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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Childs (Aka Greenfield), R. v [2014] EWCA Crim 1884 (30 September 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2014/1884.html Cite as: [2014] EWCA Crim 1884

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT
(LAWSON J)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		30/09/2014

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, CJ:

Introduction

1. Over 30 years ago, on 4 December 1979 the applicant, pleaded guilty before Lawson J at the Central Criminal Court to six murders committed between 1974 and 1978. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The judge stated he would make no recommendation as to a minimum term; in his letter to the Home Secretary, he explained he had not done so because the applicant was to give evidence for the Crown against his co-accused, MacKenney and Pinfold. A few days later on 20 December 1979, the applicant pleaded guilty at the Crown Court at St Alban's to robbery, asking for 25 further offences to be taken into consideration; those offences included conspiracies to murder, arson and robbery, possession of firearms and causing grievous bodily harm with intent; he received a sentence of 6 years imprisonment concurrent with the life sentences. He was represented at all times by Richard du Cann QC and Stephen Batten (now one of her Majesty's Counsel) who were instructed by Edward Fail, Bradshaw and Waterson, then, as now, a very distinguished firm of solicitors specialising in criminal law.
2. On 14 February 2012, the applicant sought leave to appeal out of time and the necessary extension of time of 32 years. The appeal was based on fresh evidence from Professor Gudjohnson and Dr Somekh who provided reports that stated that the applicant had severe personality disorders such that nothing he said, including the confessions and pleas he had made to the murders and other offences, could be relied on as truthful, unless corroborated. The applicant also relied on the fact that this court, on a reference from the Criminal Cases Review Commission, had on 15 December 2003 quashed the convictions of his co-accused, MacKenney and Pinfold, who had been convicted of murder in 1980 on the basis of the applicant's evidence. This court did so having heard the evidence of Dr Somekh as to the unreliability of the applicant.
3. The Single Judge referred the application to the Full Court. At a hearing on 28 November 2013 we determined we would first consider whether the fresh expert medical evidence and the evidence of Mr Batten QC, if admitted, would establish that the pleas made by the applicant might be unreliable. If the expert medical evidence and the evidence of Mr Batten QC showed that the pleas might be unreliable unless corroborated, then we would consider whether on all the evidence, and in particular the evidence of the prosecution, the confessions were corroborated so that this court could be satisfied that the applicant's convictions, founded on those confessions, were safe. We took this course as there would be no point in the very time consuming and expensive process of assembling, disclosing and analysing the other evidence in relation to the six murders, if the expert medical evidence and the evidence of Mr Batten QC did not establish the prima facie unreliability of the applicant's confessions and pleas.

The background

(a) The applicant's arrest for robbery and the statements he made in relation to six murders and other offences

