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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Atwood v The Health Service Commissioner [2008] EWHC 2315 (Admin) (06 October 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/2315.html Cite as: [2009] ACD 6, [2008] EWHC 2315 (Admin), [2009] 1 All ER 415, [2009] PTSR 1330 |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
STEPHEN ATWOOD |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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THE HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSIONER |
Defendant |
____________________
James Maurici (instructed by Beachcroft LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 15 September 2008
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
The Honourable Mr Justice Burnett:
The Complaint
"1. The account of the complaint provided by Mr Horrocks and Miss Ambrose was that after undergoing tests on 4 June 2001 at Hope Hospital, Salford (which is managed by the Trust), Miss Ambrose's father, Mr John Ambrose, who was then 68 years old, was found to have a large polypoid tumour at the lower end of his oesophagus, which was obstructing his swallowing. After pre-operative chemotherapy, on 15 October Mr Ambrose underwent a cardio-oesophagectomy (removal of the lower half of the oesophagus and stomach). On 7 November, he was discharged from Hope Hospital with a jejunostomy tube (a tube placed in the small bowel for feeding and drainage purposes, which was removed two weeks after his discharge.) He was started on a large dose of steroids, 12mg of Dexamethasone daily, but his GP was not informed of this. He subsequently lost 20kg in weight, and on 15 January 2002, a CT (computerised tomography) scan…was ordered, because it was suspected that cancer might have spread to other parts of his body. However, the CT scan was never performed.
2. On 20 January 2002, Mr Ambrose was taken by emergency ambulance to the Accident and Emergency Department at North Manchester General Hospital which was managed by a separate Trust. He was in an apparently dehydrated state and was having difficulty breathing. He was triaged…and was placed in the blue category, which was the lowest priority category. About an hour after the triage process had been completed, Mr Horrocks and Miss Ambrose left the A&E Department with Mr Ambrose, without his being seen by a doctor. They then took him to a medical drop-in centre in Bury, where a doctor advised them to take him home because he was very ill and also told them that it would probably be only weeks before he died. On arrival back at home, Mr Ambrose collapsed and, although Miss Ambrose carried out mouth-mouth resuscitation, he died shortly afterwards. Mr Horrocks and Miss Ambrose maintain that Hope Hospital had not given them sufficient information about Mr Ambrose's condition, his treatment and his prognosis. They were therefore not prepared for his death."
The Disputed Findings
"Turning to Mr Ambrose's management following his discharge, it is clear to me that his condition was neither properly monitored nor effectively followed up."
The second is found in paragraph 116 of the report:
"[N]either Mr Ambrose nor his family were given adequate information about his condition between 15 October 2001 and his death on 20 January 2002."
The First Finding
"102. Turning to Mr Ambrose's management following his discharge, it is clear to me that his condition was neither properly monitored nor effectively followed up. The Assessors have said that there is no rationale in the records for the timing of the removal of Mr Ambrose's feeding tube. In paragraphs xxxiii to xxxvii. of their report (Annex A), the first and second Assessors have summarised the contradictory accounts of the Consultant Surgeon and the Specialist Nurse of the removal of Mr Ambrose's feeding tube and the Trust's general policy on the removal of feeding tubes. They conclude that there was some confusion as to when feeding tubes would be removed and that there was no evidence of guidance or policy for staff on when it was appropriate to remove feeding tubes. In their opinion, such guidance or policy could have been written down and kept on the surgical ward, given to the dieticians and also retained by the Specialist Nurse; this would have cleared up the confusions that arose over the removal of Mr Ambrose's feeding tube. The MPS' solicitors have sent me letters from upper GI specialists on the standards for the timing of removal of feeding tubes and the general rules for management of feeding tubes that applied at the time Mr Ambrose was being treated (paragraph 21). However, the fist and second Assessors advise me that these rules apply when the patient is making normal post-operative progress, when, in Mr Ambrose's case, the opposite was true. I accept that advice.
