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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Leeds City Council v Hussain [2002] EWHC 1145 (Admin) (23 May 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2002/1145.html Cite as: [2002] EWHC 1145 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London WC2
		Thursday, 23rd May 2002

Thursday, 23rd May 2002

1. MR JUSTICE SILBER: This case raises issues relating to the circumstances in which a council can suspend private hire driver and vehicle licences and the factors which they have to take into account for doing so.
2. Leeds City Council ("the City Council") appeals by way of case stated from a decision of His Honour Judge McCallum sitting with justices made at the Leeds Crown Court on 22nd October 2001 in which they allowed an appeal by Mehfooz Hussain ("the respondent") against a decision of the Leeds Magistrates to uphold a decision of the City Council to suspend the respondent's private hire driver and vehicle licences. The reason for these suspensions was that on 2nd August 2001 the respondent had been charged with an offence of violent disorder arising out of an incident on 26th June 2001, which involved a number of private hire drivers and their vehicles.
3. The statutory provision under which the City Council and thereafter the Magistrates had suspended the respondent's hire and vehicle licences are set out in the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 ("the 1976 Act"), section 60 of which deals with suspension, revocation and vehicle licences. The relevant part of it states that:

"... a council may suspend ... a vehicle licence on any of the following grounds -

(a) that the ... private hire vehicle is unfit for use as a ... private hire vehicle;

(b) any offence under or non-compliance with the provisions of the Act of 1847 or this part of the Act by the operator or driver; or

(c) any other reasonable cause."

4. In this case, the City Council relies on the ground of "any other reasonable cause" to justify the suspension of the respondent's vehicle licence.
5. Section 61 of the 1976 Act deals with the suspension or revocation of drivers' licences, and the relevant part of subsection (1) provides that:

"... a council may suspend ... the licence of a driver of a ... private hire vehicle on any of the following grounds -

(a) that he has since the grant of the licence (i) been convicted of an offence involving dishonesty, indecency or violence; or (ii) been convicted of an offence under or has failed to comply with the provisions of the Act of 1847 or any part of this Act; or any other reasonable cause."

6. The City Council again relies on "any other reasonable cause" in that subsection to justify the suspension of the respondent's licence.

The findings of the Crown Court

7. The Crown Court found five facts, namely:

"(a) It would have been preferable to have awaited the outcome of the criminal proceedings against the Respondent before taking any action in relation to his private hire licences;

(b) The Appellant called no live evidence but relied solely upon a case summary prepared by the West Yorkshire Police, the author of which was not to be called;

(c) There was not sufficient information before us to say that there was a reasonable chance of the Respondent being convicted of the offence of violent disorder;

(d) If the appeal had not been allowed, the Respondent would have been deprived of his livelihood for some time, given that it would be many months before the criminal allegation reached trial;

(e) it was not clear whether the Respondent would be able to claim compensation if ultimately acquitted of the offence of violent disorder."

The issues

8. The questions raised by the Crown Court for the determination of this court are:

(a) Whether, in the case of a holder of private hire vehicle and driver's licences who has been charged with a serious criminal offences committed in the course of his employment, it is necessary for there to be a finding of guilty in relation to that criminal charge before a decision can properly be made as to whether there is 'any ... reasonable cause' to suspend his licences;

(b) Whether, in the case of a holder of private hire vehicle and driver's licences who has been charged with a serious criminal offence committed in the course of his employment, it is necessary to hear live witness evidence from witnesses to the offence with which he has been charged before a decision can properly be made as to whether there is 'any ... reasonable cause' to suspend his licences;

(c) Whether, in the case of a holder of private hire vehicle and driver's licences who has been charged with a serious criminal offence committed in the course of his employment, it is necessary to reach the conclusion that there is at least a reasonable chance of him being convicted of this offence before his licences can properly be suspended;

(d) Whether, in the case of a holder of private hire vehicle and driver's licences who has been charged with a serious criminal offence committed in the course of his employment, the impact of the suspension of those licences upon his livelihood and the absence of any compensation if he is ultimately acquitted of the criminal charge are circumstances which can properly be taken into account when deciding whether there is 'any ... reasonable cause' to suspend his licences."

9. At the hearing before me the City Council was represented by counsel but the respondent was neither present nor represented. At the conclusion of the hearing I announced that I would allow the appeal but would give my reasons later, which I now do.
10. The issues raised by the case stated can conveniently be considered under the following three broad heads, namely: first, whether there has to be a conviction or a reasonable prospect of a conviction of a licence holder before his licences can be suspended ("the need for conviction issue"); second, whether the finding of "any ... reasonable cause" to justify suspension can be reached without hearing live evidence from witnesses to the offence ("the hearsay evidence issue"); third, whether the impact of suspension of the licences on the livelihood of the licence holder and the absence of any compensation if he is ultimately acquitted of the criminal charge can be taken into account in determining whether there is "any ... reasonable cause" to suspend the licences ("the licenceholder personal circumstances issue").

