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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Gill, R (on the application of) v General Medical Council [2006] EWHC 2207 (Admin) (10 August 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2006/2207.html Cite as: [2006] EWHC 2207 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		10 August 2006

1. MR JUSTICE LANGSTAFF: This is an application for directions in an application which the Attorney -General proposes to make to the Divisional Court to have a Mr Gill declared a vexatious litigant under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
2. It appears from the papers before me that Mr Gill suffers from chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid type. It also appears from the report of a consultant psychiatrist who has had some care of the defendant, Dr Tirthankar Mukherjee, dated 8 August 2006, that he is currently not compliant with his medication and is difficult to engage. One example of that may be that he indicated yesterday, to the Attorney -General, that he proposed to be present in court for this hearing. Despite inquiries he has not attended, nor has any reason been given for his non -attendance. It may be that this is merely an indication of his unreliability.
3. The consultant psychiatrist recorded that Mr Gill was, on 13 April 2006, compulsorily detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act. He sufficiently recovered to become a voluntary patient on 5 July and was discharged from further treatment on 12 July. When he was discharged he was on a therapeutic regime of Rusperidal Consta, which is a long -acting injectable antipsychotic. He had become compliant with the medication during his admission.
4. The consultant psychiatrist was invited to give his opinion whether or not Mr Gill was a patient: if a patient, he might not be capable of managing this litigation; if so, the court would have to take protective steps to ensure that his views were properly represented before the court. In paragraph 16 of his report, the view of the consultant psychiatrist was that, on the balance of probability, he had the necessary capacity for managing and administering his property and affairs - that was specifically in the context of what he called the current situation and the matter of the legal proceedings. He thought that Mr Gill would be able to understand, absorb and retain information, advices and consider various options as necessary.
5. The burden of proof in showing someone is a patient rests upon those who suggest that he is. There are very obvious human rights reasons for this. Status as a patient means that others may interfere with the individual's autonomy. It is therefore not a step to be taken lightly.
6. However, it does seem to me that there must be significant uncertainty as to what, on the balance of probability, is the actual position. First, it is apparent from the psychiatrist's opinion that he, the psychiatrist, was due to see Mr Gill on 1 August and 8 August, but on each occasion he failed to attend. The suggestion is that whilst compliant with his medication, he was suitable for discharge from further in -patient treatment. Yet the psychiatrist suggests that when out of hospital he is not compliant with his medication and is "difficult to engage".
7. What the psychiatrist does not comment on - probably because he did not see it - is a document which the defendant himself produced only a matter of days after his release from in -patient treatment - that is an application dated 17 July 2006. It claims against the Royal Mail, the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Justice and Commonwealth and the Boundary Commission for damages, injunction, injunctive breach of contract and various other relief, including a requirement that the court order that the defendant "recede sovereignty over Connaught". It begins, dealing with the evidence in support of his application, by stating his national insurance number, and then proceeds:

"ie annexation of the North. CICA bought 25 Smart Street postcode M 12 4 NX to support anschluss between Britain and Ireland or to do a frontal lobotomy. S31 SCA 1981 conflicts Article 6 ECHR. My cousin James O'Connor served as a pilot in the Irish Air Force at Baldonnell. In 1972 in Northern Ireland was Bloody Sunday! The British Army justified the massacre stated that Catholic demonstrators were guilty of stealing electricity ..."

It continues in a similar vein.

8. The judge, for reasons that will be obvious, dismissed the application as having absolutely no legal merit. But it may indicate such a confusion of thought as to render it quite possible that when Mr Gill comes before the Divisional Court for the hearing of the present application the court may take the view that he is unable properly to represent himself.
9. Accordingly - though as the evidence stands at the moment there is insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof showing that he is a patient and I am not invited to by Mr Keller to make that determination - it appears to me, and I think to Mr Keller also, that there must be a significant risk that if he were to come to the Divisional Court in the state perhaps indicated by the wording of his application, it would be obvious that he was a patient. If that were to happen - and I emphasise it is only a risk but it is, in my view, a serious one - it would risk the costs of attendance by the Attorney -General, the resources of the court being utilised ineffectively, and there would be a delay in dealing with the substance of the application which is to have him declared a vexatious litigant. All this is undesirable. Accordingly, bearing in mind the overriding objective, it occurs to me - and again it seems to me from submissions that have been made that Mr Keller for the Attorney -General accepts the force of it - that steps should be taken if possible to avoid the risk that the hearing before the Divisional Court would be nugatory.
10. For those reasons I shall direct that the Official Solicitor attends by someone who has rights of audience before the Divisional Court to act as an amicus if required by the court, but otherwise potentially at short notice to accept the instructions of the Official Solicitor to act on behalf of Mr Gill, should it appear to the court that that is an appropriate step then to be taken.
11. The reason for setting this out in some detail is so that the Divisional Court can understand what is otherwise an unusual order. I should emphasise that there is no apparent authority which deals with the position where someone is perfectly capable of dealing with litigation when they take their medication but may not be when they do not. This is a topic which arises in the context of disability discrimination but has not, so far as anyone in this court is aware, been canvassed in the context of order 21.
12. Otherwise I direct that the Attorney -General's skeleton argument be provided no later than close of business on 22 September 2006, the hearing be expedited with a view to it taking place as early as may be next term. Those are all the directions I think I need to make.
13. MR KELLER: My Lord, there is, first of all, the further matter of permission to take all further steps and proceedings; and the other matter which occurred to me is regards the attendance of the Official Solicitor. It may be advisable to have two people to attend: one, somebody to give instructions on behalf of the Official Solicitor if necessary, and second an advocate. It seems to me if there was just an advocate there he would not be in a position, as it were, to simply take instructions over the phone; there would need to be someone there to see what was happening and to give the instructions.
14. MR JUSTICE LANGSTAFF: I am grateful for that. I shall direct there be a transcript of these remarks to go with the case papers. That will include the observations you have just made to me, which I endorse, and I do of course make the order that all further steps necessary in the proceedings be capable of being taken by the Attorney -General without further reference to the court. If the attendance of the Official Solicitor should prove problematic, then the Attorney -General has liberty to apply on 48 -hours' notice for further directions. Costs will be reserved.