103. In the light of the extent of Mr Ambrose's weight loss by the time of his first outpatient appointment on 11 December, more should have been done to investigate the cause of that weight loss and to provide intensive nutritional support. While the prescribing of Dexamethasone in order to stimulate Mr Ambrose's appetite was not in itself inappropriate, an earlier appointment should have been made to monitor effects correctly, two weeks after he commenced the drug in view of the rate of his weight loss, or as close as possible to that date in view of the Christmas holidays. Indeed the Gastrointestinal Professor (paragraph 21) is not clear why the short course of high dose steroids given to Mr Ambrose to stimulate his appetite decision was extended. In addition, more should have been done to ensure that prompt action was taken on the referral to the dietician. Since my interview with her, the Specialist Nurse has informed me that she and a gastro-dietician are in the process of developing a simple flow diagram to act as a prompt for dietetic referral, which is to be displayed in the outpatient clinics to ensure that correct referral takes place. I welcome this development.
104. Given the statistics quoted by the Consultant Surgeon in his evidence, he should have been aware of the possibility of recurrent or metastatic disease as a cause of Mr Ambrose's weight loss, and his evidence suggests that he was. He said at interview that the extent of the weight loss indicated progressive disease and that no action other than the prescribing of Dexamethasone was taken in light of
these indications because 'there was no further clinical decision that could have been taken'. He also said that only 1-2% of oesophagectomy patients choose palliative chemotherapy in such a situation, although it is clear from his evidence that this treatment was not offered as a matter of course and was generally received only by those patients who insisted upon it. In relation to Mr Ambrose, the Consultant Surgeon said that 'palliative chemotherapy would just have made him feel sick', and on that basis he seems to have denied Mr Ambrose the option of further treatment. Neither palliative chemotherapy nor other palliative care was offered or even discussed with him.
105. I note that in their letter referred to in paragraph 21, the MPS' solicitors say that the Consultant Surgeon should be judged by the Bolam test of 'a reasonable body of medical opinion'. The Bolam test is one used by courts when considering actions. However, the purpose of the Ombudsman's investigation into this complaint is not to establish whether the Trust and/or the Consultant Surgeon were negligent but whether Mr Ambrose and his family suffered injustice or hardship as a consequence of any failure in the service that they received from the Trust. The standard of proof that applies in such a case is lower than for negligence.
106. There has been much debate about the conflicting opinions held by the Ombudsman's Assessors on the one hand and the oncologists and surgeons who support the Consultant Surgeon's approach on the other hand on the possible benefits of palliative chemotherapy in Mr Ambrose's case, so much so that it would be easy to miss the wood for the trees. In their report (Annex A), the first and second Assessors agree with the overall view of these oncologists and surgeons that it would be unusual to give chemotherapy to someone seven weeks after surgery to treat recurrent cancer, particularly if the patient's condition was very weak. However, as the first and second Assessors also say, the key issue is not so much that Mr Ambrose was or was not offered palliative chemotherapy, but rather how little effort was made to identify the cause of his serious weight loss and to provide adequate care for him, whatever the cause of his weight loss. Contrary to accepted practice, his rapid deterioration after his operation was not investigated at all. Potentially reversible causes for his deterioration were therefore not excluded, and the assumption that this was totally due to recurrent cancer was based on scanty evidence, or indeed no evidence at the time. In the opinion of the first and second Assessors, there was inadequate investigation of his post-operative weight loss, poor communication with him and the primary care team, and lack of supportive care for him. I accept their advice. In paragraph lxii of their report, the first and second Assessors have also explained why it is not appropriate for them to consider those questions raised by the Gastrointestinal Professor in the letter of 15 December 2005 from the MPS' solicitors (paragraph 22 of the main Ombudsman report) that the third Assessor has not dealt with in his report.
