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England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges) |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges) >> A (A Child : Adoption Order) [2015] EWFC 63 (26 January 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2015/63.html Cite as: [2015] EWFC 63 |
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Neutral Citation Number : [2015] EWFC 63
Case No.MB116/14
26/01/2015
IN THE FAMILY COURT AT MIDDLESBROUGH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002
IN THE MATTER OF A (A Child)
PROSPECTIVE ADOPTERS
Applicants
And
Wendy
1 ST Respondent
And
JD
2 ND Respondent
And
AC
3 RD Respondent
And
NYCC
4 TH Respondent
NOTE : This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.'
JUDGMENT OF Her Honour Judge Matthews QC
1. I am concerned with the welfare of A dob. 22.5.13 [“A” hereafter, who is now 21 months of age. An application has been made [dated 3.11.14] to this court for an Adoption Order in respect of A by the couple who have cared for her since 13.6.13. I shall refer to them only as the Prospective Adopters in this judgment.
2. A’s birth mother is Wendy who is 28 years and her birth Father is JD who is 44 years old. A is a product of a partial surrogacy arrangement which resulted in difficulties and consequent protracted legal proceedings before this court. Father, supported by his partner, AC who was the commissioning Mother in respect of the partial surrogacy, now seeks the permission of the court to oppose the adoption application under s.47(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. I have made AC a party to this application as, although she is not biologically related to A , she was the “commissioning” mother under the surrogacy arrangement and cared for A for the first 13 months of her life. It was obviously appropriate in my judgment that she has an opportunity to take part in the hearing alongside Father.
3. My previous judgment in this matter dated 13.6.14 is set out in the bundle for this hearing [B4-36] and should be read together with this judgment in order to make any attempt to comprehend the complexity of this child’s brief life hitherto and the process which has surrounded her. I do not propose to rehearse the detail of the factual substratum which led to that judgment again here.
4. On 13.6.14 I made Care and Placement Orders in respect of A to North Yorkshire County Council [“NYCC”] authorising them to place A with the Prospective Adopters. The Care Plan placed before the court by NYCC was to remove A from the care of JD and his partner AC and to place her in a fostering to adopt placement immediately. This was achieved on the same day and I was very pleased to read in the Rule 14.11 (3) report [18.12.14] that A has thrived in their care and has not suffered significantly as a result of the transition from one set of carers to another.
5. A’s Guardian was previously, JS who was a specialist in dealing with Parental Order applications, which was the first application to come before the court in this matter. JS, sadly could not take up the renewed appointment on this occasion and I therefore appointed a very experienced local guardian, MS [referred to as Childs Guardian “CG” in this judgment]. I am very grateful for her assistance in this matter which she provided in such a short timescale. I considered it to be imperative that this matter was resolved within an appropriate time frame for the benefit of all of the interested parties. Her report dated 20.2.15 and her live evidence to the court have been invaluable in reaching a decision in this matter.
6. JD and AC have represented themselves before the court as they could not secure public funding. Wendy has also appeared on her own behalf by the link from Newcastle Combined Court Centre. NYCC and the CG were represented by Counsel. On 23.2.15 I heard evidence on oath from the Social Worker, Father, his partner AC and the CG.
7. In the light of the way matters proceeded during the first set of legal proceedings when the parties were represented, I considered it particularly important to hear evidence on oath rather than simply hear submissions from the parties. The importance of the court hearing a truthful account is never more important than when making such momentous and final decisions in the life of a child.
8. On 23.2.15, I refused permission to the Natural Father [and indeed Natural Mother] to oppose the adoption application and indicated that a written ruling would be provided from which time the 21 day time period [now running from 26.2.15 as a result of the late dissemination of this written judgment due to technological reasons] for the purposes of any appeal would commence. I apologise to the parties for that delay.
The Positions of the Parties before the Court
9. Wendy has revised her initial position in response to the adoption application which was to ask the court to make a direct contact order in her favour. Her revised position was to seek Indirect Contact only, on two occasions per annum to include photographs. She did not ask for A to be placed in her care nor did she actually seek permission to oppose the adoption. However, by asking for contact other than that proposed in the Care Plan it could be considered that she was asking to be heard by the court at a subsequent adoption hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mother effectively accepted the revised level of indirect contact recommended by the LA, which I will refer to later in this judgment.
