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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Tariq (aka Tariq Mehmood), R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWHC 1390 (Admin) (19 June 2009) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/1390.html Cite as: [2009] EWHC 1390 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge
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THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF SAAD TARIQ aka TARIQ MEHMOOD |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT |
Defendant |
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WordWave International Limited
A Merrill Communications Company
165 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2DY
Tel No: 020 7404 1400, Fax No: 020 7404 1424
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Sarabjit Singh (instructed by Treasury Solicitor) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 23 March 2009
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Stephen Morris QC :
Introduction
Factual Background
Relevant legal principles
Fresh claims and judicial review
"When a human rights or asylum claim has been refused and any appeal relating to that claim is no longer pending, the decision maker will consider any further submissions and, if rejected, will then determine whether they amount to a fresh claim. The submissions will amount to a fresh claim if they are significantly different from the material that has previously been considered. The submissions will only be significantly different if the content:
(i) had not already been considered; and
(ii) taken together with the previously considered material, created a realistic prospect of success, notwithstanding its rejection.
This paragraph does not apply to claims made overseas."
"339K. The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person's well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated"
The principles to be applied to Pakistan Ahmadi cases
(1) IA and Others in the AIT
"Contrary to what is said in KM (Pakistan) [2004] UKAIT 00302, MM (Pakistan) CG [2002] UKIAT 05714, KK (Pakistan) [2005] UKIAT 00033, MC (Pakistan) [2004] UKIAT 00139, and AZ (Pakistan) CG [2002] UKIAT 02642, Rabwah does not constitute a safe haven for any Ahmadi at risk of persecution elsewhere in Pakistan and should not, without more, be treated as an appropriate place of internal relocation."
"3. The existence of what has been described as an Ahmadi stronghold, as indeed it is when seen from the point of view of the demographic structure, has seemed on a number of occasions to the Tribunal to give a reason for supposing that an Ahmadi who in Pakistan needed to seek refuge, that is to say, an Ahmadi who had a well-founded fear of persecution in his home area, could be expected to obtain refuge in Rabwah rather than seeking the surrogate protection of the international community. Thus, it has become the practice, and it is the guidance that an Ahmadi needing to seek refuge should be regarded generally as able to find such refuge in Rabwah. Rabwah is, according to the existing guidance, a proper place of internal relocation, sufficient to defeat an asylum claim.
4. Ahmadis in Pakistan are subject to more than occasional outbursts of persecution from Sunnis particularly acting under the auspices of the body called the Khatme Nabuwwat (KN). That is a neo-fundamentalist organisation which has the aim of the extinction of Ahmadiyya: not, it must be emphasised, the extinction of Ahmadis, although its activities are sometimes violent. Its purpose is to bring an end to the religion by converting its followers to Sunni Islam. But it is the activities of that organisation, the KN, which form the basis of many claims of persecution by Ahmadis. The organisation has branches throughout Pakistan and in particular throughout Punjab province and, specifically, there is a strong branch in Rabwah because, although ninety-five per cent or more of the population are Ahmadis, there is a minority who are not Ahmadis and Rabwah is the place where Ahmadis can evidently be found if there should be anybody who seeks to take action against them.
5. The evidence is that, because of the proscription of Ahmadiyya, there is little opportunity for those who are prosecuted (under the auspices of the KN or otherwise) to make a proper defence or to invoke effectively the protection of the courts. There is evidence relating to cases almost indefinitely adjourned from month to month or from year to year. There is evidence also that those who might be available as witnesses are unwilling to come forward.
6. Thus the position has sometimes been, in Ahmadi cases, that a person has claimed to be a follower of the religion; has been therefore assumed for the reason that we have already indicated to be a person who will attempt to convert others; has been at risk from activities of the KN; even if his conduct was clearly not illegal he has been at risk of unmerited prosecution against which defence would be difficult; there has been the further risk of illegal or violent activity by the KN. He has been able in some cases to establish a well-founded fear therefore of persecution in his home area; but the guidance has been that he can safely and appropriately relocate to Rabwah.