107. I do not underestimate the difficulty faced by clinicians when dealing with patients who are terminally ill. The Consultant Surgeon is convinced that his management of Mr Ambrose's condition after his discharge from hospital was entirely in accordance with UK practice. However, the Assessors have advised me that palliative chemotherapy could have extended his survival by some months, and that other palliative care could have improved the quality of his life. Furthermore, the third Assessor considers that the Consultant Surgeon's review of literature on the subject (paragraph 21) is irrelevant to this case, because the question of chemotherapy in Mr Ambrose's cases related only to second line palliative chemotherapy. More importantly, the Assessors say that full knowledge of his prognosis would have allowed him to make an informed choice and given himself and his family an opportunity to come to terms with his impending death.
108. The Consultant Surgeon also argues that his policy for managing weight loss takes into account the fact that all oesophagectomy patients lose weight for a period after surgery. However, the third Assessor in his report (Annex B) advises me that this argument takes no account either of the degree of the patient's weight loss or the length of time that the weight loss goes on, and that it makes no sense in terms of a management plan. The third Assessor also explains why it is necessary to identify the cause of a patient's weight loss and the steps that should be taken to do this.
109. The Assessors have said that one of the likely factors in the Trust's failure to monitor Mr Ambrose's condition effectively after his discharge was the absence of multi disciplinary meetings at the time, and the fact that the Specialist Nurse appears to have been unavailable at both of Mr Ambrose's outpatient appointments. It is also clear from the medical records that the medical oncology team at Wythenshawe Hospital passed Mr Ambrose's care to the surgical team at Hope Hospital following his consultation on 3 December 2001 because he had difficulty travelling to Wythenshawe. His management was therefore left entirely to the surgical team. I welcome the fact that the Trust has, since the time of these events, introduced a partial multi-disciplinary team in upper G1 cancer, which meets weekly at Hope Hospital. However, like the Assessors, I am concerned that the oncolocy specialism is still not represented on this team, which contrary to what the Trust says, is not in line with the Manual of Cancer Services (paragraph 14). I expect the Trust to rectify this omission as a matter of urgency, since the inclusion of both a Clinical Oncologist and a Medical Oncologist on the team are essential in the light of the Assessors' view that the absence of multi-disciplinary meetings was one of the likely factors in the failure to monitor Mr Ambrose's condition effectively after his discharge.
110. On the basis of the evidence I have seen, I accept the Assessors' view that Mr Ambrose's management as an inpatient was reasonable. However, I find that his management between the date of his discharge and his death fell below a reasonable standard, in that his deterioration and weight loss were not properly investigated and his condition was not effectively managed. I uphold the complaint on that basis. It is clear that the Trust has already made some improvements to its arrangements for the care of patients like Mr Ambrose. However, it is also clear that more could be done to address the shortcomings identified by this investigation, and I recommend that the Trust implements in full the recommendations included at paragraphs lxxi to lxxxi of the first and second Assessors' report at Annex A."
It can be seen from paragraph 105 that Mr Saville directly confronted the question of the application of the Bolam test and held that the standard of proof for an adverse finding by the Ombudsman when considering questions of clinical judgement or practice is a 'lower one'.
The Second Finding
"111. Again, Mr Ambrose's family has expressed concern over the adequacy of information provided to them, both during his time as an inpatient, and following his discharge. The Assessors' view is that Mr Ambrose himself was properly informed about his diagnosis and proposed treatment on a number of occasions prior to his surgery on 15 October 2001, and I accept their advice. However, it seems that the potential outcomes of that treatment were not discussed with him. There is no record of such discussion in the clinical records, and the Consultant Surgeon said at interview that Mr Ambrose was 'an elderly man for whom statistics would have been of no interest'. The MPS' solicitors say that it is hard to understand how, if Mr Ambrose was properly informed about his diagnosis and proposed treatment on a number of occasions prior to his surgery, he could not also have been made aware of the potential outcome of his disease and its proposed treatment (paragraph 20). In their report at Annex A, the first and second Assessors comment that it is inappropriate to rely on all the information given pre-operatively to a patient undergoing such an operation being sufficiently comprehensive to deal with all eventualities post-operatively and that the clinicians should have specifically addressed the rapid and marked deterioration in Mr Ambrose's condition. In any case, as it is apparently not specifically recorded in the contemporaneous medical notes that the Consultant Surgeon or any other member of his team advised Mr Ambrose of the outcome of his disease and its proposed treatment, it cannot necessarily be inferred that Mr Ambrose was given such advice. Communication in the circumstances of a terminal illness has to be a continuing process. It is not sufficient for clinicians to tell patients that there is a risk of death; patients have to be informed of their progress as events unfold.