10. JD and his partner seek the return of A to their care immediately and say that they would be prepared to work with the authorities under a Supervision Order if necessary. They do not accept the findings of the court in respect of Threshold nor in respect of the need for A to be removed and placed in alternative care. They do not accept that it was necessary to initiate care proceedings at all. In the alternative, if A is not returned to their care the couple seek direct contact with A. Initially, they were requesting a level of 3 times per week but have now revised that down to 2-3 times per annum .
11. The Local Authority, who are the Adoption Agency in this instance, consider that there has been no change in the position of the Natural Father and his partner and support the making of an Adoption Order to the Prospective Adopters. They submit that the placement has been extremely successful.
12. The new Children’s Guardian, having carried out her own independent evaluation of the circumstances, supports the continuation of the plan to secure A’s future by way of Adoption with the Prospective Adopters. She does not consider that Direct Contact would be in the best interests of A given the antipathetic stance of JD and AC toward the adoption and their inability to work openly and honestly with the LA. She has visited A in placement and has seen for herself the strong attachment which she has formed with the adopters.
Events post dating the Final Hearing on 13.6.14
13. A was placed with the prospective adopters that evening and has made remarkable progress since that time. She is well embedded in their family and they are meeting all of her physical and emotional needs. A settling in letter has been prepared to be handed over to the natural parents. I am satisfied as is the independent CG that this is indeed an excellent placement and that the prospective adopters have claimed A and are prepared to devote their life to her care both during her minority and into adulthood.
14. The removal of A was obviously traumatic for JD and AC and indeed for AC’s children, R and D. The evidence of the CG would support a view that they have failed to move on from this and their lives have been geared to fighting the decision since that time. They say in their statements to the court that there will always be a room for A in their home which gives the impression of some sort of shrine. JD and AC wanted R and D who are children with learning difficulties to be present at the removal of A by the social workers.
15. They said during this hearing that this was to provide some “closure” for them. I indicated that this was not an appropriate step and that those children should not be present at such a highly charged emotional event. In my judgment subsequent carefully planned contact visits were more appropriate for effecting some sort of closure for R and D. Unfortunately, JD and AC still do not understand that this was completely inappropriate. This is only one example of their complete inability to appropriately consider the emotional needs of R and D.
16. They have, in my judgment compounded the emotional damage which they have inflicted upon these children through the surrogacy venture by continuing to involve them in discussions about A possibly returning home to them and allowing them to select wallpaper for her bedroom in the new family home. AC told the court that R was nearly 17 years and therefore she was almost an adult and therefore that this was appropriate.
17. However, this simplistic analysis ignores the fact that R’s chronological age is not in keeping with her emotional and intellectual maturity. This is a continuation of a theme from the previous proceedings in which the emotional needs of the children were ignored in the pursuit of the surrogacy. The children were lied to and misled by JD and AC, in addition to numerous professionals. The couple dismiss the significance of this in their evidence on the basis that it was what they thought best at the time. They appear to have learnt little from the previous legal proceedings.
18. It is noticeable that it was the CG who suggested that R and D not be part of discussions about A during her visit to the family home, not their carers. Yet, the couple declined this suggestion and subsequently R left the room in some considerable distress. It seems clear to me that the emotional intelligence and sensitivity of JD and AC has not improved in the period since the conclusion of the care and placement proceedings.
19. On 8.7.14 JD and AC sought to appeal against my judgment and the Orders of 13.6.14. Their application for permission to Appeal and for an extension of time was dismissed by Lord Justice Ryder as “totally without merit” on 29.8.14. It appears that JD has attempted to renew his application for permission to appeal, presumably by seeking an oral hearing. He has subsequent to 29.8.14 filed a further appeal notice on 23.9.14 and he has ticked the box “previous appeal decision” at F12. He says at F15 that they are asking that the Care and Placement Orders be revoked and that A be placed back in their care, if necessary under a Supervision Order. He says “we apply for an order that stops the adoption process going ahead” and “ we apply for an order that we can have more contact”.
20. My understanding is that there is no outstanding appeal before the Court of Appeal in respect of this child. I have caused the court staff to check this and I invite the LA to check this again as it is my intention to make an adoption order in respect of this child in 21 days time should no further appeal be extant at that time either against the Care and Placement Orders or against the order refusing permission to oppose the adoption application.
21. Wendy’s application for permission to appeal and an extension of time to appeal against my decision, whereby she was seeking to have Indirect Contact once per month [F126] was refused by Lady Justice King on 20.1.15. This suggestion of once per month indirect contact was not one of the many positions adopted by natural mother during the varied course of the previous hearing.