…
18. From the evidence we derive the following facts about Rabwah, some of which we have already referred to. Rabwah is a relatively small town and has a defined area. It has a population of something under 50,000 of whom the vast majority are Ahmadis. There are between 2,000,000 and 5,000,000 Ahmadis in Pakistan in all probability. Thus, although Ahmadis are a majority in Rabwah, the Rabwah Ahmadis are a tiny minority of the Ahmadis in Pakistan. Ahmadis however have, for a reason which has not been explained to us but the fact is not disputed, a disinclination to engage in government. They are required to register in a separate electoral roll. That, we understand, is a feature which they do not share with other Pakistani religious minorities. Whether as a result of that or not, Ahmadis as a group do not register for elections: it is that which makes it so difficult to estimate their numbers, but it is also that which has the effect that although in Rabwah they are the vast majority of the inhabitants, they are not represented in government as one might expect. In fact the evidence shows that Ahmadis are not in government in Rabwah, as they are not in government anywhere else in Pakistan.
19. In Rabwah there is a strong branch of the KN; there are large KN rallies several times a year and other activities. Rabwah is known as an Ahmadi area and therefore may be the target of such activities. There is, however, as Mr Waite pointed out in his submissions, relatively little evidence of anti-Ahmadi trouble in Rabwah. That is the result, no doubt, of a number of factors. One may be, as Mr Waite suggested, that Rabwah is relatively safe and indeed "slightly safer or a little safer" was the evidence received by the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission. But of course the lack of activity against Ahmadis in Rabwah does not necessarily show that Rabwah is safe. It may only show that the amount of activity against Ahmadis is not very great anyway. The question for an individual is whether he is at risk, not whether everybody is at risk.
…
21. Nevertheless, Rabwah's status as an Ahmadi stronghold has given rise to the view expressed sometimes by the Secretary of State, particularly in letters of refusal, and sometimes by the Tribunal, whether in reliance on country guidance or otherwise, that a person at risk elsewhere and so in need of a place to which to relocate internally could reasonably be expected to go to Rabwah where he would obtain protection because of the Ahmadis there. We are satisfied that that is wrong. The situation for Ahmadis in Rabwah is capable of examination in a way that is perhaps not so easy elsewhere because of the numbers. To the extent also that there is a large Ahmadi population in Rabwah, there may be some safety in numbers and it may also be the case that a member of the KN, who is intent merely on pursuing the KN's agenda in a generalised fashion, is less likely to target any identified individual in Rabwah simply because there are so many Ahmadis there. That is a difference from a person who seeks to do the same thing in a small village where there are few Ahmadis, each of whom would therefore be at proportionately greater risk.
22. But although there is that safety in numbers, and there is a possibility of informal community support amongst Ahmadis, the advantages of Rabwah stop there, even for an Ahmadi who lives in Rabwah. Such a person cannot expect in Rabwah any more than anywhere else to obtain protection from the police (there are few or no Ahmadi policemen) or from other officials; because, despite being the majority population of Rabwah, Ahmadis are not represented in government. So there is no greater protection available for local Ahmadis in Rabwah than there is for Ahmadis anywhere else in Pakistan.
23. For those who move to Rabwah, from other parts of Pakistan, the prospects are, on the evidence we have seen, to be viewed with even less equanimity. Unless they have friends or relations in Rabwah they may not, according to the evidence, be able to obtain accommodation. There are regulations prohibiting the sale of land in one part of Rabwah to Ahmadis, although there is some evidence of Ahmadi building on vacant land in the other part of Rabwah and outside the town centre. Further, the very fact of having moved to Rabwah may attract attention to an individual's religious affiliation.
24. … Rabwah is not a ghetto on the evidence that we have heard. It is, however, a place like any other place in Pakistan. That is to say it is a place where the government is Sunni and it has the additional difficulty that, if it is seen as a centre to which Ahmadis are attracted, it is at the same time a small place in which they may have some difficulty in acquiring accommodation.