112. The MPS' solicitors also argue (paragraph 20) that, because Miss Ambrose stated that her father did not speak much about his condition and that he had said that he was in the hands of God and was not afraid of dying, this demonstrates that Mr Ambrose and his wife were aware of the potential outcome of his illness. In answer to this, I would say that it does not necessarily follow from the fact that Mr Ambrose said that he was not afraid of dying that the Consultant Surgeon and/or his colleagues had in fact given him full advice about the potential outcome. Mr Ambrose clearly knew that he had had a serious operation and that the prognosis was probably not good, but that is not the same as being fully briefed on the potential outcome.
113. There is no record of Mr Ambrose being made aware of the fact that the chances of the disease recurring were, in the Consultant Surgeon's view, more than 50%. In addition, other than a general note of two discussions with the Macmillan Nurse (who would not have been aware of his prognosis), there is no evidence in the medical records of any discussion with Mr Ambrose or family members about his post-surgical progress or the options open to him. Indeed, in his report (paragraph 23), the Gastrointestinal Professor is critical in general of the written records in this case on the grounds that they were inadequate in terms of explaining what Mr Ambrose understood and consequently what his family might have understood from conversations with him. In particular, he criticised the clinical records for being deficient from the post-operative period onwards, particularly in terms of decisions made and information transmitted to Mr Ambrose and/or his family. In his opinion, poor written and verbal communication with Mr Ambrose and his family caused significant distress, for which the Trust and the clinical team should accept responsibility through system and individual failures.
114. The Consultant Surgeon has suggested that Mr Ambrose may have chosen not to share information about his condition with his family, and has hinted at the existence of family tensions. I can find absolutely no evidence to suggest that this is likely. Indeed, the evidence in the medical records clearly indicated that Mr Ambrose told Trust staff that he wanted details of his condition to be shared with his family, and that no family member was to be excluded from that process. The Consultant Surgeon seemed to be unaware of this. While the postponement of Mr Ambrose's surgery meant that Mr Horrocks and Miss Ambrose were away at the time of the operation, the family describe a number of attempts to contact the Consultant Surgeon and the Specialist Nurse. However, neither the Consultant Surgeon nor the Specialist Nurse says that they were made aware of those attempts.
115. At Mr Ambrose's outpatient attendance on 11 December 2001, concerns should have been raised about his deterioration. The evidence indicates that the Consultant Surgeon was aware of Mr Ambrose's condition from discussion with the SHO, and that the management plan was approved by him; however, there is no evidence that he saw Mr Ambrose or discussed his condition with him. The SHO, a junior member of the team, has said that she cannot remember what she said to Mr Ambrose, or whether anyone was with him. She believed that she should have told him she was worried about the weight loss, but could not remember discussing the possibility of ongoing disease with him. It was only when Mr Ambrose returned to the clinic on 15 January 2002, just five days before his death, that he and his family were told that urgent investigations were required to establish the reason for his severe deterioration. As the first and second Assessors say in their report, it was the Consultant Surgeon's responsibility, through his junior staff, to provide patients, community nurses, their GPs and other people caring for them with adequate information about patients' conditions, and his responsibility for this is not absolved by the large size of his clinics
116. I am pleased to hear from the MPS' solicitors that as a result of Mr Ambrose's case the Consultant Surgeon now takes a more proactive stance to family involvement (paragraph 20). I am also pleased that he will discuss the report with his present manager and reflect on how to improve on his practice in the areas identified (paragraph 21). Nevertheless, I find that neither Mr Ambrose nor his family were given adequate information about his condition between 15 October 2001 and his death on 20 January 2002. I uphold the complaint. I recommend that, in addition to the recommendations set out in the first and second Assessors' report, the Trust takes steps to ensure that all of those involved in patient care are aware of patients' wishes regarding the sharing of information with carers and families, and that all such discussions are properly documented. I also recommend that the Trust considers this report in its clinical governance discussions."