22. Natural Mother’s life has continued to be eventful in that she has recently separated from her partner, N.C , the father of her daughter C. She already has a new partner who she wanted to sit in during the hearing on Monday. This was refused due to the highly confidential nature of the proceedings and the objections of the other parties. Mother appears to have run away from Kilmarnock and now resides somewhere in Newcastle.
23. Great efforts were made to set up a link for her from Kilmarnock for yesterday’s hearing. It was then discovered that she was in Newcastle. After considerable delay and effort a link was established to Newcastle to enable Mother to take part in the hearing. I do not accept that she had made a request of the court staff prior to yesterday to facilitate a link from Newcastle. In fact, as I write this judgment [on 24.2.15] an email has just arrived at the court requesting the same. This is sadly, simply a continuation of the themes all too prevalent in the care proceedings.
The Law
24. The application by the Father is for permission to oppose the adoption application is under s.47(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. The Court cannot give leave unless it is satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances since the making of the placement order (s.47(7) ACA 2002). The test to be applied by the court to such an application is a two stage test:
a. Has there been a change in circumstances?
b. If so, should leave to apply be granted?
25. The test is therefore similar to that in respect of an application for permission to apply to revoke a placement order in respect of a change in circumstances. However, the significant difference between the applications relates to the second limb – if a sufficient change is established, whether permission to apply should be granted. In respect of a permission to oppose an adoption, the child’s welfare is paramount at the second stage.
26. Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146
At paragraph 74, the President of the Family Division said that at the second stage, the court will consider all the circumstances including two interrelated questions: first, the parent’s ultimate prospect of success if given leave to oppose; second, the impact on the child if the parent is/is not given leave to oppose (remembering that the child’s welfare is paramount at this stage).
26. There were 10 factors which the President identified as being relevant to the weighing of these considerations:
(i) the prospects of success relate to the prospects of resisting the adoption, not ultimately having the child returned to them;
(ii) the 2 questions of whether there has been change and whether the parent has solid grounds, are separate but are almost invariably intertwined;
(iii) once a change in circumstances is established and the parent has established solid grounds for seeking leave, the judge must very carefully consider whether the child’s welfare necessitates the refusal of leave, remembering that adoption is the “last resort” and only permissible if “nothing else will do”;
(iv) the judicial evaluation of the child’s welfare must take account of all of the negatives and positives of each of the options – giving or refusing leave to oppose; a balance sheet is encouraged;
(v) the close focus on circumstances requires proper evidence, but not necessarily oral evidence and therefore such applications are typically dealt with as here on submissions;
(vi) Generally, the greater the change (positive) in circumstances and the more solid a parent’s grounds for seeking leave to oppose, the more cogent and compelling the arguments based on the child’s welfare must be if leave to oppose is to be refused;
(vii) The mere fact of placement with the prospective adopters is not determinative, nor is the passage of time but the longer the child has been placed the greater the adverse impacts of disturbing the arrangements are likely to be;
(viii) The welfare of the child throughout his life is paramount, so short term consequences if leave were given should not be given undue weight;
(ix) Any adverse impact on the adopters and thereby on the child, of granting leave should also not be given undue weight, although it should be taken into account;
(x) The test should not be set too high.
27. The key issue is whether the parent’s ultimate prospects have solidity. There have been a number of Post B-S decisions in respect of these applications. Re W (A Child); Re H (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1177 (Munby P). In evaluating what the child’s welfare demanded, the judge would bear in mind what had happened in the past, the current state of affairs and what would or might happen in the future. There would be cases where, despite the change of circumstances, the demands of the child’s welfare were such as to lead the judge to conclude that the parent’s prospects of success lacked solidity.
28. Whilst undue weight should not be given to short term consequences of giving leave even short term consequences would be relevant ( Re D (Leave to Oppose Making of an Adoption Order [2013] EWCA Civ 1480 (Black LJ). It is not correct to submit that the mere fact of Re B-S provides evidence of “change”. The Court of Appeal have been quite clear in Re R (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625 [Munby P and McFarlane LJ] , The President at para 44 that B-S was not intended to change and has not changed the law. It was primarily directed to practice: the need for proper evidence from the Local Authority and the Guardian addressing all of the realistic options with an analysis of the realistic placement options and an adequately reasoned judgment . Nothing in B-S places a gloss on or erodes the statutory requirements of s.1 CA 1989 and s.1 ACA 2002.
The Evidence heard by the Court
Conclusion
The Orders I make
26.1.15.