25. It therefore seems to us that despite Rabwah's special profile in the Ahmadi religion it has no special status in the refugee related discourse relating to Pakistani Ahmadis. It is simply wrong to say in general that a person who has established a history of persecution or a fear of persecution as an Ahmadi in some other part of Pakistan can reasonably be expected to relocate to Rabwah. It may be that he can go to Rabwah for a short time. It may be that for that short time he will be safe. But, save in exceptional circumstances, for example if he has family or relatives in Rabwah, despite the majority of inhabitants there, he may not in fact be reasonably practicably able to live there and, if he does, he will be no safer than anywhere else: because the governmental, official structure and seat of power is the same as elsewhere in Pakistan and the fundamentalist anti-Ahmadi religious group, the KN, is as active there as anywhere else, if not more so.
26. That is not to say that every Pakistani Ahmadi is at risk of persecution and is a refugee. As Mr Waite pointed out, the evidence of serious harm to Ahmadis in Rabwah is relatively sparse. The point is, however, that the evidence does not suggest to us that Rabwah is safer than anywhere else. Mr Waite pointed to the fact that there is some evidence that, at any rate for short periods, Ahmadis from elsewhere seek some protection in Rabwah amongst the Ahmadi community there. That is a perfectly fair point, but it does not demonstrate that Rabwah is safe for long-term residence. The incidence of actual harm to Ahmadis is, on the evidence, not high in Rabwah, and, on the evidence, is not high elsewhere in Pakistan. But that is not the point. The point is not whether every Ahmadi is at risk of persecution but whether some Ahmadis who are at risk of persecution can be expected to relocate to Rabwah.
27. The Tribunal will look in due course at the other issues relating to Ahmadis. In the meantime, however, we draw attention to one comment in particular in the evidence given by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan to the Parliamentary Human Rights Group and recorded at paragraph 4.1 of the latter document.
"… the HRCP stated that safety in Rabwah depends on the nature of the persecution and/or the influence of the persecutor. For example, if a neighbour wishes to take over an Ahmadi's business by capitalising on anti-Ahmadi sentiment, then the job of the persecutor is complete once the Ahmadi has left the local community. However, should the persecutor be a person of influence or means, they may use this to follow their target to Rabwah as well. … ."
There is therefore a difference between those who are targeted or pursued, in particular those in respect of whom there is some institutional pursuit on the one hand, and those who are merely the victims of local Sunnis who want to take advantage of restrictions on Ahmadis in order to secure some financial or other advantage for themselves.
28. It is wrong to assume that Rabwah, because of its majority Ahmadi population, is either accessible or safe for those who, on the evidence, need a place of safety. Each case will depend on its facts but in no wise can the existence of Rabwah be regarded generally as a reason for dismissing an appeal that would otherwise be allowed." (emphasis added)
(2) MJ and ZM
"1. The finding in IA and Others (Ahmadis: Rabwah) Pakistan CG [2007] UKAIT 00088 that the existence of a majority Ahmadi community in Rabwah does not justify dismissing an appeal which would otherwise be allowed remains valid. Rabwah is no safer than elsewhere in Pakistan for Ahmadis, but the question whether it is an appropriate internal relocation option for an Ahmadi will always depend on the particular circumstances and facts of that individual's situation.
2. In Pakistan as a whole, whilst it is clear that from time to time local pressure is exerted to restrict the building of new Ahmadi mosques, schools and cemeteries, and that a very small number of Ahmadis are arrested and charged with blasphemy or behaviour offensive to Muslims, the number of problems recorded is small and has declined since the Musharraf Government took power. Set against the number of Ahmadis in Pakistan as a whole, they are very low indeed. The courts do grant bail and all appeals against blasphemy convictions in recent years have succeeded.
3. There is very sparse evidence indeed of harm to Ahmadis from non-state agents (though rather more anecdotal evidence of difficulties for Christians). The general risk today on return to Pakistan for Ahmadis who propagate the Ahmadi faith falls well below the level necessary to show a real risk of persecution, serious harm or ill-treatment and thus to engage any form of international protection.
