must be made. The system deployed by T-mobile to make such queries was programmed to access two types of data, not merely one. It extracted both the incoming data and the outgoing data for each telephone call.
Thus for every single telephone call requested, data was produced for the mobile making the call and the mobile receiving the call. The reason that this is so important is that this error requires the T-mobile operator to "manipulate" the data to remove the unwanted information about the mobile receiving the call. I use the word "manipulate" in the same sense as Mr Campbell, namely that the T-mobile operator must manually examine and remove certain parts of it by asking the computer to perform further tasks.
With this knowledge it is possible to understand the nature of the concerns in the reliability of the data. What Mr Campbell cannot say and does not say is that there is material upon which it is possible to state that the Appellant's alibi is demonstrably true. What Mr Campbell can and does say is that there are grounds for not accepting that T-mobile's data can be relied upon, to base an expert opinion. And therefore this should have been brought to the attention of the jury for them to decide the factual issue of the reliability of the T-mobile data.
As far as I'm concerned I was not involved in the incident in any way. I don't know any person that was involved in the incident ... I have alibi witnesses that confirm that I was Flex and Fitness gym between 11.45 am and 2.00 pm. The following persons can confirm my presence at the gym, SAL who is the owner of the gym, Bret, works at the gym, a member called Mickey who was training at the gym. I think the gym has CCTV cameras. This is also evidence of my presence at the gym. I was accompanied by my brother Shamrez Nabi ...
I am surprised and shocked that I am a suspect together with my extended family. (Italics added)
(a) he slept the previous night at home [52 Brantley Road].
(b) he went from home to the gym, with his brother [Shamrez], leaving home at about 11:15 and arriving at 11:40. There "we went through our training programme".
(c) after training, while still at the gym having a protein drink, two "Asian lads" arrived, talking about the shooting and saying that "Fat Jav" had been shot.
(d) the Appellant and Shamrez left the gym, and went to 23 Aubrey Road, Small Heath, the home of his cousin Safraz Mohammed, where they spent 1½ -2 hrs, leaving at about 4 p.m.
(e) they then went home [52 Brantley Road] and spent about an hour there
(f) the Appellant [but not Shamrez] then went by taxi from 52 Brantley Road to Kidderminster, leaving at about 6:15 p.m., and reaching the hotel at about 7 p.m.
(a) Safraz Mohammed
(b) Ali Akbar, the proprietor of Midland Radio Cars, purporting to give details of the taxi "pick up", and producing a work sheet on which the relevant entry was misplaced in time order
(c) Mohammed Saleem Raza, the proprietor of the gym, supporting the Appellant's account of his presence and training there, as well as the arrival of the Asian youths with news of the shooting.
The first sets of data for lime -811 were extracted and provided by T-Mobile on 29th November 2003. The resultant material is at AB5/Tab 4. The important points as to the process of extraction are:-
(a) the T-Mobile database remains unaltered [this is unchallenged].(b) the incoming and outgoing data is extracted separately.(c) both incoming and outgoing data initially include material which is not required for the purpose of response to the police request (i.e. essentially data relating to the other mobile telephones with which lime -811 was connected while making/receiving each call).(d) the surplus data is "trimmed off" by manual keyboard operation.
20. The keyboard process in respect of the outgoing data was incorrectly carried out. In consequence, the outgoing data [AB5/Tab 4/pages 7-9] provided to the police on 29th November 2003 was flawed. The evidence of Tracey Wilmott [in the Court of Appeal] is that the flaws resulted from the keyboard process, although it is not possible to tell precisely what error was made.
21. The important points are that:-
(a) the fact that the outgoing data was flawed was obvious to any experienced eye, and swiftly spotted by Ms Grange, the police intelligence analyst [see email dated 3rd December 2003, whose text is in Final Grounds of Appeal, paragraph 31 [AB1/Tab 1].(b) the flawed outgoing data shows a series of different IMEI numbers [i.e. handsets] whereas the incoming data shows only one [-950].(c) various entries purportedly show the mobile telephone as connected successively with cell sites in widely differing locations [i.e. essentially sometimes in Birmingham, and sometimes at Malvern House/Coniston House, Kidderminster].(d) it appears obvious that the incorrect outgoing data contains some material which relates to the other connecting mobile telephones.(e) [not mentioned in oral evidence, but apparent upon analysis] the outgoing data is inconsistent with the incoming data [see e.g. outgoing call 14:15:51, lasting 40 seconds, and incoming call 14:16:09 - i.e. apparently starting before the outgoing call had finished].(f) the incoming data does not exhibit the same peculiar features.