"117. Finally, with regard to both complaints, I must record serious concerns about the Consultant Surgeon in respect of both his clinical practice and his attitude to this complaint. It is clear from his own evidence that the Consultant Surgeon made a number of assumptions about Mr Ambrose and his family which guided his actions and led to some of the shortcomings identified in the course of this investigation. He has said that Mr Ambrose would not have been interested in statistics about prognosis, and on that basis did not share relevant information with him. He has also said that palliative chemotherapy would have made Mr Ambrose feel sick, and therefore he did not offer it to him – and, it seems, to other patients in his care with a similar prognosis. There is no evidence to suggest that Mr Ambrose, post surgery, was made aware of the potential seriousness of his condition, or of the options open to him in terms of further investigation and palliation. As a result, he was in my view denied information which would have allowed him to make informed choices about the time he had left, and to discuss those choices with his family had he so wished. Indeed it would appear that the reason that Mr Horrocks and Miss Ambrose brought Mr Ambrose to North Manchester Hospital's A & E Department on 20 January 2002 was that he and his family were not aware that he was close to death and that they would not have taken this action if the family had had adequate information about Mr Ambrose's condition. As the Assessors say, the family did not have adequate information primarily because Mr Ambrose himself did not have sufficient information.
118. The Consultant Surgeon also made unwarranted assumptions about Mr Ambrose's family, as expressed in his evidence, and suggested that Mr Ambrose had not wished them to know the details of his condition, when in fact there was clear evidence in his medical records to the contrary. Furthermore, as I have said in paragraph 107, full knowledge of his prognosis would have allowed him to make an informed choice and given himself and his family an opportunity to come to terms with his impending death.
119. I criticise the Consultant Surgeon for these shortcomings, and I am concerned that other patients of his in a similar position to Mr Ambrose should not be similarly affected in future. I had been minded to recommend that the Trust's Chief Executive should share this report with the Consultant Surgeon's current employer in order that his present manager might reflect with the Consultant Surgeon on ways in which he might improve his practice. This would have meant that the Trust's Chief Executive would send the report to the Chief Executive of his current employer. However, the Consultant Surgeon has said that he will discuss the report with his present manager and reflect on how to improve on his practice in the areas identified. I therefore recommend that the Consultant Surgeon should himself give a copy of this report to his present Trust's Clinical Director, and also his manager if the Clinical Director is not his direct line manager, so that the Clinical Director (and, if relevant, his manager as well) may reflect with him on ways in which he might improve his practice in future. Furthermore the Consultant Surgeon and/or his Clinical Director and/or his manager should confirm to me in writing that this has been done. I hold this to be particularly important in light of the fact that the Consultant Surgeon's current role gives him considerable scope for influencing the practice of other clinicians."
The Statutory Scheme
"General Remit of Commissioner
(1) On a complaint duly made to the Commissioner by or on behalf of a person that he has sustained injustice or hardship in consequence of-
(a) a failure in a service provided by a health service body,
(b) a failure of such a body to provide a service which it was a function of the body to provide, or
(c) maladministration connected with any other action taken by or on behalf of such a body,
the Commissioner may, subject to the provisions of this Act, investigate the alleged failure or other action.
(1ZA) Any failure or maladministration mentioned in subsection (1) may arise from action of--
(a) the health service body,
(b) a person employed by that body,
(c) a person acting on behalf of that body, or
(d) a person to whom that body has delegated any functions."
"action taken in connection with (a) the diagnosis of illness, or (b) the care or treatment of a patient, which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, was taken solely in consequence of the exercise of clinical judgment, whether formed by the person taking the action or any other person".