4. In June 1979 the applicant, then aged 40, was arrested on suspicion of involvement in the robbery of a Security Express delivery van which had taken place earlier in the month. He made a statement under caution in which he admitted participation in the robbery. He was charged with the robbery.
5. On 6 July 1979 he was told by two police officers, Detective Chief Superintendent Cater and Detective Inspector Foxall, that they wished to speak to him about his involvement with the activities of MacKenney, whom the police considered a notorious gangster, as the police believed MacKenney had been having an affair with the wife of Ronald Andrews who had disappeared; his car had been found in the River Nene in Lincolnshire. The police thought that it looked like a staged accident and the applicant had brought MacKenney back to London. The applicant was told that the police were interested in speaking to him about the murders of six missing persons; he was told the names of two – Ronald Andrews and Terrence (Teddy Bear) Eve. He was told that he could have time to think and that steps could be taken to assure his own safety and that of his wife and family. He was told that if he had been concerned with the murders, he would be charged.
6. Later that same day the applicant was ready to talk, having learnt of the rank of Detective Chief Superintendent Cater. He provided the officers with bare details of the six murders. On the following day, he told the officers that he had three options – to deny everything he had said the previous day, to give an account of events that had taken place without naming others and giving an account naming the others. He asked for protection for himself, his wife and family and for a deal as he did not want to spend the rest of his life in prison. The applicant was told by Detective Chief Superintendent Cater that he must give his account without a discussion as to what would happen afterwards, but Detective Chief Superintendent Cater would do everything he could to ensure his safety and that of his wife and family. The applicant said he wished to discuss matters with his wife. The police officers said they would wish to speak with him about Ronald Andrews before he saw his wife; she had admitted writing a post card at the request of MacKenney and that postcard had been delivered to the address of Ronald Andrews. The applicant then agreed to discuss the case of Ronald Andrews before he saw his wife. He then gave an account of what had happened to Ronald Andrews under caution; he declined the offer of a solicitor. While he was giving that account his wife came to see him. After seeing her, he said he would give a full account.
7. On that day and on 10 July 1979, he gave an account of the murders of Terrence Eve (October/November 1974), George and Terrence Brett (1975), Robert Brown (1975), Frederick Sherwood (1978) and Ronald Andrews (October 1978) naming MacKenney and Pinfold as accomplices. Later in July he dictated written statements under caution in relation to the six murders, his general involvement with MacKenney and Pinfold and the other offences for which he was sentenced.

(b) His account of the murders

8. In the light of the medical evidence as to his personality disorders, it is necessary to outline his account of the murders.
9. He said he had met MacKenney at Pinfold's house in 1967 and began working at Pinfold's factory. From that time onwards, they regularly discussed criminal activities. He gave a very detailed account of each of the murders which we briefly summarise.
10. Terrence Eve. Pinfold entered into a partnership arrangement with Terrence Eve to run a toy factory in Dagenham. Pinfold wanted to have Terrence Eve removed and agreed with MacKenney and the applicant that he would be killed. MacKenney and the applicant bludgeoned him and then strangled him to death in the factory. They then cleaned up the blood. Robert Brown, who lived in a room in the factory, saw some of this. They then took the body to the applicant's flat where the applicant attempted to put it though a meat mincing machine which he had bought for that purpose. The machine was not powerful enough; he then tried cutting the body up, but eventually he burnt it in pieces in his fireplace.
11. George and Terrence Brett. The applicant, MacKenney and Pinfold made it known they would act as contract killers. They were hired by Leonard Thompson for £1800 to kill George Brett a neighbour and rival. They lured him to the factory; when he arrived with his son, both were shot dead with a sten gun. The bodies were dismembered and taken to the applicant's flat, further dismembered and burnt in the fireplace. The factory was cleaned with the help of Robert Brown.
12. Robert Brown. Shortly after these murders, a business owned by Pinfold and MacKenney got into difficulties. They resolved to stage a robbery of the business. Brown learnt of the plan and was questioned by the police. They decided to get rid of Brown because of this and his knowledge of earlier events. He was lured to the applicant's flat where he was shot in the head by MacKenney, then stabbed by the applicant and attacked with other weapons by them. MacKenney and the applicant dismembered the body and burnt it in the fireplace.
13. Frederick Sherwood. A man called Paul Morton-Thurtle (otherwise known as Paul Hammond) contracted with MacKenney and the applicant for £4,000 to kill Frederick Sherwood with whom he had been doing business. MacKenney and the applicant lured Frederick Sherwood to a bungalow near the factory where MacKenney lived. He was killed using a revolver and hammer. The body was dismembered and burnt in the fireplace at the applicant's flat.
14. Ronald Andrews. Ronald Andrews was a friend of MacKenney who was having an affair with his wife. He enlisted the help of the applicant to kill him. They lured him to the applicant's flat and shot him in the head with a revolver. They then took Ronald Andrews' car and staged an accident by driving it into the river in such a way to look as if the body had been washed away. They then dismembered the body and burnt it in the fireplace at the flat.