4. Where, exceptionally, the facts of a particular appellant's case indicate that such an appellant cannot be returned safely to their home area, the existence of an internal relocation option, either to Rabwah or elsewhere in Pakistan, is a question of fact in each such appeal."
"82. The Iftikhar Ahmed decision was published just a few weeks after General Musharraf came to power in Pakistan. The evidence before us, nine years later, indicated that the propagation question would more properly be approached on a case-by-case basis with the risk dependent on the lengths to which an individual Ahmadi carried his da'wa observance. We remind ourselves of the Tribunal's finding in IA and others:
… [the AIT then set out parts of §§26 to 28 of IA and continued …]
83. On the evidence before us, that analysis remains good. Whilst it is clear that local pressure is exerted to restrict the building of new Ahmadi mosques, schools and cemeteries from time to time, and some Ahmadis are arrested and charged with blasphemy or behaviour which is offensive to Muslims, the numbers recorded are small and have declined since the Musharraf Government took power. Set against the number of Ahmadis in Pakistan as a whole, they are very low indeed.
84. There is very sparse evidence indeed of harm to Ahmadis (though rather more anecdotal evidence of difficulties for Christians). We note the great care exercised by the preaching teams who operate out of private homes, by invitation only and after careful vetting of those to whom they propagate the Ahmadi faith. We remind ourselves of the number of small Ahmadi mosques with established officers and security guards in the towns about which we heard evidence, large and small. We remind ourselves that the first appellant was able to hand out leaflets on his stall openly without harm for many years. We note that the courts do grant bail and that all appeals against blasphemy convictions have succeeded in recent years. We consider that the risk today on return to Pakistan for Ahmadis who propagate the Ahmadi faith falls well below the level necessary to show a real risk of persecution, serious harm or ill-treatment and thus to engage any form of international protection.
85. It may be, as the Tribunal said in IA and others, that in some individual cases the level of risk can be shown to be sufficiently enhanced on the particular facts to indicate that that individual cannot be returned safely to their home area. Whether or not there is an internal relocation option, either to Rabwah or elsewhere in Pakistan, will then be a question of fact in relation to that individual. Rabwah is no safer than elsewhere in Pakistan for Ahmadis, but the question whether it is an appropriate internal relocation option for an individual Ahmadi will always depend on the particular circumstances and facts of that individual's situation."
"89. Four years later in October 2004, and despite the threats that he then received, the first appellant reopened his shops before leaving Pakistan so that his wife was able to let them and use the rent for her support while living in Rabwah. We take the view that had the mullahs been serious in seeking his death as an apostate they would not have allowed him to leave Sargodha alive or to re-open his shops so that his wife could let them. On the first appellant's own account he did not actually experience any difficulties in Rabwah. He was hardly there long enough; a few days at most. We have no reason to think that if he had stayed longer, there would have been any greater risk, especially in view of the safety in Rabwah of the first appellant's wife and children thereafter.
…
91. We are not satisfied that the first appellant was ever at risk on account of his proselytising activities, which were carried on privately in the sense in which we have explained above. We conclude that the objective of the Khatme Nabuwwat mullahs in Sargodha was limited to stopping the open advertisement of the Ahmadi religion in the first appellant's shop, in which they were successful. The fact that they did not pursue the first appellant and his wife to Rabwah in our view is an indication of their limited and localised adverse interest.
92. We cannot exclude the possibility that if the first appellant were to reappear in Sargodha, re-establish his business and continue to advertise the Ahmadi religion he might again attract the adverse interest of the local Khatme Nabuwwat mullahs who know him. The evidence before us is not sufficient, however, to establish even to the appropriate lower standard of proof that if the first appellant were to relocate to another part of Pakistan, such as Rabwah or Karachi, he would be at any greater risk than any other devout Ahmadi who was inclined to proselytise. We are not satisfied that the Sargodha Khatme Nabuwwat mullahs would become aware that the first appellant had returned or that even if they did they would have any greater adverse interest in him than they appear to have in other Ahmadi officeholders in Sargodha.