"Availability of other remedy
(1) The Commissioner shall not conduct an investigation in respect of action in relation to which the person aggrieved has or had-
(a) a right of appeal, reference or review to or before a tribunal constituted by or under any enactment or by virtue of Her Majesty's prerogative, or
(b) a remedy by way of proceedings in any court of law,
unless the Commissioner is satisfied that in the particular circumstances it is not reasonable to expect that person to resort or have resorted to it."
The Ombudsman's Approach
"42. Where the Statement of Complaint includes issues related to the exercise of clinical judgment the Ombudsman will expect his professional advisers to draw on their knowledge, experience and expertise. He will be asking them, as a general rule, to advise him on whether the actions complained of were based on a reasonable and responsible exercise of clinical judgment of a standard which the patient could be reasonably entitled to expect in the circumstances in question. Advisers will be able to take appropriate account of their assessment of the skills, knowledge and experience of the professional concerned and all the other particular circumstances of the case which they considered had a bearing on the decisions and actions in question.
…
44. Advisers would not be invited to say whether they personally would have decided or acted similarly or to give advice on whether the action taken was the best possible. The Ombudsman will however expect his advisers, in deciding what was reasonable and responsible in the circumstances, to have due regard to all the relevant professional guidance on standards and good practice which, in their view, a professional working in the capacity in question could be expected to take into account. Where appropriate he would expect his advisers also to consider whether, in the matters complained of, acceptable standards of delegation, accountability, supervision and support had been demonstrated.
45. In considering whether to uphold a complaint about a clinical decision or about an alleged failure in service the Ombudsman will take fully into account all the advice he receives and the evidence of his investigation. Without seeking in any way to encourage or promote a 'blame culture' it is the Ombudsman's responsibility to criticise where in his view the patient does not receive the service he is reasonably entitled to expect. It is not his responsibility to set standards. However it will be open to his advisers, where they see fit, to draw to the attention of the Ombudsman any aspect of the services provided where they consider improvements could with benefit be made or action taken to prevent any recurrence of a shortcoming. The Ombudsman may then reflect such views in his report as matters for consideration by the responsible provider, whether or not he has decided to uphold the complaint.
46. The Ombudsman will also expect his advisers, where it is an issue in the context of the matters complained about, to express a view about whether the hardship or injustice complained about was the result of actions taken in the exercise of clinical judgment. He recognises that where this is an issue advisers would be invited to give their own view as specialists in the relevant discipline.
47. The Ombudsman will expect his advisers to reach their conclusions on the balance of probabilities. Advisers will also be able to state that in their view it would be unsafe to reach any conclusions.
49. The Ombudsman recognises that it is a natural and proper concern of patients and those who may complain on their behalf to know whether anyone was at fault. His investigations will address that issue. However he also fully recognises that clinical decisions responsibly and properly considered can and will occasionally lead to unintended and harmful consequences for patients. This can happen even when in terms of the intended outcome the treatment was successful. In his investigations and conclusions he will be seeking to be fair to all concerned. He will expect his advisers to be equally committed to that objective."
Similar observations were made in a 'Guide to the Work of the Health Service Ombudsman' published in April 1996.
The Bolam Test
"if he acts in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion even though other doctors adopt a different practice. In short, the law imposes a duty of care: but the standard of care is a matter of medical judgment."
"The use of these adjectives – responsible, reasonable and respectable – all show that the court has to be satisfied that the exponents of the body of opinion relied upon can demonstrate that such an opinion has a logical base."
So if a court were to conclude that a practice, whilst widely adopted by a section of the profession in question, was unduly sloppy, the court would not regard itself as being bound by that practice.
Competing Submissions
(i) that the Ombudsman's approach as reflected in Mr Saville's report leads to uncertainty, because there is in play a more exacting but undefined standard of care;
(ii) that the Ombudsman's approach is unworkable because clinicians are being required to operate according to two parallel but different standards; and
(iii) that the Ombudsman's approach is unfair because a clinician's conduct is vulnerable to being stigmatised as 'unreasonable' in circumstances where it would not be considered to have fallen below the standard of reasonable care and skill for the purposes of the law of negligence.
