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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Palmer Timber Ltd, R v [2019] EWCA Crim 611 (12 March 2019) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2019/611.html Cite as: [2019] EWCA Crim 611 |
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CRIMINAL DIVISION
Strand London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE GOOSE
HIS HONOUR JUDGE SLOAN, QC
(Sitting as a Judge of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)
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R E G I N A | ||
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PALMER TIMBER LIMITED |
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Crown Copyright ©
This transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.
If this transcript is to be reported or published, there is a requirement to ensure that no reporting restriction will be breached. This is particularly important in relation to any case involving a sexual offence, where the victim is guaranteed lifetime anonymity (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), or where an order has been made in relation to a young person.
Introduction
The facts
The appellant is a privately-owned company that operates from Cradley Heath, Sandwell, in the West Midlands. It operates from a large site of 30 acres and employs almost 100 people. The appellant's business is concerned with wood products used in the construction industry and operates a large modern mill. Also, the appellant owns its own transport fleet, which includes articulated lorries and forklift trucks.
Pre-sentence discussion between the parties
In their approach to sentencing, the prosecution and appellant indicated their submissions in respect of culpability and harm under the Health and Safety Offences Guideline by the Sentencing Council. The prosecution contended that culpability should be assessed as high under Step 1, whilst the appellant submitted that it would be assessed as medium level of culpability. Under the assessment of harm under paragraph 1, the parties agreed that the seriousness of harm risk was at level A, namely death or the highest physical or mental impairment. It was also agreed between the parties that the likelihood of level A harm was at the medium level, thereby setting harm at Category 2 under the Guideline.
"Such sensible agreement is to be encouraged and it is to be expected will be weighed carefully by any Court before departing from it. However and ultimately, no such agreement can bind the Court; as a matter of constitutional principle [...] the imposition of a sentence is a matter for the Judiciary [...] Principles of transparent and open justice point to the same conclusion. A private agreement between [the] prosecution and defence will doubtless inform the Court but, helpful though it may [well] be, [it] cannot be determinative of sentence."
"The assessment of the likelihood or chance of harm is quintessentially a matter for the sentencing judge on all the evidence before him."
Accordingly, whilst it was important for the judge to consider the agreed position between the parties upon the likelihood of harm, he was not bound by such agreement.
His Honour Judge Berlin applied the Guideline in the correct stepped approach. He concluded that culpability at step 1 was at the upper end of high, under the Guideline. There was evidence that the appellant had failed to put in place measures that were recognised standards in the industry, as particularised in the Health and Safety Guidelines on Safe Site Design. Further, the appellant failed to conduct any suitable and sufficient risk assessment, which was made more serious by the introduction of Combi-lift vehicles in January 2015. Drivers and a supervisor had raised clear concerns about the significant blind spot created by the use of the Combi-lifts, which the judge described as "[…] highly culpable in itself". The appellant also allowed the breach of its duty to subsist over a long period of time. Taking these factors cumulatively, the judge concluded the culpability was at the upper end of the high category.
The judge rejected the contention that there was only a medium likelihood of risk of harm at level A. He concluded that the likelihood of such harm was high. An independent Health and Safety Consultant had identified the vehicle and passenger movement on site as a high risk in 2013, before the introduction of Combi-lifts. Notwithstanding this previously identified high risk problem, in January 2015 the appellant introduced Combi-lift vehicles, being some six weeks before the accident. In the mind of the judge this increased the likelihood of very serious harm, given the blind spot problem, which added to the already high risk and noisy yard, particularly at peak loading times. The judge expressed himself in this way:
"It is no coincidence that within six weeks of their introduction a very serious accident, which could have been fatal, occurred. It is noted that there was no recorded risk assessment following their introduction or before their introduction."
Given that the risk of death or of the most serious injury was obvious in collisions between forklift and Combi-lift vehicles, this caused the judge to find that there was a high likelihood of level A harm caused by the offences of the appellant.
Further, the judge found that the harm assessment in paragraph 2 of the Guideline, both sub paragraphs(i) and (ii) were engaged. The breach of duty exposed a number of workers to the risk of harm on a daily basis as they moved around the yard. Also, whilst the type of harm caused to complainant, Mr Baker, fell within with level B, it was only a matter of chance that he did not suffer fatal injury and was only just short of level A.