93. We do not, therefore, consider that it would be unsafe or unduly harsh to expect the first appellant to exercise his internal relocation option within Pakistan if he considers that he remains at risk of harassment or difficulties in Sargodha." (emphasis added)
"94. The second appellant's account is credible; there is no issue about that. However, it is not an account of national pursuit by the Khatme Nabuwwat; the difficulties he had in Karimabad and Khewra were wholly unconnected with those which he had in Karachi and also with each other. He was not sought out in either place on account of events which had occurred in Karachi.
….
96. The difficulties in Karachi, Karimabad and Khewra were distinct and fortuitous, with no relation with each other; that is not evidence to any standard that the second appellant risks further adverse interest shown in him if he returns to Pakistan for any of those reasons.
97. The appellant accompanied the Ahmadi mosque President and a preaching team on a trip to Sindh without coming to any harm. He position in cross-examination was that his propagation of the Ahmadi faith was discreet and privately carried out. He would always do it indoors and always to an invited individual or audience, not to people at large. In these circumstances, if the second appellant were unable to return to live in Karachi, we consider that he could relocate to an area of Pakistan where he was not known. In so doing, he would be at no greater risk than any other devout Ahmadi who was inclined to propagate the Ahmadi faith.
98. The second appellant's dramatic claim that he could return to Pakistan only if his hands were tied and his eyes and ears covered is an exaggeration. Of course there remains a risk that the second appellant's propagation activities might come to the attention of Khatme Nabuwwat mullahs but the risk of this happening is so small, given the manner in which the proselytising would be undertaken, that it does not amount to a real risk. As far as safety is concerned, there is no indication that it would be unsafe for him to return to Pakistan now.
99. There remains the question of reasonableness of internal relocation. The second appellant does not want to go back to his home area of Karachi, but his reason is that he would not wish to live with his wife's parents there, as do his wife and children at present. Save for the suggestion that he would have to remain silent about his religion, the second appellant did not put forward any practical difficulties in relocating elsewhere within Pakistan. He has not discharged the burden of showing that it would be unsafe or unduly harsh to expect him to relocate within Pakistan"
(emphasis added)
(3) IA in Court of Appeal
"19. We accept that, read alone, the passage [in §25] could be so construed. But it has to be read as part of the process of reasoning which culminates in §28, which we have also highlighted. That reasoning, as we understand it, proceeds by the following steps:
(a) It is not necessarily the case that an Ahmadi who reasonably fears persecution elsewhere in Pakistan can safely relocate to Rabwah.
(b) An Ahmadi who does move to Rabwah may not be able to remain there for long; and for those who are able to remain in Rabwah, safety is not assured because local power is not in Ahmadi hands and the KN is at least as active in Rabwah as elsewhere.
(c) But this does not mean that no Ahmadi can be reasonably safe in Rabwah. As in the rest of Pakistan, the incidence of harm to Ahmadis there is not high.
(d) What matters therefore is the particular risk faced by the individual Ahmadi and the reasons for it.
(e) It follows that, for those who can establish a well-founded fear of persecution elsewhere in Pakistan, Rabwah is not to be assumed to be either generically safe or generically unsafe. The issue must be determined case by case.
20. This determination was promulgated on 17 October 2007. Later that year another division of the AIT chaired by SIJ Gleeson, who was a party to the present decision, in MJ and ZM (Ahmadis - risk) (Pakistan) [2008] UKAIT 00033 were able to deal with two further Ahmadi asylum cases on the basis of the present determination without adopting the wide premise anticipated by the Home Secretary. Since Mr Cooray tells us that a renewed application for permission to appeal against the determination may be pending, we limit what we say about the case; but we observe that, having recited the headnote of IA, the AIT directed themselves (§5):
"Questions of internal relocation and undue harshness in relation to Rabwah are therefore questions of fact in relation to the particular circumstances of each appellant."