(c) The proceedings leading to the applicant's pleas

15. On the basis of the statements he was charged with two of the murders on 21 August 1979 and four of the murders on 4 October 1979. It was subsequently made clear that, although some of the evidence which the police had obtained corroborated the statements, that evidence would have been insufficient to charge the applicant.
16. On 29 October 1979, Dr Franklin, the senior Medical Officer at HMP Winchester, and Dr Wright, a consultant forensic psychiatrist prepared on behalf of the Crown separate reports on the applicant. Both concluded that he was fit to plead, that he showed no sign of mental abnormality or that at the time of the offences he suffered from any abnormality of mind which would have impaired his responsibility for the murders. Dr Wright concluded:

"His character is that of a highly dangerous, ruthless and callous professional criminal".

17. No psychiatric report was sought on behalf of the applicant.
18. Mr Batten QC provided a statement to the court; he was not required to attend for cross examination. It was his evidence that it was by no means clear that the applicant would give evidence against MacKenney; he was held in conditions of secrecy and both counsel supplied him with books to read. He had no empathy for his victims, but wanted to protect himself and his family. He enjoyed being at the centre of events and filling in gaps in police knowledge. His calculating nature manifested itself in the way he paused before answering questions which he did so in his own self-interest. Although he would not have trusted the applicant's account about peripheral matters, neither he nor Mr du Cann QC had any doubts about the essential truth of his account.

(d) His evidence against MacKenney and Pinfold

19. After the applicant had pleaded guilty to the murders and the other offences in December 1979 as we have set out above, the applicant gave evidence at the committal hearing in February 1980 against MacKenney, Pinfold and the two persons alleged to have asked them to kill George and Terrence Brett and Frederick Sherwood, Leonard Thompson and Paul Morton-Thurtle. At the trial in October 1980 before the then May J, the applicant gave evidence; at the conclusion of his examination in chief, an application was made on behalf of the defendants for the applicant to undergo a psychiatric examination. The applicant refused to undergo such an examination.
20. The defence obtained a report from a psychologist, Mr Barry Irving, of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, who had observed the applicant give evidence; the report concluded that the behaviour of the applicant fitted closely with psychopathy and the disordered nature of his behaviour called into doubt the reliability of his testimony. The then May J held that the report was inadmissible (see (1981) 72 Cr App R 78).
21. On 28 November 1980 Pinfold was convicted of the murder of Terrence Eve. MacKenney was convicted of the murders of George Brett, Terrence Brett, Frederick Sherwood and Ronald Andrews. The other defendants were acquitted. MacKenney and Pinfold appealed against their convictions; the appeals were dismissed by this court (Ackner and Dunn LJJ and Kilner Brown J) (1983) 76 Cr App R 271.
22. Observations were made by the judges in their recommendations to the Home Secretary. None of those is relevant to this part of the appeal.
23. The applicant alleged from about 1981 that there had been an agreement that he would serve only up to eight years. In 1985 the Home Office formally rejected that claim. Although he had written in 1981 to MacKenney's counsel indicating that he could in return for money provide evidence which would destroy the Crown's case, it was only from about 1984 that he made retractions of his confessions and other statements which were inconsistent with the evidence he had given against MacKenney and Pinfold. He also alleged that he had been induced by Detective Chief Superintendent Cater into making the confession by a promise of a low sentence, avoiding the imprisonment of his wife and threats. He alleged the police had fed him information to enable him to make the confessions.
24. In 1996 the Home Secretary imposed a whole life tariff on the applicant; he became entitled to a review of that tariff by the High Court under Schedule 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, but he has not sought any such review. We were told that he was awaiting the outcome of this appeal.
25. During the course of the review of the convictions of MacKenney and Pinfold by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the applicant made a statement on 14 August 1998 in which he asserted he was guilty as were MacKenney and Pinfold; he confirmed the accuracy of that statement on 17 September 1999.