The need for conviction issue

11. The Crown Court took the view that "the chances of a conviction were material when determining whether a reasonable cause to suspend the licences [could] be found", but it asked if it was necessary for there to be a finding of guilt before this ground for suspension of a licence could be made out. The wording of section 61 of the 1976 Act provides that a driver's licence can be suspended even when he has not been convicted in respect of serious offences. This is so because subsection 61(a)(1) of the 1976 Act permits the driver's licence to be suspended not only if the driver has been convicted of an offence involving dishonesty, indecency or violence or been convicted of any offence under the 1847 Act, but also for -- and these words are significant -- "any other reasonable cause". If there had to be a conviction of the driver before his licence could be suspended, the words "for any other reasonable cause" would be unnecessary and serve no useful purpose. I consider the use of these words indicates that something other than a criminal conviction would justify a suspension of a driver's licence.
12. To my mind, the phrase "any other reasonable cause" has been specifically selected to show the width of the discretion which is given to a council. Their task of making a decision is very much a jury question for them in which they are entitled to take account of all relevant circumstances.
13. The fact that these circumstances are very wide was emphasised by Lord Bingham LCJ in McCool v Rushcliffe Borough Council [1998] 3 All ER 889, when dealing with a refusal to grant an application for a licence to drive a private hire vehicle, at page 891F:

"One must, as it seems to me, approach this question bearing in mind the objectives of this licensing regime which is plainly intended, among other things, to ensure so far as possible that those licensed to drive private hire vehicles are suitable persons to do so, namely that they are safe drivers with good driving records and adequate experience, sober, mentally and physically fit, honest, and not persons who would take advantage of their employment to abuse or assault passengers."

14. This passage demonstrates that the relevant circumstances need not relate to the criminal conduct, and it would be permissible to suspend a licence of a driver if, for example, he or she is not mentally or physically fit. I do not think as a matter of principle that before a licence can properly be suspended there is any need for a conclusion to be reached by the magistrate that in the wording of question (c) and the issues raised in the case stated "there is at least a reasonable chance [of the respondent] being convicted of [a serious] offence."
15. Indeed, in R v Maidstone Crown Court ex parte Olson (Times 21st May 1992) it was held that a local authority was entitled, for the purpose of seeking to rebut his contention that he was a fit and proper person to hold a licence, to go behind the applicant's acquittal entered on the hearing of an appeal of a charge of indecently assaulting a passenger.
16. More recently, in McCool v Rushcliffe Borough Council, the Divisional Court upheld a decision of the Crown Court that the local authority was permitted to examine the facts which had led to a charge being made against the applicant driver of indecently assaulting a passenger for the purpose of seeking to rebut his contention that he was a fit and proper person to hold a licence even though the applicant had been acquitted of that charge. In other words, in both cases the local authority was permitted to suspend the driver's licences on grounds of criminal conduct even though the holders of the licence had been found not guilty of those relevant offences.
17. Up until now when considering this issue I have been considering suspension of a driver's licence under section 61 of the 1976 Act, but a vehicle licence can also be suspended for the same reason, namely "any other unreasonable cause" as specified in section 60 of the 1976 Act. I do not believe that those words would have a different meaning in section 60 from that which I have already set out in respect of the following section, namely section 61. So I conclude that a vehicle licence can be suspended even though the driver of it has not been convicted.

The hearsay evidence issue

18. The Crown Court in issue (v) raised the question of whether it is necessary in a case of the holder of a private hire vehicle and driver's licences who has been charged with serious criminal conduct committed in the course of his employment to hear witnesses to the offence for which he has been charged before a decision can properly be made as to whether there is any "reasonable cause" to suspend the licence. This raises the issue as to whether hearsay evidence is admissible.
19. In Westminster City Council v Zestfair [1989] 88 LGR 288, the Divisional Court had to deal with the issue of whether hearsay evidence was admissible in magistrates' courts' hearings of an appeal relating to an application to grant a licence to a night cafe. Pill J, giving the only reasoned judgment with which Neill LJ agreed, adopted a statement of Cusack J in Kavanagh v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall [1974] QB 624 (which was quoted at page 629 where it was expressly adopted in that case by Roskill LJ in the Court of Appeal) to the effect that if some of the matters before the court "are hearsay and are not supported by the evidence of witnesses in the Crown Court ... it will be for that [court] to consider carefully what weight is to be attached to the evidence which is put before it in that fashion".
20. It is noteworthy that section 51(1)(a) of the Act provides that:

"... a district council shall, on the receipt of an application from any person for the grant to that person of a licence to drive private hire vehicles, grant to that person a driver's licence: Provided that a district council shall not grant a licence - (a) unless they are satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a driver's licence..."