They went on, loyally to the present decision, to hold (§28) that it was no longer sufficient to find that for an ordinary Ahmadi Rabwah was without more a safe refuge. They therefore looked in detail at the specificity of each case (and, incidentally, at the demography of the Ahmadi faith) and concluded in each case that internal relocation was both safe and not unduly harsh"
Summary of principles
(1) In Pakistan as a whole, the number of incidents recorded against Ahmadis are small, particularly when set against the number of Ahmadis in Pakistan. There is very sparse evidence of harm to Ahmadis from non-state agents. The risk today on return for Ahmadis who propagate the Ahmadi faith falls well below the level necessary to show a real risk of persecution, serious harm or ill-treatment: MJ and ZM, §§ 83 and 84.
(2) There may exceptionally be a case where the facts indicate that an individual cannot be returned safely to his home area, in which case the question of the existence of an internal relocation option arises: MJ and ZM §85 and §4 of the summary.
(3) Where a question of internal relocation does arise, the existence of an internal relocation option, either to Rabwah or elsewhere in Pakistan is a question of fact in relation to that individual: MJ and ZM §85 and §4 of the summary.
(4) Whilst Pakistan as a whole is safe, for an individual who does have a reasonable fear of persecution in one part of Pakistan, Rabwah does not necessarily constitute a safe haven: IA (CA) §§17 and 19(a). For those who can establish a well founded fear of persecution elsewhere in Pakistan, Rabwah is not to be assumed to be either generically safe or generically unsafe. The issue must be determined case by case: IA (CA), §19(e).
(5) A relevant factor in determining, on the particular facts, whether a particular place of internal relocation is safe is whether there is evidence of "national" or "institutional pursuit" or, rather, whether the past persecution was "localised": IA (AIT) §27; MJ and ZM §§91, 92 and 94; and IA (CA) §2.
The Adjudicator's Determination
"22. ... In his oral evidence the Appellant implied that his moves from Jaranwala to Rabwah, from there to Karachi and then to Shaikhupura were for the sake of his life. However he gave no evidence of having been persecuted in Rabwah. His move from there to Karachi was for his education and because of work opportunities - in reply to question 9 of the interview he said he moved to Karachi because there were no job opportunities in Rabwah.
...
26. The Appellant's Representative ... made abundant references to objective material to show persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan and the lack of real protection generally available to them ... in Pakistan... Whilst I consider there is a serious possibility that the events in Jaranwala occurred - essentially directed against his parents than the Appellant who was in his mid-teems when the events occurred. I do not find that those events would lead to a serious likelihood of persecution being directed against the Appellant if he returned there now. ... it is clear that he moved from Rabwah to Karachi to progress his education and to take advantage of work opportunities. It was not because he was persecuted in Rabwah. ... Given the background evidence I accept that there is a serious possibility that he was attacked in Karachi and did lose his job. It is claimed that he had established a good business in Shaikhupura but there is no evidence to support this and he was not in business there for very long before the further alleged persecution occurred. His evidence is that the members of the Khatame Nabuwat who opposed him were business rivals and used the pretext of his Ahmadi faith to oppose him. This does not suggest that there was any link with the persecution he claims occurred in Karachi. .... However his story with regard to the persecution and treatment at the hands of the police is consistent and supported by the objective material; there is a serious possibility that it occurred. The physical ill-treatment he claims to have suffered was at the hands of the police rather than the Khatme Nabuwat. It may be that certain police officers abused their position to extort money from him. ...
27. I have ... reached the conclusion that ... the core of his story remains to the extent that there is a serious possibility he was persecuted in Karachi ... because of his Ahmadi faith. I make no finding as to whether or not he was persecuted for a Convention reason in Shaikupura; he may well have antagonised business rivals although his business there was shortlived. ...
28. The issue is whether he would face persecution if he returned there now. .... However I accept that returning to live in Karachi where I have found he suffered persecution and possibly to Shaikhupura where he may have been persecuted, might place him in the position where there is a serious possibility that he would be persecuted again for his Ahmadi faith. ...."
29. However ... I do find it credible, taken in the round and applying the lower standard of proof that he did suffer persecution at the hands of religious extremists against whom the state was unwilling or unable to provide protection on the Horvath criteria and there is a serious possibility that he would suffer such treatment again if he returned to those parts of Pakistan where Ahmadi are in a minority.