(e) The appeal of MacKenney and Pinfold

26. As we have mentioned, on 15 December 2003 this court (Lord Woolf CJ, Aikens and Davis JJ), [2003] EWCA Crim 3643, [2004] 2 Cr App R 5, on the reference from the Criminal Cases Review Commission, allowed the appeal of MacKenney and Pinfold and quashed their convictions. Dr Somekh gave evidence to the court which the court concluded was very similar to the evidence given by Mr Irving at the trial in 1980. Dr Somekh's evidence was that the applicant suffered from a severe personality disorder and that there was a serious risk of fabrication. Although counsel for the prosecution cross-examined Dr Somekh, the prosecution did not call any evidence at all.
27. The court also considered the statements made by the applicant between the trial and the hearing. It concluded that the applicant's evidence against MacKenney and Pinfold was so unreliable as to be worthless; as their convictions depended on his evidence, and in the light of the conclusion on his reliability, the convictions were quashed.

(f) The events after December 2003

28. After reading the decision, the applicant took legal advice and obtained an opinion from Dr Somekh in 2005. A clinical psychologist, Charles Burdett, wrote a report in 2006. Counsel was then instructed; funding was granted in November 2007. Dr Somekh provided a further report in 2008. Further work was done and in June 2010 Professor Gudjonnson was instructed. His report was provided in June 2011. An application was made to the Criminal Cases Review Commission in October 2011. It concluded it could not review the case without an application to the Court of Appeal, as there had been no appeal.

The psychiatric evidence received by us de bene esse

(a) The applicant's psychological history

29. The applicant was born on 18 December 1938. There was no information available about the applicant's mental history prior to 1979 other than an account that the applicant gave to a probation officer in 1980. His account was that he had been brought up in an unstable home and had been placed with foster parents; he said he had been harshly treated by them. He was badly behaved in his early teens and his record of convictions started at the age of 14 in 1952. After subsequent convictions he was sent to Borstal in November 1957.
30. As we have set out in paragraph 16 he was not diagnosed in 1979 as suffering from any mental illness or abnormality.
31. In 1987 Dr Cooper, a medical officer at Parkhurst prison, and Dr Placid Coorey diagnosed him as having a long standing personality disorder with little evidence of maturation.
32. Between 1979 and 1998 the applicant was transferred over 40 times between prisons principally because they could not manage his disruptive behaviour and his way of utilising the complaints procedure.
33. In 1997 the applicant had befriended a woman, SW, who visited him in prison. She had an ambition to be a journalist; they agreed she would write his biography. She contacted The Mirror's Chief Crime Correspondent with a view to obtaining publicity and an advance. During the course of several meetings at which the police were also present, the applicant confessed to murders and other offences which became known as Operation Roark. The account was published in The Mirror in November 1998. The murders and offences included:

i) The killing of an inmate by the applicant when he was at Rochester Borstall in 1958/9. The police investigation of his confession concluded that although he had given a truthful account of his violent behaviour at Borstal, he had embellished it by making up the account of the murder of an inmate.

ii) The murder at the Kray Brothers Club in Holloway in 1964/5. The applicant claimed that with criminal associates he "tried" a person alleged to be an informer and then shot him. The police concluded that it was extremely unlikely that this happened.

iii) The robbery and shooting at the Soho Club in 1966/7, stabbings in a public houses in Hillingdon and drive by shootings; the police could trace no record of these.

iv) A murder in Poplar High Street in 1978 of a vagrant whom the applicant then dismembered and burnt. The police could find no evidence to support this.

v) A murder in Lincolnshire which the police investigated.

34. In 1999 the applicant suffered a serious stroke. This had caused some impairment of his memory, but not his long term memory. There was agreement that the stroke had no significant bearing on the issues before the court.