Firstly, the appellant contends that the judge incorrectly concluded that culpability was high. It is submitted that the judge did not give sufficient account to the fact the workforce had received training in the use of the Combi-lifts which included techniques when operating the plant. In short, the operator should adjust his head position to see around the obstruction created by the lift mast. Also, the judge failed to take sufficient account of the difficulty in segregating plant and pedestrians within the site.
Secondly, it is argued that the judge was wrong to conclude that the likelihood of harm risk at level A was high. Leaving aside the contention that the agreement between the parties upon this issue should have been adhered to by the judge, it is argued that he wrongly elided the harm risked with the likelihood of harm arising. Further, the judge gave insufficient weight to the limited measures introduced by the appellant to reduce risk, for example, by imposing a one-way system, speed limits and driver leaflets with toolbox training. The appellant also submits that the judge failed to take sufficient account of industry data, that only 50 people are killed and over 5,000 are injured in accidents involving workplace transport each year. It is submitted that such data does not lead to a conclusion of high likelihood of level A harm.
Thirdly, it is argued by the appellant that the judge disproportionately increased the fine to £1.4 million before reducing it to £1.1 million after mitigating factors were taken into account. It is submitted that the increase in fine should not have been so great when the actual harm caused was not at level A, death.
Fourthly, it is submitted that the level of fine of £1.1 million was disproportionate, compared to the pre-tax profit of the appellant's business which averaged over a period from 2015 to 2017 to approximately £600,000. It is argued that the fine represented close to twice the average pre-tax profit of the business and that such fine should be reserved for the most serious cases.
Discussion and conclusion
In reaching the conclusions that the judge did in this case he undertook a careful and detailed assessment of the evidence placed before the court. Before turning to the Guideline, the judge made express findings on the evidence:
"Findings:
The company did not address the workplace transport matters which required planning and work to resolve the difficulties during loading and unloading within a cluttered, noisy and high-risk yard to enable
pedestrians and lorries to circulate in a safe manner and to ensure safety by enough segregation. There were short-term measures introduced, such as the driver leaflet, the one-way system and the speed limit, but this did not address the core problem of too many lorries and too many pedestrians mingling in the yard at one time. The additional ingredient of the Combi-lifts with its known blind spot added significantly to the already high-risk area
...
The primary cause of the accident was the failure to organise its workplace so that pedestrians and lorries could circulate safely. The incident was a serious example of such a failure. It is noted that whilst there have been no previous actual injuries from the incidents from the yard, on two previous occasions in 2013 there was physical contact between the side loaders and pedestrians in the yard. This should have put the company, if nothing else had, on notice."
"…this was not addressing the real and critical, daily problem of mixing pedestrians and vehicles in a congested yard. There were not any barriers or delineated traffic routes to enable safe circulation, which itself increased in risk following the introduction of the three Combi-lifts in January 2015."
With that observation of the judge we agree.
In arriving at a fine of £1.1 million, the judge took into account the aggravating and mitigating factors identified within his sentencing remarks. He carefully assessed the financial position of the appellant disclosed within its accounts, including its pension scheme liabilities. We do not find that the judge fell into error.
A starting point for harm category 1, with high culpability, for a medium-sized organisation under the Guideline was £950,000. When taking into account the number of workers who were at risk on a daily basis within the yard and that the offence was a significant cause of actual harm just short of death, the judge then correctly increased significantly the fine to £1.4 million before reducing it by £300,000 (sic) to take into account mitigating factors.
It should also be borne in mind that the appellant had spent £1.7 million over a two-year period developing its site so as to increase the size, erecting further warehousing and racking and adding electrical fixed installations. All of this was undertaken or almost complete before the appellant had properly turned its attention to the serious and obvious risk which comprised the offence. This demonstrated, firstly, that the appellant had failed to prioritise the health and safety of pedestrians within the yard above development of the site, and secondly, it revealed the financial resources of the appellant. This was particularly significant in relation to step 3 of the Guideline, ensuring that the proposed fine based on turnover is proportionate to the overall means of the offender. The fact that the fine imposed exceeded the pre-tax profit of the company is plainly something to be taken into account by the court when sentencing for step 3 of the Guideline. We do not find that exceeding the annual pre-tax profit of the company should only occur in the most serious cases; the Guideline makes no such prescription. It requires a careful judgment after following the Guideline.
We are not persuaded in this case that the fine was disproportionate. In addition, permitting the applicant four years to pay the fine of £730,000 required payments of £182,500 a year. This was well within the means of the appellant.
In conclusion, we are satisfied that the fine imposed on the appellant was neither manifestly excessive, nor wrong in principle, and accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.
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