30. However in Rabwah, where 90% of the population are Ahmadi it is a different matter compared with Karachi, Shaikhupura and other places where Ahmadi are very much in the minority. ...
31. However I find it would be safe and not unduly harsh for this Appellant to re-locate to Rabwah. ... I have considered carefully the very detailed expert report of Mr Mansoor, Solicitor, particularly in relation to Rabwah. .... The question is whether it would be safe and not unduly harsh for this Appellant to re-locate there, not questions of administrative control or broader issues and implications. In the case of this Appellant I follow the conclusions of the Tribunal in Mirza ... in finding that notwithstanding the presence in Rabwah of members of the Khatme Nabuwat, protection is available to Ahmadis and it is generally safe for them there. According to the Appellant it was for every Ahmadi to preach their religion. In Rabwah with 90% Ahmadi, any proselytising by him would be less conspicuous with the opportunities limited to the other 10% of the population. In any event, notwithstanding his claims about his father's role and his family's profile, I do not find his evidence credible that in Pakistan he was prominent and conspicuous as a preacher of the Ahmadi faith. In Rabwah it is not a serious possibility that he would be persecuted and without available protection.
32. There was no evidence as to why it would be unduly harsh for him to re-locate in Rabwah. He has family there and there is no reason why he would not be able to establish himself and exploit his obvious business acumen...."
(emphasis added – save for line 4 in para. 31)
"33.... there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of a breach of Articles 2 or 3 of the Human Rights Convention if the Appellant were returned to Pakistan except that I would not find there to be such a risk if he re-located to Rabwah." (emphasis added)
The Claimant's Further Representations
"a. Adjudicator Strowger accepted that he had been subjected to persecution and that he would be at risk in those areas of Pakistan where Ahmadis were in the minority
b. Rabwah is not a safe relocation alternative, simply on the basis of the number of Ahmadis present within the population
c. He is an exceptional Ahmadi, who cannot return safely to his home area and is unable to relocate to Rabwah"
The Decision
"It clearly shows that in the determination promulgated in paragraph 26 "However his story with regard to the persecution and treatment at the hands of the police is consistent and supported by the objective material; there is a serious possibility that it occurred. The physical ill-treatment he claims to have suffered was at the hands of the police rather than the Khatme Nabuwat.", your client was found credible of persecution in the hands of the police and NOT from Khatme Nabuwat (KN) as in the case of IA and others ... as referred to in paragraphs 4, 6 and 30. Your claimant's circumstance differs from the case you have related to, therefore this case does not apply to you client." (emphasis added)
The Claimant's case for judicial review
(1) At paragraph 13 of the Decision, the Defendant had failed properly to apply the Country Guidance case law, and in particular, failed to apply the case of IA.
(2) The Defendant's conclusion, at paragraph 15 of the Decision, that the Claimant could relocate to any location other than Karachi or Sheikhupura was irrational and failed anxiously to scrutinize the Adjudicator's Determination, and in particular paragraph 29, where the Adjudicator had found that the Claimant would be at risk in any location other than one where Ahmadis were in the majority.
(3) The Defendant's conclusion in relation to Rabwah, at paragraph 16 of the Decision, was based on two points made by the Defendant, namely that the Claimant had never claimed ill-treatment in Rabwah and that the Claimant had failed to demonstrate that his was an exceptional case, rendering him at risk in Rabwah. Those two points are fundamentally flawed, because the Adjudicator's Determination was based upon the now unsound foundation that Rabwah was a location where Ahmadis were in the majority and the Claimant's past ill-treatment in Karachi and Sheikhupura places him in the category of exceptional Ahmadis referred to in §4 of the headnote in MJ and ZM.
(1) Paragraph 13 of the Decision: erroneous application of IA
(2) Paragraph 15 of the Decision: the conclusion as to relocation anywhere but Karachi and Sheikhupura was irrational
(3) Paragraph 16 of the Decision: Relocation to Rabwah
Conclusions