(b) The experts and their area of agreement

35. The evidence before us which we heard de bene esse, was given by:

i) Dr David Somekh is a retired forensic psychiatrist with many years' experience. He had specialised in seeing men with severe personality disorders. He had not interviewed the applicant for the purpose of the Appeal by MacKenney and Pinfold in 2003, but had had access to his medical records. He interviewed the appellant at HMP Frankland in November 2005.

ii) Professor Gisli Gudjonsson CBE is an Emeritus Professor of Forensic Psychology at the Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London. He is a chartered psychologist and had prior to his retirement been head of Forensic Psychology Services for the Lambeth Forensic Services and Medium Secure Unit at the South London and Maudsley NHS Trust. He has written extensively on forensic psychology, acted as an expert in many well known cases and has a world-wide reputation for his work on suggestibility. He interviewed the application and conducted psychometric tests on 22 February 2011.

iii) Dr Jackie Craissati, MBE is a consultant clinical and forensic psychologist and Clinical Director of the Forensic and Prisons Directorate of the Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust, Kent. She specialises in high risk personality disordered offenders. She managed personality disorder units at HMP Belmarsh and HMP Swaleside and for those on probation across London. She interviewed the applicant on 13 February 2014.

iv) Dr Ian Cumming is a consultant forensic psychiatrist at the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust. He also practises at HMP Belmarsh. He interviewed the applicant on 13 December 2013. In his report, he set out a detailed and exhaustive account of the applicant's history.

36. The psychiatrists and psychologists were agreed that

i) The applicant had an anti-social personality disorder (a pervasive pattern of disregard and violation of the rights of others) and a narcissistic personality disorder (a pervasive pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, attention seeking and a lack of empathy). These had existed at the time of his confession and pleas.

ii) He met the cut off point for psychopathy as a result his score on the psychopathy check list.

iii) He lied. Instrumental lying was more likely to be found in an anti-social personality disorder and irrational-lying more likely to be lined to narcissistic personality disorder

37. Their disagreement centred on the nature and extent of his lying, where on the spectrum of prisoners suffering from personality disorders he lay and the reliability of his confession.

(c) The evidence of Dr Somekh

38. Dr Somekh's evidence was that the applicant suffered from an emotionally unstable personality disorder, as a result of a severe disturbance of emotional development; his emotional development was significantly different to the average person. His disorder was so severe as to qualify as a mental disorder – a severe psychopathic disorder. He was in a tiny minority of prisoners with this type of emotional immaturity and who caused disruption by breaking rules and being difficult. The best evidence of his disorder was his behaviour during the first ten years of his life sentence.
39. He had not been so diagnosed in 1979 because the experience of most psychiatrists in relation to such disorders was limited and they were unaware of his background and had therefore not given thought to whether he had a severe personality disorder.
40. The applicant was a pathological liar; nothing he said could be believed – neither his allegations against the police nor his confessions unless corroborated. The applicant embellished accounts and lied for the purpose of getting pleasure by stirring distressing emotions in his listener; he was not simply brutal and callous, but enjoyed giving such accounts. He had made a fantastical series of lies in the matters referred to as Operation Roark to which we have referred at paragraph 33.
41. Dr Somekh accepted that the applicant was perfectly capable of lying to suit his own ends, but his personality disorder had to be taken into account when assessing his ability to choose between alternative courses of action.

(d) The evidence of Professor Gudjonsson

42. Professor Gudjonsson's evidence was that, in the light of the severity of the applicant's personality disorder and the circumstances of his interviews with the police, his confessions and guilty pleas could not be relied upon. He lied for instrumental reasons, to achieve a specific end and did so without regard to the feelings of others in his single minded and ruthless pursuit of his own self-interest. The attention he had received during his interviews with the police fed into his need for notoriety.
43. In his second report Professor Gudjonsson emphasised the severity of the applicant's narcissism, relying in particular on the applicant's perception he might receive a long sentence, his desire to reduce it and to protect his wife and children, the provision of some information by the police, the applicant's insistence on speaking to a senior officer, Detective Chief Superintendent Cater, before making the statements, his desire for notoriety, unnecessarily gruesome detail in which he described the murders when in prison and the account of the matters referred to as Operation Rorak designed to impress SW. He was also motivated by a desire for revenge on his wife and to maintain his "hard man" image in prison.
44. He accepted that the applicant had demonstrably acted in his own interests over the decades; he did not consider anyone except what he wanted for himself. Before the applicant suffered a stroke, he was above average intelligence, no more suggestible than the average person and able to weigh options. About 3.6% of the prison population had a narcissistic personality disorder.