22. On 5th December 2003, in response to the police request to check the flawed data, a second set of both incoming and outgoing data for lime -811 was provided [AB5/Tab 6]. The important points are:-
(a) this data was obtained by two extractions [i.e. incoming and outgoing data extracted separately] made separately from, and subsequent to, the original extractions.(b) the second incoming data was consistent with the original incoming data.(c) the second outgoing data differed markedly from the original outgoing data. The second set had only one IMEI [handset] number throughout. The errors in the original set did not appear in the second set.(d) the first 8 entries showed the use of central Birmingham cell sites, both in the midnight/2:00 a.m. period and in the 10:00 a.m. - 11:30 a.m. period - i.e. consistent with the Appellant staying overnight with a girlfriend at an address in/near Digbeth.
23. Billing records for lime -811 were prepared, again on a separate occasion, and by a separate extraction. Billing records (a) relate only to outgoing calls and (b) contain only information relevant to financial charging, and thus not any information relating to cell sites.
24. Subject to those limitations, billing records provide a further check as to the second outgoing call data provided on 5th December 2003. The important points are that:-
(a) billing records have a very high degree of accuracy.(b) Mr Clues audited [i.e. checked] the billing records against the second outgoing call data. See his report at AB4/Tab 4/pages 8-9 and Respondent's Skeleton Argument [3] at AB1/Tab 3/paras 75-79.(c) Mr Clues concluded that, save for "explainable exceptions", the data in the CDRs [i.e. the second set of outgoing call data] "matched that in the billing records" - see para 3.1.4 of Mr Clues' report.(d) Mr Campbell, in his second and third reports, both compiled after he had seen Mr Clues' report, simply ignores Mr Clues' analysis and conclusions.(e) in contrast, Mr Clues, who had been instructed specifically to consider the "raw data" for lime -811, tested that data and by inference concluded that it was accurate.
25. The fourth extraction of data was made by Tracey Wilmott on 17th December 2003, when she extracted the data which forms Exhibits TW1 and TW2 [AB5/Tabs 9-10]. Again, the incoming and outgoing data was extracted by two separate processes. Both incoming and outgoing data match the second sets extracted on 5th December 2003, and used by Mr Uglow as the basis for his analysis.
The ... pair of relevant calls are call 16 ..., starting at 12.32.31 using the Howard Johnson north cell and the call at 12.34.27 using Simoco Tower north (which call can be seen at App Bundle 7 Tab 16 page 16/2 as call 17, and is not shown on any of Mr Uglow's exhibits PMU 30 to 33). The distance to be travelled to access coverage to this cell is 3.8 miles, the time available is 116 seconds and thus the average speed necessary to travel this distance in the time available is 118 miles per hour.
Again, it must be remembered that this is during the day and is in a built up area of Birmingham.
Timeliness. Network operators can and do change their networks frequently by adding new cells, changing power levels and frequencies, and/or by changing or re-allocating cell identities. Network Operations and maintenance centres maintain a continuous watch on traffic conditions on their network and can change the performance of any station on command, in response either to faults or unusual traffic. It follows that it is more likely than not that a network will have changed between the time records were made and the time when experts are in the field checking and interpreting the data".
The next pair of relevant calls start with call 17 as above, at 12.34.27 using Simoco Tower north cell, and the call at 12.35.47 [to the person described during the trial as the Chief] using Pia Rayat House north cell (which call can be seen at App Bundle 7 Tab 16 page 16/2 call 20 and is not plotted by Mr Uglow in his exhibits PMU 30 to 33). The distance to be travelled to access coverage to this second cell is 4.8 miles, the time available to travel this distance is 80 seconds and thus the average speed necessary to cover this distance in the time available is 216 miles per hour.
For this pair of calls it has now become impossible for this journey to have been made. This in itself calls into question the reliability of the data supplied by T-mobile.
The next pair of relevant calls starts at 12.36.42 [call no 23 to Zafran Rashid] using Pia Rayat House north cell (which call can be seen at App Bundle 7 Tab 16 page 16/2 call 23 and is not plotted by Mr Uglow in his exhibits PMU 30 to 33) and the call at 12.38.54 [incoming call number 24 from an unknown person], using Simoco Tower east cell [azimuth 120º] (which call can be seen at App Bundle 7 Tab 16 page 16/2 call 24 and is not plotted by Mr Uglow in his exhibits PMU 30 to 33). The distance to be travelled to access coverage for this second cell is 4.8 miles and the time available to cover this distance is 132 seconds. Thus the average speed necessary to travel this distance in the time available is 131 miles per hour. This it is submitted in extremely unlikely given the time of day and the area in question.