21. Subsection (1A), inserted by amendment, reads:

"For the purpose of satisfying themselves as to whether an applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a driver's licence, a council may send to the chief officer of police for that police area in which the council is situated - (a) a copy of that person's application, and (b) a request for the chief officer's observations; and the chief officer to respond to that request."

22. More recently in McCool v Rushcliffe Borough Council Lord Bingham said at page 893G:

"It is common ground that in reaching their decision the justices were entitled to rely on hearsay evidence. That is in my judgment clear from s 51(1)(a) and also from Kavanagh v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall ... It is also in my judgment plain from the judgment of Pill J in Westminster City Council v Zestfair ... I conclude that, in reaching their respective decisions, the borough council and the justices were entitled to rely on any evidential material which might reasonably and properly influence the making of a responsible judgment in good faith on the question in issue. Some evidence such as gossip, speculation and unsubstantiated innuendo would be rightly disregarded. Other evidence, even if hearsay, might by its source, nature and inherent probability carry a greater degree of credibility. All would depend on the particular facts and circumstances."

23. Thus, hearsay is admissible when considering the suspension of licences for "any reasonable cause".

The licence holder's personal circumstances issue

24. The Crown Court asks in question (d) whether the impact of a suspension of licences upon the likelihood of a driver, in the absence of any compensation if he is ultimately acquitted of the criminal offence, is a circumstance which can properly be taken into account in deciding whether there is "any reasonable cause" to suspend his licence.
25. There is indeed no authority on this point, but as Lord Bingham explained in the passage in McCool that I have already quoted, the purpose of the power of suspension is to protect users of licensed vehicles and those who are driven by them and members of the public. Its purpose, therefore, is to prevent licences being given to or used by those who are not suitable people taking into account their driving record, their driving experience, their sobriety, mental and physical fitness, honesty, and that they are people who would not take advantage of their employment to abuse or assault passengers. In other words, the council, when considering whether to suspend a licence or revoke it, is focusing on the impact of the licence holder's vehicle and character on members of the public and in particular, but not exclusively, on the potential users of those vehicles.
26. This does not require any consideration of the personal circumstances which are irrelevant, except perhaps in very rare cases to explain or excuse some conduct of the driver.

Conclusions

27. In answer to the four questions posed which are:

(a) Whether, in the case of a holder of private hire vehicle and driver's licence who has been charged with a serious criminal offence committed in the course of his employment, it is necessary for there to be a finding of guilt in relation to that criminal charge before a decision can properly be made as to whether there is "any ... reasonable cause" to suspend his licences;

(b) Whether, in the case of a holder of private hire vehicle and driver's licences who has been charged with a serious criminal offence committed in the course of his employment, it is necessary to hear live evidence from witnesses to the offence with which he has been charged before a decision can properly be made as to whether there is "any ... reasonable cause" to suspend his licences;

(c) Whether, in the case of a holder of private hire vehicle and driver's licences who has been charged with a serious criminal offence committed in the course of his employment, it is necessary to reach the conclusion that there is at least a reasonable chance of him being convicted of this offence before his licences can properly be suspended;

(d) Whether, in the case of a holder of private hire vehicle and driver's licences who has been charged with a serious criminal offence committed in the course of his employment, the impact of the suspension of those licences upon his livelihood and the absence of any compensation if he is ultimately acquitted of the criminal charge are circumstances which can properly be taken into account when deciding whether there is "any ... reasonable cause" to suspend his licences."

28. My response to each of them is in the negative. I therefore allow the appeal. As the City Council has already, on account of a recent development, revoked the suspension of the respondent's licence, Mr Storey does not ask for this matter to be remitted to the Crown Court and I do not so order.
29. The City Council did ask for their costs of this appeal to be paid by the respondent, but as he did not have notice of the application and as he was not present in court, I have ordered that he should pay to the City Council their costs of this appeal, such costs to be assessed if not agreed, but that this order shall not be drawn up until 14 days after he is notified of this order by the court, and that in the meantime the respondent has liberty to apply to me in writing or orally to vary or discharge this order within that period. If he takes advantage of this, I will give the City Council an opportunity to make representations. Since the end of argument I have received the City Council's detailed bill of costs, but my order did not provide for immediate assessment. In any event, I do not believe that the detailed bill was served on the respondent within the time required for summary assessments.