(e) The evidence of Dr Craissati

45. Dr Craissati, although agreeing with the diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder, considered that the diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder was the most unsatisfactory of all the personality diagnoses. As it was based on bad behaviour as a diagnosis, it could be a very circular diagnosis - the diagnosis was the result of repeat aggressive offending. That was why about 50% of the prison population met the diagnostic criteria. If a person was to be so diagnosed, there was a need for another personality disorder (as, in the applicant's case his narcissistic personality disorder) or other symptoms such as intense distress or self-harm.
46. Dr Wright's description of the applicant which we have set out at paragraph 16 might now be expressed as an anti-social personality disorder or psychopathy. About 10 % of prisoners met the cut-off point for psychopathy.
47. She considered that an aspect of the applicant's narcissistic disorder was that he embellished his accounts to make himself appear dangerous and violent and to add a shock factor. However he had given consistent accounts of his upbringing, which although it had some embellishment did not have the embellishment which would be characteristic of those with a severe personality disorder. The results of the tests she had performed did not show exaggeration. His enjoyment of the shocked reaction to his embellishment could be an aspect of his psychopathy or his narcissistic personality disorder or his emotionally unstable personality disorder.
48. Lying was associated with an anti-social personality disorder and a narcissistic personality disorder and psychopathy, but it was not a necessary component. Brutal truth telling was associated with psychopathy. The applicant's confession was, in her view, motivated by concerns to protect his family or to obtain a deal to reduce his sentence. She considered that when he lied, he did so because he thought it was in his own interests, though his thinking might be flawed because of his personality disorder. She could not rule out that he would incriminate himself in very serious offences or place himself at times in a notorious or dangerous light and to shock and impress, but the balance weighed heavily in favour of him looking after himself to ensure he got what he wanted in his own self-interest.
49. She accepted he was disruptive in prison and anti-authoritarian because of his anti-social and narcissistic personality disorders. He enjoyed his notoriety. The matters referred to as Operation Rorak were an aspect of his narcissistic disorder, but she could not accept that that led to the conclusion that he was a compulsive liar and had an inability to act in his own interests.

(f) The evidence of Dr Cumming

50. He did not agree with Dr Somekh or Professor Gudjonsson that because the applicant had the personality disorders his confessions could not be relied upon. Although pathological lying was seen in narcissistic and anti-social personality disorders, it was not the primary feature and not inevitably present.
51. His opinion was that the applicant was a man who lied for instrumental reasons and for mischievous reasons; he was not a compulsive or pervasive liar; when he lied it was by choice and largely goal directed. The applicant had explained his assertion of his guilt to the Criminal Cases Review Commission as he did not want it to be known that he was not the man people believed him to be, but had then asserted his innocence to the Commission after the convictions of MacKenney and Pinfold had been quashed.

Our conclusion

52. It is clear from what the experts agreed before the hearing that the applicant had in 1979 and thereafter a narcissistic personality disorder and anti-social personality disorder and his score on the psychopathy checklist met a diagnosis of psychopathy. He lied.
53. The oral evidence showed a further area of agreement. His decision to lie was instrumental and driven by his intention to act in his own best interests. However, his judgment as to what was in his own best interests was affected by his disorders.
54. It was contended by Miss Trowler QC that the severity of the narcissistic personality disorder, his proved lies in respect to the matters known as Operation Rorak and his exceptionally difficult behaviour in prison showed that he was at the extreme end of the disorders; it followed that his confession and pleas could not be relied on without corroboration. He was one of the very small number of defendants who were in the position where the personality disorder could not be dealt with at trial. In this case his false confession had been motivated by concern for his family and the encouragement given by the police officers to confess. This played on his narcissism. He saw a way of getting out of the predicament he was in and to enjoy the notoriety of what he asserted. He had made a false confession.
55. We cannot accept this submission:

i) It is clear that he was fit to plead. Although that is a very powerful consideration, it is not of itself conclusive. In R v Lee [1984] 1 WLR 578, the defendant had pleaded guilty to a number of offences of arson and manslaughter; there was psychiatric evidence that he was fit to plead. About 18 months later, he sought leave to appeal on the basis that he was of low intelligence, that he had pleaded not as an acknowledgement of guilt but to gain notoriety, his confession evidence was flawed as he had been subjected to a long and remorseless interrogation, there was evidence from inquiries made by The Sunday Times which showed he had alibis. His defence team had grave doubts as to their original instructions and the prosecution's ability to prove his responsibility. The Court held it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and to admit fresh evidence. It observed:

"The fact that the appellant was fit to plead; knew what he was doing; intended to make the pleas he did; pleaded guilty without equivocation after receiving expert advice; although factors highly relevant to whether the convictions or any of them were either unsafe or unsatisfactory, cannot of themselves deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the applications."

ii) It is accepted that the applicant was no more suggestible than the average person. There is no material which calls into question the approach of the police officers and in particular Detective Chief Superintendent Cater. We cannot accept that the police officers did or said anything that motivated the applicant to act as he did. The evidence of Mr Batten QC as to his view of Detective Chief Superintendent Cater's integrity and his proper conduct of the investigation strongly supports this view.

iii) On the contrary he plainly thought that he was acting in his own best interests in the expectation that he would receive a substantially reduced term of imprisonment and his family would be protected. There was clearly a rational basis for this approach as is evident from the contemporaneous evidence of Mr Batten QC. His evidence was that an evolving practice had developed in "supergrass" cases to settle on a figure in high single figures for a person who pleaded guilty and was prepared to give evidence against his co-gangsters.

iv) It is also clear from the evidence of Mr Bratten QC that the applicant's legal team had no doubt, after the initial hesitation to which we have referred at paragraph 18, that the applicant had taken the deliberate decision to plead and that there was no concern about his capacity.

v) Although it is common ground that his personality disorders existed at the time, there is powerful contemporaneous evidence of his mental state. We accept the evidence of Dr Craissati that the description by Dr Wright of the applicant which we have set out at paragraph 16 was what now would be described as an anti-social personality disorder or psychopathy.

vi) It is we consider no coincidence that the appellant started to assert that his confession was false in 1984 when he realised that he was not going to be released from prison in accordance with the deal he thought he had obtained. He did so motivated by a belief that this was in his own interest. This was not an irrational decision.

vii) The decision of this Court in the appeal of MacKenney and Pinfold does not, on analysis, assist the applicant. The issue with which the court was concerned was the reliability of a witness on whom the convictions depended; as he was a person who lied to suit his own ends, convictions based on his evidence could not be regarded as safe. No evidence was called by the Crown to challenge the evidence of Dr Somekh.

viii) No appeal was brought until 2012, some 32 years after the pleas. The delay prior to the decision of this Court in the appeal of MacKenney and Pinfold cannot be properly explained; he asserted his guilt to the Criminal Cases Review Commission in 1998. Furthermore there is no real justification for the delay of over 8 years after 2003. If an appeal is to be made so long after the conviction, it must be launched and pursued with much greater expedition than occurred.

56. In such circumstances we consider that clear and compelling medical evidence was needed to show that the confession and the pleas were the result of his personality disorders. Taking into account the whole of the medical evidence, there was no such compelling evidence. Although the experts were agreed on the disorders from which the applicant suffered, we do not accept that they were of such severity that his confessions in all the circumstances were unreliable. It follows therefore that his convictions were not unsafe and the application for leave to appeal out of time must fail.