Discussion
(a) Injustice;
(b) Hardship;
(c) Failure in a service;
(d) Failure to provide a service;
(e) Maladministration.
"The deceased took his own life, in part because the risk of his doing so was not recognised and the appropriate precautions were not taken to prevent him doing so."
This is an example of a failing which is expressed in terms unconnected with the question whether the failing was culpable. It is striking that the area in which this formulation was advanced by the House of Lords was one where the Bolam test would be applied to the medical staff if their conduct were investigated in a civil claim.
"it is not unreasonable to have expected a more individual standard of care for Mr Ambrose and closer monitoring of his nutritional status to determine, in his best interest, when his feeding tube should have been removed. In our view it would be inappropriate to measure this in such a broad way with reference to standards that apply across the country. We do not agree with the argument of [the Claimant's] solicitors …"
"lvii. In his report (paragraph 23 of the main Ombudsman's report), the Gastrointestinal Professor concludes that the clinical decision making was entirely reasonable on both occasions that Mr Ambrose attended the outpatient clinic. Nevertheless, even if one accepts the inevitable outcome of Mr Ambrose's condition, it is clear to us that the inexperience of the SHO at the first outpatient appointment and poor communication (both verbal and written) led to a situation developing that denied Mr Ambrose a dignified and comfortable end to his life. The absence of an effective and appropriate input from agencies to which Mr Ambrose was entitled cannot be viewed as satisfactory.
lix. With regard to the first head of complaint, we believe that the standard of care delivered to Mr Ambrose between 15 October and 7 November 2001 in terms of investigation and management was entirely appropriate. From the time of his discharge from hospital until the time of his death, we do not believe that his deteriorating condition and weight loss were adequately investigated or managed.
lxx. In his report (paragraph 23 of the main Ombudsman's report), the Gastrointestinal Professor says that he did not believe that there was any strong evidence indicating that any alternative course of action might have significantly prolonged Mr Ambrose's survival and/or general well being. However, this argument seems to flow from the assumption that Mr Ambrose was dying of recurrent cancer and there was nothing further that could usefully be done for him. In our opinion, the clinicians could have searched rather more thoroughly for an explanation for his rapid deterioration, they could have provided adequate psychological and emotional support for him and carers and they could have discussed the possibilities of recurrent cancer with him and his carers"
"After receiving comments from the MPS' solicitors (paragraphs 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the main Ombudsman report), the investigating officer asked me for further advice on (a) whether the clinicians who were treating Mr Ambrose adequately monitored his weight loss after his operation; (b) whether they should have investigated the cause of his weight loss; and (c) whether they should have offered him palliative chemotherapy or other palliative care."
The Individual Complaints
(i) Fact finding is a matter for the Ombudsman or her delegate.
(ii) The report must be read fairly and as a whole. The court should resist an invitation to over-analyse isolated parts of the report.
(iii) The standard of reasoning required in an Ombudsman's report is by analogy similar to that required of planning inspectors, as explained in cases such as South Bucks DC v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953, per Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood at [24] – [36] particularly by reference to Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1993) 71 P & CR 309. At paragraph [36] Lord Brown summarised the law in this way:
"36 The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the "principal important controversial issues", disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision. "
(iv) The context of the report included its detailed evolution, in which the Claimant was involved (to which I have referred).
(v) The report cross references to the views of the assessors and has clearly taken account of the evidence of Professor Alderson, as did they.
(vi) In various places within the Report the views of the assessors are adopted and made the views of the Ombudsman.
(vii) The detailed challenge is limited in nature and it should not be overlooked that much of the report is not the subject of challenge.
(viii) The Trust accepted all finding and recommendations including those which concerned the Claimant who was their employee.
Discussion
i) Mr Saville failed to take into account the views of the distinguished independent expert instructed on behalf of the Claimant, Professor Alderson;
ii) alternatively, he rejected Professor Alderson's views
a) without any other explanations or reasons for doing so and;
b) without any proper basis for doing so.
iii) he misunderstood the evidence;
iv) he arrived at conclusions which were manifestly unsound.